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US Officials Demand Comprehensive Strategy to Confront Syria’s Illicit Drug Trade

An aerial view shows shelters at the newly-established Watan camp for internally displaced people in the village of Kafr Jales in Syria's northwestern Idlib province, on November 17, 2021. (Photo by Omar HAJ KADOUR / AFP)
An aerial view shows shelters at the newly-established Watan camp for internally displaced people in the village of Kafr Jales in Syria's northwestern Idlib province, on November 17, 2021. (Photo by Omar HAJ KADOUR / AFP)
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US Officials Demand Comprehensive Strategy to Confront Syria’s Illicit Drug Trade

An aerial view shows shelters at the newly-established Watan camp for internally displaced people in the village of Kafr Jales in Syria's northwestern Idlib province, on November 17, 2021. (Photo by Omar HAJ KADOUR / AFP)
An aerial view shows shelters at the newly-established Watan camp for internally displaced people in the village of Kafr Jales in Syria's northwestern Idlib province, on November 17, 2021. (Photo by Omar HAJ KADOUR / AFP)

Over the course of the Syrian civil war, the Syrian regime had transformed into one of the leading “narcotics institutions” worldwide.

Its production chains and smuggling networks dealt with everything from Hashish to the most profitable drug, Captagon. With narcotics becoming one of the regime’s main exports, many countries were harmed, leaving a harsh reality before US government and legislative institutions which are fighting off this harmful trade.

Captagon, produced in Syria, is a mild stimulant pill that is taken for “recreational purposes” throughout the Middle East.

According to a report issued by the Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR), Captagon pills reached a market value of no less than 3.5 billion dollars during 2020.

This figure is five times the value of Syria’s legitimate exports.

Legislators in the US have called for the need to fight Syria’s harmful trade and stand against it within the policy of sanctions against the Syrian regime.

Although the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act did not include punishing or disrupting Syrian drug networks, the new 2022 National Authorization Act (NDAA) received some amendments that work towards the goal of curbing Syria’s drug trade.

The 2022 NDAA amendment, proposed by Congressman French Hill (R-AR-2), demands that the US administration develops a strategy among government agencies to disrupt and dismantle the drug trade and smuggling networks linked to the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.

This amendment was supported by a majority vote - 316 votes out of 435 - in the House of Representatives and is proposed before the Senate.

According to Hill’s amendment, the Captagon trade linked to the regime in Syria constitutes a transnational security threat, and the US must develop and implement an interagency strategy to dismantle it no later than 180 days from the date of enactment of the abovementioned law.

The 2022 NDAA amendment’s proposal demands that the Department of State, Department of Treasury, Department of Defense, DEA, and other federal agencies present a joint report on a strategy to disrupt and dismantle illicit drug manufacturing in Syria. The report must be submitted to appropriate congressional committees.

The report must also present an infrastructure for executive actions against the Assad regime.

Moreover, the amendment requests using sanctions authorities to target individuals and entities linked directly or indirectly to the illicit drug infrastructure of the Assad regime. It also calls for using US-global diplomatic interactions related to the economic pressure campaign against the Assad regime to target the illicit drug infrastructure.

Although there is still a long way to go before the approval of this bill, the mobilization for its approval may make it binding in the new 2022 National Authorization Act (NDAA).

In a video published by Hill, he urges President Joe Biden’s administration to do everything in its power to stop the systematic drug smuggling operations in Syria, describing the Assad regime as a narcostate.

Hill called on his fellow representatives in Congress to support the amendment.

He explained that the amendment constitutes the first step to end the civil war that has devastated the country.

A State Department spokesperson told Asharq Al-Awsat last month that the US government is concerned about drug trafficking from Syria and is working to combat it, through multiple efforts, including “traditional law enforcement tools and capabilities.”

The spokesperson emphasized that the US government has numerous powers to identify and detect those who lead, facilitate, or partner with drug traffickers and transnational organized crime.

Caroline Rose, a political researcher at the Newlines institute for policy and research in Washington, believes that Hill’s amendment is the first of its kind that addresses the harmful effects of the Captagon trade and its relationship to the Assad regime.

She considered the amendment an important step that defines an interagency process that can review the adverse effects of the Captagon trade.

Rose told Asharq Al-Awsat that this is an attempt on behalf of the US to fill a vacuum in the maximum pressure campaign in Syria.

However, she believes that it will be difficult, as there appears to be a level of paralysis on the democratic side over US policy toward Syria.

Hill has introduced this amendment, but it has been difficult for it to gain bipartisan support, she said.

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Arab World

ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria

An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
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ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria

An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)

Syria has moved since early this year from internal unrest in the northeast, the coast, and the south to relative calm and attempts to impose a new security and political order, most clearly seen in the security file and in an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces.

But the shift has set up an undeclared race with ISIS across multiple regions and social environments.

ISIS has re-emerged as a destabilizing force, seeking to regain a foothold by exploiting gaps in security control. It is leaning on an aggressive narrative and targeted attacks that intensified from mid-February, eased in early March, then picked up again.

The Jazira region, spanning Deir al-Zor, Raqqa and Hasaka, is the main test ground for the group in 2026. Damascus’s takeover of areas east of the Euphrates in late January, after a US troop repositioning and full withdrawal, along with the earlier pullback of SDF forces, created a new security landscape that ISIS is trying to exploit.

The US withdrawal and repositioning at bases such as Kharab al-Jir and Rmelan caused temporary disruption along control lines.

ISIS’s weekly al-Nabaa newsletter reported a rise in attacks on government checkpoints and positions, using roadside bombs and direct assaults. The group carried out about 22 attacks across Syria in March 2026 alone, targeting military sites and civilians.

Ability to hit high-value targets

An attack on Syria’s 86th Division in Deir al-Zor, and on its positions near the Panorama area at the city’s southern entrance, underscored ISIS’s ability to strike deep inside government-held territory and hit sensitive targets.

The group has fully shifted to guerrilla warfare, deploying small, mobile units across vast desert areas that still offer cover despite heavy US airstrikes.

Its messaging, including a Feb. 5 speech by spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, signals an effort to recast itself as the “only legitimate resistance” to the new order. Content in al-Nabaa shows a shift from monitoring to a broad ideological offensive.

The spokesman declared a “new phase of operations” targeting governance in Damascus, signaling a move from defending desert pockets to a war of attrition in cities. Al-Nabaa has stepped up attacks on the new government, branding it an “updated version of apostasy,” and focusing on Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, still referred to by his former nom de guerre.

Undermining military credibility

ISIS casts al-Sharaa’s shift from jihadist leader to head of state as a “great betrayal.” It is trying to draw in fighters from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other factions frustrated by integration into the “new Syrian army” or by perceived leniency toward former regime officials.

It also questions Syria’s role in the US-led coalition, framing it as a concession.

By escalating attacks since mid-February, ISIS appears intent on undermining the government’s ability to enforce security and stability, while casting doubt on the military effectiveness of newly formed forces. It promotes a narrative that al-Sharaa serves US interests, presenting itself as a more ideologically rigid alternative.

Exploiting fault lines

ISIS is betting on social tensions as Damascus reasserts control over areas once run by autonomous authorities or foreign-backed factions, especially in the northeast and parts of the north.

It taps into tribal concerns over central rule, positioning itself as a fallback or covert ally against perceived abuses. At the same time, the state’s focus on remnants of the former regime and opposition militias on the coast and in Sweida gives ISIS more room to move in the east.

Despite losing territory, ISIS retains the ability to survive through flexibility, continued recruitment and enough funding to sustain operations.

Its strength lies in decentralization. Regional branches now operate with autonomy after the weakening of central leadership following the killing of its fourth “caliph,” Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Hashimi. Cells can recruit and act without waiting for orders.

The group has also rebuilt small support hubs in rugged parts of the Homs desert, some hit by US strikes this year, including raids on Jabal al-Amour near Palmyra, making full clearance difficult.

The United States said it carried out 10 airstrikes between Feb. 3 and 12 on more than 30 targets across Syria, many in Homs province, including the Sukhnah desert and gas field areas, raising fresh concerns after the US withdrawal.

Recruiting a new generation

ISIS is targeting teenagers and young men raised in displacement camps or economic hardship, using encrypted platforms to avoid detection. It also exploits sectarian and political narratives to reinforce a sense of marginalization among Sunni communities.

But it faces mounting pressure. Coordination between Damascus and the international coalition has tightened, limiting ISIS’s ability to exploit divisions. Advances in surveillance and drone technology have also reduced the advantage of desert terrain.

Still, the group is betting on potential economic failure or weak public acceptance of the government in newly retaken areas. It is also trying to destabilize tribal dynamics in Deir al-Zor by exploiting arrests of local figures or disputes over oil resources.

Momentum shifts

A security campaign launched in late February by the Interior Ministry, with army support, shifted the balance on the ground. Operations swept eastern Hama, the central desert, and areas around Aleppo and the coast.

In early March, authorities said they foiled a major attack targeting military sites in Aleppo and dismantled three sleeper cells on the coast and in the Homs countryside, disrupting ISIS’s internal networks and communications.

By mid-March, attacks had dropped to levels not seen since late 2024. Small groups were seen moving to the rural edges of Raqqa and Deir al-Zor to regroup.

Some fighters reportedly sought settlements with authorities amid funding shortages and a lack of basic supplies.

Researcher Zain al-Abidin al-Akeidi said ISIS had previously exploited Arab tribal resentment toward the SDF, but areas still under SDF control are now mostly Kurdish, limiting the group’s reach.

He warned of continued recruitment despite the government's experience in tracking ISIS cells, noting that resolving the al-Hol camp issue and restoring state control east of the Euphrates could weaken ISIS propaganda.

But he said security conditions in the Jazira region remain “very difficult,” citing poor living conditions, weak services and drug trade as factors ISIS exploits.

A Syrian army colonel, Mohammed al-Amer, said “tribal fronts” in eastern Syria have links to ISIS and have mediated with some fighters to leave the group after ideological reviews.

He said some were detained and others monitored, adding, “We use all methods to end ISIS’s presence in Syria, especially through security and intelligence work.”

Harassment over control

ISIS no longer aims to seize territory, but to raise the cost of governing. It retains the ability to harass Damascus, even if at a limited level.

Attacks in late March were largely defensive, targeting small patrols or abandoned positions on desert fringes, reflecting weaker planning capacity and a shift toward symbolic presence.

Lying low

By early April, ISIS appeared to enter a “dormancy” phase, pulling back from frontlines, reorganizing and reassessing. This likely precedes a familiar strategy of hiding and rebuilding after losses, as seen in Iraq in 2007.

Worsening economic conditions could aid recruitment, but Damascus's progress in building a unified army and stabilizing living conditions could undermine the group.

ISIS may have lost its aura of dominance in 2026, but not its will to fight. Its attacks on the president and government reflect recognition of the threat posed by the new state.

A dual test

The drop in ISIS activity reflects a mix of security, military and economic pressures. Campaigns have disrupted its structure, forced a partial withdrawal, and triggered internal reorganization and a shift away from direct attacks.

Small cells remain active along desert edges and at the frontlines between Deir al-Zor and Raqqa, suggesting a temporary phase of regrouping.

Past patterns show ISIS exploits downturns to reposition and capitalize on instability. Regional conditions could help it reopen supply lines or reconnect with affiliates.

The coming months will test whether Syrian forces can hold recent gains, and whether ISIS can endure sustained pressure. It may either fade into a marginal threat or re-emerge through sporadic, targeted attacks to signal its presence without entering open conflict.

Either way, the next phase will be decisive in shaping the security landscape in northern and central Syria and defining the trajectory of the fight between the state and ISIS.

Arab World

Gaza Prepares for First Local Elections in Two Decades

Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Prepares for First Local Elections in Two Decades

Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)

Deir al-Balah in central Gaza will hold the enclave’s first local elections in nearly two decades, with voting set to begin on Saturday alongside municipal polls in the occupied West Bank.

A decree by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas designated Deir al-Balah as the only voting site in Gaza, citing its relatively limited damage from the Israeli war and better-preserved infrastructure compared with other areas.

Gaza last held local elections in 2005, when Hamas secured a majority. It followed with a legislative election win a year later and in 2007 consolidated control of the enclave after a conflict with rival Fatah. From 2005 to 2023, Hamas appointed members of local councils and municipalities across Gaza.

This vote comes after a two-year war that has reshaped the enclave and added political and operational challenges.

Who can vote?

The Central Elections Commission said about 70,449 registered voters in Deir al-Balah are eligible to cast ballots at 12 polling centers. These include open areas fitted with tents, while schools remain shelters for displaced residents.

The figure excludes many displaced people now living in the city, as only original residents are allowed to vote.

The commission has accredited 292 observers from 10 local monitoring groups and 45 journalists. Around 675 staff will run polling operations to ensure compliance with legal and professional standards.

Jamil al-Khalidi, the commission’s regional director in Gaza, told Asharq Al-Awsat the system uses closed lists. Voters select one list and cast votes for five candidates from it. A 15-member municipal council will be formed from the candidates who get the most votes, with at least four seats reserved for women.

Khalidi said ballot boxes and papers were ready ahead of Saturday, with 12 centers prepared across nine tents and three civil society facilities. Each center will include eight polling stations.

Preliminary results are expected on Sunday morning. All competing lists are independent and clan-based, with competition driven largely by geographic and family ties.

Who will secure the vote?

Khalidi said the Palestinian civil police, effectively the Hamas-run force, will secure the process.

He added that officers will keep their distance from polling centers due to the risk of Israeli strikes. They will deploy without weapons and intervene only if needed, before returning to positions outside the sites.

A private security company had been considered to handle the task, but Gaza’s civil police insisted on taking responsibility, and a plan was agreed with all parties, Khalidi said.

Commitment to the PLO program

Four lists are competing and campaigning has been more visible online than on the ground, with limited posters. Observers say the lists are self-funded, without factional backing.

Candidates were required to sign a pledge committing to the program of the Palestine Liberation Organization and recognizing it as the legitimate representative.

This requirement is contentious for Hamas, as it implies adherence to positions including recognition of Israel. The Palestinian Authority is seeking to enforce the pledge in line with its commitment to a two-state solution.

A local source said some candidates have past ties to Fatah and Hamas but are running as independents. No faction has publicly endorsed any of the competing lists.

Arab World

South of Litani: A New Front Under Israel-Set Deterrence Limits

This picture shows the rubble of buildings destroyed in Israeli strikes in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
This picture shows the rubble of buildings destroyed in Israeli strikes in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
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South of Litani: A New Front Under Israel-Set Deterrence Limits

This picture shows the rubble of buildings destroyed in Israeli strikes in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
This picture shows the rubble of buildings destroyed in Israeli strikes in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on April 21, 2026. (AFP)

After Israel imposed a new reality on the ground following a ceasefire, a new deterrence equation has emerged, confining hostilities to the area south of the Litani River.

Israeli forces continue operations in zones under their control, while Hezbollah has limited its attacks to that area, with restrained responses to ceasefire violations inside northern Israel.

With direct talks between Lebanon and Israel expected to begin, with Israeli withdrawal a central issue, this equation came into focus on Tuesday.

Hezbollah said it responded to what it called “blatant and documented violations by the Israeli army, exceeding 200 breaches since the ceasefire took effect, including targeting civilians and destroying villages and homes in southern Lebanon.”

It said it targeted an artillery position in the settlement of Kfar Giladi, which it described as the source of recent shelling toward Yohmor al-Shaqif, using a barrage of rockets and drones.

On Wednesday, Hezbollah said it again targeted an Israeli artillery position in Bayyada with a drone, “in response to Israeli ceasefire violations and continued shelling of villages in southern Lebanon.”

The Israeli military said Hezbollah launched a drone toward its troops on the front line in southern Lebanon, adding the air force intercepted it before it crossed into Israel, calling it a breach of the ceasefire.

Limited operations to avoid escalation

Riad Kahwaji, a security and defense analyst, told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah is trying to impose new rules of engagement but lacks the military capability to do so. He said the group knows any escalation beyond the current framework would trigger a broad Israeli response.

He explained that Hezbollah is operating within a calculated margin, carrying out limited strikes inside what is known as the “engagement zone” or “yellow zone” set by Israel, in an attempt to shape a new equation without sliding into full-scale war.

Kahwaji said rules of engagement are dictated by the balance of power, not intent, adding that Israel retains the ability to define the scope and ceiling of operations. He pointed to the expansion of Israeli activity to areas south of the Zahrani River, not just south of the Litani, highlighting a wide gap in military capabilities, from precision to firepower and reach, giving Israel operational superiority.

Kahwaji said Hezbollah’s operations reflect that reality, remaining limited and largely symbolic. He said they often target open areas, claiming to hit military targets without clear evidence, in an effort to preserve deterrence rather than shift the balance.

Hezbollah understands Israel’s ability to inflict wide destruction on border villages and that it cannot currently protect or retake them if the conflict expands. As a result, its role is confined to acting as “a support front for Iran,” launching rockets within calculated limits while preserving its military capacity ahead of any renewed war involving Iran, he added.

Captive Hezbollah fighter

Israeli ceasefire violations continued on Wednesday. One person was killed, and two were wounded in a drone strike on the outskirts of the Jbour area in western Bekaa.

The town of Tayri was later shelled in an area where journalists and civilians were present, the National News Agency said, adding that two people were killed and journalists were wounded.

The agency said Israeli forces surrounded journalists Amal Khalil and Zeinab Faraj and prevented the Red Cross and the Lebanese army from reaching them for some time, triggering an alert in Lebanon. Information Minister Paul Morcos said he was following up with UNIFIL and the Lebanese army and held Israel responsible for their safety.

Separately, Lebanese Civil Defense personnel in Rmeish treated a wounded Hezbollah fighter who had crawled to Ain Ebel from Bint Jbeil, before contacting the Lebanese Red Cross to evacuate him. Israeli forces in Debel called the rescuers, demanding he be handed over and threatening to target the ambulance, the agency said.

The rescuers refused. The wounded man then chose to walk toward Debel to surrender, to protect the medics and residents, despite heavy blood loss.

Systematic demolitions

Israeli operations south of the Litani have intensified, with systematic demolitions in residential neighborhoods in Bint Jbeil and the towns of Beit Lif, Shema, Tayr Harfa and Hanine.

Roads in Wadi al-Slouqi have been bulldozed using heavy machinery backed by military vehicles. Homes and property in Aita al-Shaab were also destroyed, including remaining shops along the main road.

In Khiam, near-continuous explosions have targeted homes, buildings and mosques, alongside demolition and bulldozing of infrastructure, in what appears to be an attempt to erase the town. Israeli forces also blew up several homes at dawn in Bayyada, with explosions heard across Tyre.

Israeli army spokesperson Ella Waweya said the military carried out an airstrike to “eliminate an immediate threat” after detecting two individuals who she said breached the front defensive line in Wadi al-Slouqi.

She added that forces are continuing operations south of that line to prevent threats to northern communities.