Looking into the sympathy for the Iranian regime shown by its Arab sympathizers, we find many reasons. First and foremost, we have sectarian considerations, which cover the broadest segments of sympathizers. Another is a narrow segment of the supporters of Iran motivated by anti-American sentiments, and most of them have inherited a deep sense of frustration stemming from previous experiences with its wars and defeats.
That is why we find, in this blend, Nasserists and communists, as well as ex-Nasserists and communists, who have yet to lose hope that Khomeinist Iran will succeed where Nasser, the Palestinian resistance, and behind them the Soviet Union failed.
Not far from this segment of sympathizers stands another that is grateful to Tehran, as well as Moscow, for supporting and backing Bashar al-Assad. Of course, as with every political loyalty, we have a segment of supporters driven by personal benefits and profiteering...
However, we also find a factor that is rarely mentioned. It isn’t necessarily a cause, but it has the potential to reinforce or pave the way for other reasons to sympathize: limited familiarity with and sensitivity to Nazism.
Of course, that does not mean that the Iranian regime is a Nazi one, but watching a single movie about Nazism is enough to leave us rubbing our eyes and wondering: Where do we find scenes closest to this one today? crowds lined up in extremely orderly and symmetrical fashion, chanting with a single voice, saluting a single leader, and announcing that they are prepared to die, with both children and the elderly recruited to occupy the public space?
Recreating these scenes that are now being replicated by the Iranian regime was an aspiration of some Arab ideologues who had had no luck in the 1930s and 40s:
Let us read this excerpt from a lecture given by Syrian Social Nationalist Party Zaiim (führer) Antoun Saade:
“A day will come, and it is near, when the world will witness a new scene and a dangerous incident - men in black belts, leaden clothes, and with spears shining over their heads walking behind red whirlwind banners carried by the mighty army. The forests of swords will advance in splendidly ordered ranks. Thus, the will of the Syrian nation will become unrelenting because this is its fate and destiny.”
That is in Lebanon. In Iraq, the Director of General Education Sami Shawkat called for an “industry of death” powered by young men who believed in “iron and fire,” which the Arab Nationalist Movement elevated into a noble and reassuring principle: “iron, blood, fire/ unity, liberation, revenge.”
As we well know, where Saade, Shawkat, the Arab Nationalist Movement, and the others all failed, Khomeini and a few of his students succeeded.
These movements became extremely proficient at creating a fondness for death and creating this mesmerizing imagery around it, propelling what was a revolt against several intellectual traditions. It is a revolt, for example, against the tradition of philosophical pessimism rooted in the dread of death, which is particularly strongly linked with Schopenhauer.
It is also a revolt against the tradition of the absurd, which (also because of death) sees life as meaningless and is symbolized by Albert Camus - though he did not give in to this meaninglessness, calling for filling our lives, since living them is inevitable, with positive meaning.
It is, of course, also a revolt against the principle of "natality" put forward by Hannah Arendt, who argues that life is beginnings embodied by birth and its continuity, not ends. Here, with Nazism and Khomeinism, an optimistic view of death encourages demanding it and bragging about it.
However, their similarities go beyond questions of death and its epic, emotionally charged imagery.
At the political level, we are also looking at a duality of authority (party-state) that had been adopted by Nazism and Communism, and then Khomeinism, which, in turn, then exported it to Lebanon (Hezbollah), Iraq (Popular Mobilization Forces), and Yemen (Ansar Allah).
They also share an expansionist bent that does not recognize nation-states, their borders, or their sovereignty in practice, and it certainly does not recognize the will of these countries’ peoples.
Nonetheless, the most important feature shared by Nazism and Khomeinism remains that both combine an extremely ancient and primitive ideology with very modern institutions (the party, army, security apparatuses, and of course, the rule of a single transcendental leader).
The sum of these similarities makes the Iranian regime more dangerous than any political regime or idea that one could face with reservations or even hostility. It seems that disregarding this threat cannot be explained by a scarcity of sensitivity to Nazism or limited familiarity with it alone.
We also have a generous reading of modern Iranian history: even some of those opposed to the Iranian regime continue to find it difficult to admit that the 1979 revolution was a damned giant step backwards and that the Shah’s regime, which was undoubtedly despotic and extremely bad, had been hundreds of times better and thousands of times less dangerous than the regime that replaced it. This is true for freedoms, the economy and the status of women, as well as in the degree of hostility towards the outside world.
The reasons for not recognizing this are many. Still, in general, they stem from the extent of our reluctance to break with these worn-out principles, one of the sources of which is Nazism - that is, the single most monstrous idea known to man.
