Lebanon’s Tammam Salam Recalls Premiership Difficulties: Aoun’s Party Acted Like Political Militia

A Lebanese cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Tammam Salam in 2015. (Photo: Dalati & Nohra)
A Lebanese cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Tammam Salam in 2015. (Photo: Dalati & Nohra)
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Lebanon’s Tammam Salam Recalls Premiership Difficulties: Aoun’s Party Acted Like Political Militia

A Lebanese cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Tammam Salam in 2015. (Photo: Dalati & Nohra)
A Lebanese cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Tammam Salam in 2015. (Photo: Dalati & Nohra)

A new book by Journalist Abdul-Sattar Ellaz, to be published soon by Dar Riyad Al-Rayes for Books and Publishing, recounts the details of the difficult period during which Tammam Salam assumed the premiership of the Lebanese government - the last under the tenure of President Michel Suleiman and which continued during the presidential vacuum that lasted two and a half years before the election of President Michel Aoun.

The book narrates the main obstacles that Salam faced during his tenure, during which he spent more than ten months seeking to form a government of “national interest,” and two years and ten months leading a government that assumed the responsibilities of the presidency with the failure to elect a new president.

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes excerpts from one of the book’s chapters entitled, “When We Make Our Brothers Enemies”, which touched on the difficulties that Salam’s government faced in the relations with Arab countries, due to Hezbollah’s role and its interference in the internal affairs of Gulf states, in addition to the positions of then-Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, which were biased towards Iran.

Salam talks to journalist Ellaz about the difficulties he faced due to these interventions, and the negative role played by Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement.

He says: “I am from a school that considers politics to be a noble act that has its moral obligations, such as integrity, transparency, and clean hands that must precede other requirements related to knowledge, experience, and administrative competence. I believe that the maneuvers, alliances, and deceptions that political action may involve must stop when they reach the level of harming the higher national interest.”

He continues: “Despite my knowledge of the corridors of Lebanese politics, which I accumulated over the years of experience in public work, I was shocked by the performance of these forces that surpassed all national ceilings and proscriptions for the sake of partisan interests.”

Asked by the journalist about more details, Salam says: “The Aounists in particular crossed all boundaries and used all means to reach their political goal that is General Michel Aoun assuming the presidency; even if this led to obstructing the state affairs at the expense of the citizens’ interests.”

The former premier went on to say: “They acted like a political militia, blocking the government’s path whenever they wanted, and freezing its work on various pretexts ... They hijacked the parliament and paralyzed its work…. In their battle, they used a rhetoric of sedition and all means of sectarian incitement.”

Salam stresses that had it not been for Hezbollah’s support to Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), the latter would not have been able to persist in the policy of obstruction.

“Of course, Hezbollah is also responsible… Here, I am not talking about his ministers, who were of tact and good performance, but about the general policy that the party followed with its ally in order to bring Michel Aoun to the presidency and the costs incurred by the country,” the former premier recounts.

He adds: “We must not forget that among these costs is the rupture in relations with the Arab world, which was caused by the party’s stances on Gulf states and the unilateral positions adopted by Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil in Arab forums.”

Ellaz writes that when Salam formed his government in February 2014, no one believed that its members - who come from different factions that have been in rivalry for years - would be a team with a unified vision, working in perfect harmony to get the country out of its problems.

According to the writer, the state of isolation that Lebanon has reached was undoubtedly the result of the policies that a local political group – Hezbollah - has pursued over the years along with its interference in the internal affairs of Gulf states.

He says that Salam tried many times to defuse the tensions that resulted from this provocative policy towards the Arabs. He faced many difficulties, but always “bet on the love of the Gulf brothers for our country, and on the warmth of their feelings towards us.”

Hezbollah was not the only party that angered the Gulf. Then-Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil declared, in some Arab forums, positions that did not satisfy them.

The Crisis with Bahrain and The UAE

At a meeting held in Cairo on January 16, 2015, the Arab foreign ministers adopted a declaration submitted by Bahrain, which considered Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s statements as “clear incitement to violence and terrorism with the aim of destabilizing security and stability in the Kingdom of Bahrain and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.”

The foreign ministers called on the Lebanese government to “take the necessary and deterrent measures to ensure that such hateful statements are not repeated.”

Ellaz says that Lebanon was embarrassed at the meeting. Bassil announced his objection to the declaration, stressing at the same time that the official Lebanese position was not to interfere in the internal affairs of Arab countries.

The foreign minister added: “If we were given a choice between Lebanese national unity and Lebanon’s Arab relations that we are keen on and adhere to, we would definitely choose the first and not neglect the second.”

This did not please Gulf states, but rather increased their resentment.

Bahrain’s Foreign Minister, Khalid bin Muhammad Al Khalifa, said that the Lebanese delegation at the meeting “preferred to adhere to false national unity over Arab solidarity that saved it from war,” adding that Lebanon “is a great country ruled by honorable men and sheikhs such as Beshara El Khoury, Camille Chamoun, Saeb Salam and Rafik Hariri. But today, it is unfortunately controlled by a terrorist agent.”

Ellaz recounts that the Prime Minister feared that this crisis would lead to negative measures against Lebanese nationals in some Gulf countries. So he rushed to issue a balanced statement, in which he stressed that Lebanon’s official position on Arab and international issues is expressed by the government “and not by any single political party,” even if it was present in the coalition government.

The Kingdom of Bahrain did not take any action against the Lebanese, despite the discontent with Nasrallah’s words. Indeed, its foreign minister told Salam, whom he met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference in early February, that the Lebanese in Bahrain “live in their country and among their families, and nothing will harm them.”

The problem with Bahrain was resolved, but it exploded elsewhere, specifically in the United Arab Emirates. Information has begun to circulate about the intention of the Abu Dhabi authorities to deport a number of Lebanese nationals.

Salam seized the opportunity of his presence and the UAE Foreign Minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, in Munich to talk to him about this issue, and the outcome of the meeting was harsh for Lebanon.

Ellaz recounts that Sheikh Abdullah was very polite, but at the same time spoke in a decisive tone that reflected the amount of anger among the Gulf leaders at Hezbollah’s repeated verbal aggression against their countries and interference in their affairs.

When Salam asked him about an intention to deport Lebanese, he did not deny the plan, adding that the UAE authorities would not tolerate any resident who could pose a threat to national security.

Distancing Lebanon from its Arab Identity

It didn't take long for the “huge blast.” This time the crisis was provoked by Bassil when he instructed Lebanon’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Abdel Sattar Issa, to abstain from voting on a resolution at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation conference in Jeddah, denouncing Iran for the attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad.

This Lebanese position angered Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and provoked many local reactions that considered Lebanon to be distancing itself from its Arab identity and falling into the arms of Iran and its expansionist policy in the region.

As usual, the Prime Minister, who was participating in the Davos Economic Forum, rushed to prevent an escalation, and issued a statement, saying: “Saudi Arabia is right in its positions, and has a leading role in the Arab world to promote stability and improve regional conditions; while Iran has been interfering in the Arab world for many years and this is the origin of the conflict between them and the Kingdom.”



What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.


Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)

More than a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections, the country's top leaders remain locked in talks to form a government while facing pressure from Washington to exclude Tehran-backed armed groups.

Amid seismic changes in the Middle East, where new alliances are forming and old powers waning, Iraqi leaders face a daunting task: navigating relations with US-blacklisted pro-Iranian factions.

The US has held significant sway over Iraqi politics since leading the 2003 invasion that ousted long-time ruler Saddam Hussein.

But another specter also haunts Iraq's halls of power: Washington's arch-foe, Iran.

Iraq has long been caught between the two, with successive governments negotiating a delicate balance.

Now, after November's election, Washington has demanded the eventual government must exclude Iran-backed armed groups and instead move to dismantle them, Iraqi officials and diplomats told AFP.

A State Department spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "Iraqi leaders well know what is and is not compatible with a strong US-Iraq partnership".

Washington, the spokesperson said, "will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of dismantling Iran-backed militias".

But some of these groups have increased their presence in the new chamber and have joined the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shiite parties with varying ties to Iran and which holds the majority.

For weeks, the Coordination Framework has been embroiled in talks to nominate the next prime minister.

"The US has put conditions that armed factions should not be part of the new government," a senior Iraqi official said. The factions must disarm and "sever ties with Iran's Revolutionary Guard," he added.

In recent tweets, the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya said that Iraqi leaders are at a "crossroads".

Their decision "will send a clear and unmistakable signal to the United States... that Iraq is ready to claim its rightful place as a stable and respected nation in the new Middle East.

"The alternative is equally clear: economic deterioration, political confusion, and international isolation," Savaya said.

The US has blacklisted as "terrorist organizations" several armed groups from within the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces, a former paramilitary alliance now integrated into the armed forces.

They are also part of the Iran-backed so-called "Axis of Resistance" and have called for the withdrawal of US troops -- deployed in Iraq as part of an anti-ISIS coalition -- and launched attacks against them.

Most of these groups hold seats in parliament and have seen their political and financial clout increase.

The Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, led by Qais al-Khazali, who is a key figure in the Coordination Framework, won 27 seats in the latest election, making it harder to exclude it from the government.

A potential compromise is to deny it a key portfolio, as in the current government.

"The US has turned a blind eye before, so they might after all engage with the government as a whole but not with ministries held by armed groups," a former Iraqi official said.

Other blacklisted groups are:

+ Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armed groups, supports a parliamentary bloc (six seats).

+ Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataeb Imam Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.

+ The al-Nujaba movement is the only group that has steered clear of elections.

Iraq has its economic growth to worry about.

After decades of turmoil, it has only begun to regain a sense of normalcy in recent years.

Washington has already imposed sanctions on several Iraqi entities and banks, accusing them of helping Tehran evade sanctions.

But Iraqi leaders hope for greater foreign investments and support partnerships with US companies.

The most striking endorsement came from Khazali, an opponent of the US military presence who now argues that it would be in Baghdad's interest for major US companies to invest.

Since the Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, Iraq has remained relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East.

Iraqi armed groups did launch attacks on US troops and largely unsuccessful ones on Israel. Washington responded with heavy strikes, and the attacks have long since halted.

Iraq remained the only close regional ally of Iran to stay out of Israel's crosshairs.

So far, the US has acted as a buffer, helping to prevent an Israeli attack, but Iraqis have been warned of strikes against the armed groups, multiple sources said.

But as the presence of American forces dwindles, fears are growing.


Bethlehem Camp's 'Lifeline' Football Field Faces Israeli Demolition

 Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
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Bethlehem Camp's 'Lifeline' Football Field Faces Israeli Demolition

 Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)

Earlier this month a group of Palestinian boys turned out to train at their local football pitch in the shadow of the wall separating Israel from the West Bank's Aida refugee camp -- and found a note at the gate.

The children took the ominous message from Israeli authorities to Muhannad Abu Srour, sports director at the Aida Youth Center in the camp near Bethlehem, and the news was not good.

"We were shocked to discover that it was a decision to demolish Aida camp's football field," Abu Srour told AFP, adding that more than 500 children regularly train on the field roughly half the size of a regulation soccer pitch.

"The football field is the only open space we have. If the field is taken away, the children's dream is taken away," Abu Srour said.

The planned destruction of the Aida field is one of many points of contention in the occupied West Bank, but it is a particularly painful one for young Palestinians yearning for a better future.

One of the older members, 18-year-old Abdallah al-Ansurur, hopes to make it into the national Palestinian team, and, like many other youth at Aida camp, took his first steps in the game on the pitch flanked by the eight-meter concrete Israeli wall.

"I started when I was about 13 years old. This field gave me a real opportunity to train," said Ansurur, who was born and raised in Aida camp, one of the smallest in the West Bank.

Ansurur, who trains to be a goalkeeper, calls the astroturf-covered piece of land a "lifeline".

"Without this field, I wouldn't have had this chance. If it didn't exist, we'd be playing in the streets -- or not playing at all," he said.

Israel has occupied the West Bank since 1967 and frequently demolishes Palestinian homes or infrastructure, arguing they were built without permits.

AFP was shown the note from COGAT, the Israeli defense ministry body in charge of Palestinian civilian affairs, which says the field was not authorized.

But Anton Salman, who was mayor of adjacent Bethlehem when the field was built in 2021, told AFP the construction was legal.

Salman said his municipality leased the land from the Armenian Church authorities to whom it belongs, before allowing Aida camp's popular committee to manage it for the benefit of residents.

Saeed al-Azzeh, head of the popular committee, confirmed the information, calling the space, "the only breathing space" for camp residents.

"Today, more than 7,000 people live on the same piece of land. Streets are narrow, alleys are cramped -- there is nowhere else," Azzeh said, referring to the camp.

Like other Palestinian refugee camps, Aida was built to accommodate some of the hundreds of thousands of people who either fled their homes or were forced out during the creation of Israel in 1948.

With time, tents gave way to concrete buildings, with the football field representing one of the few open spaces in the camp's dense patchwork.

Abu Srour is proud of what came out of the field, with youth sports delegations able to travel abroad to play, a welcome escape from the West Bank's myriad restrictions.

This is because checkpoints, a fixture of the West Bank since the start of Israel's occupation, have multiplied since the start of the war in Gaza.

Abu Srour mentioned that bringing a local team to Ramallah, a city 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) away as the crow flies, took six hours recently, instead of one hour in the past.

Restricted mobility is a major issue for most Palestinian athletes as it makes it nearly impossible for athletes of similar levels from different cities to train together.

Waseem Abu Sal, who was the first Palestinian boxer to participate in the Olympics, told AFP he frequently sparred with athletes of different levels or weight categories for lack of mobility.

Taking a short break from running a practice for 50 excited five- to 10-year-old boys, coach Mahmud Jandia told AFP he hoped the field would remain.

"Yes, the wall is there -- it feels like a prison -- but despite that, the most important thing is that the field remains and the children keep playing."

"If the field is demolished, all the children's dreams will be demolished with it."