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The Syrian Oil: Time for New Approach?

US - Russian Struggle Opens Opportunity for 'War lords'

US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)
US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)
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The Syrian Oil: Time for New Approach?

US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)
US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)

With the war in Syria now in its twelfth year and with the US-Russian conflict still ongoing to control the oil sector and its potential, local belligerents and regional opponents have found in oil a rare point of consensus to cooperate and pick clean the country’s wealth and revenues.

Oil production from fields and facilities mainly located in north-eastern Syria was about 400,000 barrels per day prior to the conflict. After the eruption of the conflict in 2011, various warring forces, including opposition factions and ISIS, successively seized control of much of this invaluable oil wealth. Western sanctions placed on the oil sector have caused foreign oil companies to leave the country.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US-backed coalition, currently controls one-quarter of Syria’s territory, including the area east of the Euphrates. This means that the SDF now dominates 90 percent of the oil and over 50 percent of the gas fields, as well as the infrastructure owned by foreign companies, according to legitimate contracts signed with the Damascus government, including Gulfsands Petroleum, Total, and Shell. Oil wells and facilities were cordoned off and “protected” by the US-led coalition forces and SDF.

On the other hand, Damascus announced that the oil sector’s losses since the beginning of the crisis amounted to USD 91.5 billion. Oil Minister Bassam Tohme revealed that the daily oil production is 89,000 barrels, mainly in Kurdish-controlled areas. Tohme describes this oil as being “stolen” from the Syrian people.

International Conflict

After the Russian military intervention in late 2015, Damascus signed contracts with Russian companies to invest in the oil and gas sectors in Syria and its territorial waters. It also contracted with Evro Polis, the Yevgeny Prigozhin-linked company financing Wagner mercenaries, to protect oil and gas facilities and liberate them from ISIS in exchange for 25 percent of their proceeds. This included Evro Polis taking control of Suncor’s large Ebla gas development near Palmyra – an operation that led to many casualties.

This agreement was the cover under which the Wagner paramilitary group operated. Wagner was estimated to have as many as 2,500 men in Syria in 2018. They participated in the fighting in Syria or took part in training and preparation camps in Russia. Some of them have been relocated to Libya and now to Ukraine.

In reality, the agreement between Evro Polis and Damascus only covered areas under Damascus control. In early 2018, Wagner mercenaries launched an assault on the Conoco gas plant in the eastern Euphrates, a position of the SDF, but they were hammered by US artillery and airstrikes that killed about 200 mercenaries.

In late 2019, former US President Donald Trump made a shock announcement that American troops would withdraw from the area around Syria’s border with Turkiye, east of the Euphrates, giving Turkiye the green light to invade northern Syria and putting the SDF, Washington’s allies, under new pressure. On October 6, 2019, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, together with some US and European officials, persuaded President Trump to keep 900 members of the US military there to protect the oil. Trump later said that "a small number of soldiers will remain in the areas that contain oil," stressing that "we have ensured the security and protection of oil."

In July 2020, Washington announced that SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi informed the Trump administration of the signing of an agreement with the American company Delta Crescent Energy to invest in oil after obtaining a waiver from the Treasury Department from the sanctions placed on Syria. Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the deal was intended to "modernize oil.”

The situation embarrassed the US Department of Defense which issued conflicting statements. It initially stated that "Syrian oil is for the Syrian people and we remain committed to the unity and territorial integrity of Syria.” It further emphasized that “the US government does not own, control, or manage the oil resources in Syria. The populations in areas liberated from ISIS make their own decisions on local governance.” Former US Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced that "we are now taking measures to strengthen our position in Deir el-Zour to deny ISIS access to the oil fields.” The Pentagon confirmed sending troops and armored vehicles to protect oil fields.

The US-Russian conflict is still ongoing. An opposition leader said that high-ranking Russian officers had repeatedly informed the SDF leaders to allow Russian companies that signed contracts with Damascus to work in the oil fields east of the Euphrates, but the Kurdish officials responded that this required the approval of the US allies that co-control the oil fields.

A stand-off has ensued, with undesirable consequences.

Illegal but all Too Comfortable

The ongoing Russian-US conflict has been aggravated as a result of the war in Ukraine and the stagnation of the military situation in Syria, especially with the absence of a prospect for a political solution while economic and humanitarian needs of the Syrian people escalate. This means that oil has emerged as a factor of tacit cooperation between illegitimate Syrian and foreign belligerents to share the revenues of about 89,000 barrels per day.

According to expert estimates, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) receives around USD 16 per barrel and a further USD 15 goes to the Syrian government. The remaining amount, which could amount up to USD 50 per barrel, is ‘lost’ and ends up in the hands of these war profiteers. The AANES uses part of the production locally, while the mediators and the war profiteers transport another part to government areas (constituting two-thirds of Syria’s territory) for refining or keeping. It is well reported that oil is also smuggled into Iraqi Kurdistan, either for local use or for smuggling into Turkiye. Oil is sold at very low prices and the fields and surrounding environment now suffer considerable damage.

Officials talk about networks operating in the shadows to smuggle oil and its derivatives between the east of the Euphrates, controlled by the SDF whose linchpin is the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), and the Euphrates Shield areas or other enclaves controlled by the Syrian opposition factions and the Turkish army. It is noteworthy that the military forces in these two regions are involved in daily fighting, strikes, and raids, and exchange accusations of disloyalty, treason, and terrorism.

The same applies to the path crossed by oil tanks from the eastern Euphrates to oil refineries in the areas controlled by the Syrian government. The latter accuses the dominant forces in the east of the country of being traitors and agents of the American occupation. In the same vein, an informed source said that officials in the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) advised leaders of the SDF to coordinate with Damascus regarding the sale of oil internally and regionally.

The cooperation between the belligerents extends beyond the borders. Reports indicate that oil is smuggled into Iraqi Kurdistan and some Turkish regions, with the involvement of mediators and individuals close to the decision-makers there, although political and military differences are ongoing between the decision-makers in Qamishli and Erbil. In this regard, an informed Western official said, "most likely, the decision-makers in these areas are not in a hurry to reach a political solution that would impede the flow of money into their pockets. It is most likely that the war profiteers in the local areas of influence and the neighboring countries do not want the war to end.”

An Alternative Approach -

When President Joe Biden assumed office, his administration announced sanction exemptions that allowed some targeted investments, (although this excluded the oil industry), in Eastern Euphrates. However, it decided not to extend the sanction waiver granted to Delta Crescent Energy for many reasons, mainly the objection of foreign companies holding sovereignty rights in the oil fields. For instance, Gulfsands Petroleum (“Gulfsands”) signed a contract with Damascus in 2003 to invest in and develop Block 26 east of the Euphrates. According to its 2021 annual report, unauthorized production from Block 26 since early 2017 has reached about 20,000 barrels per day, meaning that around 35 million barrels have been produced from the block since then.

Meanwhile, London-based Gulfsands is calling for a "win-win" humanitarian initiative that would enable it and other international oil companies to regain control of their assets. Rather than flow to the sanctioned entities and other unauthorized intermediaries , the Gulfsands initiative would see revenues from oil sales transferred to a UN-controlled fund. John Bell, the managing director of Gulfsands, said a new approach was needed to alleviate the enormous suffering in Syria. He added, "Syria needs billions of dollars that can only be generated with oil and gas,” and described the plans as "a gain for the Kurds, Damascus, and the Syrian people." He also posited that a share of oil proceeds would go to a UN-controlled humanitarian account whose payments are fully in line with the international sanctions placed on Syria.

That might seem simple, but analysts have linked the initiative with the Oil-for-Food program enforced in Iraq before the US invasion in 2003. Bell acknowledges that lessons need to be learned from that ill-fated program as he proposes the initiative to the international stakeholders. This is a particularly timely initiative as discussions continue regarding the extension of providing international aid across borders, including the amendment to include the financing of early recovery projects and other humanitarian and health affairs.

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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.