'Worse than a Jungle': The Cartel Controlling Iraqi Borders

This picture taken on March 14, 2021 shows an aerial view of imported livestock waiting on the pier at the port of Umm Qasr, south of Iraq's southern city of Basra. (Photo by Hussein FALEH / AFP)
This picture taken on March 14, 2021 shows an aerial view of imported livestock waiting on the pier at the port of Umm Qasr, south of Iraq's southern city of Basra. (Photo by Hussein FALEH / AFP)
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'Worse than a Jungle': The Cartel Controlling Iraqi Borders

This picture taken on March 14, 2021 shows an aerial view of imported livestock waiting on the pier at the port of Umm Qasr, south of Iraq's southern city of Basra. (Photo by Hussein FALEH / AFP)
This picture taken on March 14, 2021 shows an aerial view of imported livestock waiting on the pier at the port of Umm Qasr, south of Iraq's southern city of Basra. (Photo by Hussein FALEH / AFP)

Along Iraq's borders, a corrupt customs-evasion cartel is diverting billions of dollars away from state coffers to line the pockets of armed groups, political parties and crooked officials.

The prime beneficiaries are Iran-linked Shiite paramilitaries that intimidate federal officials who dare obstruct them, sometimes through chillingly specific death threats, a six-month AFP investigation has found.

The network is so well-oiled and entrenched that revenues are parceled out among rival groups with remarkably little friction, part of a parallel system that Iraq's finance minister has described as "state plunder".

"It's indescribable," said one Iraqi customs worker. "Worse than a jungle. In a jungle, at least animals eat and get full. These guys are never satisfied."

Like most of the government officials, port workers and importers interviewed for this story, this worker cited threats to his life and asked to speak anonymously.

The network they described arises from Iraq's glacially slow bureaucracy, fractious politics, limited non-oil industry and endemic corruption that is itself largely a product of years of chaos in the wake of the 2003 US invasion to topple dictator Saddam Hussein.

Customs provide one of the few sources of state revenues, and to keep disparate groups and tribes happy, many of them close to Iran, entry points are divvied up among them and federal duties largely supplanted by bribes.

"There's a kind of collusion between officials, political parties, gangs and corrupt businessmen," Iraq's Finance Minister Ali Allawi told AFP.

- 'Designed to fail' -

Iraq imports a vast majority of its goods -- from food and electronics to natural gas -- mostly from neighbors Iran and Turkey and from China.

Officially, the country of 40 million brought in $21 billion worth of non-oil goods in 2019, the latest year for which full government data is available.

Iraq has five official crossings along its 1,600-kilometer (1,000-mile) border with Iran and one on the nearly 370-km frontier with Turkey, while the single biggest and most lucrative gateway is the port of Umm Qasr in the southern province of Basra.

Duties on imports at these points of entry are meant to supplement state revenues from Iraq's huge oil sector -- but they don't.

Iraq's import system is infamously outdated and cumbersome, with a 2020 World Bank report citing frustrating delays, high compliance fees and frequent exploitation.

"If you want to do it the right way, you end up paying in the four figures for demurrage (docking fees) for a single month" in dollar terms, said an importer based in the region.

"It's designed to fail," he said.

An informal parallel system rose in its stead, in which parties and paramilitary groups have divided up Iraq's land and sea crossings, said officials, port workers, importers and analysts.

- Paramilitary groups -

Many of Iraq's entry points are informally controlled by groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces, a powerful state-sponsored armed network close to Iran, as well as other armed factions, officials confirmed to AFP.

The PMF's members, their allies or their relatives work as border agents, inspectors or police, and are paid by importers who want to skip the official process entirely or get discounts.

"If you want a shortcut, you go to the militias or parties," said an Iraqi intelligence agent who has investigated customs evasion.

He said importers effectively tell themselves: "I'd rather lose $100,000 (on a bribe) than lose my goods altogether."

The PMF publicly denies the claims. But sources close to its hardline member groups Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataeb Hezbollah acknowledged that customs posts are indeed parceled out in the manner alleged.

They cited specific harbor berths, land crossings and products that matched what customs officials and the intelligence agent told AFP.

- $10,000 a day in bribes -

The Mandali crossing on the Iranian border, for example, is run by the Badr Organization, an Iraqi movement founded in Iran, port workers, officials and analysts confirmed.

An official there boasted to AFP that a border operative can rake in $10,000 per day in bribes, the bulk of which is distributed to the overseeing armed group and complicit officials.

In other cases, an armed group controls a particular kind of trade.

"If I'm a cigarette trader," he said, "I go to Kataeb Hezbollah's economic office in the Jadriyah neighborhood (of Baghdad), knock on the door, and say: 'I want to coordinate with you'."

One key figure is always the "mukhalles" -- the state customs agent assigned to an incoming shipment who often doubles as a middleman for an armed group.

"There's no such thing as a neutral mukhalles. They're all backed by parties," the intelligence agent said.

Once paid -- in cash for smaller operations, and by bank wire for larger deals -- the mukhalles tampers with paperwork.

By misrepresenting the type or amount of goods imported or their value, the customs fee is sharply reduced.

One importer told AFP that under-declaring quantities could score a trader discounts of up to 60 percent.

- Right connections -

For high-tariff goods, meanwhile, the favored trick is to declare them as something else altogether.

Cigarette imports are taxed with a regular import tariff of 30 percent, plus a further 100 percent to encourage consumers to buy local brands.

To cut those fees, cigarettes are often recorded as tissues or plastic goods.

Facilitators also tamper with a shipment's estimated total value, which is first marked on the import license but re-evaluated at the point of entry.

In one case described to AFP by an Umm Qasr official, metal reinforcements were valued by the customs agent so cheaply that the importer was charged $200,000 in duties, when he should have paid over $1 million.

With the right connections, some cargo slips through with no inspection at all.

"I'm not corrupt, but even I have had to wave through cargo I didn't actually inspect because the shipment was linked to a powerful party," said the customs worker quoted earlier.

One importer told AFP he paid $30,000 to a customs agent at Umm Qasr to allow through prohibited refurbished electrical equipment.

He said he also regularly bribed port police to warn him of surprise inspections. For an additional fee, the officer offered an extra service -- to send patrols to hold up rival imports.

- 'A real mafia' -

With points of entry seen as cash cows, public servants pay their superiors for postings, especially at Umm Qasr.

"Minor clerks' jobs in some outposts change hands for $50,000 to $100,000, and sometimes it goes up to multiples of that," Allawi, the finance minister, lamented.

The subterfuge around the import system "contributes to state plunder," he told AFP.

To protect their pillaging, parties and armed groups use their political influence and threats of violence.

A worker at Mandali told AFP he once delayed a shipment from Iran because of missing paperwork, but then allowed it through, duty-free, after the mukhalles handling the cargo brandished his credentials as a PMF member.

The intelligence officer said an informant at Zerbatiya crossing, which likewise borders Iran and is managed by Asaib Ahl al-Haq, was repeatedly put on leave for blocking efforts to import Iranian produce customs-free and eventually relented.

"We came back later to talk to him again and found he had joined Asaib," the intelligence officer said.

A senior member of Iraq's border commission told AFP he receives regular calls from private numbers threatening his relatives by name, in an effort to intimidate him into halting cargo inspections.

The customs worker was among others who also said they contended with death threats.

"We can't say anything because we'll be killed," he said. "People are afraid. This is a real mafia."

- Spoil-sharing -

This parallel system has become the lifeblood of Iraqi parties and armed groups, including Iran-backed PMF factions, said Renad Mansour of the Chatham House think tank.

They professionalized this financing stream after Iraq's defeat of ISIS in 2017.

That victory ended the allocation of large defense budgets to the anti-ISIS military campaign, which included the PMF, sparking the need to find alternative funding sources.

They latched on tighter after Iran came under crippling sanctions imposed by former US president Donald Trump.

In March 2020, the US blacklisted Al Khamael Maritime Services (AKMS), a shipping company in Umm Qasr, for using Shiite paramilitary groups to help the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps "evade Iraqi government inspection protocol".

It also sanctioned two Iraqis and two Iranians linked to AKMS for financing Kataeb and the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah.

The spoil-sharing is surprisingly smooth, given the rivalries among parties and armed groups.

"One border point can make up to $120,000 a day," said Mansour. "This doesn't go only to one group, but is shared by many, which at times may even seem to be enemies when you zoom out."

Turf wars are rare, but do happen. In February, the separate killings of two members of Asaib Ahl al-Haq were described to AFP by two PMF sources as "economically motivated".

But usually, the cartel operates smoothly.

"There's no competition," said the Iraqi intelligence agent. "They know if one of them goes down, they all will."

- Trickling down -

The parallel system starves the state of a funding resource for schools, hospitals and other public services at a time when the poverty rate in Iraq has reached 40 percent.

"We should get seven billion dollars (a year) from customs," Allawi told AFP. "In fact, just 10-12 percent of the customs resources reach the finance ministry."

The cost of bribes ultimately also trickles down to the consumer, an Iraqi official said. "As a consumer, you're the one who ends up paying for that corruption in the store."

Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhemi, within weeks of taking office in May 2020, prioritised border reform, to shore up government revenues hit hard by depressed oil prices.

In highly-publicized trips to Umm Qasr and Mandali, he vowed to send new troops to each entry point and regularly swap senior customs staff to break up corrupt circuits.

There have been some modest victories. The border commission now reports daily seizures of cargo in cases where importers tried to evade customs fees.

And Iraq collected $818 million in duties in 2020, the commission said, slightly higher than the previous year's $768 million, despite imports being hit by the coronavirus downturn.

- Stuttering reforms -

But importers, facilitators and even officials have laughed off the premier's measures.

They told AFP that while some importers were now paying government tariffs, they also still paid facilitators to stop goods being arbitrarily held up.

"In the end, we're paying double," said an Arab businessman, who has imported into Iraq for over a decade.

The well-connected, meanwhile, were not affected.

"Nothing changed," said an Iraqi importer, noting he brought in construction materials through Mandali without paying tariffs.

Security forces described chaos.

"The police there is all involved in the bribery," a soldier, whose unit had been briefly deployed to Mandali, told AFP.

"The traders drop money like crazy. We arrested one guy but they got him out the next day."

The senior border commission official admitted some promised deployments never happened.

"Other times, it's a joke of a unit" consisting only of "about two dozen guys," he told AFP.

But the main issue, importers and officials agreed, was that staff rotations did not extend to a crucial cog in the corruption machine: the mukhalles.

"The main facilitator of corruption is still there," said the customs official. "One rotten apple will spoil the rest."

- Threat of violence -

A US defense official told AFP that Kataeb Hezbollah, accused recently of firing rockets at the US embassy, was ordered to close its office inside Baghdad Airport's arrivals terminal to stop it from smuggling in high-value goods.

"Now they've got a position just outside the airport, but they can still drive up to the plane and do what they need to do," the official said. "Corruption still happens."

Instead of brazenly phoning each other, facilitators have moved to WhatsApp and other encrypted messaging apps.

"Our work has actually become harder because they're taking more precautions," the intelligence agent said.

The cartel remains intact.

Officials said they expect traders to react by increasingly avoiding official border crossings, relying on smuggling instead, or importing goods unofficially through Iraq's northern Kurdish region.

Trying to dismantle the lucrative network completely, they warned, would bring violence Kadhemi may be unprepared for.

"A single berth at Umm Qasr is equivalent to a state budget," the intelligence agent said, using deliberate exaggeration to emphasize the point.

"They won't compromise easily."



Iranians Have Long Sought Work and Relative Stability in Türkiye. The War Could Force Some to Return

Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
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Iranians Have Long Sought Work and Relative Stability in Türkiye. The War Could Force Some to Return

Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Sadri Haghshenas spends her days selling borek — a layered, savory pastry — at a shop in Istanbul, but her mind is on her daughter in Tehran.

The family had to send her home to Iran after they ran into difficulties renewing her visa, despite fears that a shaky ceasefire could soon collapse.

For years, short-term residency permits have allowed tens of thousands of Iranians to pursue economic opportunities and enjoy relative stability in neighboring Türkiye. But it's a precarious situation, and the war has raised the stakes.

“I swear, I cry every day,” Haghshenas said, raising her hands from behind the counter of the pastry shop. “There is no life in my country, there is no life here, what shall I do?”

Haghshenas and her husband moved to Türkiye five years ago with their then-teenage daughters and have been living on tourist visas renewable every six months to two years.

They could not afford a lawyer this year, because her husband is out of work due to health problems. As a result, they missed the deadline to apply for a new visa for their 20-year-old daughter, Asal, who is still in her final year of high school.

Asal was detained at a checkpoint earlier this month and spent a night at an immigration facility. Her mother found a friend to take her back to Tehran rather than face deportation proceedings that could complicate her ability to return to Türkiye. They hope she can come back on a student visa.

Haghshenas has been unable to talk to her daughter since she left because of a monthslong internet blackout in Iran.

A man walks past an Iranian grocery shop in Istanbul on Tuesday, April 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Türkiye has not seen an influx of refugees, as most Iranians have sought safety within their country. Many who have crossed the land border were transiting to other countries where they have citizenship or residency.

Nearly 100,000 Iranians lived in Türkiye in 2025, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute. Around 89,000 have entered Türkiye since the start of the war, while around 72,000 have departed, according to the United Nations' refugee agency.

Some Iranians have used short-term visa-free stays to wait out the war, but there are few options for those who want to stay longer.

Sedat Albayrak, of the Istanbul Bar Association’s Refugee and Migrant Rights Center, said that getting international protection status can be difficult, and the system encourages Iranians to apply for short-term permits instead.

“There are people who have lived on them for over 10 years," The Associated Press quoted him as saying.

Nadr Rahim, right, sits with a friend at an Iranian coffee shop in Istanbul on Tuesday, April 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

If the war continues, more may have to return Nadr Rahim came to Türkiye for his children’s education 11 years ago. Now, the war may force him to go home.

Because of the difficulty of getting a permit to start a business or work legally in Türkiye, he lived off the profits of his motorcycle salesroom in Iran. But there have been no sales since the war started, and international sanctions — and the internet outage — make it extremely difficult to transfer funds.

His family only has enough money to stay in Türkiye a few more months. His children grew up in Türkiye and don't read Farsi or speak it fluently. He worries about how they would adapt to living in Iran, but said “if the war continues, we will have no choice but to return.”

In the meantime, he spends most of his days scrolling on his phone, waiting for news from his parents in Tehran or discussing the war over waterpipes with Iranian friends.

A 42-year-old Iranian woman came to Türkiye eight months ago, hoping to make money to support her family. She and her daughter registered as university students to get study visas.

She attends classes in the morning to keep her legal status before rushing to service jobs, sometimes working until 3 a.m.

They share a room with six other people at a women's boarding house, she said, speaking on condition of anonymity out of fear for her security should she return to Iran.

“I truly love Iran. If necessary, I would even go and defend it in war,” she says. But she sees no future there, while in Türkiye, she’s barely scraping by and only able to send small amounts of money to her parents.

“I have a bad life in Türkiye, and my parents have a bad life in Iran,” she said. “I came to Türkiye with so much hope, to support my parents and build a future. But now I feel hopeless.”

A 33-year-old freelance architect from Tehran traveled to Türkiye during Iran's violent crackdown on mass protests in January. She had planned to return after the situation calmed down, but then the United States and Israel went to war with Iran at the end of February.

“I started to believe that it’s a very bad situation, worse than I expected,” she said, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of persecution if she returns to Iran.

She has been unable to work for her usual clients back in Iran because of the internet blackout. With the end of her 90-day visa-free window approaching, she can't afford to apply for a longer stay in Türkiye.

Instead, she has decided to go to Malaysia, where she will get free accommodation in return for building shelters during a month of visa-free stay.

She has no plan for what comes next.


Strait of Hormuz Blockade Step by Step: What Do We Know?

A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
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Strait of Hormuz Blockade Step by Step: What Do We Know?

A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)

Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained mostly at a standstill on Monday, with just three vessels crossing the vital waterway, according to Kpler, a maritime data firm.

On Sunday, a US Navy destroyer attacked and seized an Iranian-flagged cargo ship that US President Donald Trump said had tried to evade the US blockade on ships traveling to and from Iranian ports.

In a separate incident, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations center, which is administered by Britain’s Royal Navy, said that two vessels had been hit while trying to cross the Strait of Hormuz, according to a notice published on Saturday.

In one instance, gun ships operated by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps fired at a tanker without radio warning, the British organization said. In the second incident, a container ship was hit by “an unknown projectile” that damaged some of the containers.

On Tuesday, the US military said it had seized an Iran-linked tanker in international waters, in what appears to be the latest move to enforce a blockade as the ceasefire deadline looms.

The US military said it had boarded the tanker Tifani “without incident.”

The ship, capable of carrying 2 million barrels of crude, last reported its position on Tuesday morning near Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, according to MarineTraffic tracking data. It was close to fully loaded and had signaled Singapore as its destination.

A two-week ceasefire between the US and Iran is set to expire early Wednesday.

Latest developments

The US Navy has turned back 27 ships trying to enter or exit Iranian ports since an American blockade outside the contested Strait of Hormuz began about a week ago, the military’s Central Command said on Monday.

On Sunday, a Navy destroyer disabled and seized the Touska, an Iranian cargo ship, in the Gulf of Oman after it tried to evade the blockade. It was the first time a vessel was reported to have tried to evade the US-imposed blockade on any ship entering or exiting Iranian ports since it took effect last week.

The guided-missile destroyer Spruance, one of more than a dozen Navy warships enforcing the US blockade, ordered the vessel’s crew to evacuate its engine room.

The Spruance then fired several rounds from its Mk-45 gun into the ship’s propulsion system as it steamed toward the port of Bandar Abbas in Iran, Central Command said in a statement that included a video of the firing.

American officials will determine what to do with the disabled vessel once the search is completed, a US military official said on Monday, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, according to the New York Times. One option would be to tow the stricken ship to Oman, independent specialists said. An alternative would be to let the Touska steam to an Iranian port, if it can.

A spokesman for Iran’s military reiterated a threat on Monday to “take the necessary action against the US military” in response to the ship’s seizure, Iran’s state broadcaster reported.

How is the US imposing the blockade?

According to CENTCOM, more than 10,000 US personnel, including sailors, marines, and airmen, are participating in the operation, supported by over a dozen warships and dozens of aircraft. The effort spans key waterways surrounding Iran, including the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

The US blockade on Iranian ports does not have a defined geographic boundary, and the United States can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they arrive at their final port.

Analysts say modern technology allows blockade enforcement at great distances.

Can ships evade the blockade?

Maritime intelligence experts say that more ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz seem to be adopting “spoofing” tactics to avoid detection.

Under international maritime law, most large commercial vessels travel with a transponder that automatically transmits the ship’s name, location, route and other identifying information. That includes a nine-digit number with a country code, which serves as a digital fingerprint for a ship.

The tactics were used by Russian “shadow fleet” vessels evading sanctions related to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

When a ship is engaged in spoofing, its captain can type in a false origin or destination or can pretend to be piloting another ship altogether. Vessels can also temporarily turn off their transponders, seeming to disappear in one place and reappear in another.

The strait is “a contested information environment,” said Erik Bethel, a partner at Mare Liberum, a maritime technology venture capital fund.

Still, whatever ruses they employ, vessels going to and from Iran may get only so far. It is difficult to pass between the open ocean and a waterway as narrow as the Strait of Hormuz without being detected.

“My expectation is that the US Navy can sit out in the Gulf of Oman,” said Ami Daniel, the chief executive of Windward, a maritime intelligence data provider. “I don’t think there’s a way to breach the blockade.”

What are the US and Iranian strategies?

The US blockade sets up a significant test in the Iran war: Which side can endure more economic pain?

Instead of directing missiles and bombs, Trump is trying to choke off Iran’s oil exports, which make up just about all of the government’s revenue.

Some experts questioned whether the US blockade would work.

“Iran is already hurting, and they have shown that they are willing to take more than a couple of hits,” said Ahmet Kasim Han, a professor of international relations at TED University in Ankara, Türkiye.

Iran’s strategy appears to be using its leverage over global energy markets, where Tehran has discovered new powers that can cause pain in the US economy through spikes in the price of gasoline and other staples.

Why is the strait so important?

The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic waterway connecting the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. It is the only sea route for moving oil, natural gas and other cargo out of the Gulf. Iran’s coastline runs along the entire route.

At the strait’s narrowest and most vulnerable point — between Iran to the north and the Musandam Peninsula of Oman to the south — the navigable channel is about two miles wide each for inbound and outbound traffic, according to the International Energy Agency.

The legal status of the strait is complex. It lies within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman, but under international law it is treated as an international waterway where ships are generally guaranteed passage.

Iran has signed but not ratified that framework and has disputed the extent of those rights.

Before the war, about 20% of global oil and liquid natural gas passed through the strait. Most of the fossil fuels are bound for Asia, especially China, India, Japan and South Korea.

Other large vessels also use the strait, including car carriers and container ships.

Crucial industrial goods traveling through Hormuz include helium from Qatar, fertilizer from Oman and Saudi Arabia, and plastic feedstocks from Saudi Arabia and Emirati petrochemical plants.

How does Iran control the strait?

Iran’s military can threaten shipping traffic throughout the Strait of Hormuz, even though much of its navy has been destroyed by US and Israeli strikes.

The United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on the argument that if Iran one day got a nuclear weapon, it would have the ultimate deterrent against future attacks.

It turns out that Iran already has a deterrent: geography.

“The Iranians have thought a lot about how to utilize the geography to their benefit,” said Caitlin Talmadge, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies Gulf security.

*The New York Times


US-Iran Talks Test Power Balances in Tehran as National Security Council Comes to the Forefront

Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
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US-Iran Talks Test Power Balances in Tehran as National Security Council Comes to the Forefront

Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)

After US-Israeli bombardment eliminated Iran’s supreme leader and much of its top echelons, the country’s leadership didn’t fall apart — but negotiations to end the war offer a new test.

For decades, the supreme leader successfully managed several powerful factions, bringing to heel those who challenged his authority while listening to rival opinions. It’s now unclear who wields that kind of authority over the collection of civilian figures and powerful generals from the Revolutionary Guard who appear to be in charge.

They have found unity — for now — by taking a tough line. But disagreements over how much to concede in negotiations with the United States could reveal fault lines, as Pakistani mediators try to host a new round of talks this week, according to The Associated Press.

Who is in charge?

In the past, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was able to impose his will on the country's disparate power centers. After Israeli strikes killed him on the first day of the war, his son Mojtaba Khamenei succeeded him.

But doubts continue to swirl over the younger Khamenei’s role after reports he was wounded in the strikes. Still in hiding, he has not appeared in public since becoming supreme leader and how he gives orders to top leaders is a mystery.

At the center of power now is a politburo-like body known as the Supreme National Security Council, which includes Iran’s top civilian and military officials. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the parliament speaker and a veteran insider with strong contacts on all sides, has emerged as its face and the chief negotiator with the US.

The late Khamenei began giving more authority to the council before his death, but the war has consolidated its power.

The council contains a range of political opinions and often acute rivalries. A political rival of Qalibaf and uncompromising opponent of the US, Saeed Jalili, represents the supreme leader on the council, while the body’s nominal head is reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Hard-liner members include the Guard’s new chief commander, Ahmad Vahidi, and the council’s new secretary, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, also a commander in the Guard.

But Israel’s strategy of eliminating top leaders points to a misreading of how the Iranian regime works, experts say.

Iran’s leadership survived “precisely because there are multiple power centers with overlapping authorities,” said Ali Vaez, Iran director at the International Crisis Group. “Factionalism is just built into the DNA of this system.”

But since the war, the Guard’s growing clout on the council has also stoked speculation that a fundamental change could be coming.

Negotiations with the US will stress test the power structure

The council now faces potentially divisive questions over how far to go to reach a deal with the US, which is demanding Iran make major concessions aimed at ensuring it is never able to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran has long insisted its program is peaceful while saying it has the right to uranium enrichment.

In an interview with Iranian state TV on Sunday, Qalibaf said Iran wants a comprehensive accord that brings “a lasting peace” where the US no longer attacks the country.

“This dangerous loop needs to be cut,” he said. The US has twice launched strikes on Iran during high-level negotiations: once in the 12-day war in June, then again in the current conflict.

Council members have projected confidence that Iran holds the upper hand now, particularly because its grip on the Strait of Hormuz — a crucial passage for the world’s oil — enables it to drive up fuel prices, thus threatening the global economy and exerting political pressure on US President Donald Trump back home.

Senior officials have insisted they can hold out for assurances that Iran won’t be attacked again — even risking the war reigniting — because they believe Iran can endure the pain longer than the United States and its allies.

But ultimately, the leadership’s priority remains its own survival. The war and the US blockade, which is threatening Iran’s oil trade, are tightening the screws on the country’s cratering economy.

Economic hardship has fueled waves of unrest over the past two decades, including protests in January that openly called for the regime’s overthrow. A deal with the West lifting sanctions could help it keep its grip at home.

Signs of disagreement

Events over the weekend surrounding the Strait of Hormuz gave an indication of serious differences over how much to concede in negotiations. Engagement with Washington has long divided Iran’s top ranks, despite a shared deep mistrust of the US.

On Friday, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced in a posting on X that Iran was opening the strait to commercial traffic as part of the ceasefire agreement with the US. Hours later, Trump proclaimed that the US would continue its blockade to keep pressure on Iran to reach a deal over its nuclear program.

On Saturday morning, Iran’s military announced that it was reclosing the strait in retaliation for the blockade.

Some Iranian media criticized Araghchi, suggesting his post created the impression Iran was showing weakness and revealing the differing positions behind the scenes. A report by the Tasnim news agency, seen as close to the Guard, said the position on the strait should have come from the National Security Council itself.

Araghchi’s office pushed back, saying the Foreign Ministry “does not take any action without coordinating with higher-level institutions.”

In his interview Sunday, Qalibaf tried to paper over any divisions, emphasizing that everyone in the leadership was on the same page on Iran’s strategy in US talks.

A possible bridge builder

The 64-year-old Qalibaf is best positioned to bridge divides among Iran’s factions.

Qalibaf is a former general in the Guard and national police chief and kept close to the Guard throughout his long political career. As Tehran’s mayor from 2005 to 2017, Qalibaf gained a reputation as a pragmatist able to get things done, like overhauling an ailing public transport system, even as he faced major corruption and human rights abuse allegations.

Ali Rabie, a well-known reformist and an assistant to the president, wrote last week in a newspaper editorial that Qalibaf was “the representative of the country and the regime.”

At the same time, Qalibaf is close to the Khamenei family both hailing from the area of the eastern city of Mashhad, said Mohsen Sazegara, one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guard in the 1980s who is now an opposition figure living in the US.

During his father’s rule, Mojtaba Khamenei backed Qalibaf’s several unsuccessful attempts to run for president.

Qalibaf is also close to the senior Guard figures who stepped in to replace those killed by Israel and who are widely seen as holding the key to any future agreement with the US. His cross-factional backing could enable him to ensure support at home for a deal against blowback from ideologues who will resist compromise.