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US Sanctions IRGC-Affiliated Individuals, Entities for Malicious Cyber Acts

US Special Envoy for Iran, Rob Malley (AFP)
US Special Envoy for Iran, Rob Malley (AFP)
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US Sanctions IRGC-Affiliated Individuals, Entities for Malicious Cyber Acts

US Special Envoy for Iran, Rob Malley (AFP)
US Special Envoy for Iran, Rob Malley (AFP)

The US Treasury imposed new sanctions on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) for their role in malicious cyber acts.

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned ten individuals and two entities for their roles in conducting malicious cyber acts, including ransomware activity.

The Treasury said, in a statement, that the individuals and entities designated are all affiliated with the IRGC.

Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson said the ransomware actors and other cybercriminals, regardless of their national origin or base of operations, have targeted businesses and critical infrastructure across the board, directly threatening the physical security and economy of the United States and other nations.

"We will continue to take coordination action with our global partners to combat and deter ransomware threats, including those associated with the IRGC," said Nelson.

This is the second set of sanctions imposed by the US Treasury within a week after it sanctioned Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and its Minister of Intelligence, Esmail Khatib, based on accusations in connection with a cyber-attack in July on Albania.

Meanwhile, the Special Envoy for Iran, Rob Malley, briefed Congress about the status of the nuclear negotiations.

The session was closed to the public, so committee members could not express their dissatisfaction, but several expressed their anger over Malley's performance.

Since his appointment by US President Joe Biden, the envoy faced severe criticism from several lawmakers.

Recent media leaks showed increased frustration with Malley, and an Israeli official claimed the envoy now has a limited role in the negotiations, and the US decision to return to the agreement is out of his control.

The administration was quick to deny this information, asserting that Malley is the special envoy for Iran and still very much in charge of the team and the US' efforts.

State Department spokesperson Ned Price asserted there is nothing to those reports.

"I can tell you Rob is deeply engaged day to day on the substance of this. He is leading a team here at the department," said Price.

The spokesman asserted that Malley is regularly engaging with counterparts at the White House, the Treasury Department, the Intelligence Community, and elsewhere regarding the efforts to achieve a joint return to compliance with the deal and Washington's contingency planning.

The administration may have a stern defense to back its envoy, but it does not mitigate the implications of the Israeli media leaks.

Congressional sources confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that Israeli officials are contacting prominent Senate and House of Representatives members to coordinate their rejection to return to the nuclear agreement.

The Israeli Mossad head, David Barnea, was forced, during his recent visit to Washington, to cancel his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to evade any crisis with the White House, according to a committee source.

The sources stated that some officials did not support Malley's appointment when the US first launched its efforts to return to the agreement, and events proved their position was correct.

The Foreign Affairs Committee presented a draft resolution criticizing the administration on the same day of Malley's testimony. This proves the growing opposition to the envoy and the administration's approach to dealing with the negotiations.

The proposed draft calls on the US President to hand over to Congress any documents related to the negotiations and inform it of any initiative or negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program.

According to the text of the proposed resolution, "the President is requested to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution, copies of any document, memorandum, or other communication in his possession, or any portion thereof, that refers or relates to any initiative or negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program."

The draft resolution reflects the dissatisfaction of bipartisan members of Congress with the lack of any coordination with them in this file and their fear that Biden will seek to bypass them if an agreement is reached, as former President Barak Obama did.

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How Likely Is the Use of Nuclear Weapons by Russia?

This photograph taken at a forensic expert center in an undisclosed location in Ukraine on November 24, 2024, shows parts of a missile that were collected for examination at the impact site in the town of Dnipro following an attack on November 21. (Photo by Roman PILIPEY / AFP)
This photograph taken at a forensic expert center in an undisclosed location in Ukraine on November 24, 2024, shows parts of a missile that were collected for examination at the impact site in the town of Dnipro following an attack on November 21. (Photo by Roman PILIPEY / AFP)
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How Likely Is the Use of Nuclear Weapons by Russia?

This photograph taken at a forensic expert center in an undisclosed location in Ukraine on November 24, 2024, shows parts of a missile that were collected for examination at the impact site in the town of Dnipro following an attack on November 21. (Photo by Roman PILIPEY / AFP)
This photograph taken at a forensic expert center in an undisclosed location in Ukraine on November 24, 2024, shows parts of a missile that were collected for examination at the impact site in the town of Dnipro following an attack on November 21. (Photo by Roman PILIPEY / AFP)

On 24 February 2022, in a televised speech heralding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin issued what was interpreted as a threat to use nuclear weapons against NATO countries should they interfere.

“Russia will respond immediately,” he said, “and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.”

Then on 27 February 2022, Putin ordered Russia to move nuclear forces to a “special mode of combat duty’, which has a significant meaning in terms of the protocols to launch nuclear weapons from Russia.”

Dr. Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security program at Chatham House, wrote in a report that according to Russian nuclear weapons experts, Russia’s command and control system cannot transmit launch orders in peacetime, so increasing the status to “combat” allows a launch order to go through and be put into effect.

She said Putin made stronger nuclear threats in September 2022, following months of violent conflict and gains made by a Ukrainian counterattack.

“He indicated a stretch in Russian nuclear doctrine, lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use from an existential threat to Russia to a threat to its territorial integrity,” Lewis wrote.

In November 2022, according to much later reports, the US and allies detected manoeuvres that suggested Russian nuclear forces were being mobilized.

Lewis said that after a flurry of diplomatic activity, China’s President Xi Jinping stepped in to calm the situation and speak against the use of nuclear weapons.

In September 2024, Putin announced an update of the 2020 Russian nuclear doctrine. The update was published on 19 November 2024 and formally reduced the threshold for nuclear weapons use.

According to Lewis, the 2020 doctrine said that Russia could use nuclear weapons “in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”

On 21 November 2024, Russia attacked Dnipro in Ukraine using a new ballistic missile for the first time.

She said Putin announced the missile as the ‘Oreshnik’, which is understood to be a nuclear-capable, intermediate-range ballistic missile which has a theoretical range of below 5,500km.

Lewis added that Russia has fired conventionally armed nuclear-capable missiles at Ukraine throughout the war, but the Oreshnik is much faster and harder to defend against, and suggests an escalatory intent by Russia.

Nuclear Response During Cold War

In her report, Lewis said that nuclear weapons deterrence was developed in the Cold War primarily on the basis of what was called ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD).

The idea behind MAD is that the horror and destruction from nuclear weapons is enough to deter aggressive action and war, she added.

But the application of deterrence theory to post-cold war realities is far more complicated in the era of cyberattacks and AI, which could interfere with the command and control of nuclear weapons.

In light of these risks, presidents Biden and Xi issued a joint statement from the 2024 G20 summit affirming the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons.

The US and Russia exchange information on their strategic, long-range nuclear missiles under the New START agreement – a treaty to reduce and monitor nuclear weapons between the two countries which is set to expire in February 2026.

But, Lewis said, with the US decision to exit the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, there are no longer any agreements between the US and Russia regulating the number or the deployment of ground-launched nuclear missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km.

She said short-range nuclear weapons were withdrawn and put in storage as a result of the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives but are not subject to any legal restraints.

The 10th NPT Review Conference was held in 2022 in New York. The issue of nuclear weapons threats and the targeting of nuclear power stations in Ukraine were central to the debate.

Lewis noted that a document was carefully crafted to finely balance concerns about the three pillars of the treaty – non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But Russia withdrew its agreement on the last day of the conference, scuppering progress.

“It was believed that if Russia were to use nuclear weapons it would likely be in Ukraine, using short range, lower yield ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons,” she said, adding that Russia is thought to have more than 1,000 in reserve.

“These would have to be taken from storage and either connected to missiles, placed in bombers, or as shell in artillery,” Lewis wrote.

Increasingly the rhetoric from Russia suggests nuclear threats are a more direct threat to NATO – not only Ukraine – and could refer to longer range, higher yield nuclear weapons.

For example in his 21 September 2022 speech, Putin accused NATO states of nuclear blackmail, referring to alleged “statements made by some high-ranking representatives of the leading NATO countries on the possibility and admissibility of using weapons of mass destruction – nuclear weapons – against Russia.”

Putin added: “In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.”

There have been no expressed nuclear weapons threats from NATO states.

NATO does rely on nuclear weapons as a form of deterrence and has recently committed to significantly strengthen its longer-term deterrence and defence posture in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The current UK Labor government has repeatedly reiterated its commitment to British nuclear weapons – including before the July 2024 election, according to Lewis.

Therefore, she said, any movement to ready and deploy Russian nuclear weapons would be seen and monitored by US and others’ satellites, which can see through cloud cover and at night – as indeed appears to have happened in late 2022.

Lewis concluded that depending on other intelligence and analysis – and the failure of all diplomatic attempts to dissuade Russia – NATO countries may decide to intervene to prevent launch by bombing storage sites and missile deployment sites in advance.