Russian Guarantees Facilitate Implementation of Daraa Truce in S. Syria

Russian military police and a Syrian regime security committee met with members of the central negotiations committee in the southern Daraa city on Monday. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Russian military police and a Syrian regime security committee met with members of the central negotiations committee in the southern Daraa city on Monday. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Russian Guarantees Facilitate Implementation of Daraa Truce in S. Syria

Russian military police and a Syrian regime security committee met with members of the central negotiations committee in the southern Daraa city on Monday. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Russian military police and a Syrian regime security committee met with members of the central negotiations committee in the southern Daraa city on Monday. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Russian military police and a Syrian regime security committee met with members of the central negotiations committee in the southern Daraa city on Monday to ensure the implementation of the truce there.

The central committee and residents agreed to resume the implementation of the true after its sudden collapse on September 1.

The meeting was held after a Russian military delegation, headed by the deputy defense minister and commander of Russian forces in Syria, made a surprise visit to Daraa on Sunday.

A source from the negotiations committee told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Russian delegation held a series of meetings with all negotiating parties.

The Russian deputy defense minister ordered regime forces to cease the attacks on Daraa al-Balad. He gave the central committee until Monday morning to agree to truce that was announced last week and implement its stipulations with the guarantee of Russian forces.

Failure to agree to the truce would force the army, with Russian support, to resort to a military operation in Daraa al-Balad to resolve the crisis.

The source said the negotiations committee agreed to return to the talks and work with Russian officials over the required elements that would ensure the establishment of nine military posts in Daraa al-Balad.

Each point would include 15-20 personnel that are chosen by the military security branch in Daraa. Light weapons would be handed over and security forces would be allowed into Daraa al-Balad and to search houses, escorted by Russian military police and senior Daraa officials. The identities of residents would be verified to ensure that no outsiders are in the area and root out defectors and others who have shirked military conscription.

Buses would be brought in to transport people who are opposed to the settlement so that they can be displaced to other regions in Syria.

All displays of opposition to the regime would be removed, while Daraa al-Balad, al-Sad and the al-Moukhayyam areas would be declared safe zones that are devoid of weapons.

Russian officials pledged that the forces besieging Daraa al-Balad would withdraw and return to their bases. All roads leading to the city would be reopened after the direct implementation of the truce.



After al-Sadr’s Boycott, al-Abadi Withdraws from Iraq’s Upcoming Elections

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announcing victory over Daesh in late 2017 (Archive – Government Media) 
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announcing victory over Daesh in late 2017 (Archive – Government Media) 
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After al-Sadr’s Boycott, al-Abadi Withdraws from Iraq’s Upcoming Elections

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announcing victory over Daesh in late 2017 (Archive – Government Media) 
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announcing victory over Daesh in late 2017 (Archive – Government Media) 

Following the decision by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sadrist Movement to uphold its boycott of Iraq’s parliamentary elections, former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has also announced that his Victory Coalition will withdraw in protest against “political money” and the lack of safeguards to prevent its misuse.

Al-Sadr has repeatedly declared that systemic financial and political corruption is the main reason his movement refuses to participate. Al-Abadi’s coalition echoed similar concerns, saying the upcoming November vote has been overshadowed by unrestrained spending and vote-buying.

Despite efforts by political forces to convince the Sadrists to reconsider, al-Sadr remained resolute. While he did direct his supporters to update their voter records, it is still unclear whether he will ultimately endorse any of the electoral lists reportedly registered under different names by allied groups.

The Victory Coalition formally notified its partners in the National State Forces Alliance that it will not field its own candidates, becoming the second major Shiite bloc to step aside.

In a statement, the coalition said it remains committed to democratic principles but refuses to legitimize an election “driven by political money, lacking serious enforcement of legal measures to prevent manipulation, vote-buying, misuse of public resources, and foreign funding.” The coalition stressed that a political entity’s credibility stems from its conduct, which defines its true influence.

Meanwhile, the Independent High Electoral Commission has begun reviewing candidate lists submitted by parties and alliances after the nomination period closed. Commission spokesperson Imad Jameel confirmed that officials are verifying documents to ensure candidates meet eligibility criteria, with background checks to be completed within 15 days.

As millions of Sadrist supporters face the likelihood of sitting out the election, traditional Shiite factions are positioning themselves as the natural political heirs and preparing to court disillusioned voters, particularly in Baghdad.

Separately, an official source revealed that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, leader of the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, plans to run about 470 candidates nationwide. Al-Sudani will hold the top slot in Baghdad. Former Speaker of Parliament and Taqaddum leader Mohammed al-Halbousi also plans to contest Baghdad rather than Anbar, seeking to secure a strong Sunni presence in the capital.

These moves signal an intense contest for dominance in Baghdad, as al-Sudani may capitalize on Sadrist absence to expand Shiite support, while al-Halbousi’s campaign could reshape the sectarian balance in Iraq’s political heartland.