Gorbachev and Reagan: A Friendship that Ended the Cold War

Mikhail Gorbachev met his US counterpart Ronald Reagan for the first time in Geneva in 1985 for talks on revitalizing international relations between the superpowers (AFP)
Mikhail Gorbachev met his US counterpart Ronald Reagan for the first time in Geneva in 1985 for talks on revitalizing international relations between the superpowers (AFP)
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Gorbachev and Reagan: A Friendship that Ended the Cold War

Mikhail Gorbachev met his US counterpart Ronald Reagan for the first time in Geneva in 1985 for talks on revitalizing international relations between the superpowers (AFP)
Mikhail Gorbachev met his US counterpart Ronald Reagan for the first time in Geneva in 1985 for talks on revitalizing international relations between the superpowers (AFP)

Mikhail Gorbachev stepped onto a Washington street and began shaking hands to cheers and applause in 1990 -- a bit of unaccustomed political showmanship worthy of his friend Ronald Reagan.

Ana Maria Guzman was in the park on her lunch break that May when she saw the Soviet leader, who died on Tuesday at 91, AFP said.

"We knew he was in town and we saw his motorcade. Then he just got out of his limousine and began shaking hands," she recalled. "It was very emotional. He was like a people's person. Wow!"

It was the personal touch that Reagan, the Hollywood actor who became president and an icon of the American right, was known for.

Reagan and Gorbachev broke through decades of tensions between their countries to form one of the unlikeliest relationships of the 20th century, bonding over their shared desire to reduce nuclear tensions and ultimately bringing about a momentous shift in world politics.

- Overcoming decades of mistrust -
At the beginning, the longtime Soviet apparatchik had almost nothing in common with his US counterpart.

The two came from countries where mistrust of the other was set in cement.

But when Reagan came to office in 1981, one of his primary -- and secret -- goals was to ease Cold War and nuclear tensions with Moscow.

He made overtures to three Soviet leaders -- Leonid Brezhnev, Turi Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko -- but all were change-resistant and none survived long enough to establish a relationship.

When Gorbachev became Communist party general secretary in March 1985 after Chernenko's death, the White House sensed a potential opening, said Jack Matlock, then Reagan's top negotiator with Moscow and later ambassador to Russia.

"Early in his term, Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as an evil empire," Matlock told AFP.

"But from the very beginning, he talked about negotiating and the possibility of establishing a peaceful relationship if the Soviet leader was willing to get along with the free world."

"There was very little response until Gorbachev. With Gorbachev, they finally began communicating, and within two or three years, they were almost, you might say, reading off the same piece of music."

Gorbachev was no blind idealist, said John Lenczowski, who was principal Soviet affairs adviser on Reagan's national security council.

The White House understood he was inheriting a weakened economy, a military that saw the Pentagon as increasingly superior and threatening, and a Communist Party rotting from the inside out.

Gorbachev needed to ease the military competition with the United States first if he was to address the other two challenges and preserve the Soviet Union.

"He came in to the general secretaryship seeing that the Soviet Union was in a state of multiple crises. He was trying to overcome those crises in order to save the Soviet system," said Lenczowski.

Reagan, for his part, saw Kremlin paranoia about the United States as dangerous for both.

"Reagan began to think that we really needed to tone it down, and to try to manage the relationship a little bit more gently," said Lenczowski.

He saw "that we were in a position of strength to negotiate better with Moscow, and that we should explore some of the different venues."

- Slow start -
Reagan had an invitation to visit Washington passed on to Gorbachev at Chernenko's funeral, but nothing much happened for months.

Still, the White House perceived a change in tone as the two sides discussed advancing nuclear arms control negotiations.

"Basically, they were both men of peace," said Matlock.

"Gorbachev really realized, increasingly, he had a system that needed to change. But he couldn't really change it as long as there was a Cold War going on, and you had the arms race."

"And I think that Reagan understood that. And Reagan was not out to bring down the Soviet Union."

Their big ice-breaker was a summit in Geneva in November 1985. Talks were tense, and little was agreed. But the two leaders had several one-on-one conversations, sowing the seeds of trust.

One year later, the two met in Reykjavik for more talks, again with only slight progress.

Media called the summit a failure, but in fact, Matlock recalled, both sides found more common ground. Detente was taking root.

When Gorbachev came to Washington in December 1987, he and Reagan were able to sign the landmark treaty on limiting intermediate range nuclear forces.

At first he thought Reagan was very conservative," Matlock said of Gorbachev.

"But as time went on, and as they began to agree, more and more they actually became friends."

Long after he was shunted aside in Russian politics, Gorbachev would return to the United States in 2004 for Reagan's funeral.

"I think they both had similar ideals. They both hated nuclear weapons, and hoped that they could abolish them, that's the truth," Matlock said.

"Very few on their staffs thought that that was going to be possible, but they did."



The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.