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“Here is Why I Won’t Vote”: Faeze Hashemi Speaks to Independent Persian

“Here is Why I Won’t Vote”: Faeze Hashemi Speaks to Independent Persian
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“Here is Why I Won’t Vote”: Faeze Hashemi Speaks to Independent Persian

“Here is Why I Won’t Vote”: Faeze Hashemi Speaks to Independent Persian

Faeze Hashemi, daughter of Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, is a political activist known for her biting criticisms of the government. Elected to the Iranian parliament in 1996, getting the second-most number of votes in Tehran, her loud voice has landed her in jail in recent years. Recently, her controversial statement on Donald Trump (she said his re-election would have been better for Iranians since it would put more pressure on the government) and her saying that she won’t vote in Iran’s presidential elections in June has led to much debate. Speaking to Camelia Entekhabifard, Independent Persian’s editor-in-chief, Faeze spoke of why she didn’t take part in the elections and of the dead-end in which reformists of the Iranian regime find themselves in. She also spoke on the controversial topic of succession of Ayatollah Khamenei.

— Ms Hashemi, you said you wouldn’t vote in the elections. Many Iranians will follow you and do the same. Do you think the Islamic Republic cares about this non-participation? Mr Kadkhodayi (spokesperson for the Guardian Council) has said that low turnout won’t create a legitimacy problem for the election. What do you think about this problem?

I think low turnout means people who would not vote for conservatives would stay at home and this suits the latter. If these people do come to the booth, the conservatives won’t win. Just like the last time when Mr Rouhani won and before that, where Mr Khatami won. Mr Kadkhodayi is right that the elections’ legitimacy won’t be undermined because it is up to people to decide whether to vote or not. If they don’t vote, the elections won’t have a legal problem. Even if the winning candidate has little support. But I think it would undermine the legitimacy of the regime because those who don’t vote are protesting and want to express something with their not voting. If the turnout is low it means that those who didn’t come to vote have problems that remain unsolved and that they don’t care much for the electoral booth as a way of solving them and giving victory to the majority. If the government cares for people’s opinion, somethings should change. People not voting means they are looking for change and want to show something by not voting. If those who run the government care, they should know that many things in the system will be undermined.

You have had many criticisms of the reformist movement in Iran. You believe that the reformists have abandoned their reformist slogans as part of the power struggle. We also know that, for the conservatives, connections to the main core of power means that they’ve long had a guaranteed place in politics. Since the reformists now face criticisms and lack public support, do you see a political blockage in Iranian politics, election and governance? For many years, Iranians have had no representative in power and have been repressed whenever they protest. What will this political blockage mean for the Iranian people?

Let me correct some of your assumptions and offer my own opinion. Reformists are not part of the power struggle. I wish they were. They are looking for survival, in weakest of conditions. They keep giving concessions and going along without ever getting any concessions. They are not looking for power. They are looking to keep up the status quo and have been totally enmeshed in it.

As for your claim that Iranian people for years have not had a representative in power, I don’t believe in this. Anytime there have been elections, people’s representatives have gone to the parliament, city councils, presidency and the Assembly of Experts. But in the last four years, since my father passed away (and I believe his death was consequential) the reformists have lost their path. In the last four years, people’s representative have either lost their connections to the people or have seen these connections reduce significantly. They don’t look at people’s demands and have sadly picked another path: away from people, closer to power.

So you don’t think there is political blockage right now?

Not as such. But I do see the reformist movement in a dead-end. I feel like anybody who tries to get some reform done — in governance, for people’s rights, for economic development, for management and many other matters — it gradually hits a dead-end but I am not sure political blockage is the best term for it. But the very fact that people might not vote means that those people see that the reform movement is at a dead-end and, no matter how much people try, what is needed to happen doesn’t occur, not even to a very limited degree.

Even if many don’t vote in these elections, many regard it as a very important event. Because there are questions about succession to Ayatollah Khamenei and many think any faction that wins these elections will be able to keep power after the Supreme Leader’s death. I want to ask you this: Is it possible that the Supreme Leader positions becomes hereditary? I mean that Ayatollah Khamenei’s son succeeds his father? Because right now we see the Supreme Leader controlling the politics from above so that no elected official can enforce the opinion of people. Can this go on? If the Islamic Republic survives Ayatollah Khamenei, how will the position of the Supreme Leader survive?

I don’t see these elections as different from others. I don’t think it will affect Ayatollah Khamenei’s succession. The routes to becoming Supreme Leader and president are separate and I don’t see them as connected. We can’t really predict whether Supreme Leader becomes a hereditary position or not. I have heard from somewhere that that a three-person committee is to decide on the next Supreme Leader. But this doesn’t mean that whoever becomes president now, Mr Rayisi for example, is going to be the next leader. This might or might not happen but I don’t think there is a link between becoming the president and the Supreme Leader. In the debates here on this issue, this question has not been highlighted.

Could you please tell us a little about this three-person committee?

Few years ago we heard that this committee was formed but not officially declared. It might also be that such a body doesn’t actually exist and this was not a real news. This committee is to decide on succession but I am also not sure if the composition of the committee is as we heard it or not. We heard this a few years ago. Maybe one of its members is Mr Rayisi and maybe Mr Larijani also but I am not sure. We don’t have more information.

After Ayatollah Khamenei, will the next Supreme Leader hold most of the power? As it is today? As someone who lives in Iran and has done political work all her life, how do you see the future of the Islamic Republic which is headed by a Supreme Leader?

The Supreme Leader is a position stipulated in our constitution and until we change the constitution it will continue to be there. After the amendments passed in 1989 (10 years after the revolution), changing of the constitution has become really hard. Everything is up to the Supreme Leader and has to be approved by him. He needs to decide on everything before a new constitution could be put to a referendum. Evidence doesn’t support the idea that the Supreme Leader position is going to be abolished. As for the other question, yes, the regime could go on as it is. Because money is pouring from everywhere in this country and until there is money, the regime will go on what it's doing.

You spoke of a lot of money being in the country but we know that the distribution of this money is very unjust. One reason for this is extensive corruption and role of the IRGC which has a presence in economic affairs but also political, cultural and security spheres. Tell us a little about the IRGC. How dangerous is it for the future of Iran for an armed force to have a presence in all organs of power?

Before I get to this, I have to say mismanagement is one of our most important problems. Because there is no meritocracy, no circulation of experts. Positions are filled based on politics, ideology and morals. This is a violation of the constitution. Experts are put aside and not used. We haven’t trained managers and this is one of Iran’s major problems at the moment.

The problem of money not being spent in the right places is mostly due to that mismanagement problem. Right now we hardly have good managers. It’s rare for us to have good and expert managers. You are right in what you say about the IRGC. Right now, unfortunately, everything ends with the IRGC. You can see their marks in economy, social affairs, political affairs, the judiciary and politics. This is another violation of the constitution. IRGC’s interference is also one reason for the problem of mismanagement.

Speaking of IRGC, let’s get to the region and the question of Iran-Saudi ties. IRGC’s role in regional affairs is a central reason for continued tensions between the two countries. We know that this relationship has had its ups and downs. Your late father did a lot to improve this relationship. But we know that his approach had many critics in the government. But do you think reestablishing Iran-Saudi ties could help the Iranian economy, open the path for Iranian Hajis and help peace and security in the region? Will Ayatollah Khamenei accept a change in the behavior of the IRGC to bring down the tensions with Saudis? We have heard him speak against “passive diplomacy” which seems to mean encouraging interference in regional affairs. What do you think about ties with Saudi Arabia?

Supreme Leader’s remarks were about the published voice file of Mr Zarif who said the ‘battlefield’ is always given priority over diplomacy in Iran. Unfortunately, our foreign policy has for years been an aggressive one and not a constructive and universal engagement with other countries based on principles of international law. I can’t blame it all on the IRGC. The Rouhani administration was also responsible for ruining of relations between Iran and Saudis because it didn’t do enough about this. Especially when my father was still alive, they didn’t work enough on this issue. They lost an opportunity. Thankfully, a dialogue is now going on. I don’t know where it will lead but I believe if conservatives win the presidency (which they will) they’ll probably solve this problem too. One of our problems is that whenever something needs to get done, people think of who is going to get the credit for it: the administration, reformists or the conservative section of the government. Many of the obstacles that they create is due to this issue.

One of the conservatives, I believe it was Mr Taraghi, had said that if negotiations are going to happen with the US, conservatives should do them. Now, they may also go toward reestablishing ties with Saudis. Because this is an important issue. Saudi Arabia is an important country, both in the Middle East and its relations with other Islamic and Arab countries which can help our relations with them too. Saudi Arabia is not just a country but one that represents many Arabic and Islamic countries and our relationship with Riyadh affects our relations with all these other countries.

Since this issue is important, is it possible that Ayatollah Khamenei would revise Islamic Republic’s regional behavior and policies which is directly linked to the question of ties with Saudis?

The experience shows that, when under pressure, we have done something to correct our behavior. We can predict that as part of the JCPOA and talks to bring US back to the deal, Iran's ties with Saudi Arabia will also be restored. I believe that we change our policies when international pressure increases and it shows its effect on Iran. But in normal conditions, I don’t have much hope for this change to happen. You should first accept that something is unsuitable and then decide to change it. When you see most officials talking, they speak as if everything is currently peachy. You'd think we are at the height of power, growth, development, progress, ethics, culture and everything else and the world is collapsing. You’d think that developed countries have countless problems and we are at our height. If you believe in this, why would you change your politics?

To expand on the question of regional policy: let’s talk about Israel. After the ceasefire last night, we see all Islamic countries supporting Palestine and ceasefire in unison. But the Islamic Republic, which claims to be supporting the Palestinian people, has, for 42 years, backed extremist groups and has really made things worse for the Palestinian people. What do you think about Iran’s policy on Israel and Palestine?

Let me first state the basics. Israel is an occupier, aggressor and criminal. I should speak of occupation of Palestine. When we look in history, much of Iran has also been alienated from it in treaties such as Turkmenchai (1828) and Golestan (1813.) Or Russia which has currently occupied the Crimean peninsula. Now, if we are so sensitive on this issue, how come we can have such great relations with Russia and not care about this but care so much about another place? They might say it’s because of Muslims. I want to ask a question: Following the Arab Spring, how many Syrians were killed for Bashar Assad to remain in power while we were there as military advisors and Guardians of the Shrine? How many?

In the last 10 years, many more Syrians have been killed than all Palestinians killed in the last 100 years due to violations, occupation and Israeli crimes. If killing Muslims is bad, how come we have stayed in a place where so many Syrian Muslims were killed? We have our own contradictions. I don’t like our approach to supporting the Palestinian people because if we want to oppose tyranny and crimes, we need to have a good behavior ourselves. Our own behavior is faulty and worse than Israel when you look at the allegations against us in going along with killings of Syrians or events in Yemen.

If we want to defend the rights of Palestinian Sunnis, why don’t we do anything for the rights of Sunnis inside our own Iran? In our own country, they don’t have equal rights. I think we are making things worse in Palestine. Yasser Arafat was no small figure in Palestine. He moved toward peace but we put him aside, became more Catholic than the Pope and strengthened Islamic Jihad and Hamas who drove politics in another way. I don’t think this makes any sense. I can’t really accept that our policies toward Palestine and Israel are honest and really aimed at countering tyranny, crimes or occupation. In the annals of history, we see many countries being divided or merging and we are not sensitive about them. In the current conditions, if we truly care for the Palestinian people, we should move toward a two-state solution. When we look at world policies, all Muslim countries, the UN and other countries, all insist that the ceasefire should be used as a basis of moving towards both states of Palestine and Israel coming to be and living together side by side. They’ve been fighting for more than 70 years. What happened? What did they reach? We can’t try something over and over again. This will only happen if the West also pressures Israel and takes Israel’s return to 1967 borders seriously so that we can get to the two-state solution.

Based on this explanation, what do you think the leaders of the Islamic Republic really want from Palestine?

I don’t think the Islamic Republic really wants anything from Palestine. Because all we do there is spending. Palestinian question doesn’t give us anything. But some issues have seemingly become part of the Islamic Republic’s identity. Mahmoud Abbas, just like Yasser Arafat before him, is mostly interested in getting to peace and solving this issue for Palestine. But for us this is an issue of identity and for domestic consumption so that we can forever remain in “the current sensitive conditions” that justify securitized policies. Otherwise, there is no reason for these policies. Our approach has so far brought us zero benefits and only increased our costs. Just like lack of relations with the US has become part of our identity and we are losing a lot by this wrong policy and have made the fate of our people a victim of it. We’ve victimized our trade and economy. It’s the same with the question of Palestine.

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Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.