Erdogan and Biden Meet at a Tense Moment for Turkish-US Tieshttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3024496/erdogan-and-biden-meet-tense-moment-turkish-us-ties
Erdogan and Biden Meet at a Tense Moment for Turkish-US Ties
In this Jan. 23, 2016, file photo, then US Vice President Joe Biden, left, poses for photographers with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, right, prior to their meeting at Yildiz Mabeyn Palace in Istanbul. (AP)
Erdogan and Biden Meet at a Tense Moment for Turkish-US Ties
In this Jan. 23, 2016, file photo, then US Vice President Joe Biden, left, poses for photographers with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, right, prior to their meeting at Yildiz Mabeyn Palace in Istanbul. (AP)
President Joe Biden and Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan have known each other for years, but their meeting Monday will be their first as heads of state. And it comes at a particularly tense moment for relations between their two countries.
The list of disagreements is unusually long for the two NATO allies: There’s US support for Kurdish fighters in Syria, as well as Turkey’s purchase of a Russian weapons system. And in April, Biden infuriated Ankara by declaring that the Ottoman-era mass killing and deportations of Armenians was “genocide.”
Previous US presidents had avoided using the term out of concern that it would complicate ties with Turkey, which is fiercely proud of its Ottoman history and insists that those killed in the early 20th century were victims of civil war and unrest.
However, besides blasting the decision in speeches, Erdogan didn’t hit back at Washington. The muted response suggests he wants a good relationship with Biden, said Rachel Ellehuus, an analyst at the Washington think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“Not least because he needs that economic relationship with the US and the appearance of a cooperative relationship in order to retain his base, which is very much built on a functioning Turkish economy that is tethered into the West,” Ellehuus said, according to The Associated Press.
Erdogan, in power for 18 years as prime minister and then president, has dialed down his anti-Western rhetoric as his government grapples with an economic downturn made worse by the coronavirus pandemic. His ruling AKP party has recently been hit by a series of corruption allegations, including drug trafficking and arms smuggling, made by a fugitive mafia boss who has been releasing tell-all videos on social media, without evidence.
“The most important thing for the Turkish leader at this time is to give a veneer of positive relations with the US in terms of Turkey’s image,” said Merve Tahiroglu, Turkey Program Coordinator at the Project on Middle East Democracy. “He seems to understand that to get any kind of international investment to Turkey, he will need to project an image of positive relations with the US.”
Biden has often touted the personal relationships he’s developed with world leaders over nearly 50 years as a factor that makes him uniquely equipped to revitalize the reputation of the United States following the presidency of Donald Trump.
In recent days, he’s mentioned to aides that he’s developed a strong rapport with Erdogan over the years, according to a senior administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss private conversations.
Biden still fondly recalls making a house call to Erdogan in 2011 when he was in Turkey to speak at the Global Entrepreneurs Summit, according to the official. Erdogan did not attend because he was recovering from major surgery, but Biden stopped by to check in on him. Their conversation was supposed to be brief but lasted over two hours.
Still, the relationship has been complicated at times. In 2014, while vice president, Biden apologized to Erdogan after suggesting in a speech that Turkey helped facilitate the rise of the ISIS group by allowing foreign fighters to cross Turkey’s border with Syria. During the 2020 presidential campaign, Biden drew ire from Turkish officials after an interview with The New York Times in which he called Erdogan an “autocrat.”
Erdogan enjoyed collegial relations with Trump, who didn’t give him a hard time about Turkey’s human rights record and agreed to withdraw US troops from northern Syria in 2019, paving the way for a Turkish military offensive against Syrian Kurdish fighters who had fought alongside US forces against ISIS militants. Biden was strongly critical of that decision, accusing Trump of selling out US allies.
Erdogan waited several days before congratulating Biden on his election victory as Trump challenged the results. At the same time, Erdogan sent a message to Trump thanking him for his “warm friendship.”
After taking office, Biden waited three months before giving Erdogan a call, which was widely seen in Turkey as a snub. The first time they spoke after the election was when Biden called to tell Erdogan about the Armenian “genocide” announcement.
In an interview with Turkish state broadcaster TRT on June 1, Erdogan noted he had cordial relations with previous US presidents, particularly Trump, and that he would ask Biden on the sidelines of the NATO meeting in Brussels “why Turkey-US relations are in such a state of tension.”
They are expected to take up Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 advanced Russian defense systems that angered Washington and resulted in Ankara being kicked out of the US F-35 fighter aircraft production program, sanctions on senior Turkish defense industry officials, and bans on military export licenses. Washington says the system is a threat to NATO security and insists that sanctions cannot be lifted until Turkey gets rid of the system, which has cost the country $2.5 billion.
Turkey repeatedly has called for dialogue to resolve the issue. Turkish media reports say Turkey is set to propose the deployment of the S-400s at Incirlik air base, which is home to a US Air Force wing, where they would be watched by US military officials. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu told reporters the S-400s would be “100% under (Turkish) control” and that no Russian military official would be in Turkey.
Erdogan is also expected to raise the issue of US military support for Syrian Kurdish fighters, who Ankara argues are inextricably linked to a decades-long Kurdish insurgency in Turkey.
National security adviser Jake Sullivan said Biden and Erdogan will discuss Syria and Iran as well as what role Turkey can play on Afghanistan following the US troop withdrawal. Also on the agenda is how Washington and Ankara “deal with some of our significant differences on values and human rights and other issues,” Sullivan said.
He said Biden knows Erdogan very well.
“The two men have spent a good amount of time together, and they are both, I think, looking forward to the opportunity to really have a business-like opportunity to review the full breadth of their relationship,” Sullivan said.
Putin Offers Help to Iran to End Mideast War ahead of Summithttps://english.aawsat.com/world/5327596-putin-offers-help-iran-end-mideast-war-ahead-summit
Putin Offers Help to Iran to End Mideast War ahead of Summit
Russia and Iran have significantly deepened military and trade ties. Evgenia Novozhenina / POOL/AFP/File
Russia's President Vladimir Putin vowed on Thursday to "do everything" to help end the Middle East war when he met Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian for talks ahead of a regional summit, Russian media reported.
The leaders of two of the world's most sanctioned nations met after arriving in Turkmenistan for a summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that starts on Friday in the Caspian Sea resort of Avaza.
"We are ready to do everything that is in our power to contribute to the settlement of this situation," said Putin.
He added that Iran had made "real efforts to end the war" since US-Israeli attacks started on February 28, according to Russian news agencies.
Putin also noted the "positive evolution" in Iran-Russia relations.
The two countries have reinforced diplomatic and military links since Russia launched its offensive in Ukraine in February 2022, becoming increasingly reliant on each other.
- Conflict impasse -
Kyiv and Western countries have accused Iran of supplying Russia with Shahed drones and short-range missiles to pummel Ukraine.
Russia has been accused of supplying data to Iran for its attacks on US targets in the Middle East.
Putin and Pezeshkian also met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kyrgyzstan last month. And in a call on Wednesday, Putin told Pezeshkian that he was ready to help mediate in the Middle East war, Iranian state news agency IRNA reported.
The contacts came with Iran-US talks at an apparent impasse. Pezeshkian said this week that negotiations with Washington were "meaningless".
Diplomatic efforts to resolve Russia's offensive in Ukraine also appear deadlocked, even as both sides intensify attacks.
"We are engaged in dialogue, but every time we negotiate with the United States, they attack again," Iranian state media quoted Pezeshkian as saying at the talks with Putin.
Trump ruled out attacking Iran again before the US midterm elections on November 3, saying on Thursday that Washington was holding "productive discussions" with the Iranian republic.
Pezeshkian said Tehran wanted to see a "final framework" to end the war.
But he accused the United States of "trying to impose its policies and views on all countries".
"If the United States insists on pursuing a unilateral approach, a resolution will not be possible," he said, according to state media.
- Sphere of influence -
Putin and Pezeshkian will attend the summit of the CIS -- originally a grouping of former Soviet nations -- with leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Turkmenistan and other Central Asia states.
The Putin-Pezeshkian meeting was one of several bilateral encounters scheduled on the sidelines of the summit, according to Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov.
The CIS was established in 1991 to ease the pain of the Soviet collapse and maintain ties among its former republics.
Some states have left -- Georgia withdrew following a 2008 war with Russia, Ukraine halted its participation after Moscow's 2014 annexation of Crimea and Moldova left in 2023 as it sought closer ties with the European Union.
For Russia, which has found itself isolated since launching the Ukraine conflict in 2022, the CIS proves that it "actually has the orbit and that it has its own sphere of influence that is fortified and institutionalized", Temur Umarov, a researcher at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, told AFP.
But Friday's meeting also comes at a time when several CIS members are seeking to diversify their economic and diplomatic partnerships, notably by strengthening ties with China and Western nations.
"Even if Russia decides to use this platform to propagate anti-Western or anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, that does not mean the other members will automatically subscribe to its position," Zhanibek Arynov, a Kazakhstan-based researcher specializing in Central Asian geopolitics, told AFP.
Deadly Attacks Leave Several Wounded in Southeastern Iranhttps://english.aawsat.com/world/5327502-deadly-attacks-leave-several-wounded-southeastern-iran
Deadly Attacks Leave Several Wounded in Southeastern Iran
An image published by the Mizan news agency showing unrest in Zahedan, the capital of Sistan and Baluchestan province, on July 8.
Armed attacks on police and army personnel across Iran’s southeastern Sistan and Baluchestan province left security forces dead and wounded on Wednesday evening. The attackers’ identities and the full casualty toll remained unclear.
Iranian police said an explosion at police headquarters in Golshan County was followed by gunfire from armed attackers. Police killed one assailant and wounded several others, official sources said, while a search for the remaining attackers continued, according to the Tasnim news agency.
A minibus carrying military personnel also came under armed attack in the Nikshahr area as they traveled to a shift change, Tasnim reported, citing the public relations office of the Iranian army’s 88th Armored Division. The official account said serviceman Mohammad Reza Oukati was killed and three others were wounded.
In a third attack, gunmen targeted a police patrol carrying out a security mission along the “Lakhshak–Zahedan/Nosratabad” route, killing officer Vahid Enayat, Tasnim said.
Several attackers were wounded but escaped, prompting Iranian forces to launch a search.
The attacks follow a string of operations and assaults in recent days. On Oct. 5, Iranian sources reported that two police officers were killed and a third was wounded in an attack on a patrol in Bampur, in the same province.
The violence appears to form part of a series of attacks and clashes close together in time across the province. Reports in early October described hours-long clashes near Zahedan. The Revolutionary Guards later said they had killed six people they described as members of an armed group, though accounts concerning the opposing side remained disputed.
Days earlier, Iran’s Intelligence Ministry announced it had dismantled three armed cells in the southeast, arrested 10 people and killed two others in clashes. That suggests security agencies were already on heightened alert in the region before Wednesday’s attacks.
Iran’s Last Supreme Leader: When the Republic Becomes a Networked Organizationhttps://english.aawsat.com/world/5327444-iran%E2%80%99s-last-supreme-leader-when-republic-becomes-networked-organization
Iran’s Last Supreme Leader: When the Republic Becomes a Networked Organization
Two Basij members outside Tehran’s Grand Mosalla during a farewell ceremony for Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, July 3, 2026. REUTERS
The bomb was hidden in a tape recorder at Tehran’s Abu Dhar mosque. Ali Khamenei was addressing worshippers in June 1981 when it exploded. Several people were injured. He suffered the worst wounds.
“I went to the brink of death, but God brought me back ... I felt he was waiting for me to fulfill a great duty,” Khamenei later recalled. He survived with a paralyzed right hand, convinced that this “duty” awaited him.
Khamenei ruled as Iran’s supreme leader for nearly 37 years, succeeding its first leader, Ruhollah Khomeini. At the height of his power, he sat at the center of complex networks and far-reaching mechanisms for controlling the “Islamic Revolution.”
Then, according to some estimates, roughly 15 minutes of an Israeli air raid in late February ended a long chapter in the Iran we knew. The country appears to have changed, though the nature of that change remains unclear.
Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives treatment at Baharloo Hospital in Tehran after surviving an assassination attempt in June 1981 (Supreme Leader’s website).
Iran’s third supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, did not inherit his father’s legacy as a conventional leader. That legacy, which was divided among many “sons,” consists of absolute powers, potent religious symbolism, intertwined interests and centralized political, military and financial authority.
This is how fundamentalist organizations adapt when shock and necessity force them to operate through networks of interconnected strands.
Did Khamenei prepare the “Islamic Revolution” to function without a head, through multiple leaders working almost independently? Or did he never imagine his eventual fate, convinced that the “hand of God” protected him, as he repeatedly said in public?
His son Mojtaba may offer an answer to the puzzle of Iran’s deep state, which prepared for the birth of a republic operating as a web of networks.
Either way, Iran today is a republic of dispersed cells, working much like its own “resistance” affiliates.
“We are not talking about a battle now”
The “Islamic Revolution” built its stature on deterrence at a distance. Khamenei probably never imagined the fire of confrontation would reach him. No one articulated that approach more clearly.
In March 2011, he openly welcomed the outbreak of what was then called the “Arab Spring.”
“In these events, one can sense the hand of God’s power,” he said.
In May 2019, supporters enthusiastically chanted a slogan calling for a “battle against America.” Khamenei stopped them.
“We are not talking about a battle now. The issue is resistance.”
After Oct. 7, 2023, Iran faced repeated pressure to respond to Israel and the United States. Instead, Tehran devised “strategic patience,” requiring regional proxies and affiliates to observe lengthy truces.
Khamenei’s strategy clearly combined his religious view of history with Iran’s tactic of keeping the battlefield far from Tehran. That approach held even after Oct. 7, which an Iraqi cleric from Najaf described as “a cup of poison Yahya Sinwar made the supreme leader drink.”
Throughout four decades at the apex of power, Khamenei avoided direct confrontation while weaving the system’s networks. He appointed loyalists to oversee vital security, political, economic and media affairs.
In informed circles in Tehran, Baghdad and Beirut, the supreme leader’s office is said to be far more than “an institution in a conventional building with a guard and a gate.”
It is a vast, invisible network of officials, representatives, delegates and affiliates, larger than might be expected. It even reaches into institutions overseen by Iran’s president. Everyone’s task is to ensure that “the supreme leader sees, hears and decides everything.”
A former official in Baghdad, who asked not to be named, described one example of that reach.
“An Iranian cleric scrutinized Iraqi oil policy every day, on personal orders from the supreme leader,” he said.
“Khamenei, or his office, was keen to receive daily updates on strategic matters.”
Red lines remain red
Khamenei’s position exceeded the constitutional limits of the supreme leader’s office.
“Over many decades, stretching back to before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Khamenei accumulated factors and resources beyond the conventional limits of the office’s constitutional powers,” Iraqi researcher Ali al-Madan said.
“Alongside his political experience, he brought together his presidency, his religious standing and a broad network of relationships and loyalties within institutions.”
Madan, an Islamic philosophy researcher with more than three decades of study and residence in Qom, believes the elder Khamenei’s position rested on more than his constitutional powers.
It also reflected “his accumulated experience and ability to balance different institutions and centers of power.”
The unconventional authority Khamenei built was probably protected by deterrence. Whenever he appeared in public, whatever the occasion, he infused it with a “divine dimension.”
In 2018, worsening US sanctions squeezed Iranians’ livelihoods. Thousands gathered around his podium that August to hear him say:
“I feel the powerful hand of God manifesting itself and taking shape in the strength of the people.”
The message filtered through to his supporters in Iran and the countries of the so-called “axis of resistance”: red lines were red. They could not be breached.
An Iraqi politician who spent years dealing with politicians close to the elder supreme leader’s office said they shared Khamenei’s certainty that the “hand of God” protected him, the “Islamic Revolution” and themselves.
Even their most extreme scenario for direct confrontation was that it “might hit the man sitting next to the supreme leader, but not the supreme leader,” as one of them put it.
Was Khamenei certain US President Donald Trump or Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would never order his assassination?
A definitive answer is hard to obtain. But even when Khamenei anticipated events turning upside down, he pointed to others.
On June 10, 2005, marking the anniversary of the first supreme leader’s death, he said: “This powerful hand, the hand of God, may sometimes turn into a fist and strike a person on the head.”
The Iraqi politician believes Khamenei wanted to avoid confrontation and prolong the conflict “at least until his life ended naturally, rather than as the Israelis and Americans imposed.”
In his view, “for the conflict to reach the point of killing the supreme leader means that a long era in Iran’s history has reached its twilight.”
Khamenei’s son: the Guards’ supreme leader?
Many favor the view that Khamenei opposed passing the leadership to Mojtaba. Yet the father allowed his son, early on, to stay out of sight while extending his reach into society and institutions through the Revolutionary Guards.
Iraqis and Lebanese who witnessed Iran’s changes in the 1990s, and who asked not to be named, said Mojtaba exploited “the flexibility of Hashemi Rafsanjani,” who was Iran’s president when he played a pivotal role in the father’s election as supreme leader in 1989.
Mojtaba then “immersed himself in building relationships with everyone: the Guards, the seminaries, the bazaar, the army, the Basij and the judiciary.”
One of them said the younger Khamenei “put Mirhossein Mousavi in prison, crushed political movements in their infancy or as they were taking shape, engineered Ebrahim Raisi’s rise to the presidency and established a new philosophy under which state institutions became something resembling Hezbollah at the heart of the state.”
He learned the principles of the “deep state” early.
Did the elder Khamenei oppose hereditary succession because it contradicted the “Islamic Revolution,” which arose from the ruins of the shah’s system?
And did he nevertheless allow his son to inherit the deep state that appointed him supreme leader; or its “public face,” as the Najaf cleric described him?
“Mojtaba Khamenei is a son of the system; he was born and grew up within it ... He is a product of its institutions, rather than one of its founders,” Madan said.
“He has never held a public political office comparable to those his father held before assuming the leadership. Nor does his standing within the religious establishment yet have the same reach his father acquired over decades of scholarly formation and the exercise of power.”
“Passing the office to him therefore does not necessarily mean transferring all the personal and political resources concentrated in his father.”
Specialists see a vast gulf between father and son. For the Najaf cleric, that leads to a firm conclusion:
“The elder Khamenei was the last supreme leader to meet the minimum requirements of Islamic jurisprudential qualification. He was also the last to exercise real dominance over the Revolutionary Guards, unlike the younger Khamenei, whom the Guards dominate and whose affairs they manage.”
That does not mean the supreme leader’s office has become symbolic or that its powers have passed to another institution.
Madan distinguishes between “the supreme leader’s constitutional authority and his practical ability to concentrate decision-making in his own hands.”
A woman walks past a mural depicting a portrait of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the US and Israel strike on Feb. 28, at Azadi (Freedom) street in Tehran, Iran, Wednesday, July 29, 2026. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)
A republic of dividing cells
If power did not pass from the elder Khamenei to his son, who remains out of sight, where did it settle?
The ready answer is that the Revolutionary Guards control everything.
At the very least, the Guards oversaw and managed his election by the Assembly of Experts on March 8, 2026. Their influence and security and economic networks extend into Middle Eastern capitals, parts of West Asia and farther afield.
Assembly members arrived at the election venue accompanied by Guards personnel. The dramatic scene recalled World War Two, when the British government met in Westminster shelters as German aircraft rained bombs on London.
“The latest war against Iran is the largest military confrontation the region has seen, almost surpassing the eight-year war with Iraq,” the Iraqi politician said.
Madan resists describing events in Iran as a smooth process of replacing one leader with another. He also resists describing the change as a shift from “rule by the supreme leader” to “rule by the Revolutionary Guards.”
That assumes a direct transfer that neither the system’s internal structure nor the challenges of war yet permit.
Wartime conditions may themselves be the key to understanding what has changed.
Most likely, the “Islamic Revolution” system that existed under Khomeini and Khamenei has dispersed without disintegrating, becoming a republic of interconnected organizations.
“Iran today does not need a supreme leader, but operational commanders who act like leaders of clandestine cells, whose sole task is survival,” the Iraqi politician said.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi described Iran’s strategy during the latest war as “decentralized defense.” He was seeking to explain a shift from protecting senior leaders to ensuring survival during wartime.
That appears to involve multiple combat structures that are difficult to control or track.
There is no evidence that the elder Khamenei planned this organizational division. But the result is the same: Iran today is both “the state and the revolution.”
An Iranian reflection always emerges in Baghdad. This time, it reflects fragmentation.
In March 2016, the Iraqi government was negotiating a short, two-day truce with a faction. The Americans had secured a promise that attacks on their embassy in Baghdad would stop. Explosive-laden drones kept striking their facility.
Sources said communications between US and Iraqi officials were strained “because of the government’s failure to reach an agreement with a faction.”
Reliable sources said “a Revolutionary Guards officer working in Iraq did not respond to a senior Iraqi official’s inquiries about why the attacks continued despite the agreement.”
“One center and many strands”
From this sharp angle, the real changes become visible.
Under Khamenei, Iran had multiple institutions and centers of power. The Revolutionary Guards were among the most prominent. But the elder Khamenei’s experience and attributes allowed him to centralize their management and settle disputes among them.
After his departure, “decision-making appears to depend more heavily on interaction among the supreme leader’s office, the Supreme National Security Council, military and security leaders, the Revolutionary Guards and other state institutions,” Madan said.
He sees “a relative shift in Iran from highly pronounced personal centralization to a more complex institutional centralization.”
Within that structure, “security and military institutions have gained importance because of the war and the circumstances surrounding the succession.”
The Revolutionary Guards, for example, have shifted toward operating as separate “units.” Local and regional commanders enjoy a degree of operational autonomy, as though the “supreme commander” were perpetually dead.
For Madan, the question today is no longer who rules Iran. It is how decision-making is distributed after the disappearance of the figure who held all the strands together at one center.
It is “a stage of redefining the relationship between the leadership institution and the centers of power, a process still taking shape whose chapters remain unfinished.”
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian makes no secret of his concern about an “Iran of cells.”
“No group will be allowed to take Iran in any particular direction,” he said recently.
Many analysts see such statements as an Iranian tactic to construct a “good cop, bad cop” narrative. But developments on the ground reflect a country operating as separate parts.
Will Iran continue in this networked form, able to operate ambiguously, without a clear central head whose loss in half an hour could paralyze the whole system?
Different answers circulate among those following the issue. The more pressing question is whether Tehran can coordinate its separate “units.”
Has their autonomy within the system become excessive? More troubling still, has their autonomy become more frightening than external attacks; beyond anything the elder Khamenei would have accepted or endured?
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