Alliances, Conspiracies Overshadowed the Letters between Assad, Saddam

Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)
Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)
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Alliances, Conspiracies Overshadowed the Letters between Assad, Saddam

Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)
Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)

The relationship once shared between the late Syrian and Iraqi leaders, Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, can be described as both complicated and intertwining. So was the history between Damascus and Baghdad.

Many factors, such as politics, sectarianism, ideology, and geography, defined the characteristics of the ties between Iraq and Syria and the race towards leadership in the region.

The roots of the competition for regional domination can be traced back to the interlocked fate of the two countries. Baathists had arrived in power in Damascus in March 1963 but ended up losing Baghdad by the end of the same year.

However, after managing to steer governance in Syria to a new direction in 1966, the Baath party made its way back to the forefront of authority in Iraq a couple of years later. In 1970, Assad went on to end all struggles facing the movement with his Corrective Revolution.

There were several attempts to reconcile the two Baathist regimes in Iraq and Syria.

Indeed, Iraq assisted with the 1973 October War and Oil Embargo. But the relationship would soon return to falling apart. At the time, Saddam was “soaring” under the wing of former Iraqi President Aḥmad Ḥasan Bakr, while Assad was solidifying his position and influence in Damascus and Lebanon in 1976.

Breakthroughs in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations and tokens of a “revolution” in Iran meant that both Syria and Iraq would lay on a “bed of thorns.” This led to presidents Bakr and Assad signing the Charter of Joint National Action in 1978, which culminated in plans and treaties that would lead to the unification of Iraq and Syria at the start of 1979—two weeks before a “revolution” was announced in Tehran.

Hungry after more power, each of Saddam and Rifaat al-Assad, former Vice President of Syria and Assad’s younger brother, opposed the initiative.

While Assad managed to toe his brother back in line, Saddam succeeded in overthrowing Bakr and rise to power in July 1979. On the way to becoming Baghdad’s new ruler, Saddam ordered the execution of unification “enthusiasts” and accused Syria’s then Vice President of “conspiracy.”

After the signing of the Camp David Accords, Assad sought to reinforce the “southern front” against Israel. This effort was mirrored by a similar endeavor by Baghdad fortifying Iraq’s eastern gates against Iran.

Soon after the Iraq-Iran war began after the “revolution” in Tehran, Assad sided with Saddam’s enemy, and the Damascus-Baghdad track dove into yet another deep valley. Baghdad responded by severing relations with Damascus in October 1980 and supporting the “Muslim Brotherhood” in Syria.

Preoccupied with its agenda in Lebanon, Syria shut down borders with Iraq in 1982, cutting off the Iraqi oil pipeline to the Mediterranean. Iran then moved on to replace lost Iraqi oil with its own.

Secret Meetings

In the mid-80s, towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Jordan’s King Hussein brought Assad and Saddam together for a “stormy marathon” meeting.

Moreover, “secret” and “experimental” meetings were held between former Syrian vice presidents Farouk al-Sharaa, Abdul Halim Khaddam, and Saddam’s close aid, Tariq Aziz.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Assad decided to join the international coalition to liberate the Gulf country. While the Syrian president strengthened his internal economic status and influence in Lebanon, his Iraqi counterpart, Saddam, was drowning in a quagmire of isolation and sanctions.

In the mid-90s, the Baathist “comrades” would try to take the pulse of bilateral relations once again.

Assad was motivated to look for alliances that would protect him from the uncertainty of peace negotiations with Israel and help solve an economic crisis at home. At the same time, Saddam sought any way he could break the siege on Iraq.

Turkish pressure, the aftermath of Hussein Kamel, Saddam’s son-in-law, fleeing to Amman under the banner of changing his father-in-law’s regime, and Jordan’s talk of “federalism” would also bring Assad and Saddam closer.

The two kingpins referred to choosing two of their most trusted companions to head a secret communication backchannel.

Saddam picked his former bureau chief and ambassador in Doha, Anwar Sabri Abdul Razzaq al-Qaisi, and Assad assigned Khaddam, who had served him well during his struggle with Baathist comrades in the 60s.

Each of Qaisi and Khaddam was well aware of the need for utmost confidentiality with their task.

When comparing Khaddam’s records, which he took to Paris in 2005 and Asharq Al-Awsat had access to, and an exclusive interview with Qaisi, a difference in opinions surfaces about who jumpstarted the channel.

Khaddam says that Saddam broke the ice in August 1995, but Assad met this initiative with “doubts” in light of their shared history and Saddam’s role in thwarting the Charter of Joint National Action in 1979.

Rising above his doubts, Assad decided to hold dialogue and test Saddam before turning on a new leaf, according to Khaddam.

But Qaisi claims that Assad first launched the initiative after publicly declaring Jordan’s ambitions for federalism as a threat to Syria and Iraq. According to the former ambassador, after Assad’s declaration, he received a signal from Khaddam to open a channel between the two presidents.

Rushing in…Slowing Down

In his letters to Assad, Saddam seemed in a rush to reopen the two embassies that were closed in 1982 and to hold political meetings and open the borders.

In early 1996, Assad responded to Saddam’s request with patience and cautiousness to not drive a wedge between Damascus and Arab countries. He informed his Iraqi counterpart that he intends to “conduct contacts with a number of Arab countries in order not to complicate the Arab situation further.”

Qaisi told Asharq Al-Awsat that he secretly visited Damascus six times, four of which were made through trips transited from Sudan.

“Saddam was serious about opening a new page with Assad to restore relations,” he told the newspaper, adding that he was given the green light to show Iraqi readiness for far-reaching reconciliation.

“The president told me to tell the Syrians that if Assad took a step forward, he would match it with ten ahead,” said Qaisi.

Opening the channel, according to Qaisi, was to “convince brothers in Syria not to receive Kamel.”

“Indeed, he was not received due to the common concern about Jordan’s ambitions for proposing federalism,” noted Qaisi, adding that Saddam had proposed holding a secret summit with Assad on the border, forming a “joint political leadership,” and holding bilateral discussions on reviving the Charter of Joint National Action, as well as floating the idea of an Arab summit in Damascus for Iraqi-Arab reconciliation.

“King Hussein’s recent statements, before his visit to Washington, confirm that he is accelerating the push for the United States concluding a military agreement and forming a regional alliance with Israel and Turkey at its backbone; this is certainly directed against Iraq and Syria,” Saddam wrote to Assad in March 1996.

Corollary, the then director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service Mani Rashid revealed that Iraqi-Syrian covert security meetings were held to ensure coordination “against Jordan and Turkey placing the two countries between the claws of a pincer.”

According to Qaisi, Saddam “openheartedly” welcomed Assad’s stingy criticism of establishing federalism in the region.

“Abu Uday”

In the letter exchanges and records of the top-secret meetings, the discourse between Saddam and Assad saw a significant shift, to the extent that Khaddam would convey the latter’s greetings to “Abu Uday (father of Uday: Saddam)” – in Arabic, referring to someone by their fatherhood is considered a sign of respect and amiability.

For his part, Saddam would refer to Assad as “the brother President.” The letter exchange proceeded to be dominated by what the two can do and what they want to do.

Besides talking to Saddam, Assad carried on with contacting Arab nations and informing French President Jacques Chirac that “the situation in Iraq is worrying and has become a ticking bomb about to explode.”

Behind closed doors, Chirac surprised Assad by opening yet another issue: The Syrian presence in Lebanon. The French president made an offer regarding disarming Hezbollah vs Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights, but Syria would have to guarantee its military presence in Lebanon.

By the second half of 1996, Assad’s primary goal became preventing the collapse of the regime in Iraq and reopening borders with the fellow Levantine country. This followed his initial try at overthrowing Saddam.

Even though Assad was uncomfortable with Saddam delegating Aziz to redevelop relations with Syria, he welcomed him in Damascus in November 1997. Assad also received then Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Saeed Al-Sahaf in February 1998.

At the time, Assad’s conviction was that Saddam isn’t working to remove “justifications” for a military strike during a crisis with international inspectors. So he agreed with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to relay to Saddam that a strike was on the way and that it would target both his regime and country.

Once again, there was an overlap in the regional matters. After Chirac’s offer to “swap” between Iraq and Lebanon, US President Bill Clinton linked Iraq with the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations.

On February 21, 1998, Clinton wrote to Assad that if Saddam was forced to take up arms, it is essential that Syria remains impartial, and that Iraq complies with UN resolutions. He also noted that he was not willing to go back to the starting point after all that was accomplished in previous negotiations.

Assad responded on March 13 that year, talking about “anxieties and tensions building up around the possibility of military action against Iraq.”

He stressed the desire to resume negotiations (with Israel) from the point where they had stopped, following the loss of Shimon Peres and the victory of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996.

Afterward, Iraqi-Syrian borders were reopened, and reconciliation bureaus were set up in the two capitals. “Transition” took place in Damascus, and the “regime was brought down in Baghdad.”

As the US attack on Iraq started dawning in 2003, Assad flew to Tehran. He met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to agree on “resisting” Americans in Iraq, which was seen as a buffer zone between Syria and Iran.

The content of the letters exchanged between Saddam and Assad was unknown. However, revealing them, while also being acknowledged by Qaisi, aims to highlight parts of the shared history between Syria and Iraq and how it affected the region.



US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
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US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)

The fifth round of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations ended in Washington on Friday with the signing of a framework agreement that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said could help lay the foundation for “lasting peace and security” between the two countries.

At a ceremony where the flags of the United States, Lebanon and Israel stood side by side, Rubio announced a framework agreement between the sovereign government of Lebanon and the government of Israel, mediated and supported by Washington.

The US-sponsored talks shifted the discussion from a ceasefire to a field-based model under which Israel would gradually withdraw from areas it occupies in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army would then take control of those areas and prevent the return of Hezbollah’s military presence.

Behind closed doors, and despite talk from Tehran and its allies about “victories” and “resistance,” leaks from negotiating rooms in Washington and Switzerland point to a different picture: firm US pressure, Israeli efforts to secure substantial security gains, and Iranian concessions that could reshape Tehran’s regional influence from Beirut to Baghdad.

Before the agreement was announced, Rubio said Israel and Lebanon had made progress and were close to a “declaration of intentions.” Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said the talks focused on security measures needed to restore stability and extend state authority to Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders. Israeli and Lebanese officials, however, denied US claims that Israel had withdrawn from part of the “buffer zone” as a goodwill gesture.

What emerged on Friday was an initial understanding on direction, not an agreement on implementation. The talks therefore appear to mark the start of a new political and security track rather than the end of the current military phase.

The Lebanese track has also become connected, though not fully merged, with US negotiations with Iran. Washington insists Lebanon’s future is being discussed with its government, while also holding Tehran responsible for restraining Hezbollah and ending its funding and armament. The round has thus become part of a broader test of a regional order that did not exist before the war.

Israeli military APCs parked in northern Israel, near the border with Lebanon, Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)

Army deployment

The main outcome was preliminary acceptance of “pilot zones.” The plan calls for selecting a defined area from which Israeli forces would withdraw after Hezbollah’s military infrastructure is removed. Lebanese Army units would then deploy and secure the area before the model is repeated elsewhere.

The formula combines Lebanon’s demand for withdrawal and restored sovereignty with Israel’s demand that evacuated territory not become a platform for Hezbollah to rebuild its capabilities.

But Rubio’s phrase “commitment of intentions” also reveals the limits of the achievement. It signals agreement on the broad goal, not on maps, timetables or monitoring rules.

Disagreement also remains over the location of the first zone: whether it begins north of the Litani River, as Lebanese information suggests, or inside the buffer zone established by Israel.

Another unresolved question is whether withdrawal would be part of a comprehensive roadmap or decided case by case according to Israeli security assessments.

The confusion over withdrawal underscored that these questions remain unsettled.

A US official said Israel had pulled forces from part of the area without specifying where. An Israeli security official noted that the army had not withdrawn, while a senior Lebanese official stressed that Beirut knew nothing about such a step.

This may mean Washington announced Israeli political approval before implementation, or that a limited redeployment took place that Israel does not consider a withdrawal and that Lebanon has no information about.

Either way, Washington appears to be trying to prevent the talks from collapsing under the pressure of skirmishes and strikes.

Southern Lebanon remains, in practice, a war zone for tens of thousands of displaced residents unable to return because of Israeli forces or widespread destruction. The success of the agreement will be measured by whether it produces the first clear, documented handover of land to the Lebanese army.

A security wall in northern Israel on the border with Lebanon , Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)

‘Pilot zones’

The plan means different things to each side. For Lebanon, a pilot zone should be the first step toward full Israeli withdrawal, an end to strikes and assassinations, the return of residents, and the deployment of the state up to the international border.

For Israel, it is a test of the Lebanese army’s ability to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure, control supply routes and prevent the group’s fighters from returning under civilian cover.

Israel is therefore insisting on a “zone-by-zone” approach. It does not want to commit in advance to a comprehensive withdrawal before seeing the results of the first phase.

It is also linking any pullback to Hezbollah’s disarmament, or at least to clearing the relevant area of military infrastructure and weapons capable of threatening northern Israeli communities.

Beirut fears the plan could yield another form of the occupation: withdrawal from secondary positions while Israel keeps a narrower security strip.

This leaves a central question unanswered: what does Hezbollah’s disarmament actually mean? Does the first phase only require removing weapons and fighters from areas where the state deploys, or does it include Hezbollah’s arsenal across Lebanon? Which weapons come first: precision and long-range missiles, drones, air defenses, anti-tank missiles, tunnels or command centers?

Nothing announced so far proves there is a final agreement on the type of weapons to be collected or the timetable.

Washington appears to be trying to break the problem into stages: first establishing areas free of military presence, then moving to heavy and strategic weapons, while leaving small arms and organizational structures to a longer Lebanese process.

Israel fears this approach will give Hezbollah time to regroup. Lebanon fears a domestic confrontation the army cannot contain.

The US guarantee

This is where the US guarantee becomes essential. The model requires a verification mechanism that determines who decides an area is weapons-free, how violations are monitored, what happens if Hezbollah tries to return, and what limits are placed on Israel’s right to act.

Without agreement on these rules, every violation could become a pretext for renewed Israeli strikes, and every strike could trigger a return to fighting.

Separating Lebanon from Iran’s influence

At first glance, US policy toward Lebanon appears dual-track. Rubio says Lebanon-Israel negotiations are separate from talks with Iran because Lebanon is a sovereign state with a government Washington deals with directly.

In parallel, Vice President JD Vance is leading talks with Tehran that include ending the fighting in Lebanon, while President Donald Trump has threatened to strike Iran again if it fails to stop Hezbollah from “causing trouble.”

Rubio’s track identifies the legitimate decision-maker: the Lebanese government, not Iran or Hezbollah. Vance’s track deals with the actor capable of obstructing the US efforts.

In that sense, Washington is negotiating Lebanon’s future with Beirut, while negotiating with Tehran over support for the force that could derail any arrangement. It is using Iran’s need to stabilize the ceasefire and ease sanctions to pressure it on Hezbollah without granting it guardianship over Lebanon.

Trump’s warnings are therefore more than just threats. They shift responsibility for Hezbollah’s actions to its sponsor, Iran, suggesting that continued violence in Lebanon could carry a direct cost for Tehran.

The strategy is risky. Including Lebanon in a US-Iran understanding could allow Tehran to claim that any Israeli withdrawal resulted from its pressure, not from the Lebanese track.

It also raises fears in Beirut and Tel Aviv that Lebanese security details could become bargaining chips in talks over the nuclear file, sanctions and the Strait of Hormuz.

That is why Rubio insists publicly on separation, even as he acknowledges that Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah cannot be ignored.

Washington may be unable to separate the two tracks completely, but it is trying to prevent their political merger.

Its success depends on using Iranian influence to restrain Hezbollah without turning Iran into a partner in shaping the Lebanese state or its arrangements with Israel.

Israeli tank maneuvers as United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) convoy drive between destroyed houses in the south Lebanon village of Mais al-Jabal, as seen from the Israeli side of the border in the upper Galilee, 26 June 2026. (EPA)

Israeli concerns

Israel’s concern is that a US-Iran understanding could save Hezbollah from the consequences of the war. Israeli officials fear Washington’s priority may shift from dismantling the group and reducing Iranian influence to simply preserving a ceasefire and preventing conflict, while pressuring Israel to withdraw before durable security guarantees are in place.

Israel therefore is insisting on freedom to act against what it sees as rearmament or imminent threats and has not offered an unconditional commitment to return to the border. The buffer zone has become both a negotiating card and a security guarantee. Giving it up without disarmament would expose Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to domestic criticism.

The Lebanese army, meanwhile, faces a test that goes beyond entering territory vacated by Israel. It must prove it can remain there, control it, prevent Hezbollah’s return, deal with weapons depots and tunnels, and avoid being dragged into civil strife.

It also needs manpower, equipment, funding and political cover, all of which remain uncertain, especially amid widespread destruction and the need to protect returning residents and secure the border.

The United States is studying training for Lebanese units and ways to verify their readiness and reliability. Reports have suggested a possible role for US Central Command, or CENTCOM, in supervision or monitoring, but no final announcement has clarified whether CENTCOM would directly vet personnel or limit itself to support and coordination.

Analysts say the deeper problem is that army deployment is not the same as disarmament.

The army may be able to control a specific area after an Israeli withdrawal if it receives enough support. But dismantling Hezbollah’s network across Lebanon requires a national political decision, a gradual mechanism, guarantees for the Shiite community and steps to prevent Iran from rebuilding funding and weapons channels.

If Washington burdens the army with more than it can carry, the model may turn from a test of state sovereignty into a test that exposes the limits of the state.


Through Lebanon… Is a New Regional Order Taking Shape?

Esmail Qaani 
Esmail Qaani 
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Through Lebanon… Is a New Regional Order Taking Shape?

Esmail Qaani 
Esmail Qaani 

Iran is portraying the outcome of the current war as a “victory” that forced Israel to consider withdrawal. That narrative was reinforced by a warning from Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force, who said Israel would either withdraw voluntarily or “flee in defeat”, a clear attempt to present the negotiating process as the result of the resilience of Tehran’s regional axis.

While Qaani’s remarks are unmistakably mobilizing rhetoric aimed at domestic audiences and Iran’s regional allies, one fact cannot be overlooked: Tehran succeeded in making a ceasefire in Lebanon part of its understandings with Washington. Despite the military blows it has sustained, Iran has preserved both its political system and a key regional bargaining chip.

Measured against the concessions, Tehran has been forced to accept, however, the picture looks different. Lebanon is engaged in direct negotiations with Israel over the deployment of the Lebanese Army and the disarmament of Hezbollah, Iran’s most prominent regional ally. Washington has also publicly held Iran responsible for Hezbollah’s actions, while Iran-aligned factions in Iraq are facing pressure to integrate into state institutions or reduce their independent armed presence. At the same time, negotiations over sanctions and Iran’s nuclear program have become linked, to some extent, to Tehran’s ability to rein in its regional network.

Writing in Foreign Affairs, former US ambassador James Jeffrey argues that failing to achieve maximum objectives does not amount to an Iranian victory. In his view, the conflicts since 2023 have weakened Iran’s capabilities, eroded its network of proxies, and strengthened Washington’s position. That assessment remains open to debate, however, given that Hezbollah has not disappeared, Iraqi armed factions have not been disarmed, and Iran has demonstrated an ability to use the Strait of Hormuz and other regional flashpoints to compel direct negotiations.

It may therefore be more accurate to say the region is entering a transitional phase rather than witnessing the definitive end of Iran’s regional axis. Tehran appears to be shifting from reliance on large, openly organized groups with extensive arsenals to smaller, more clandestine networks, or accepting the formal integration of some factions into state institutions while preserving its influence within them.

The success of the Lebanese model will therefore carry significance far beyond Lebanon itself. If Israel withdraws, the Lebanese Army deploys, and Hezbollah is prevented from re-establishing its presence, it would set a precedent for placing arms exclusively in the hands of the state. Only then could it be said that the fifth round of negotiations marked the beginning of a new phase for Lebanon and the wider region. If, however, withdrawal remains stalled or Hezbollah returns to evacuated areas, the fifth round will amount to little more than another negotiated truce.


Older Buildings and Substandard Construction Left Venezuela Vulnerable to Earthquakes

People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
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Older Buildings and Substandard Construction Left Venezuela Vulnerable to Earthquakes

People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)

Older buildings, substandard construction and geography left many neighborhoods in Venezuela vulnerable to strong earthquakes like the ones that struck the country this week.

Engineers and other experts said the back-to-back earthquakes on Wednesday were among the most intense to hit the country in more than a century, leveling buildings and leaving more than 900 dead with the number expected to rise. Videos and satellite imagery from the disaster zone reviewed by The Associated Press reveal scores of multistory buildings had collapsed.

Microsoft’s AI for Good Lab analyzed satellite imagery of Catia La Mar in La Guaira state, one of the hardest hit cities along the Caribbean coast. Using AI-based damage assessment models, Microsoft determined that about a third of the city's nearly 30,000 structures were damaged.

Among the factors that left so many structures at risk: Some housing complexes in northern Venezuela were constructed quickly during recent oil booms, and builders may not have adhered to best practices that mitigate the risks of serious seismic activity, according to experts.

Engineers said that older housing erected in the 1950s and 1960s — before modern earthquake standards were adopted — may not have been retrofitted to survive such violent shaking. And many buildings were constructed on geography and soft soils that compound the danger of the earthquakes, the experts said.

Tall buildings and older concrete contributed to damage David Cocke, a structural engineer in California and former president of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, said that a combination of soft soils, tall towers and older concrete structures contributed to the widespread damage, particularly when buildings pancaked, or collapsed floor-by-floor.

“They just don’t have the more modern reinforcing steel connections that we put in those kinds of buildings today,” said Cocke.

Since the 1970s, engineers have known that concrete buildings are particularly susceptible to earthquakes and seek to reinforce new construction with steel. While many rich nations have forced property owners to retrofit or tear down dangerous buildings, many poorer or middle income countries have lagged in enforcing upgrades as they battled more immediate woes.

“Some of the more advanced countries like Japan and New Zealand and the US have made those changes, but some of the other countries have not,” Cocke said. “It’s a very typical kind of construction all over the world.”

‘Soft stories’ and soft soil played a role

Other experts noted that a number of buildings that collapsed also had non-structural walls comprised of heavy bricks, or they had “soft stories" in which their ground floors consisted of garages or similar open spaces. Such construction increases the risk of pancaking, they said.

“Soft stories are a huge problem everywhere in the world,” said Eduardo Miranda, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford University. “And in Venezuela, they are particularly prevalent, and if you combine softer soils with a soft story, buildings can collapse.”

Marcos Ferreira, a geophysicist and researcher at the Geological Survey of Brazil, said the destruction in Venezuela was compounded by the back-to-back quakes, known as a doublet. A similar incident took place in Türkiye and Syria in 2023, killing almost 60,000 people.

“It is as if I am screaming and then someone starts screaming, too," Ferreira said. “That amplifies the vibration and adds to the potential hazard.”

Newer buildings also collapsed

Venezuelan government officials took steps following a deadly 1967 quake to update building codes. But it is unclear how many buildings were retrofitted to comply with those rules.

In late 1999, former President Hugo Chávez’s first year in office, floods and landslides destroyed housing, including in coastal northern Venezuela. The government went on a building spree to replace the demolished structures and to house so many displaced people, said Juan Carlos Vielma, a Venezuelan civil engineer who is head of academic affairs of the civil engineering school at Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso, Chile.

Some of the newer buildings appear to also have collapsed.

“Something that leaves me perplexed is the fact that, among the collapsed buildings, more than one was recently designed and built in accordance with current standards,” Vielma said. “We need to embark on a process not only of reconstruction, but also of reviewing the applicable standards, since something might have gone wrong within our engineering processes, too.”