Reminders of bright, or at least reasonable, moments in the past do not imply that we should return to that past, nor are they meant to clear this past of any shortcomings or flaws. As tons of experiences and proof from our region and across the world have taught us, no return- whatever return it may be- to any past- whatever past it may be- is possible.
Reminders of and references to these moments do, on the other hand, have three functions: highlighting the ills of the present and its disadvantages, judging history in a manner that deviates from the naive evolutionary method (today is better than yesterday, and tomorrow will be better than today), and finally repudiating arguments that limit the policy options available to us to a single current option, usually resistance, which we are told is our fate, that history has not graced us with any other.
On the occasion of the maritime border agreement between Lebanon and Israel, we recall the Lebanese theory on the relationship with the Jewish state after it was established in 1948.
Firstly, the 1949 armistice kept the borders quiet for almost two decades, and it gave Lebanon back 13 villages that the Israelis had occupied in the 1948 War.
Second, the economic boycott approved by the Arab League, of which Lebanon is a member, protected Lebanon from competing with the Israeli economy, which was especially crucial for protecting the Port of Beirut’s growth from the Port of Haifa.
Third, it restricted the ideologization of the conflict with Israel by positioning it within diplomatic, cultural, and humanitarian frameworks. With this, it tried to snatch from the religious sects additional fodder to fuel fear and tension domestically, as well as the communal armaments and counter-armaments that could ensue from those fears and tensions.
Fourth, it canceled the need to build a strong national army that would have not only weighed heavily on our weak national economy but would have undermined democratic life and multiplied the factors that threatened it. As for the Arab experience with armies and coups, it has no shortage of evidence to this effect.
Finally, it ensured our harmony with the Arab world that Lebanon belongs to geographically, as well as having shared economic interests and cultural aspects, both in terms of religion and language.
None of that would have been possible if the state had not had a monopoly on weapons and if the state had not been the arbitror of political life and its disputes- a status that became shaky starting in the late sixties.
The fact is that the flaw was not in the theory, but in the spoil-sharing among sects that surrounded it, which could have been fairer, and in the manner in which Palestinian refugees were received, which could have been more welcoming, with more done to put common humanity ahead of sectarian obsessions.
Facing this theory, two contradictory and extremist theories emerged. Each of them had its own sectarian affiliation, and following each has opened the floodgates to disasters and calamities:
The first revolves around the idea of resistance, Palestinian yesterday and Shiite today.
The Palestinian resistance movement ended up embroiled in a regional-civil war that continued to reproduce itself until 1989, involved two Israeli invasions, a small one in 1978 and a big one in 1982, and Syrian tutelage, which began in 1976 and did not end, though their presence was to an extent intermittent, until the massacre of February 14, 2005. As for Shiite resistance, it was seen by the other sects as threatening to subjugate them and to perpetuate the dysfunction of the state and several wars in the south and east- wars that solidified the hold of Iran and “Souria Al-Assad” (Assad’s Syria). In the meantime, especially with the recent border demarcation agreement, it became apparent that ideological justifications are merely pretexts for sectarian empowerment, as did the extent to which the suffering of the Palestinians is an easy game in the hands of sectarian projects.
Elsewhere, as a reaction to the theory of resistance and the armament that came with it, we witnessed the emergence of a theory of alignment with Israel in pursuit of its protection. This was born once Mount Lebanon and the Christian regions were besieged, and it was crowned with Bashir Gemayel being elected president while Lebanon had been under Israeli occupation. To non-Christians, these developments were seen to threaten subjugation and domination. Thus, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, the state was then expelled from the capital on February 6, 1984, and the Mountain’s War, which destroyed the spinal cord of the state and society, erupted.
Now, it might be premature to qualify the recent border demarcation agreement and derive theories from it or about it. However, two issues will crystallize our assessment: building a fair state and ending the domination of one community over the others, which are, at the end of the day, a single issue.
Dealing with Israel is not easy: neither does calling it an “enemy” solve the problem, nor does aligning with it. It would be difficult and unfair to entrust a weak and disjointed country like Lebanon with coming up with the correct vision for this extremely complex matter. In all likelihood, a comparison of the three theories mentioned above could benefit us. Such an assessment probably won’t materialize.
