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Israeli Gas to Be Pumped to Syria and Lebanon through Arab Pipeline to Curb Iran’s Influence

In this Monday, March 29, 2021 file photo, the capital city of Beirut remains in darkness during a power outage as the sun sets, in Lebanon. (AP)
In this Monday, March 29, 2021 file photo, the capital city of Beirut remains in darkness during a power outage as the sun sets, in Lebanon. (AP)
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Israeli Gas to Be Pumped to Syria and Lebanon through Arab Pipeline to Curb Iran’s Influence

In this Monday, March 29, 2021 file photo, the capital city of Beirut remains in darkness during a power outage as the sun sets, in Lebanon. (AP)
In this Monday, March 29, 2021 file photo, the capital city of Beirut remains in darkness during a power outage as the sun sets, in Lebanon. (AP)

The gas that will be pumped to Lebanon through the Arab pipeline, which stretches from Egypt, Jordan and Syria, is mostly Israeli. The electricity that will be sent to Lebanon through Syria and Jordan is also mostly Israeli, in line with an agreement that was drafted years ago by senior US diplomat Amos Hochstein.

Just days ago, Hochstein himself sponsored border negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. He informed Beirut that the Arab Gas Pipeline will be exempted from the Caesar Act sanctions imposed by Washington on Syria. The US official was also behind a Jordanian-Israeli deal in 2014 that sought to promote an “axis of moderation in the Middle East between moderate Arab countries and Israel.”

Beyond the technical and economic aspects of the new gas deal, several signs indicate that it is ultimately aimed at confronting Iran’s influence in Lebanon and Syria. The greatest evidence of this is that the deal was announced just days within Tehran’s announcement that it was sending oil derivatives to Lebanon through Syria. Beyond the region, Moscow and Washington are also seeing eye-to-eye on this issue despite their varying motives and goals.

A western official quoted a senior Russian official as saying that Israel was the one who encouraged Russia and the US to force the return of the Damascus regime to southern Syria and agree to delivering energy to Lebanon. Israel believes that such a move will help confront Iran’s influence in Lebanon and Syria, said the Russian official. Furthermore, CIA chief William Burns, who had toured the region in recent months, was also involved in the gas deal, which was also backed by National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk.

Drafting the deal demanded extensive efforts and coordination: Establishing security in southern Syria where the gas and energy networks will pass through. Indeed, Russia led “settlements” in recent months that have seen the return of government forces along the border with Jordan. The opposition was forced out of the area, mines are being removed and Amman has since improved its relations with Damascus, with Jordan’s King Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar Assad holding a telephone conversation early in October. Moreover, the Amman-Damascus highway was reopened and discussions have been held over border security and providing incentives to Damascus.

Ministerial meetings between Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and Syria have also been held to overcome obstacles in the operation of the gas pipeline and energy network. Also part of the deal is Washington’s pledge to Moscow that the World Bank will fund the project through assistance to Lebanon’s Electricite du Liban (EDL).

Notably, US Ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea informed Lebanese President Michel Aoun that Washington had agreed to the proposal after holding telephone talks with the Egyptian and Israeli energy ministers. Those talks focused on “future plan to deliver Israeli gas for liquification in Egyptian plants before their export.” Israeli sources said the plan called for “delivering the Israeli gas through natural gas plants in Egypt ahead of their export to a third country.”

Egyptian and Israeli companies have struck several agreements over the years. In 2018, they agreed to the delivery of 64 billion cubic meters of Israeli gas from the Tamar and Leviathan Mediterranean fields to Egypt. The deal is valid for ten years and was worth 15 billion dollars. After Egypt declared self-sufficiency in gas production, it announced that the import of Israeli gas transforms it into a regional energy hub.

On the Jordanian front, Hochstein had kicked off negotiations over an electricity deal between Amman and Tel Aviv in 2012. Years later, Jordan’s National Electric Power Company reached an agreement with the American company representing the Leviathan field over the delivery of 45 cubic meters of gas for electricity production.

Washington’s interest in this project was piqued in order to provide political cover for the gas and electricity projects for Lebanon. American officials informed their Arab counterparts that the projects will be exempt from the Caesar Act that came into effect in mid-2020. Beirut, Cairo and Amman still demanded written guarantees and Hochstein informed the Lebanese officials of the exemptions.

In spite of the technical and political challenges, such as fixing the actual pipeline, removing mines and protecting the border, Washington has sought to remove legal obstacles and Moscow has sought to remove the military ones all for mainly political purposes, as opposed to economic ones.

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Driven by the Pressures of War, Iran Gives Its Field Commanders More Power Over Factions in Iraq

Members of the Popular Mobilization Forces attend a funeral for colleagues who were killed in a US airstrike in Anbar, in Najaf, Iraq, Wednesday, April 1, 2026. (AP)
Members of the Popular Mobilization Forces attend a funeral for colleagues who were killed in a US airstrike in Anbar, in Najaf, Iraq, Wednesday, April 1, 2026. (AP)
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Driven by the Pressures of War, Iran Gives Its Field Commanders More Power Over Factions in Iraq

Members of the Popular Mobilization Forces attend a funeral for colleagues who were killed in a US airstrike in Anbar, in Najaf, Iraq, Wednesday, April 1, 2026. (AP)
Members of the Popular Mobilization Forces attend a funeral for colleagues who were killed in a US airstrike in Anbar, in Najaf, Iraq, Wednesday, April 1, 2026. (AP)

Iran has granted its commanders greater autonomy over armed factions in Iraq, allowing some groups to carry out operations without Tehran’s approval, a shift driven by the pressures of the war, three faction members and two other officials told The Associated Press.

Many Iran-backed factions are funded through the Iraqi state budget and embedded within the security apparatus, drawing criticism from the United States and other countries that have borne the brunt of their attacks and say Baghdad has failed to take a tougher stance.

Despite mounting pressure from the US, Baghdad has struggled to contain or deter the groups. The most hard-line factions now operate under Iranian advisers using a decentralized command structure, the five officials told AP, each on condition of anonymity to speak freely about sensitive matters.

“The various forces have been granted the authority to operate according to their own field assessments without referring back to a central command,” said one faction official, who didn't have permission to speak publicly.

The war in the Middle East has exposed the fragility of Iraq’s state institutions and their limited ability to restrain these groups. A parallel confrontation between Washington and the factions has deepened the crisis, with factions acting as an extension of Iran’s regional campaign and escalating attacks on US assets in Iraq before a tenuous ceasefire deal was reached in April.

Even if the ceasefire agreement holds, Washington is expected to intensify efforts against the groups militarily and politically, particularly as they gain latitude to operate more independently, officials and experts said. On Friday, the US imposed sanctions on seven commanders and senior members of four hard-line Iran-backed Iraqi armed groups.

“The US is still going to feel it has the freedom of action to hit Iraqi factions,” said Michael Knights, head of research for Horizon Engage, a geopolitical risk consulting firm, and an adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “That may well play out into an effort to try and guide a less faction-dominated government formation.”

Decentralized control

Days into the war sparked by US and Israeli strikes on Iran on Feb. 28, an Iranian delegation arrived in Iraq’s Kurdish region and delivered a blunt message: If faction attacks escalated near US military bases, commercial interests and diplomatic missions, Iraqi Kurdish authorities should not come to Tehran with complaints, as there was little they could do about it.

“They said they’ve devolved authority to regional Iranian commanders,” a senior Iraqi Kurdish government official said on condition of anonymity, citing the subject's sensitivity.

In the past, Kurdish leaders in Iraq would call Iranian officials after attacks to ask why they had been targeted. “This time, they wanted to preempt that by saying, ‘We can’t help you with the groups in the south right now,’” the official said.

This shift reflects lessons drawn from the 12-day war in June, the official said. Faction officials corroborated the claim. During that war, operations were tightly centralized. In its aftermath, greater autonomy was granted in the field.

A spokesperson for Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, among the Iran-backed armed groups that have attacked the US in Iraq, said there was “coordination” with Iran in launching attacks but didn't give details.

“Since we are allies of Iran, we have coordination with our brothers in Iran,” Mahdi al-Kaabi said.

In the recent war, key Iraqi faction leaders appeared to step back from the latest phase and didn't appear to be directly involved in operations, Knights said. US strikes largely killed mid-level commanders, according to faction officials.

“None of the first-line leaders have been killed,” said a second faction official, who wasn't authorized to brief reporters.

Rather than targeting top figures, the US also focused on Iranian Revolutionary Guard advisory cells, said Knights, who tracked the attacks. In one strike in Baghdad’s upscale Jadriya neighborhood, three Guard advisers were killed at a house used as their headquarters during a meeting, according to the second faction official.

Pressure on Iraq is intensifying

At the heart of government efforts to rein in armed groups lies a paradox: The factions the government says it cannot control are tied to political parties that brought it to power.

The Coordination Framework, an alliance of influential pro-Iran Shiite factions, helped install Mohammed Shia al-Sudani as prime minister in 2022. He now serves as caretaker premier amid a prolonged political deadlock.

Faction forces carrying out attacks on US targets aren't rogue actors; they're part of the state’s Popular Mobilization Forces, created after the fall of Mosul in 2014 to formalize volunteer units that were critical in defeating the ISIS group.

The PMF has evolved into a powerful force, with fighters receiving state salaries and access to government resources, including weapons and intelligence. The result, critics say, is a deep contradiction: Certain state-funded groups operate in line with Iranian priorities, even when doing so undermines Iraq’s national interests.

Al-Sudani’s office didn't respond to the AP’s requests for comment on the decentralized control of armed groups.

The US is focused on curbing the power of these groups in Iraq, the senior Iraqi Kurdish official and a Western diplomat said, which will put increasing pressure on the government, still functioning in caretaker status. The diplomat also spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't permitted to brief reporters.

Last week, Iraq’s ambassador to the US was summoned to Washington to hear US condemnation of attacks by Iran-backed factions on American personnel and diplomatic missions, according to State Department deputy spokesperson Tommy Bigot.

“The Deputy Secretary affirmed that the United States will not tolerate any attacks targeting its interests and expects the Iraqi Government to take all necessary measures immediately to dismantle Iran-aligned armed groups,” Bigot said in a statement.

Factions resist steps from Iraq's government

Al-Sudani has taken limited steps to curb faction influence, including further institutionalizing the PMF and occasionally removing commanders who act outside state authority. The efforts have met significant resistance from armed groups.

Further institutionalizing them has deepened their entrenchment within the state. The US may seek to isolate the most hard-line factions — including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada — from others more embedded in Iraq’s political system. “The bad factions from the worse factions,” the senior Iraqi Kurdish official said.

Harakat al-Nujaba spokesperson al-Kaabi offered a dual framing of the group’s position, stressing both its alignment with Iran and its claim to Iraqi state legitimacy.

“To put it bluntly, we are allies of Iran,” he said. He described the group as part of Iran’s regional “axis” alongside Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthis in Yemen.

At the same time, he insisted the group operates within Iraq’s political order, supporting the state and government when they serve national interests.

“It’s true we’re not affiliated with the government or the prime minister, but we respect the law and the constitution,” he said.

Features

For Iran, Flexing Control Over Hormuz Is a New Deterrent

Female members of Iran's Basij militia are seen during a government rally in support of Mojtaba Khamenei. (The New York Times)
Female members of Iran's Basij militia are seen during a government rally in support of Mojtaba Khamenei. (The New York Times)
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For Iran, Flexing Control Over Hormuz Is a New Deterrent

Female members of Iran's Basij militia are seen during a government rally in support of Mojtaba Khamenei. (The New York Times)
Female members of Iran's Basij militia are seen during a government rally in support of Mojtaba Khamenei. (The New York Times)

Mark Mazzetti, Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes*

The United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on the argument that if Iran one day got a nuclear weapon, it would have the ultimate deterrent against future attacks.

It turns out that Iran already has a deterrent: its own geography, reported the New York Times.

Iran’s decision to flex its control over shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic chokepoint through which 20% of the world’s oil supply flows, has brought global economic pain in the form of higher prices for gasoline, fertilizer and other staples.

It has upended war planning in the United States and Israel, where officials have had to devise military options to wrest the strait from Iranian control.

The US-Israeli war has significantly damaged Iran’s leadership structure, larger naval vessels and missile production facilities, but it has done little to restrict Iran’s ability to control the strait.

Iran could thus emerge from the conflict with a blueprint for its hardline theocratic government to keep its adversaries at bay, regardless of any restrictions on its nuclear program.

“Everyone now knows that if there is a conflict in the future, closing the strait will be the first thing in the Iranian textbook,” said Danny Citrinowicz, a former head of the Iran branch of Israel’s military intelligence agency and now a fellow at the Atlantic Council. “You cannot beat geography.”

In several social media posts on Friday, US President Donald Trump said that the strait, which in one post he called the “Strait of Iran,” was “completely open” to shipping.

Iran’s foreign minister made a similar declaration. On Saturday, however, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps said that the waterway remained closed, suggesting a divide among Iranian military and civilians on the issue during negotiations to end the war.

Whereas just the prospect of sea mines is enough to scare off commercial shipping, Iran retains far more precise means of control: attack drones and short-range missiles.

American military and intelligence officials estimate that, after weeks of war, Iran still has about 40% of its arsenal of attack drones and upward of 60% of its missile launchers — more than enough to hold shipping in the Strait of Hormuz hostage in the future.

A central goal of the US-led military campaign in Iran is now reopening the strait, which was open when the war began. It is a precarious position for the United States, and its adversaries have taken notice.

“It’s not clear how the truce between Washington and Tehran will play out. But one thing is certain — Iran has tested its nuclear weapons. It’s called the Strait of Hormuz. Its potential is inexhaustible,” Dmitri Medvedev, a former president of Russia and deputy chairman of the country’s security council, wrote on social media last week.

Iran’s control over the strait forced Trump to announce a naval blockade of his own, and this week the US Navy began forcing cargo ships into Iranian ports after they transited the waterway.

Iran responded with anger, but also taunting. “The Strait of Hormuz isn’t social media. If someone blocks you, you can’t just block them back,” one Iranian diplomatic outpost, which has posted snarky messages throughout the war, wrote on X in response to Trump’s move.

The dispute over the strait has been the focus of numerous AI-generated videos depicting American and Israeli officials as Lego characters.

Still, the impact of the American blockade has been real.

Seaborne trade accounts for roughly 90% of Iran’s economic output — approximately $340 million per day — and that flow in recent days has largely ground to a halt.

Iran considers the blockade an act of war and has threatened to attack it. But so far it has not, nor has the United States tried during the current ceasefire to reduce Iran’s grip over the strait when the conflict finally ends.

“It may be that both countries see there is a real window to have negotiations” and don’t want to escalate the conflict right now, Admiral Kevin Donegan, who once commanded the US Navy’s fleet with responsibility for the Middle East and is now retired, said during a seminar hosted by the Middle East Institute this week.

Iran tried to block the Strait of Hormuz once before, mining it and the Gulf during the conflict with Iraq during the 1980s.

But mine warfare is dangerous, and decades later Iran has effectively harnessed missile and drone technology to threaten both commercial and military maritime traffic.

While the US and Israeli war significantly damaged Iran’s weapons manufacturing capability, Iran has preserved enough of its missiles, launchers and one-way attack drones to put shipping in the strait at risk.

US intelligence and military estimates vary, but multiple officials said that Iran has about 40% of its prewar arsenal of drones.

Those drones have proved to be a powerful deterrent. While they are easily shot down by American warships, commercial tankers have few defenses.

Iran also has ample supplies of missiles and missile launchers.

At the time of the ceasefire, Iran had access to about half its missile launchers. In the days that immediately followed, it dug out about 100 systems that had been buried inside caves and bunkers, bringing its stockpile of launchers back up to about 60% of its prewar level.

Iran is also digging out its supply of missiles, similarly buried in rubble from American attacks on its bunkers and depots. When that work is done, Iran could reclaim as much as 70% of its prewar arsenal, according to some American estimates.

Officials note that the counts of Iran’s weapon stocks are not precise. Intelligence assessments offer a broad look at how much power Iran retains.

But while estimates of Iran’s missile stockpiles differ, there is agreement among officials that Iran has enough weaponry to halt shipping in the future.

Iran’s government chose not to block the Strait of Hormuz last June, when Israel launched a military campaign that United States eventually joined to hit deeply buried nuclear sites.

Citrinowicz, the former Israeli official, said that decision probably reflected the cautious approach of slain supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who may have been concerned that blocking the strait could have led other countries to join the military campaign against Iran.

Khamenei was killed during the first day of the current war, a move that signaled to Iranian officials that American and Israeli goals for this conflict were far more expansive.

Iran “saw the June war as an Israeli war for their own strategic objectives,” Citrinowicz said. “This is a regime change war.”

*The New York Times

Features

Allies Fear a Rushed US–Iran Framework Deal Could Backfire, Leaving Technical Deadlock

Commuters drive past a giant billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz along a busy street in Tehran on April 19, 2026. (AFP)
Commuters drive past a giant billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz along a busy street in Tehran on April 19, 2026. (AFP)
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Allies Fear a Rushed US–Iran Framework Deal Could Backfire, Leaving Technical Deadlock

Commuters drive past a giant billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz along a busy street in Tehran on April 19, 2026. (AFP)
Commuters drive past a giant billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz along a busy street in Tehran on April 19, 2026. (AFP)

European allies fear an inexperienced US negotiating team is pushing for a swift, headline-grabbing framework deal with Iran that could entrench rather than resolve deeper problems, diplomats with past experience dealing with Tehran said.

They worry Washington, eager to claim a diplomatic win for President Donald Trump, could lock in a superficial agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief, then struggle through months or years of technically complex follow-on talks.

"The concern isn’t that there won’t be an agreement,” said a senior European diplomat, one of eight who spoke to Reuters who have previously worked on the nuclear file or continue to do so. "It's that there will be a bad initial agreement that creates endless downstream problems.”

Responding to a series of questions from Reuters, ranging from negotiating style and team to objectives and the potential dangers of a quick deal, the White House rejected the criticism.

"President Trump has a proven track record of achieving good deals on behalf of the United States and the American people, and he will only accept one that puts America first," spokeswoman Anna Kelly said.

2015 NUCLEAR DEAL ABANDONED BY TRUMP

Diplomats from France, Britain and Germany — which began negotiating with Iran in 2003 — say they have been sidelined.

From 2013 to 2015, the three worked with the United States to secure a deal on curbing Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, known as the Joint ‌Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Trump withdrew ‌from the accord - the signature foreign policy agreement of his predecessor Barack Obama - in 2018, during his first term, calling ‌it "horribly one-sided".

After ⁠40 days of ⁠airstrikes, US and Iranian negotiators opened talks in Islamabad earlier this month, again focused on the familiar trade-off of nuclear restrictions for economic relief. There were some signs in the Pakistani capital on Sunday of preparations for a resumption of face-to-face negotiations.

Diplomats say deep mistrust and sharply different negotiating styles raise the risk of a fragile framework neither side can sustain politically.

"It took us 12 years and immense technical work,” said Federica Mogherini, who coordinated the talks from 2013 to 2015. "Does anyone seriously think this can be done in 21 hours?"

HIGH-LEVEL DEAL, LIGHT ON DETAIL

The diplomats said a skeletal agreement may be achievable, built around a nuclear package and an economic package. But they warned the nuclear component remained by far the most contentious.

"The Americans think you agree on three or four points in a five-page document and that's it, but on the nuclear file, every clause opens the door to a dozen more disputes," ⁠a second European diplomat said.

Talks are focusing on Iran's stockpile of roughly 440 kilograms (970 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60%, material ‌that could be used for several nuclear weapons if further enriched.

The favored option is "downblending" inside Iran under International Atomic ‌Energy Agency supervision. Another is a hybrid approach, with some material shipped abroad.

Türkiye and France have been mentioned as possible destinations. Shipping material to the United States would be politically difficult for ‌Iran, while Russia is unattractive to Washington, two of the diplomats said.

Even those options would require lengthy negotiations over recovering material possibly buried by airstrikes, verifying quantities and transporting ‌it securely.

Iran has also floated storing material abroad for a fixed period.

"Whatever happens now is only a starting point,” said a Western diplomat previously involved in nuclear talks. "That’s why the 2015 JCPOA ran to 160 pages."

Beyond stockpiles lies the deeper dispute over Iran’s right to enrich uranium at all. Trump has publicly pushed for zero enrichment, while Iran insists it has the right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes and denies seeking a bomb.

One possible compromise would be a temporary moratorium followed by resumption at very low levels under strict conditions.

Europeans stressed that a central role for the ‌IAEA, including intrusive verification and unrestricted access, was essential.

"A negotiation with Iran is meticulous and subtle: every word matters," said Gérard Araud, France’s chief negotiator from 2006 to 2009. “That’s not something you rush.”

SANCTIONS RELIEF AND FACE-SAVING

The economic track focuses on lifting ⁠sanctions and unfreezing Iranian assets.

In the short term, ⁠Iran wants access to limited frozen funds overseas. Broader sanctions relief would come later and require European buy-in, diplomats said, as Iranian leaders see European trade as critical over the long term.

Officials say Washington is again separating an agreement in principle from its painstaking follow-up, an approach they say risks misreading Iranian political culture.

"These talks aren't a real-estate deal settled with a handshake,” said a senior regional diplomat briefed by Tehran, referring to the background of Trump's main negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. "They involve sequencing, sanctions relief and reciprocal nuclear steps.”

The war has hardened Iran’s stance, diplomats said, showing it can absorb pressure even as it seeks financial relief.

Tehran’s top demand is a non-aggression guarantee after being attacked by the US and Israel during earlier diplomatic efforts.

The concern is shared in the region. Gulf states want Iran’s ballistic missiles and proxy activities addressed, while Israel is pushing for maximal constraints.

Iran, by contrast, sees its remaining missile capability as a vital deterrent after the war degraded its forces.

Diplomats say demanding total abandonment would be unrealistic without broader security guarantees.

A senior Trump administration official said Washington’s redlines included ending uranium enrichment, dismantling major enrichment facilities, recovering highly enriched uranium and accepting a broader de-escalation framework involving regional allies.

EUROPE ON THE SIDELINES — BUT STILL RELEVANT

European officials acknowledge they sidelined themselves in part by pushing last year to reimpose UN sanctions and by designating Iran’s Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organization.

But they say their decision to stay out of the conflict has not gone unnoticed in Tehran.

"There’s simply not enough expertise in this US team,” said one European official, noting that roughly 200 diplomats, financial and nuclear experts were involved in the 2015 talks. "We’ve worked on this file for two decades.”

A White House official said officials from the National Security Council, State Department and Defense Department were present in Islamabad and remained involved.