Who Attacked Al-Tanf In Syria, Why?

Syrian opposition fighters train with Americans at Al-Tanf base (Maghawir Al-Thawra Brigade)
Syrian opposition fighters train with Americans at Al-Tanf base (Maghawir Al-Thawra Brigade)
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Who Attacked Al-Tanf In Syria, Why?

Syrian opposition fighters train with Americans at Al-Tanf base (Maghawir Al-Thawra Brigade)
Syrian opposition fighters train with Americans at Al-Tanf base (Maghawir Al-Thawra Brigade)

In mid-2017, US forces launched raids on armed factions close to the Al-Tanf garrison in the Syrian desert. The attacks drew a red line and defined the rules of engagement between Washington and its allies on the one hand and Moscow and its partners on the other.

The question today is “what has changed?” to lead up to US forces and ally Syrian opposition factions getting attacked by drones on Wednesday evening.

Four years ago, US and Russian contacts agreed on a memorandum of understanding that prevented the two countries’ armies from colliding in Syria. According to the agreement, the Euphrates River would serve as a divider separating Russian and US forces.

East of the Euphrates, Manbij and its neighboring Aleppo countryside, and Al-Tanf would be marked as Washington’s territory, while west of the Euphrates and two security blocs in al-Hasakah and Qamishli would be left for Moscow and its allies.

The deal stood the test of time, especially as the US-led Coalition staged attacks against ISIS and Russia targeted opposition factions.

By the end of 2019, some field changes east of the Euphrates had resulted in then US President Donald Trump pulling US forces away from Syria’s borders with Turkey, leaving room for Ankara to wiggle its way into Tal al-Abyad and Ras al-Ayn.

This gave rise to new agreements between Washington and Ankara and between Russia and Ankara. These agreements aimed to coordinate complex military deployments at hand and prevent patrols and air forces from clashing under the new status quo.

With the start of 2020 and the US taking out Iran’s Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani, Syrian-Iraqi borders transformed into an arena for US-Iranian clashes and message exchange.

More so, Israel continued to pound Iranian sites near the borders to cut off the Tehran- Al Bukamal- Damascus – Beirut route conjured up by Iranian forces as an alternative for the Tehran- Baghdad – al-Tanf – Damascus-Beirut route blocked by US forces at Al-Tanf.

Iranians had been operating a military base at the border city of Al Bukamal.

What’s New Today?

After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the agreement to roll back US combat forces deployed in Iraq, pressure has been building up against US presence in Syria.

Factions aligned with Tehran, have more than once, hit US bases in the war-torn country. Turkish drones targeted Kurdish leaders in the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). At the same time, each of Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Syria stepped up political campaigns against the “illegitimate” presence of US forces in Syria.

In contrast, Washington sought, through secret contacts and visits, to reassure Kurds and allies in Syria.

Nevertheless, it became widely believed that US presence in Syria is not open-ended.

Despite the many and immense disputes between Moscow, Damascus, and Tehran on the one side and Ankara on the other, the four players come together over the need to pressure the US and Kurds east of the Euphrates.

Another factor in the equation is played by developments in the Israeli-Russian relationship. Since the first day of Naftali Bennett becoming Israel’s prime minister, Russian President Vladimir Putin raised the stakes involved in any airstrike against Syria.

The Russian-operated Khmeimim airbase has been openly publishing the details of how Syrian air defenses have been using Russian missiles to confront attacks. This has reduced Israel’s attack margins in Syria.

Bennett tried to inherit Netanyahu’s leverages with Putin. He wanted the same “free pass” Netanyahu had for bombing sites in Syria if they did not involve Syrians or Russians.
The new Israeli prime minister dispatched Foreign Minister Yair Lapid to restore the “military coordination mechanism” between Moscow and Tel Aviv.

Before every Syria summit with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Putin used to step up raids near Turkish-held positions in the Levantine country. Similarly, the recent escalation against the US’ Al-Tanf base came just before Bennett’s arrival to the resort city of Sochi to meet with Putin and discuss Syria and Iran’s presence there.

Prior to Bennett’s visit, Russia had prepared “rhetorical ammunition” to put pressure on Israel.

Khmeimim airbase published details of the latest Israeli bombing on the 14th of October with a focus on Al-Tanf.

According to the Russian airbase in Syria, an “Iranian base” at the T-4 airbase in Homs was attacked by “Israeli F-16 tactical fighters that entered Syria’s airspace through the US-controlled Al-Tanf area.”

It is widely believed that Al-Tanf provides logistical support for Israeli raids.

Therefore, Moscow has sought several times to dismantle the US-operated base.

Former US officials had tabled the possibility of dismantling Al-Tanf in negotiations with Russia, but they quickly took back this option in response to Israel’s demands. Even when Trump talked about withdrawing from Syria, it was clear that this would not include Al-Tanf.

With all that being said, it still doesn’t mean that Al-Tanf’s bombing was staged by Russia.

Major Russia-led changes have been happening in southern Syria. These changes included settlements that extended from west to north of the Daraa governorate. These agreements have rolled their way east, near Al-Tanf’s land borders, that has come to be known as the “55 km area.”

These “Russian settlements” are achieved through a public understanding with Jordan and a hidden one with Israel in the hope of reducing Iranian influence in the south.
It was remarkable that hours after targeting Al-Tanf, the Jordanian army announced the downing of a drone used in an attempt to smuggle drugs from Syria.

Although Putin and Bennet will be discussing what happened at Al-Tanf, two key players remain absent from the summit: Iran and the US.

Therefore, once again, Putin finds himself involved in searching for a recipe that balances antagonistic parties and competing interests.



Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.