The departure of German Chancellor Angela Merkel after 16 years at the helm leaves a gaping hole in both European politics and the European Union. Heralded as a beacon of stability during stormy times, Merkel’s multilateralist and compromise-based approach steered the EU through many high seas, including the euro currency debt crisis, a weakening relationship with the US under former President Donald Trump, and the onslaught of the global pandemic.
The world has traditionally looked to the United States to play global policeman - with the EU as second-in-command - but the Biden administration’s foreign policies have thus far failed to impress. The superpower has shifted, and narrowed, its focus, partly in response to a slew of domestic issues; the United Kingdom is equally distracted with its own political troubles. This is the moment, therefore, for the EU to exercise its considerable influence over international matters, such as the JCPOA negotiations with Iran and deescalating tensions between Russia and Ukraine.
In 2022, strong leadership of the EU will be more important than ever as a counterbalance to an increasingly assertive China and aggressive Russia, but it is unlikely to be realized. The bloc is grappling with internal rivalries and disagreements: France’s contentious policy positions are distancing it from other members; and the Commission’s loss of confidence in Poland and Hungry threatens the institution cohesion, and therefore effectiveness. Furthermore, the growing trust deficit between the UK and France post-Brexit is proving to be a major distraction too.
Much rests on the shoulders of Olaf Scholz and his unprecedented alliance of social democrats, greens and liberals. Calls from within his coalition for tougher positions against Eastern Europe, Russia and China will be welcomed by the US and UK, but many question whether Germany’s new leadership is ready, or indeed prepared, to take on an active role in tackling complex global issues from Libya through to Hong Kong through to the western Balkans. But in the absence of another European heavyweight willing to steer the ship, Germany must work to balance the viewpoints and sensitivities of the EU members to avoid the very real threat of deepening divides, escalating conflicts, and irreparably damaging the bloc’s clout. It is no small ask.
How the institution addresses pressing internal issues, which pose not only a threat to its integrity, but also its future, is a significant challenge. Whilst Merkel adopted a conciliatory approach to Poland and Hungary’s rule of law transgressions, it is not clear whether her successor Olaf Scholz will follow suit. Her exit will leave a vacuum into which France will step. French president Emmanuel Macron will likely take a more hard-line approach to Warsaw and Budapest on a range of issues, including their undermining of courts, NGOs and media; allegation of financial irregularities with EU financial aid; subverting democratic principles and fueling populist parties; and subordinating European laws to national laws. As such, the Commission’s current investigation into both countries - fully backed by the European parliament - will likely be supported by France (and others). The EU is expected to withhold funding and impose financial sanctions under Article 7, which permits sanctions when the rule of law is violated. A draconian move, such as this, would tear at the fabric of the EU and further exacerbate sensitivities between East and West Europe. Arguably, it could lead to Poland beginning its own exit process from the EU.
In other words, 2022 will prove to be a critical year for the EU, as the institution charts choppy waters without Merkel at the bridge, and whilst Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki consider using the lifeboats. Of course, much depends upon the outcome of the French presidential election in April. Although Macron is expected to win, should he lose, then the resulting vacuum in EU leadership will leave the institution temporarily rudderless, but also give Hungary and Poland a reprieve.
The outcome of the French presidential elections, however, will have little bearing on French-British relations, which are at an all-time low. The issues that continue to separate the two countries, including quid-pro-quo travel restrictions in response to Covid infection rates; migrant crossings over the Channel; and the AUKUS deal, which saw the cancellation of France’s contract to build submarines for Australia, will serve as major irritants in the relationship. However, these issues are symptomatic of a deeper problem in Franco-British relations, which is rooted in Brexit and will persist throughout the coming year. On the one hand, Paris feels betrayed by London’s refusal to implement and re-litigate key parts of the Brexit agreement, notably on Northern Ireland and, on the other, the UK believes that France is intent on punishing it for leaving the European project. At the heart of the matter, trust between the two countries has been lost and will take many years to recover and, until it is, relations will continue to be strained and further complicate matters between Brussels and London.
