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French Ambassador to UN to Asharq Al-Awsat: Political Process in Syria Has Become a 'Joke'; Iran's Nuclear Program Is a 'Top Priority'

De Riviere: The situation in Lebanon is 'very bad'; Saudi Arabia and the UAE deserve safety

Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Nicolas de Riviere. (Twitter)
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Nicolas de Riviere. (Twitter)
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French Ambassador to UN to Asharq Al-Awsat: Political Process in Syria Has Become a 'Joke'; Iran's Nuclear Program Is a 'Top Priority'

Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Nicolas de Riviere. (Twitter)
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Nicolas de Riviere. (Twitter)

The Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Nicolas de Riviere, stressed that the war in Ukraine, if it occurred, would be a "disaster" for the European people.

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, he expressed his "pessimism" regarding the current situation in Syria, describing the political and constitutional process as a “joke," despite the "rationality" of the step-by-step approach adopted by the UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen in an effort to implement Security Council resolution 2254.

He described President Bashar Assad as "stubborn," adding that his Russian and Iranian "godfathers" were wrong to believe that they can achieve a complete military victory.

The French diplomat, who played a key role in reaching the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA, in 2015 with Iran, stressed that the nuclear deal was a "good compromise" because it deals with the top threat, which is the nuclear program. But warned that "time is running out now" to return to the deal. He acknowledged there is a "need" to address the other problems with Iran, including the regional stability, support for terrorism, and its ballistic program.

De Riviere warned against "returning to square one" in the Yemeni conflict, stressing the security of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in light of the continuous attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthi militias.

Here are excerpts from the interview with de Riviere:

* No matter what happens in or with Ukraine, it seems that the gap between Russia and the United States and the its allies, including the Europeans, is widening instead of closing. France has a big stake in this issue because of the Normandy Format with regards to the implementation of Minsk agreements. What's going on?

- Well, this is a big concern for France, for Europe, for all of us. The situation is very tense. There is a high level of threat on, in and around Ukraine posed by Russia. The next days will be probably critical. We really need to avoid a huge crisis. And we are confident that diplomacy can make the difference. And we will support the Secretary General as well. So this is very much where we are. I believe we are at a critical juncture.

* Apparently, the European countries are worried about the situation of gas and gasoline and all the petroleum products. Do you think the Arab world can play a role in easing those concerns?

- The Europeans mainly are preoccupied with peace,. Should there be a war, I think it would, just be a disaster. I think we will try to make sure that the European people will get energy from different sources. And we are working on that.

* Can Saudi Arabia play a role in the energy security in Europe?

- Everybody can play a role (…) we really hope to be in a position to avoid such a debate, because the main stakeholders in Eastern Europe have made the wise choice to sit and talk instead of shooting at each other.

Disappointment in Syria in 2013

* From the situation that we were witnessing today, do you think that Russia was emboldened because the West was kind of weak in a country like Syria?

- We need to stand firm on our principles to defend democracy, freedom of choice, human rights (…) all what is in the UN Charter (…) there is a good degree of unity on this one. Syria is a different case. There was this very disappointing choice made in 2013 not to react after the chemical attack on the suburbs of Damascus. And I think it should not happen again.

* I'm mentioning Syria because the Defense Minister of Russia decided to visit Syria during this crisis on Ukraine, and they decided to hold huge military exercises in the Mediterranean, and they sent some strategic fighter jets to Syria. Is this a sign that the situation is going to get worse instead of getting better?

- Well, it's a different file. We don't see much progress in Syria, whether on the political track, the chemical track and even on humanitarian access. We'll continue to push. We really expect Russia to do more, to put more pressure on the Syrian regime to cooperate because in the end, we cannot just continue to provide humanitarian relief forever.

What we need is a political solution, some degree of power sharing, implementation of resolution 2254, to make sure that we can move to the next step, meaning reconstructing Syria, and repairing the damages caused by 11 years of war. We are ready, but they don't seem to be ready. I think that as long as the Syrian regime does not cooperate and does not move one inch, and as long as the Russians and Iranian godfathers do not help us to move them, I think we will not make much progress.

* So, are we at an impasse?

- Well, I think yes. We support the Special Envoy Geir Pedersen (who) has a reasonable approach: the step-by-step approach (…) if Assad and his godfathers believe in 100 percent military victory and the total surrender of the other side is their desired outcome, I think they're wrong. We need to find some kind of political package and power sharing, to make sure that there is a reasonable degree of reconciliation among moderate Syrians, that we can move to the next phase. But we are not there. This constitution and political process in Geneva is just becoming a joke.

* You sound pessimistic…

- Yeah? Are you optimistic? (Laughter)

* Well, I am asking you because the picture is pretty bleak…

- Yeah the picture is not very good, because everything have been destroyed. There is a readiness (with) many stakeholders to move to the next phase, but the regime is totally stubborn. It's frustrating. Why would Europe start to engage with absolutely zero guarantee that we will have to do it again two or three years later, over and again. It’s ridiculous.

* You mentioned Iran's role in Syria, but Iran is not only not helping, maybe Iran is playing a bad role in Syria and in other places, including Lebanon, Yemen, and (in) attacking also Saudi Arabia and the UAE by the Houthis. What do you think about the situation?

- It was true in 2015, and I think it remains true: nobody within the P5 and Germany expect a nuclear deal to fix the other issues we have with Iran, including the regional stability, support to terrorism, the ballistic program, etc. I think the these are separate issues.

The priority for now is to make sure that we have the JCPOA back in place with everybody in support. This is by far the top priority. Once we manage to do that, I think everybody will be interested in trying to address the other issues with Iran: regional stability, missiles and others.

We tried after 2015 already. It is difficult, but I think there is a there is a need to find diplomatic modalities from us to do that. So frankly, if you ask me, I don't expect Iran to change a lot in Syria in the short term, and even if there is a resumption of JCPOA. After that, we may engage Iran in a more productive manner on regional issues in the Middle East, whether it's Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and other hotspots. I think we may have a new conversation provided we cross this bridge.

Nuclear first

* You took part in the architecture of the JCPOA. Now why would you go back to it…

- JCPOA was a good compromise in 2015. It remains a good compromise because it addresses the threat number one, which is a nuclear threat. Now, the time is running out. We may reach a point where the constraints established by JCPOA may be outdated. So it's really time to finalize this negotiation.

The other issues have always been treated separately. I think this was the big difference we had with the Trump administration that wanted to put everything in the same bag. We told them time and again: it’s a non-starter. I think if you want to address all the issues in the in the same package, you will fail, it is a recipe for failures. The right approach is to have different tracks to prioritize the nukes, then you need to address the other issues in parallel or one after the other.

The regional stability should be feasible. The ballistic missiles issues are probably more difficult. Even on regional stability to prioritize some issues which are probably easier than others, and then to have another set of conversations on weapon transfer to the non-state actors (…) this is a large menu.

UAE and Saudi Arabia's security

* We’ve seen recently more attacks from the Houthis towards Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates apparently with missiles fully or partly made or provided by Iran. After the deal, are we going to see a region boiling more than ever?

- Now, it seems that we are back to square one with fighting on all sides, bombing from one side and then retaliation, which is bad. I really understand that Emirati people are scared, because the shelling that took place last month was really a huge threat. I understand the reaction, it's clear. Now, we need to have everybody stopping the fighting and start negotiating with the UN envoy, Hans Grundberg, fixing the issues, ceasefire, talks, humanitarian access the Safer tanker. All these issues should be addressed. Should there be an agreement in Vienna on the nukes, I hope it would improve the atmosphere in the whole region and be conducive to progress on other files.

* President Emmanuel Macron visited Saudi Arabia and the UAE recently, and apparently this issue was on the table.. So is France in a situation to help prevent those attacks from happening. What is France trying to do?

- The UAE is a close partner to France. Saudi Arabia as well. So we'll make sure that these countries remain safe because they deserve to be safe. So we will continue to be with them in a very rational and diplomatic way.

Lebanese tango

* What do you think the role that France with Saudi Arabia and the UAE can play regarding the situation in Lebanon?

- We have been engaging a lot to improve the situation in the Lebanon, which is very bad politically, economically, socially and in terms of security. France will continue to engage in support of Lebanon of course, even if it's very frustrating.

We believe that a lot has to be done by the Lebanese authorities themselves. They need to put their own house in order and the political system, the economic and financial system, of course. I think not much has been done, so we are a little frustrated with that. They need also to improve the relations with their neighborhood and this is why President Macron tried to encourage some kind of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, when he visited the Kingdom.

* So the first step will come from inside…

- We have been very present, we are ready to provide a lot of support … And we will continue to do so. The question is just that at some stage, if nothing changes inside Lebanon itself, it's very difficult. You can pour money again and again, and if it does not go to the people, and if you have absolutely no financial reform, transparency, also improvement in governance of the country, it's not worth making the effort. So I think we'll continue to push, but it takes two to tango, and for the time being, we have the impression that we are dancing alone.

Libya: We want elections

* What are the prospects of peace and moving the political process in Libya?

- Since the end of 2020, we enjoyed a different situation with a kind of sustainable ceasefire among the major stakeholders. We are moving things in the right direction. Some issues remain, such as the economic governance, the prisons within Libya, the foreign actors like the Turkish proxies and the Russian proxies, which is bad. There are others probably.

We need to address all these issues at once. The thing is that now we are probably at a critical juncture. There is a political roadmap. We need to see elections and we need a new date for elections. And we need the UN to put its own house in order as well. You know, there has been some difficulties with the UN mission in terms of leadership and governance. We want elections in the shortest possible timeframe. Because we are very much afraid that if nothing happens now, more things can unravel and could be back to square one.

What strikes me is while we were preparing the election, it was postponed. A huge number of Libyan people registered to vote. That means the population of Libya is very much interested in its own country, they want to choose the leaders. They went massively to register on electoral lists. I think like in the Lebanon, the leaders should be at their level.

* The mercenaries and foreign powers in Libya include Russians. So Russia is in Syria, Libya and now in Mali with Wagner, where France is pulling out. What is going to happen?

- It is a different model. If a country decides to cooperate with mercenaries, with private companies, that is its choice. But those are not there to promote peace and stability. It seems the Malians don’t like it… We need to be very cautious because it is a very different partnership from being hosting a UN operation or European Union operation, or partnership with a country. When France is acting in Mali, it is very expensive for France. When Wagner will operate in Mali, it will be very expensive for Mali!

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Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.