Assad, Erdogan...and Putin’s ‘Goblet of Normalization’

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during their meeting in Sochi (AFP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during their meeting in Sochi (AFP)
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Assad, Erdogan...and Putin’s ‘Goblet of Normalization’

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during their meeting in Sochi (AFP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during their meeting in Sochi (AFP)

It is quite known that Russian President Vladimir Putin is pushing his Syrian and Turkish counterparts to drink from the goblet of “normalization.” This desire is as old as Russia's military intervention in Syria seven years ago.

But what is new is that conditions have become more favorable for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to shift from attending security meetings in Moscow and Tehran to normalizing political ties between Ankara and Damascus.

The “deposit” lodged by Putin in Erdogan’s pocket a few days ago at their meeting in the Black Sea city of Sochi proposed that instead of Turkey launching a new military operation in northern Syria, the Turkish president would call Assad and hold negotiations to meet Turkish security demands.

It is noteworthy that several meetings were held between the head of Syria’s National Security Bureau Ali Mamlouk and his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan. Some of the meetings were publicly held in Moscow at the start of 2020. Other meetings, especially those convened to discuss developing a new version of the 1998 Adana Agreement, were held in secret.

In fact, developing the Adana Agreement and security cooperation against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) requires political normalization and the opening of diplomatic channels.

Putin's key is for Erdogan to communicate directly with Assad with the blessing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. However, each of the three presidents sees this move from a different angle. Here there are losses and there are risks.

The Russian president is ready for this step because it weakens the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) allied to the US, Britain, and France. These are the countries that are fighting Russia in Ukraine.

Moreover, such a move would strengthen the Russian role in Syria and give legitimacy to the regime in Damascus. It would do so by neutralizing the Turkish role in support of the Syrian opposition.

If successful, the normalization of ties between Damascus and Ankara would turn a key page of the last decade.

For Putin, such a step increases the chances of his “arch-friend” and “hostile partner” in many arenas, Erdogan, to win the elections in the middle of next year.

However, this expected “gift” from Putin completely contradicts the desire of Assad, who does not want a new presidential term for Erdogan, who has been giving military and political support to the Syrian opposition for the last decade.

For Assad, normalizing ties with Turkey could constitute an embarrassment that is difficult to navigate among his allies in Damascus and abroad –especially that Turkey continues to occupy large swathes of land in northern Syria that are twice the size of Lebanon.

Also, Erdogan has been the target subject of media campaigns, accusations, and criticisms by Syrian authorities.

Khamenei, the third partner in the Astana process and the control of Syrian territory, has complicated calculations as well.

Tehran wants to support Assad and weaken US allies and does not want Turkish incursions. It also agrees with Damascus and Ankara in rejecting Kurdish entities.

Indeed, the three countries coordinated against Iraqi Kurdistan in the 90s. But Iran also has rivalries with Turkey and Russia in Syria and elsewhere.

For his part, Erdogan wants to neutralize the Syrian refugee issue and to deal a blow to Syria’s Kurds before upcoming elections.

He also does not mind security and political coordination with Damascus to keep Kurds away.

However, he finds it embarrassing to switch stances on Assad and Damascus. For years, Erdogan had raised the ceiling of his stances and support for the opposition.

Most likely, Putin is pushing the relationship between Assad and Erdogan to new stages.

The first stage was after the protests in early 2011, when meetings were held to search for a political settlement to the Syrian crisis.

The second stage witnessed maximum hostility in the Turkish president’s rhetoric about Assad stepping down.

The third stage saw Erdogan’s focus shift from “regime change” in Syria to making deals with Putin for disbanding the Kurdish entity in northern Syria. Subsequently, Turkey spread its forces in several Syrian enclaves.

The fourth and newest stage includes political dealings under Putin's umbrella. Erdogan would deal with Assad as president. In turn, Assad would accept Erdogan as an interlocutor.

This may come as a shock or surprise to some. But it is okay to recall the fluctuations of the Damascus-Ankara line over the decades as there have been many upheavals in the Syrian-Turkish-Kurdish triangle.

In mid-1998, Turkey massed its army on Syria’s borders and demanded the expulsion of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.

Afterwards, the Adana Agreement, which established security cooperation against the PKK, was signed.

When Syrian President Hafez al-Assad died, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s participation in the funeral inaugurated the transition to a new political dimension and the intensification of cooperation against the PKK.

After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, relations gradually moved towards more cooperation and more visits and meetings between Assad and Erdogan.

This led to a “strategic partnership,” “eliminating borders,” and a tacit recognition of the annexation of Iskenderun (Hatay).

Indeed, Erdogan was among the few leaders who maintained a relationship with Assad after the US isolated Damascus over the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005.

Moreover, Erdogan mediated between Assad and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

Erdogan talking about Putin asking him to contact Assad, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu recently recalling a “quick chat” he had with his Syrian counterpart last year, and Damascus holding back on its condemnation of Turkey are all factors likely signaling a new beginning whereby Assad and Erdogan drink from Putin’s “goblet of normalization.”



Career Diplomat Becomes the Face of Trump’s ‘America First’ Agenda at the UN

US Ambassador to the United Nations, Dorothy Shea (C), addresses a UN Security Council meeting called following a recent missile strike by Russia on a residential area in Ukraine, at the United Nations headquarters in New York, New York, USA, 08 April 2025. (EPA)
US Ambassador to the United Nations, Dorothy Shea (C), addresses a UN Security Council meeting called following a recent missile strike by Russia on a residential area in Ukraine, at the United Nations headquarters in New York, New York, USA, 08 April 2025. (EPA)
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Career Diplomat Becomes the Face of Trump’s ‘America First’ Agenda at the UN

US Ambassador to the United Nations, Dorothy Shea (C), addresses a UN Security Council meeting called following a recent missile strike by Russia on a residential area in Ukraine, at the United Nations headquarters in New York, New York, USA, 08 April 2025. (EPA)
US Ambassador to the United Nations, Dorothy Shea (C), addresses a UN Security Council meeting called following a recent missile strike by Russia on a residential area in Ukraine, at the United Nations headquarters in New York, New York, USA, 08 April 2025. (EPA)

The highest-ranking US representative now at the United Nations told Congress two years ago that Russia's invasion of Ukraine was "unprovoked" and "unjustified," urging UN members to condemn Moscow’s aggression and demand an end to the war.

In February, it was the same career diplomat, Dorothy Shea, who voiced the Trump administration's extraordinary decision to split with European allies and refuse to back a UN resolution blaming Russia for its invasion on the third anniversary of the war.

While it is typical for diplomats to stay on as US presidents — and their political parties — change, Shea's interim role has unexpectedly made her a face of the stunning US transition on the world stage, with President Donald Trump's "America First" approach increasingly upending the post-World War II international order.

Shea will be in place longer than expected after Trump's unusual decision last month to withdraw his nominee for UN ambassador, Rep. Elise Stefanik, from consideration because of a slim Republican House majority.

"I would say (Shea’s) position is unique. It is probably particularly unique in that because of the extraordinary change, not just from one administration to another, but really an era of US foreign policy, even when there were nuanced differences," said Phillip Reeker, the former acting assistant secretary of state for Europe. "The change in the vote that took place at the UN on the Russia-Ukraine war was really an inflection point in US policy."

A UN vote changes US messaging on Ukraine

On Feb. 24, the US joined Russia in voting against a European-backed Ukrainian resolution demanding an immediate withdrawal of Moscow's forces. A dueling US resolution noted "the tragic loss of life" and called for "a swift end to the conflict," but it didn't mention Moscow’s aggression as the Trump administration opened negotiations with Russia on a ceasefire.

"Continuing to engage in rhetorical rivalries in New York may make diplomats feel vindicated, but it will not save souls on the battlefield," Shea, 59, said at the time. "Let us prove to ourselves and to our citizens that we can come together and agree on the most basic principles. Let us show one another that the bold vision of peace that once pulled us out of hell can prevail."

The message was a shocking retreat for the US in the 193-member UN General Assembly, whose resolutions are not legally binding but are seen as a barometer of world opinion. It also reinforced the fears of some allies about what a second Trump presidency could mean for longstanding transatlantic partnerships — and whether the US could remain a bulwark against aggressors like Russia.

For Shea, it was another day at work. She has spent the last 30-plus years serving as a diplomat under both Republican and Democratic presidents — from Bill Clinton to Trump — carrying out their policies even if they were a departure from longstanding US positions.

"I don’t know what her personal views are on things. But administrations change, policies change. And your job as a diplomat is to advocate for those policies," said a former colleague and deputy US ambassador, Robert Wood, who recently retired.

The US mission to the UN declined to comment. The State Department did not immediately respond to an Associated Press request for comment.

The roots of a diplomat

Shea's work has included stints in South Africa, where she witnessed Nelson Mandela become the first democratically elected president, and Israel, where she worked on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Shea grew up in the suburbs of Washington — her father a World War II veteran and her mother active in the local Japanese American friendship society. The experience of Japanese exchange students staying with her family over several summers and wanting to understand world events propelled her into international relations at the University of Virginia. After graduation, she scored a job offer with the US Foreign Service.

She worked her way up and in 2019 was tapped to be Trump's ambassador to Lebanon, where the soft-spoken diplomat made headlines for her criticism of the Hezbollah group. A Lebanese judge banned local and foreign media outlets from interviewing Shea for a year, saying her criticism of Hezbollah was seditious and a threat to social peace.

In 2023, Biden nominated Shea to become No. 2 at the UN.

The top US role at the UN — for now

It is unclear when Shea will hand off to a Senate-confirmed political appointee. Stefanik went through a confirmation hearing, but her nomination was pulled last month because her vote to advance Trump's agenda remains crucial to Republicans in the House. The GOP congresswoman was the fourth Trump nominee not to make it through the confirmation process.

Trump has made no mention of whom he would nominate to replace Stefanik and fill his last remaining Cabinet seat. Until then, Shea is at the helm at a critical moment for US foreign policy, selling big changes to dealing with both allies and adversaries and defending the administration's slashing of foreign assistance.

The White House recently proposed additional drastic cuts to the State Department, which would include eliminating funding for nearly all international organizations, such as the UN.

The proposal is highly preliminary but reflects the administration's isolationist view, which, along with funding uncertainties, poses a major challenge to the mandate and work of the UN.