Lebanon 'Tackles' Presidential Vacuum...with Army Generals

LAF Commander General Joseph Aoun (LAF website)
LAF Commander General Joseph Aoun (LAF website)
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Lebanon 'Tackles' Presidential Vacuum...with Army Generals

LAF Commander General Joseph Aoun (LAF website)
LAF Commander General Joseph Aoun (LAF website)

As Lebanon’s political blocs have failed to elect a new president for the country, all attention turns, as usual, to the military institution, which enjoys the people’s trust as the most cohesive authority within the Lebanese state.

In addition to MP Michel Moawad, two candidates share the electoral stage; but no party has endorsed their candidacy. Those are former MP Sleiman Franjieh, and Army Commander General Joseph Aoun. The latter’s chances are rising with the faltering elections, especially since he also enjoys international confidence that was expressed on more than one occasion.

The Army tends to disregard talks about the candidacy of its commander and refrains from making public statements about it.

A security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that the commander’s directives were firm in this regard.

“His main concern today is to spare the institution the catastrophic repercussions of the crises that afflict the country; he is not envisaging political work,” the source remarked.

Asharq Al-Awsat presents an extensive investigation, based on the experience of four Army generals - Fouad Chehab, Emile Lahoud, Michel Sleiman, and Michel Aoun - who assumed the Lebanese presidency.

All of the four generals were elected as a result of consensus and the inability of politicians to propose solutions to the crises that afflict the country. Paradoxically, the tenure of each of them witnessed a change in the international and regional balance of power that further scattered the country’s torn papers.

Fouad Chehab: The era of institutions... and intelligence services

General Fouad Chehab played two pivotal roles in the two biggest crises that afflicted Lebanon. The first was the resignation of President Bechara El-Khoury in 1952 under the pressure of massive demonstrations against his internal policies, and apparently, his endeavor to renew his mandate after amending the constitution.

The second crisis was represented in the events of the so-called 1958 revolution at the end of the term of President Camille Chamoun, who sided with the policies of the West in contrast to the policies of Egyptian President Abdel Nasser, who was overwhelmingly popular among Muslims in Lebanon.

In the first crisis, Chehab was appointed head of a transitional government for three days, which oversaw the transfer of power between the resignation of Khoury and the election of Chamoun. In the second, the army stood neutral between the two parties to the conflict and prevented supporters of the opposition and the government alike from occupying strategic sites such as airports, radio stations, and government buildings.

Although Fouad Chehab rejected the temptation to run for the presidency in 1952, he accepted that in 1958.

His tenure was known as “the era of institutions,” but was also marked by the strong involvement of the Army Intelligence - known at the time as the Second Bureau - in political life, as well as in administrations and civil societies.

Renowned Author Emile Khoury described Chehab’s rule as the “era of stability and reforms.”

Emile Lahoud... A failed reproduction of Chehab’s Experience

With the end of President Elias Hrawi’s term in 1995, Army Commander General Emile Lahoud was the preferred candidate for Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, who at that time had the last say in the appointment of senior positions in the country.

However, external pressure and wishes made Assad postpone this election, and accept the extension of Hrawi’s term for an additional three years, after which Lahoud would be elected as president in 1998 after amending the constitution for this purpose.

Lahoud’s tenure saw a decline in the power of the Syrian regime in Lebanon. Moreover, Assad’s support for amending the constitution to extend Lahoud’s term for an additional three years resulted in the latter’s international isolation, especially since it occurred before the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the great upheaval that followed.

Former Minister Karim Pakradouni, who was a supporter of Lahoud’s election, says: “There is a rule in Lebanon: every time politicians fail to agree on a candidate’s name, they resort to the army. This is what happened in 1958 when differences prevailed between political and sectarian forces… This also happened when they elected General Emile Lahoud as president…”

Pakradouni continued: “In this context, President Lahoud summed up the policies of his era with ‘liberation, alliance with Syria, and reform’. Lahoud succeeded in achieving liberation, as the land was liberated from the Israelis in 2000, and he was able to ally with Syria, but he did not succeed in the issue of reform, knowing that much was expected of him in reforms…”

The Era of Michel Sleiman… The Golden Trio turns into Intense Rivalry

President Michel Sleiman assumed the presidency following a compromise between the parties to the conflict at the end of Lahoud’s term, and after a presidential vacuum that lasted for nearly six months. Sleiman was a consensual president produced by agreements in Doha in the aftermath of a military operation carried out by Hezbollah against its political opponents in Beirut and the Mountains in May 2008.

Alike his military predecessors, he faced changes in the international equation, with the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings and their arrival in Syria with the direct involvement of Hezbollah.

The “honeymoon” with the party did not last long, and talk of the “Army, People and Resistance,” which was adopted in the ministerial statement during his tenure, turned into intense rivalry with Sleiman, to the extent that his supporters described this slogan as the “wooden trio”, ridiculing Hezbollah’s description of it as the “golden trio.”

Former Minister Nazim al-Khoury, who was close to Sleiman, considers him “a national figure who succeeded in playing the role of arbitrator between the political parties. His election came as a realistic solution to a crisis that almost brought the country back to civil war.”

Khoury noted that Sleiman’s main accomplishments included his success in managing the national dialogue and achieving consensus on the famous Baabda Declaration, which was considered a complement to the Taif Document and the Doha Agreement, and later became an official document approved by the United Nations and the League of Arab States.

Sleiman wanted the declaration to be a pre-emptive Lebanese agreement that would fortify it internally. Unfortunately, Iran entered the war line in Syria, which made Hezbollah retract its support for the Baabda Declaration and directly engage in the Syrian conflict.

Michel Aoun… The Era of Crises

Michel Sleiman’s term ended in a new presidential vacuum. The March 14 team had the necessary parliamentary majority to elect the president (about 70 deputies). However, the opposite team disrupted parliament sessions and prevented voting for two years and five months, after which a settlement was reached to elect General Michel Aoun, provided that MP Saad Hariri assumes the premiership.

This experiment has drastically failed. Lebanon suffered a relapse in the middle of the mandate, with a new international and regional change, accompanied this time by a financial and economic collapse, the greatest in the country’s history.

Aoun could not rule. Hezbollah, which closed Parliament to secure the election of its ally, “did not help him succeed,” says a senior official in the pro-Aoun movement.

MP Alain Aoun, the former president’s nephew and a member of his parliamentary bloc, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “President Aoun’s experience was not up to his ambitions or the aspirations of his supporters because of the financial collapse that occurred during his tenure…”

“This setback, despite its magnitude, cannot abolish the positive accomplishments during the era of President Aoun, in terms of the return of security and political stability in the first half of his tenure, thanks to the understandings that existed at the time, and the electoral reform that saw the adoption of the proportional system for the first time in the history of Lebanon, and finally and most importantly, the agreement on the maritime border demarcation with Israel,” the deputy said.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.