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Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: I Told Arafat He Was Lying, Plotting Against Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria

Episode Eight

An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).
An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).
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Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: I Told Arafat He Was Lying, Plotting Against Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria

An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).
An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).

In this eighth episode of the memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam, published by Asharq Al-Awsat, the late Syrian vice-president narrates the decisive moments of the military intervention in Lebanon in 1976, the parallel contacts that took place between Syria and the Arab countries to form an Arab deterrent force, in addition to the role of the Syrian forces.

He says: “In light of the insistence of the Palestinian leadership and the allied Lebanese parties on continuing the fighting and the refusal to lift the siege on Zahle and the Christian villages in the north of Lebanon, and in the face of all the damage inflicted on the Lebanese people… the Syrian military intervention became urgent to stop this dirty war, so our forces crossed the Lebanese borders on June 1, 1976, on the day Alexei Kosygin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, arrived in Damascus.”

Khaddam devotes a large part of his account to the conflict with the head of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar), in the diplomatic corridors, especially during a meeting that coincided with the entry of the Syrian forces into Lebanon.

“On June 1, 1976, the Coordination Office of the Non-Aligned Movement convened in the city of Algiers, in the presence of Arafat, who gave a theatrical speech and talked about an American-French-Israeli plot against the Palestinian revolution and the national forces in Lebanon, and that he feared it would be implemented by Arab hands”, in reference to Syria.”

Khaddam added that he responded to Arafat loudly so that everyone could hear him, saying: “You lied, Yasser, as is your habit, and did wrong to Syria and the Palestinian cause… You are tearing Lebanon apart, tearing the Palestinians apart, and serving Israel.”

Arafat replied, saying: “You entered Lebanon and hit us.” Khaddam answered: “We will strike everyone who tries to divide, and we will hold accountable everyone who sheds blood. Lebanon is not Palestine. You will pay a dear price for your conspiracy against Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria.”

The late Syrian vice-president recounts: “During the discussions to amend the Lebanese constitution to elect a new president, it was agreed that President Sleiman Franjieh would submit his resignation, so that the new president, Elias Sarkis, would exercise his powers, work to end the war and achieve reconciliation. Despite the election, tension remained and the shooting continued. The national movement campaign escalated under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt, and the Palestinian leadership continued to play with fire to prevent a serious cessation of fighting and the start of a national dialogue to end the crisis, according to the constitutional document.”

In May 1976, Khaddam received Karim Pakradouni, who conveyed a message from President Sarkis, saying: “[Sarkis] believes that his first contact should be with Syria to explain his perception. He is confident that the first step they should take is political dialogue with the conflicting parties. This must take place in two stages: The first is to ask the parties to end the fighting, while the second is to have a round-table meeting.”

Despite the efforts made to calm the situation in preparation for the presidential transition from Franjieh to Sarkis, the political atmosphere witnessed further tension after an alliance was forged between Raymond Edde, Kamal Jumblatt, and Saeb Salam, in addition to the forces of the national and progressive parties, and the efforts made by Arafat to continue the fighting.

Khaddam says: “The military pressure of the Palestinian forces and their Lebanese allies intensified in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, and some Christian forces were attacked in the south. The siege also intensified around Zahle and Christian villages in Akkar, including Qobayat and Andaqt. Lebanon was threatened by the widening of the circle of sectarian massacres, which provided the best opportunities for Israel to intervene and find an ally in the Lebanese arena.

The late Syrian official said that with the escalation of the fighting, Jumblatt made proposals, including: “A serious ceasefire without the withdrawal of fighters from their positions, engaging into round table negotiations without preconditions, the gradual withdrawal of the Syrian army, and defining the agenda of the dialogue: political reform, amendment of some articles of the constitution and the political system… and the re-arrangement of institutions in a national, non-sectarian order.”

According to Khaddam, it was clear that Jumblatt had a vision to build a new regime in Lebanon that would free the people from the sectarian system, and that would constitute a guarantee for some segments of Lebanese society, and end the Maronite domination of the country’s leadership.

“On June 2, 1976, the Palestinian coalition, along with some Lebanese forces, called for a general strike to protest the entry of the Syrian forces into Lebanon. The Palestinian militias and their allied forces (the Communist Party, the Communist Action Organization, the Syrian Nationalist Party, Al-Mourabitoun, and other organizations imposed by Arafat from Fatah) forced shop owners to close their stores under death threats.

“It is evident that the strike only took place in areas controlled by the Palestinian forces and their allies. As for the other regions, they were in a different situation, as the entry of the Syrian forces, which was carried out at the request of President Franjieh, lifted the siege on the threatened Christian areas and dispelled their fears.

“On June 3, the Lebanese National Movement held a meeting headed by Jumblatt, and issued a statement declaring the sweeping success of the general strike that included all Lebanese regions in rejection of the Syrian military occupation and of every foreign intervention… In parallel, the commander of the Arab Lebanon Army, Lieutenant Ahmed Al-Khatib, a Lebanese Army dissident, made an appeal to confront the Syrian army.

“Despite this media propaganda, the militias of the Palestinian factions and their allies from the Lebanese parties were fleeing our forces. As usual, Arafat started shouting and crying out. He called for a meeting of the Arab League, which was scheduled for June 9.

Khaddam continues: “On the morning of June 9, I headed to Cairo, and was met at the airport by Mamoun Al-Atassi, our embassy’s Chargé d'Affairs. As the plane landed, he came up to me and informed me that a meeting took place the day before, on June 8, and a delegation was formed (to go to Damascus), headed by Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Mubarak bin Hamad Al Khalifa, head of the session, and the foreign ministers of Algeria (Bouteflika) and Libya (Ali Triki) and Secretary-General of the Arab League (Mahmoud Riad). I asked the pilots to prepare an immediate departure plan for Damascus to meet with President Assad, and I asked Atassi to contact Damascus, to inform him that he would not receive the delegation before my arrival.

“Atassi had informed me of the text of the ministerial meeting’s decision, which included several items, including, “requesting all parties to stop the fighting immediately” and “establishing symbolic Arab security forces, under the supervision of the League’s Secretary-General, to maintain security and stability in Lebanon… to replace the Syrian forces, while the Arab security mission ends at the request of the elected President of the Lebanese Republic…

“I immediately returned to Damascus. The director of Damascus airport kept the plane of the Arab ministers in the air until after my arrival, so I called Assad and told him about the latest developments. Assad refused to discuss any issue [with the Arab ministers] before the holding of a new Arab League meeting, in which I would present Syria’s stance.

“We agreed to hold a meeting the next day, that is, on June 10. Indeed, I went to the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo, entered the hall, where the atmosphere was tense…

“I said in the session: “Oh Yasser, I came from Damascus with two handkerchiefs to wipe my tears because of the massacres that took place against you, which you were talking about with our brothers in the previous sessions... Yasser, your place is not here, but at the Rihani Theater (in Beirut) because you are an actor.” He interrupted me, saying: “I represent the Palestinian people.” I replied: “You are on a stage, and you are the enemy of the Palestinian people. Yasser, I advise you… your methods will destroy the Palestinian cause.”

“Then I turned to the ministers (...) and requested that the decision be taken without my presence to be reconsidered, so that any reference to the Syrian forces be deleted, emphasizing that the work of these forces comes within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty. After discussion, the council responded to my request.”

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Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
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Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)

The fragile global legal framework for nuclear weapons control faces further setbacks in 2026, eroding guardrails to avoid a nuclear crisis.

The first half of the year will see two key events: the US-Russia bilateral treaty, New START, expires on February 5, and in April, New York hosts the Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) -- the cornerstone of global nuclear security frameworks.

The RevCon, held every four to five years, is meant to keep the NPT alive. But during the last two sessions, the 191 signatory states failed to agree on a final document, and experts expect the same outcome in April.

"I think this is going to be a difficult RevCon," said Alexandra Bell, head of US-based global security nonprofit the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, at a UN-hosted online conference in early December.

"In terms of the current state and near future prospects of nuclear arms control architecture, things are bleak," she added.

Anton Khlopkov, director of Russian think-tank the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), took an even starker point of view, saying at the same event that "we are at the point of almost complete dismantlement of arms control architecture".

"We should be realistic in the current circumstances. At best, I think we should try to preserve what we have," he said.

- 'Crumbling' safeguards -

From US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to Russia's test of the new Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and US President Donald Trump's remarks about possibly resuming nuclear tests -- the international nuclear landscape darkened in 2025.

At the same time, "the arms control architecture is crumbling", Emmanuelle Maitre of France's Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) told AFP.

A key challenge hinges on a shift in global relations.

Nuclear control had been built over decades around a Moscow-Washington axis, but China's growing power and rapid technological advances have shifted the international playing field, which is simultaneously increasingly strained.

"The growing interlinkage between nuclear and conventional forces and the emergence of disruptive technologies (such as the US Golden Dome defense system and new hypersonic weapons) have transformed traditional nuclear deterrence into a multi-domain concept, especially in a multipolar world," said Peking University's Hua Han.

"This trilateral configuration introduces complexities far beyond the Cold War-era bilateral model. Increasing China-Russia cooperation further complicates deterrence calculations, particularly in the two main theaters of concern: Europe and the Asia-Pacific," she added, according to the minutes of an April event held by Pakistan's Center for International Strategic Studies.

A likely result of the changing landscape is the lapse of New START, which sets weapon limits and includes inspection systems.

"The entire inspection component is no longer functioning, the notifications when a missile is moved, etc, all of that has vanished. What remains is only the voluntary commitment to stay within the limits," said Maitre.

- 'Collective solutions' -

But allowing New START to lapse is "in American interest", according to Robert Peters of the influential Heritage Foundation, reflecting the stance of much of the US strategic community to avoid tying Washington's hands to Moscow alone.

Beijing, which currently has fewer weapons, has so far refused to engage in trilateral disarmament talks.

"China is the fastest growing nuclear power on the planet. It's building 100 new warheads a year and now has more ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) silos than the US has active Minuteman III silos," Peters said at a recent online International Institute for Strategic Studies event.

"New START does nothing to address" that issue, he added.

However, Maitre said, a New START lapse doesn't mean the world should expect serious consequences as early as February 6.

In both Washington and Moscow, "there is a small margin to bring some weapons back into service, but the numbers cannot be very significant. There are bottlenecks" that will slow any buildup, she said.

Nor will the lack of a final document from the RevCon cause "immediate or damaging consequences" to the NPT, she said.

But, she warned, fewer safeguards risks leaving the world without diplomatic tools to resolve tensions.

"The less functional the NPT becomes, the harder it is to forge collective solutions in the event of a crisis."

Features

Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.

Features

What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.