In the mid-fifties, Egypt and Syria broke what had been known as the “West’s monopoly on arms supply” in the Middle East. It was a consequential and dangerous decision taken for many reasons: the new military and security regimes wanted to distinguish themselves from the previous traditional regimes of notables. Moreover, since the Western colonists were gone, their weapons had to go with them, and the aim became reducing economic trade with them in favor of whatever came of trade with their communist opponents. Finally, the conflict with Israel requires different weapons from those obtained by Israel. Indeed, if a Western gun never fought another Western gun, the only commodity Russia had been famous for exporting was arms, and it was very generous with all who asked.
The “Arab masses” were called on to celebrate the decision, and so they did. Indeed, the coup regimes’ legitimacy was weak, and they sought an achievement to strengthen it; whenever there was an uproar, “popular legitimacy” would be made a stand-in for constitutional legitimacy.
The fact is that it is difficult to defend monopoly, any monopoly, or armament, any armament. However, it seems, at least by today’s standards, that matter was not worth all the commotion it created. It could have been resolved differently, more calmly and gradually, framed as part of the decolonization process and a necessary requisite for reinforcing the sovereignty of newly independent states.
What happened instead is that Soviet arms strengthened the military-security regimes in the region, undermining its relative stability and development prospects and leaving it inextricably tied to the Cold War in Western Europe and the Far East. As for Israel, the result of the biggest test put to the theories that justified “breaking the West’s monopoly on arms supply,” the 1967 war, attested to their misguidedness.
The reason for this return to the mid-fifties is that the region is currently undergoing a strategic shift of the same caliber as “breaking the monopoly on arms supply.”
Let us look into some of the panicked headlines of the past few days:
According to National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby, Russia and Iran have formed a full-fledged defense partnership: the former is offering Iran unprecedented military and technical support, and they are preparing to jointly manufacture drones. According to Kirby, such a partnership will harm “Ukraine, Iran’s neighbors, and the international community.” The National Security Council spokesperson also did not deny that his country fears Russia intends to “provide Iran with advanced military components,” including helicopters and air defense systems.
UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly has said he believes “Iran has become one of Russia’s main military supporters” and that “the relationship between them was threatening global security;” he also believes that this will increase the risks facing “our partners in the Middle.” On top of that, Cleverly warned that Iran’s support for Russia will become more robust over the next few months as the latter is seeking more weapons, including hundreds of ballistic missiles.
Australia also made a statement, announcing that it was sanctioning Iranians and Iranian institutions for supplying Russia with drones to use against Ukraine. Its foreign minister, Penny Wong, said commenting on the supply of drones to Russia that “it is evidence of the role Iran plays in destabilizing global security.”
Ukraine has accused Iran of supplying Moscow with the same “kamikaze” drones used on October 17. Tehran denied this at first, but it soon confirmed that it had given Moscow a limited number of these drones “many months before the war.” In turn, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rebuffed Iran’s claims, reminding us that the Ukrainian air force had shot down between 10 and 15 of the kinds of drones that had been used in the south of the country and severely damaged infrastructure and the electricity grid.
These facts and others lead us to the conclusion that Russia and Iran have developed a comprehensive alliance, which has led to Iran taking part in the Ukraine war. Just as Russia “has the right” to intervene in Syria alongside Iran, Iran “has the right” to intervene in Ukraine alongside Russia. As for the theory behind this shift, it is ready, just as it had been when the “West’s monopoly on arms supply” was being broken: what else could it be but breaking American unipolarity and standing up to the West’s arrogance etc.…
Just as the latter theory gave rise to interventionist policies backed by Nasser and extended from Yemen to the Congo in the sixties, which were repeated by Castro’s policies in the seventies that drove his forces to Angola and Ethiopia, Iran has resumed this strategy: a bankrupt country under the grip of draconian security forces that is facing a popular revolution has appointed itself the “liberator” of an oppressed, downtrodden people. It could be said that Khomeinist Iran is well-equipped to undertake this task since Iran has been practicing in four or five Arab countries. However, getting involved in distant Ukraine marks a qualitative shift in this regard, a shift that speaks volumes about Iran, Russia, and their role in creating the miserable conditions we find ourselves in today.
