'Worse than a Jungle': The Cartel Controlling Iraqi Borders

This picture taken on March 14, 2021 shows an aerial view of imported livestock waiting on the pier at the port of Umm Qasr, south of Iraq's southern city of Basra. (Photo by Hussein FALEH / AFP)
This picture taken on March 14, 2021 shows an aerial view of imported livestock waiting on the pier at the port of Umm Qasr, south of Iraq's southern city of Basra. (Photo by Hussein FALEH / AFP)
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'Worse than a Jungle': The Cartel Controlling Iraqi Borders

This picture taken on March 14, 2021 shows an aerial view of imported livestock waiting on the pier at the port of Umm Qasr, south of Iraq's southern city of Basra. (Photo by Hussein FALEH / AFP)
This picture taken on March 14, 2021 shows an aerial view of imported livestock waiting on the pier at the port of Umm Qasr, south of Iraq's southern city of Basra. (Photo by Hussein FALEH / AFP)

Along Iraq's borders, a corrupt customs-evasion cartel is diverting billions of dollars away from state coffers to line the pockets of armed groups, political parties and crooked officials.

The prime beneficiaries are Iran-linked Shiite paramilitaries that intimidate federal officials who dare obstruct them, sometimes through chillingly specific death threats, a six-month AFP investigation has found.

The network is so well-oiled and entrenched that revenues are parceled out among rival groups with remarkably little friction, part of a parallel system that Iraq's finance minister has described as "state plunder".

"It's indescribable," said one Iraqi customs worker. "Worse than a jungle. In a jungle, at least animals eat and get full. These guys are never satisfied."

Like most of the government officials, port workers and importers interviewed for this story, this worker cited threats to his life and asked to speak anonymously.

The network they described arises from Iraq's glacially slow bureaucracy, fractious politics, limited non-oil industry and endemic corruption that is itself largely a product of years of chaos in the wake of the 2003 US invasion to topple dictator Saddam Hussein.

Customs provide one of the few sources of state revenues, and to keep disparate groups and tribes happy, many of them close to Iran, entry points are divvied up among them and federal duties largely supplanted by bribes.

"There's a kind of collusion between officials, political parties, gangs and corrupt businessmen," Iraq's Finance Minister Ali Allawi told AFP.

- 'Designed to fail' -

Iraq imports a vast majority of its goods -- from food and electronics to natural gas -- mostly from neighbors Iran and Turkey and from China.

Officially, the country of 40 million brought in $21 billion worth of non-oil goods in 2019, the latest year for which full government data is available.

Iraq has five official crossings along its 1,600-kilometer (1,000-mile) border with Iran and one on the nearly 370-km frontier with Turkey, while the single biggest and most lucrative gateway is the port of Umm Qasr in the southern province of Basra.

Duties on imports at these points of entry are meant to supplement state revenues from Iraq's huge oil sector -- but they don't.

Iraq's import system is infamously outdated and cumbersome, with a 2020 World Bank report citing frustrating delays, high compliance fees and frequent exploitation.

"If you want to do it the right way, you end up paying in the four figures for demurrage (docking fees) for a single month" in dollar terms, said an importer based in the region.

"It's designed to fail," he said.

An informal parallel system rose in its stead, in which parties and paramilitary groups have divided up Iraq's land and sea crossings, said officials, port workers, importers and analysts.

- Paramilitary groups -

Many of Iraq's entry points are informally controlled by groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces, a powerful state-sponsored armed network close to Iran, as well as other armed factions, officials confirmed to AFP.

The PMF's members, their allies or their relatives work as border agents, inspectors or police, and are paid by importers who want to skip the official process entirely or get discounts.

"If you want a shortcut, you go to the militias or parties," said an Iraqi intelligence agent who has investigated customs evasion.

He said importers effectively tell themselves: "I'd rather lose $100,000 (on a bribe) than lose my goods altogether."

The PMF publicly denies the claims. But sources close to its hardline member groups Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataeb Hezbollah acknowledged that customs posts are indeed parceled out in the manner alleged.

They cited specific harbor berths, land crossings and products that matched what customs officials and the intelligence agent told AFP.

- $10,000 a day in bribes -

The Mandali crossing on the Iranian border, for example, is run by the Badr Organization, an Iraqi movement founded in Iran, port workers, officials and analysts confirmed.

An official there boasted to AFP that a border operative can rake in $10,000 per day in bribes, the bulk of which is distributed to the overseeing armed group and complicit officials.

In other cases, an armed group controls a particular kind of trade.

"If I'm a cigarette trader," he said, "I go to Kataeb Hezbollah's economic office in the Jadriyah neighborhood (of Baghdad), knock on the door, and say: 'I want to coordinate with you'."

One key figure is always the "mukhalles" -- the state customs agent assigned to an incoming shipment who often doubles as a middleman for an armed group.

"There's no such thing as a neutral mukhalles. They're all backed by parties," the intelligence agent said.

Once paid -- in cash for smaller operations, and by bank wire for larger deals -- the mukhalles tampers with paperwork.

By misrepresenting the type or amount of goods imported or their value, the customs fee is sharply reduced.

One importer told AFP that under-declaring quantities could score a trader discounts of up to 60 percent.

- Right connections -

For high-tariff goods, meanwhile, the favored trick is to declare them as something else altogether.

Cigarette imports are taxed with a regular import tariff of 30 percent, plus a further 100 percent to encourage consumers to buy local brands.

To cut those fees, cigarettes are often recorded as tissues or plastic goods.

Facilitators also tamper with a shipment's estimated total value, which is first marked on the import license but re-evaluated at the point of entry.

In one case described to AFP by an Umm Qasr official, metal reinforcements were valued by the customs agent so cheaply that the importer was charged $200,000 in duties, when he should have paid over $1 million.

With the right connections, some cargo slips through with no inspection at all.

"I'm not corrupt, but even I have had to wave through cargo I didn't actually inspect because the shipment was linked to a powerful party," said the customs worker quoted earlier.

One importer told AFP he paid $30,000 to a customs agent at Umm Qasr to allow through prohibited refurbished electrical equipment.

He said he also regularly bribed port police to warn him of surprise inspections. For an additional fee, the officer offered an extra service -- to send patrols to hold up rival imports.

- 'A real mafia' -

With points of entry seen as cash cows, public servants pay their superiors for postings, especially at Umm Qasr.

"Minor clerks' jobs in some outposts change hands for $50,000 to $100,000, and sometimes it goes up to multiples of that," Allawi, the finance minister, lamented.

The subterfuge around the import system "contributes to state plunder," he told AFP.

To protect their pillaging, parties and armed groups use their political influence and threats of violence.

A worker at Mandali told AFP he once delayed a shipment from Iran because of missing paperwork, but then allowed it through, duty-free, after the mukhalles handling the cargo brandished his credentials as a PMF member.

The intelligence officer said an informant at Zerbatiya crossing, which likewise borders Iran and is managed by Asaib Ahl al-Haq, was repeatedly put on leave for blocking efforts to import Iranian produce customs-free and eventually relented.

"We came back later to talk to him again and found he had joined Asaib," the intelligence officer said.

A senior member of Iraq's border commission told AFP he receives regular calls from private numbers threatening his relatives by name, in an effort to intimidate him into halting cargo inspections.

The customs worker was among others who also said they contended with death threats.

"We can't say anything because we'll be killed," he said. "People are afraid. This is a real mafia."

- Spoil-sharing -

This parallel system has become the lifeblood of Iraqi parties and armed groups, including Iran-backed PMF factions, said Renad Mansour of the Chatham House think tank.

They professionalized this financing stream after Iraq's defeat of ISIS in 2017.

That victory ended the allocation of large defense budgets to the anti-ISIS military campaign, which included the PMF, sparking the need to find alternative funding sources.

They latched on tighter after Iran came under crippling sanctions imposed by former US president Donald Trump.

In March 2020, the US blacklisted Al Khamael Maritime Services (AKMS), a shipping company in Umm Qasr, for using Shiite paramilitary groups to help the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps "evade Iraqi government inspection protocol".

It also sanctioned two Iraqis and two Iranians linked to AKMS for financing Kataeb and the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah.

The spoil-sharing is surprisingly smooth, given the rivalries among parties and armed groups.

"One border point can make up to $120,000 a day," said Mansour. "This doesn't go only to one group, but is shared by many, which at times may even seem to be enemies when you zoom out."

Turf wars are rare, but do happen. In February, the separate killings of two members of Asaib Ahl al-Haq were described to AFP by two PMF sources as "economically motivated".

But usually, the cartel operates smoothly.

"There's no competition," said the Iraqi intelligence agent. "They know if one of them goes down, they all will."

- Trickling down -

The parallel system starves the state of a funding resource for schools, hospitals and other public services at a time when the poverty rate in Iraq has reached 40 percent.

"We should get seven billion dollars (a year) from customs," Allawi told AFP. "In fact, just 10-12 percent of the customs resources reach the finance ministry."

The cost of bribes ultimately also trickles down to the consumer, an Iraqi official said. "As a consumer, you're the one who ends up paying for that corruption in the store."

Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhemi, within weeks of taking office in May 2020, prioritised border reform, to shore up government revenues hit hard by depressed oil prices.

In highly-publicized trips to Umm Qasr and Mandali, he vowed to send new troops to each entry point and regularly swap senior customs staff to break up corrupt circuits.

There have been some modest victories. The border commission now reports daily seizures of cargo in cases where importers tried to evade customs fees.

And Iraq collected $818 million in duties in 2020, the commission said, slightly higher than the previous year's $768 million, despite imports being hit by the coronavirus downturn.

- Stuttering reforms -

But importers, facilitators and even officials have laughed off the premier's measures.

They told AFP that while some importers were now paying government tariffs, they also still paid facilitators to stop goods being arbitrarily held up.

"In the end, we're paying double," said an Arab businessman, who has imported into Iraq for over a decade.

The well-connected, meanwhile, were not affected.

"Nothing changed," said an Iraqi importer, noting he brought in construction materials through Mandali without paying tariffs.

Security forces described chaos.

"The police there is all involved in the bribery," a soldier, whose unit had been briefly deployed to Mandali, told AFP.

"The traders drop money like crazy. We arrested one guy but they got him out the next day."

The senior border commission official admitted some promised deployments never happened.

"Other times, it's a joke of a unit" consisting only of "about two dozen guys," he told AFP.

But the main issue, importers and officials agreed, was that staff rotations did not extend to a crucial cog in the corruption machine: the mukhalles.

"The main facilitator of corruption is still there," said the customs official. "One rotten apple will spoil the rest."

- Threat of violence -

A US defense official told AFP that Kataeb Hezbollah, accused recently of firing rockets at the US embassy, was ordered to close its office inside Baghdad Airport's arrivals terminal to stop it from smuggling in high-value goods.

"Now they've got a position just outside the airport, but they can still drive up to the plane and do what they need to do," the official said. "Corruption still happens."

Instead of brazenly phoning each other, facilitators have moved to WhatsApp and other encrypted messaging apps.

"Our work has actually become harder because they're taking more precautions," the intelligence agent said.

The cartel remains intact.

Officials said they expect traders to react by increasingly avoiding official border crossings, relying on smuggling instead, or importing goods unofficially through Iraq's northern Kurdish region.

Trying to dismantle the lucrative network completely, they warned, would bring violence Kadhemi may be unprepared for.

"A single berth at Umm Qasr is equivalent to a state budget," the intelligence agent said, using deliberate exaggeration to emphasize the point.

"They won't compromise easily."



A Look at the UK’s Royal Navy, Which Has Faced Jibe After Jibe from Trump and Hegseth

Indonesian soldiers stand guard as Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey is docked at Tanjung Priok Port during a port visit in Jakarta, Indonesia, Wednesday, Jan. 15, 2025. (AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana, File)
Indonesian soldiers stand guard as Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey is docked at Tanjung Priok Port during a port visit in Jakarta, Indonesia, Wednesday, Jan. 15, 2025. (AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana, File)
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A Look at the UK’s Royal Navy, Which Has Faced Jibe After Jibe from Trump and Hegseth

Indonesian soldiers stand guard as Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey is docked at Tanjung Priok Port during a port visit in Jakarta, Indonesia, Wednesday, Jan. 15, 2025. (AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana, File)
Indonesian soldiers stand guard as Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey is docked at Tanjung Priok Port during a port visit in Jakarta, Indonesia, Wednesday, Jan. 15, 2025. (AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana, File)

US President Donald Trump and his Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have been damning of the UK's naval capabilities. Their jibes may have stung in a country with a long and proud maritime history, but they do carry some substance.

The UK has been at the forefront of Trump’s ire since the onset of the Iran war on Feb. 28, when British Prime Minister Keir Starmer refused to grant the US military access to British bases.

Though that decision has been partly reversed with the decision to permit the US to use the bases, including that of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, for so-called defensive purposes, Trump is adamant he was let down. He has repeatedly lashed out at Starmer and branded the Royal Navy’s two aircraft carriers as “toys.”

“You don’t even have a navy,” he told Britain's Daily Telegraph in comments published Wednesday. "You’re too old and had aircraft carriers that didn’t work.”

Hegseth, meanwhile, said sarcastically that the “big, bad Royal Navy” should get involved in making the Strait of Hormuz safe for commercial shipping.

For numerous reasons, the Royal Navy is not as big and bad as it used to be when Britannia ruled the waves. But it's not as feeble as Trump and Hegseth imply and is largely similar with the French navy, which it is often compared with.

“On the negative side, there is a grain of truth, with the Royal Navy being smaller than it has been in hundreds of years,” said professor Kevin Rowlands, editor of the Royal United Services Institute Journal. “On the positive side, the Royal Navy would say that it’s entering its first period of growth since World War II, with more ships set to be built than in decades.”

Capabilities and preparedness

It’s not that long ago that Britain could muster a task force of 127 ships, including two aircraft carriers, to sail to the south Atlantic after Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands. That 1982 campaign, which then-US President Ronald Reagan was lukewarm about, marked the final hurrah of Britain’s naval pedigree.

Nothing on that scale, or even remotely, could be accomplished now. Since World War II, Britain’s combat-ready fleet has declined substantially, much of it linked to changing military and technological advances and the end of empire. But not all.

The number of vessels in the Royal Navy fleet, including aircraft carriers, destroyers frigates and submarines has fallen from 166 in 1975 to 66 in 2025, according to The Associated Press' analysis of figures from the Ministry of Defense and the House of Commons Library.

Though the Royal Navy has two aircraft carriers at its command, there was a seven-year period in the 2010s when it had none. And the number of destroyers has halved to six while the frigate fleet has been slashed from 60 to just 11.

Diminished state

The Royal Navy faced criticism for the time it took to send the HMS Dragon destroyer to the Middle East after the war with Iran broke out. Though naval officials worked night and day to get it shipshape for a different mission than the one it was readying for, to many it symbolized the extent to which Britain’s military has been gutted since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

For much of the Cold War, Britain was spending between 4% and 8% of its annual national income on its military. After the Cold War, that proportion steadily dropped to a low of 1.9% of GDP in 2018, fuel to Trump's fire.

Like other countries, Britain, largely under the Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, sought to use the so-called “peace dividend” following the collapse of the Soviet Union to divert money earmarked for defense to other priorities, such as health and education.

And the austerity measures imposed by the Conservative-led government in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-9 prevented any pickup in defense spending despite the clear signs of a resurgent Russia, especially after its annexation of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine.

No quick fix

In the wake of Russia's full-blown invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and with another Middle East war underway, there's a growing understanding across the political divide that the cuts have gone too far.

Following the Ukraine invasion, the Conservatives started to turn the military spending tide around. Since the Labour Party returned to power in 2024, Starmer is seeking to ramp up British defense spending, partly at the cost of cutting the country's long-vaunted aid spending.

Starmer has promised to raise UK defense spending to 2.5% of gross domestic product by 2027, and the updated goal is now for it to rise to 3.5% of GDP by 2035, as part of a NATO agreement pushed by Trump. That, in plain terms, will mean tens of billions pounds more being spent — a lot more kit for the armed forces.

The pressure is on for the government to speed that schedule up. But with the public finances further imperiled by the economic consequences of the Iran war, it's not clear where any additional money will come.

The jibes will likely keep coming even though the critiques are unfair and far from the truth, said RUSI's Rowlands, who was a captain in the Royal Navy.

“We are dealing with an administration that doesn’t do nuance,” he said.


Back to Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon?

Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
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Back to Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon?

Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)

A month into Israel's war against Hezbollah, invading Israeli troops are gradually advancing in south Lebanon, raising fears for the area's fate following the last Israeli occupation that lasted nearly two decades.

Since war erupted last month, Israeli officials have said Israel intends to establish a "security zone" inside Lebanon.

More recently, Defense Minister Israel Katz said the military "will establish itself in a security zone inside Lebanon ... and will maintain security control over the entire area up to the Litani" river, around 30 kilometers (20 miles) from the border.

What is happening on the ground and how far could Israel go?

- What's happening in south Lebanon? -

The Israeli military previously issued unprecedented evacuation orders for swathes of the country's south, where Iran-backed Hezbollah holds sway.

An Israeli military source told AFP that four army divisions are currently deployed across the country's northern border.

A Western military source in south Lebanon said "the Israelis are advancing one axis at a time" and destroying border villages as they go.

The source told AFP on condition of anonymity that Israeli forces had taken the strategic town of Khiam, located along the eastern stretch of the shared border.

Hezbollah, which drew Lebanon into the Middle East war last month with rocket fire towards Israel, has been claiming repeated attacks on Israeli troops in south Lebanon, where Israel's military says 10 soldiers have been killed in combat.

The Iran-backed group is not halting Israeli troops' advance "but is seeking symbolic victories such as the destruction of Merkava tanks", the Western military source said.

David Wood, senior Lebanon analyst at the International Crisis Group, told AFP that as Israel pushes further inside Lebanon, "it is entering a style of warfare that might actually suit Hezbollah better, in this sort of guerrilla hit-and-run style of fighting".

Lebanon's army has announced troop "repositioning and redeployment" in parts of the south where Israel is advancing.

A Lebanese military source said Israeli soldiers have advanced up to 10 kilometers (six miles) in some places, and Lebanon's army, which has limited means, fears it will be targeted or encircled.

Israeli fire has killed one on-duty Lebanese soldier.

United Nations peacekeepers deployed in south Lebanon have been powerless to stop the fighting, with three of their troops also killed.

- What does Israel want? -

Katz has said Israel would control south Lebanon up to the Litani, and vowed that hundreds of thousands of south Lebanon residents will not return until northern Israel's security is guaranteed.

Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa this week denounced "a clear intention to impose a new occupation of Lebanese territory".

UN aid chief Tom Fletcher has warned that south Lebanon could become another occupied territory in the Middle East.

But Eyal Zisser, a Lebanon expert at Tel Aviv University, cautioned against taking Katz's announcements at face value.

"He's good at making statements, but you always have to check first of all if it is in full agreement" with what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says, he told AFP's Jerusalem bureau.

Netanyahu has ordered troops to "further expand" a so-called security zone in south Lebanon "to definitively neutralize the threat of invasion (by Hezbollah) and to keep anti-tank missile fire away from the border".

Military analyst and retired Lebanese army general Khalil Helou told AFP that Hezbollah has "recruited people from southern towns" for decades, giving the group "local power" that Israel fears could be further exploited if southerners return.

- New occupation? -

Israel has previously tried to create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

Following a first invasion in 1978, Israeli troops returned four years later, entering Lebanon all the way to Beirut to drive out Palestinian fighters.

Hezbollah was born in response to the 1982 invasion.

Israel withdrew gradually but kept an area up to 20 kilometers deep inside Lebanese territory until 2000, when it pulled out under persistent pressure from Hezbollah.

Lebanese are increasingly concerned about a return to a similar scenario.

In its last war with Hezbollah and even after a November 2024 ceasefire, Israeli troops damaged or destroyed swathes of border villages and towns through strikes, controlled demolitions and the wrecking of agricultural areas.

Zisser said Israel maintaining control of the area south of the Litani was technically feasible.

"But you need to make a decision and you need to decide how to do it, (whether) to occupy the entire territory and establish yourself there" or not, he said.

Wood meanwhile cautioned that an occupation would create "new security threats" for Israel.

"If Israel denies people the right to return to their ancestral homes, then armed resistance groups will emerge or will continue to take up this struggle," he said.


Al-Tanf Crossing Opens Iraqi Energy Lifeline to Counter Hormuz Disruption

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
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Al-Tanf Crossing Opens Iraqi Energy Lifeline to Counter Hormuz Disruption

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)

In a step reflecting a strategic shift in regional energy routes, Baghdad has officially begun exporting crude oil via Syria, in an effort to bypass the paralysis that has affected traditional maritime trade corridors. The move, which Damascus described as a return to its role as a “transit compass” and a vital platform for global energy, comes amid sweeping geopolitical shifts in the region that are imposing a new economic reality based on overland integration between the two countries.

The first convoys of Iraqi fuel tankers set off through the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed border crossing, heading toward the Baniyas refinery on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, marking the effective launch of a new phase of economic cooperation. The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that the cargo of 299 fuel tankers will later be loaded for export.

The Al-Tanf crossing had been closed since 2015, when ISIS took control of it. In 2016, US-backed forces established a military base in Al-Tanf. Syrian forces took control of the base last month, paving the way for the crossing to reopen.

"Transit Compass"

With the first convoys entering Syrian territory through the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed crossing en route to Baniyas, Syrian Energy Minister Mohammed Al-Bashir wrote on X: “From the Syrian-Iraqi border to the maritime carriers in Baniyas... Syria is returning as a transit compass and a strategic export platform for global energy.” He said the step “enhances national interests and advances Arab economic integration toward broader horizons.”

The General Authority for Land and Sea Ports said the move represents “an important milestone in developing economic cooperation between the two countries by activating trade and energy routes, enhancing opportunities for economic integration, and supporting trade flows in the coming phase,” stressing its readiness to provide all necessary facilitation and ensure efficient procedures.

Mazen Alloush, director of public relations at the authority, announced Tuesday via Facebook the reopening of the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed crossing, confirming the entry of the first Iraqi oil tanker convoys toward the Baniyas terminal.

In parallel, a delegation from the authority conducted a field tour to assess readiness at the Al-Yarubiyah–Rabia crossing ahead of plans to resume operations in early May, while also reviewing the status of the Semalka–Fishkhabour crossing as part of procedures to integrate it into the authority’s operational system. Passenger traffic has resumed at the Al-Bukamal–Al-Qaim crossing.

Alongside the reopening of Al-Waleed, Syrian government efforts are focused on activating Al-Yarubiyah–Rabia in early May and completing procedures at Semalka–Fishkhabour to strengthen the broader cross-border connectivity network.

For his part, the Iraqi subdistrict head of Al-Waleed, Mujahid Mardhi Al-Dulaimi, told the Iraqi News Agency (INA) that the crossing has entered a trial reopening phase with crude oil tankers beginning to move between Iraq and Syria. He said more than 150 tankers are currently waiting to enter Syrian territory, expecting daily traffic to reach at least 500 tankers.

Oil cooperation between Syria and Iraq has the backing of President Donald Trump’s administration. US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack said last week at the Atlantic Council that Syria could be “the solution” to the energy crisis stemming from the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, highlighting the potential development of pipeline networks, including from Iraq.

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)

"Syria a Vital Option"

The move gains added significance amid escalating regional tensions and intensifying confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, which has resulted in direct threats to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of global energy supplies pass.

In this context, economic expert Dr. Fadi Ayash said Iraq, as a major oil producer, has found in Syria a vital and available option to sustain export flows, especially given the difficulty of secure maritime exports. He said the current direction aims to raise tanker traffic to between 500 and 700 per day at a minimum.

Amid drone attacks and shelling targeting the Syrian side of the border since the outbreak of the unprecedented regional war- including a drone strike last Saturday launched from Iraq on the Al-Tanf base in southeastern Syria, questions arise about the sustainability of keeping crossings open and continuing Iraqi oil exports through Syrian territory under these security conditions.

Ayash said: “There is no doubt that Iraq is among the Gulf countries most affected by the current war, given that it is a major oil producer and exporter heavily dependent on export revenues. It therefore had to look for alternatives to sustain exports, and Syria was a viable option. However, sustainability depends on balancing financial and oil needs- especially with continued disruption in the Strait of Hormuz- against on-the-ground security challenges in active conflict zones.”

Iraq is seeking to increase exports through Syria to between 600 and 700 trucks per day, making it a vital and mutually agreed option. According to Ayash, this represents “a practical application of spatial economics as a temporary solution to sustain exports, allowing time and resources to revive the pipeline linking Iraq and Syria to the Baniyas oil terminal on the Mediterranean. Pipeline exports are more efficient, less costly, and more secure, particularly as border areas are subject to intermittent security tensions and shelling, posing direct risks to trucks and crews.”

Iraq had reduced oil production by about 80 percent, to 800,000 barrels, due to shipping difficulties.

Operations Despite Risks

Despite the risks, initial convoys have begun moving, indicating an effort to proceed despite regional conditions. Ayash said continuation depends primarily on the ability of security forces in both countries to secure tanker routes, as well as the availability of financial, technical, and logistical resources needed to rehabilitate pipelines and pumping stations in both Iraq and Syria.

Economic Returns for Syria

According to current estimates and agreements under implementation, exporting Iraqi oil through Syrian territory is expected to generate direct and indirect financial and technical benefits for Syria. Transit fees alone could reach between $150 million and $200 million annually if operations run at high capacity.

The Syrian treasury would also benefit from port fees, storage and unloading charges, and road service revenues for trucks. Operating between 600 and 700 trucks daily would drive significant spending on fuel, maintenance, and road fees, stimulating economic activity along transit routes.

Ayash added that the arrangement could allow Syria to obtain shares of oil or derivatives at preferential prices or as part of transit compensation, easing its energy import bill. These revenues, he said, are vital under current conditions, contributing to economic recovery and foreign currency inflows, although final returns depend on export volumes and border security stability, which remains essential for sustaining exports through the Syrian route.