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Normalization between Syria and Türkiye … Putin’s Gift to Erdogan

Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
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Normalization between Syria and Türkiye … Putin’s Gift to Erdogan

Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)

The Russian-sponsored Syrian-Turkish military meeting that was held in Moscow on Wednesday is the latest effort to achieve rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus.

It will likely culminate in a “gift” to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan from his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin: a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ahead of Turkish elections in 2023.

However, are the normalization efforts serious or simply cosmetic?

Background

Relations between Ankara and Damascus shifted in summer 2011, months after the eruption of the Syrian anti-regime protests. Türkiye became a safe haven and supporter of the opposition against Damascus.

Syria transformed into an arena of violence, chaos and division. It also became a backer of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) that is opposed to Ankara.

Russia intervened in the conflict in the regime’s favor in 2015. Soon, it had troops deployed in Syria, effectively becoming Türkiye’s neighbor. Ankara would then discover the extent of NATO’s support to it, forcing it to cooperate with Moscow to impose a new reality in Syria.

A year later, Türkiye would prioritize preventing the formation of a Kurdish entity on its southern borders. It therefore reached a series of settlements and agreements with Russia that put an end to Kurdish ambitions. It succeeded in gaining control of pockets of regions in Syria, estimated at over 20,000 square kilometers, roughly twice the size of Lebanon.

Putin pushed for rapprochement between Erdogan and Assad with the launch of the Astana talks between Russia, Iran and Türkiye in 2017 and the development of the “hostile cooperation” between Ankara and Moscow.

In early 2020, Moscow succeeded in hosting an open meeting between Syria’s national security chief Ali Mamlouk and Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan. Mamlouk demanded that Türkiye pull out from Syrian regions and reopen the Aleppo-Latakia highway. Fidan wanted deeper cooperation against the YPG.

Putin succeeded in bringing them together, but failed in reaching a major breakthrough.

New attempt

Erdogan has repeatedly been threatening to wage a new military offensive in Syria. He also has his eyes set on the upcoming elections and growing Turkish opposition to Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Notably, Türkiye and Russia have seen their cooperation deepen in wake of the war on Ukraine.

With all of the above, Putin has been paving the way for a meeting between Erdogan and Assad before the summer.

The first step he took was have a secret meeting take place between Mamlouk and Fidan in Moscow in July 2022.

The Syrian official demanded that his country’s sovereignty be respected. He demanded a timetable for Türkiye’s withdrawal from Syrian regions and called on it to cease its support to opposition factions and “terrorists”. He urged Türkiye to reopen the Aleppo-Latakia and Bab al-Hawa-Idlib highways, to take measures against western sanctions and back Syria’s reconstruction.

For his part, Fidan demanded cooperation with Damascus against the YPG and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). He demanded the establishment of a security zone that excludes these groups 23 kilometers deep into Syria and the establishment of safe zones that can take in a million returning refugees. He also urged cooperation in the Constitutional Committee and resolving the Syrian crisis through United Nations Security Council resolution 2254.

Mamlouk and Fidan failed to reach an agreement and the meeting ended without a breakthrough.

Normalization or not?

In recent months Erdogan wasn’t wondering whether he will meet with Assad or not, but rather when he will meet him. He has repeatedly declared that he is ready to meet with him, listing various reasons, such as resolving differences with the majority of countries in the region before the Turkish elections.

Assad, however, is in no rush to hold a meeting that would favor his rival, whose country he views as an occupying nation.

As Türkiye and Russia intensify their cooperation in Ukraine, the Turkish elections draw near and the Syrian economic crisis deepens, Putin has pushed more and more for normalization and for a meeting to be held between him, Erdogan and Assad. The meeting would be seen as a gift to his “frenemy” and a boost for him to win the elections.

To that end, Russia has proposed holding a series of meetings that include tripartite security talks, meetings between the ministers of defense attended by intelligence officials, and a meeting between the Russian, Turkish and Syrian foreign ministers that will be capped by a summit between Putin, Erdogan and Assad.

Russia is trying to offer magical remedies to bridge the divide between Türkiye and Syria. It is offering a series of military, security and political meetings, as well as amendments to the 1998 Adana agreement between Ankara and Damascus that addresses cooperation against the PKK and the possibility of a Turkish incursion 5 kilometers deep into Syria.

The amendments would merge the Adana and 2019 Sochi agreements to include the deployment of Russian-Turkish patrols, the withdrawal of the YPG 30 kilometers away from the Turkish border and the deployment of Syrian border guards along the border with Türkiye.

Politically, Russia is proposing that a joint statement be issued with main clauses that underscore a “commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria”, “rejection of separatist agendas” and return of refugees.

Türkiye is home to some 3.7 million Syrian refugees. The issue has been one of the main headlines of the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections. Erdogan wants to take away this card from his rivals, which is why he is pursuing rapprochement and agreement with Damascus. Ultimately, however, the return of two million refugees back to their homeland is a hard ask.

Assad wants the withdrawal of thousands of Turkish soldiers from Syria, an end to “occupations” and a halt to military and political support to the Syrian opposition. It would be difficult to envisage an alliance with Ankara against the Kurds and meeting with Erdogan before a step is taken towards fulfilling these demands.

Moscow has set the process of normalization between Damascus and Ankara in motion, with all its security, military and political demands, with the final goal being a summit between Putin, Erdogan and Assad.

Normalization will be the chief pursuit of 2023 with its anticipated impact on normalization between Arab countries and Damascus and how far the US will allow it to go ahead.

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What to Know about the Protests Shaking Iran as Govt Shuts Down Internet and Phone Networks

Mourners carry coffins during a funeral procession for members of security forces and civilians said to be killed in protests on Sunday, amid evolving anti-government unrest, in Tehran, Iran, in this screengrab from a video released on January 11, 2026. IRIB/Handout via REUTERS
Mourners carry coffins during a funeral procession for members of security forces and civilians said to be killed in protests on Sunday, amid evolving anti-government unrest, in Tehran, Iran, in this screengrab from a video released on January 11, 2026. IRIB/Handout via REUTERS
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What to Know about the Protests Shaking Iran as Govt Shuts Down Internet and Phone Networks

Mourners carry coffins during a funeral procession for members of security forces and civilians said to be killed in protests on Sunday, amid evolving anti-government unrest, in Tehran, Iran, in this screengrab from a video released on January 11, 2026. IRIB/Handout via REUTERS
Mourners carry coffins during a funeral procession for members of security forces and civilians said to be killed in protests on Sunday, amid evolving anti-government unrest, in Tehran, Iran, in this screengrab from a video released on January 11, 2026. IRIB/Handout via REUTERS

Nationwide protests in Iran sparked by the country’s ailing economy are putting new pressure on its theocracy as it has shut down the internet and telephone networks.

Tehran is still reeling from a 12-day war launched by Israel in June that saw the United States bomb nuclear sites in Iran. Economic pressure, which has intensified since September when the United Nations reimposed sanctions on the country over its atomic program, has sent Iran's rial currency into a free fall, now trading at over 1.4 million to $1.

Meanwhile, Iran's self-described “Axis of Resistance” — a coalition of countries and militant groups backed by Tehran — has been decimated since the start of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023.

A threat by US President Donald Trump warning Iran that if Tehran “violently kills peaceful protesters” the US “will come to their rescue," has taken on new meaning after American troops captured Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro, a longtime ally of Tehran.

“We're watching it very closely,” Trump has warned. “If they start killing people like they have in the past, I think they're going to get hit very hard by the United States.”

Here's what to know about the protests and the challenges facing Iran's government.

How widespread the protests are

More than 500 protests have taken place across all of Iran’s 31 provinces, the US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency reported early Monday. The death toll had reached at least 544, it said, with more than 10,600 arrests. The group relies on an activist network inside of Iran for its reporting and has been accurate in past unrest.

The Iranian government has not offered overall casualty figures for the demonstrations. The Associated Press has been unable to independently assess the toll, given that internet and international phone calls are now blocked in Iran.

Understanding the scale of the protests has been difficult. Iranian state media has provided little information about the demonstrations. Online videos offer only brief, shaky glimpses of people in the streets or the sound of gunfire. Journalists in general in Iran also face limits on reporting such as requiring permission to travel around the country, as well as the threat of harassment or arrest by authorities. The internet shutdown has further complicated the situation.

But the protests do not appear to be stopping, even after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said “rioters must be put in their place.”

Why the demonstrations started

The collapse of the rial has led to a widening economic crisis in Iran. Prices are up on meat, rice and other staples of the Iranian dinner table. The nation has been struggling with an annual inflation rate of some 40%.

In December, Iran introduced a new pricing tier for its nationally subsidized gasoline, raising the price of some of the world’s cheapest gas and further pressuring the population. Tehran may seek steeper price increases in the future, as the government now will review prices every three months.

Meanwhile, food prizes are expected to spike after Iran’s Central Bank in recent days ended a preferential, subsidized dollar-rial exchange rate for all products except medicine and wheat.

The protests began in late December with merchants in Tehran before spreading. While initially focused on economic issues, the demonstrations soon saw protesters chanting anti-government statements as well. Anger has been simmering over the years, particularly after the 2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in police custody that triggered nationwide demonstrations.

Some have chanted in support of Iran's exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, who called for protests Thursday and Friday night.

Iran's alliances are weakened

Iran's “Axis of Resistance," which grew in prominence in the years after the 2003 US-led invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, is reeling.

Israel has crushed Hamas in the devastating war in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah, the Shiite militant group in Lebanon, has seen its top leadership killed by Israel and has been struggling since. A lightning offensive in December 2024 overthrew Iran’s longtime stalwart ally and client in Syria, President Bashar Assad, after years of war there. Yemen's Iranian-backed Houthis also have been pounded by Israeli and US airstrikes.

China meanwhile has remained a major buyer of Iranian crude oil, but hasn't provided overt military support. Neither has Russia, which has relied on Iranian drones in its war on Ukraine.

The West worries about Iran’s nuclear program Iran has insisted for decades that its nuclear program is peaceful. However, its officials have increasingly threatened to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran had been enriching uranium to near weapons-grade levels before the US attack in June, making it the only country in the world without a nuclear weapons program to do so.

Tehran also increasingly cut back its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, as tensions increased over its nuclear program in recent years. The IAEA's director-general has warned Iran could build as many as 10 nuclear bombs, should it decide to weaponize its program.

US intelligence agencies have assessed that Iran has yet to begin a weapons program, but has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.”

Iran recently said it was no longer enriching uranium at any site in the country, trying to signal to the West that it remains open to potential negotiations over its atomic program to ease sanctions. But there's been no significant talks in the months since the June war.

Why relations between Iran and the US are so tense

Iran decades ago was one of the United States’ top allies in the Mideast under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who purchased American military weapons and allowed CIA technicians to run secret listening posts monitoring the neighboring Soviet Union. The CIA fomented a 1953 coup that cemented the shah’s rule.

But in January 1979, the shah fled Iran as mass demonstrations swelled against his rule. Then came the Iranian Revolution led by Khomeini, which created Iran’s theocratic government.

Later that year, university students overran the US Embassy in Tehran, seeking the shah’s extradition and sparking the 444-day hostage crisis that saw diplomatic relations between Iran and the US severed.

During the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the US backed Saddam Hussein. During that conflict, the US launched a one-day assault that crippled Iran at sea as part of the so-called “Tanker War,” and later shot down an Iranian commercial airliner that the US military said it mistook for a warplane.

Iran and the US have seesawed between enmity and grudging diplomacy in the years since. Relations peaked with the 2015 nuclear deal, which saw Iran greatly limit its program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. But Trump unilaterally withdrew America from the accord in 2018, sparking tensions in the Mideast that intensified after Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel.

Features

How the US Could Take Over Greenland and the Potential Challenges

05 February 2025, Greenland, Nuuk: Greenlandic flags fly in front of the Inatsisartut parliament in the capital Nuuk. (dpa)
05 February 2025, Greenland, Nuuk: Greenlandic flags fly in front of the Inatsisartut parliament in the capital Nuuk. (dpa)
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How the US Could Take Over Greenland and the Potential Challenges

05 February 2025, Greenland, Nuuk: Greenlandic flags fly in front of the Inatsisartut parliament in the capital Nuuk. (dpa)
05 February 2025, Greenland, Nuuk: Greenlandic flags fly in front of the Inatsisartut parliament in the capital Nuuk. (dpa)

US President Donald Trump wants to own Greenland. He has repeatedly said the United States must take control of the strategically located and mineral-rich island, which is a semiautonomous region that's part of NATO ally Denmark.

Officials from Denmark, Greenland and the United States met Thursday in Washington and will meet again next week to discuss a renewed push by the White House, which is considering a range of options, including using military force, to acquire the island.

Trump said Friday he is going to do “something on Greenland, whether they like it or not.”

If it's not done “the easy way, we're going to do it the hard way," he said without elaborating what that could entail. In an interview Thursday, he told The New York Times that he wants to own Greenland because “ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.”

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has warned that an American takeover of Greenland would mark the end of NATO, and Greenlanders say they don't want to become part of the US.

This is a look at some of the ways the US could take control of Greenland and the potential challenges.

Military action could alter global relations

Trump and his officials have indicated they want to control Greenland to enhance American security and explore business and mining deals. But Imran Bayoumi, an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, said the sudden focus on Greenland is also the result of decades of neglect by several US presidents towards Washington's position in the Arctic.

The current fixation is partly down to “the realization we need to increase our presence in the Arctic, and we don’t yet have the right strategy or vision to do so,” he said.

If the US took control of Greenland by force, it would plunge NATO into a crisis, possibly an existential one.

While Greenland is the largest island in the world, it has a population of around 57,000 and doesn't have its own military. Defense is provided by Denmark, whose military is dwarfed by that of the US.

It's unclear how the remaining members of NATO would respond if the US decided to forcibly take control of the island or if they would come to Denmark's aid.

“If the United States chooses to attack another NATO country militarily, then everything stops,” Frederiksen has said.

Trump said he needs control of the island to guarantee American security, citing the threat from Russian and Chinese ships in the region, but “it's not true” said Lin Mortensgaard, an expert on the international politics of the Arctic at the Danish Institute for International Studies, or DIIS.

While there are probably Russian submarines — as there are across the Arctic region — there are no surface vessels, Mortensgaard said. China has research vessels in the Central Arctic Ocean, and while the Chinese and Russian militaries have done joint military exercises in the Arctic, they have taken place closer to Alaska, she said.

Bayoumi, of the Atlantic Council, said he doubted Trump would take control of Greenland by force because it’s unpopular with both Democratic and Republican lawmakers, and would likely “fundamentally alter” US relationships with allies worldwide.

The US already has access to Greenland under a 1951 defense agreement, and Denmark and Greenland would be “quite happy” to accommodate a beefed-up American military presence, Mortensgaard said.

For that reason, “blowing up the NATO alliance” for something Trump has already, doesn’t make sense, said Ulrik Pram Gad, an expert on Greenland at DIIS.

Bilateral agreements may assist effort

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told a select group of US lawmakers this week that it was the Republican administration’s intention to eventually purchase Greenland, as opposed to using military force. Danish and Greenlandic officials have previously said the island isn't for sale.

It's not clear how much buying the island could cost, or if the US would be buying it from Denmark or Greenland.

Washington also could boost its military presence in Greenland “through cooperation and diplomacy,” without taking it over, Bayoumi said.

One option could be for the US to get a veto over security decisions made by the Greenlandic government, as it has in islands in the Pacific Ocean, Gad said.

Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands have a Compact of Free Association, or COFA, with the US.

That would give Washington the right to operate military bases and make decisions about the islands’ security in exchange for US security guarantees and around $7 billion of yearly economic assistance, according to the Congressional Research Service.

It's not clear how much that would improve upon Washington's current security strategy. The US already operates the remote Pituffik Space Base in northwestern Greenland and can bring as many troops as it wants under existing agreements.

Influence operations expected to fail

Greenlandic politician Aaja Chemnitz told The Associated Press that Greenlanders want more rights, including independence, but don't want to become part of the US.

Gad suggested influence operations to persuade Greenlanders to join the US would likely fail. He said that is because the community on the island is small and the language is “inaccessible.”

Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen summoned the top US official in Denmark in August to complain that “foreign actors” were seeking to influence the country’s future. Danish media reported that at least three people with connections to Trump carried out covert influence operations in Greenland.

Even if the US managed to take control of Greenland, it would likely come with a large bill, Gad said. That’s because Greenlanders currently have Danish citizenship and access to the Danish welfare system, including free health care and schooling.

To match that, “Trump would have to build a welfare state for Greenlanders that he doesn’t want for his own citizens,” Gad said.

Disagreement unlikely to be resolved

Since 1945, the American military presence in Greenland has decreased from thousands of soldiers over 17 bases and installations to 200 at the remote Pituffik Space Base in the northwest of the island, Rasmussen said last year. The base supports missile warning, missile defense and space surveillance operations for the US and NATO.

US Vice President JD Vance told Fox News on Thursday that Denmark has neglected its missile defense obligations in Greenland, but Mortensgaard said that it makes “little sense to criticize Denmark,” because the main reason why the US operates the Pituffik base in the north of the island is to provide early detection of missiles.

The best outcome for Denmark would be to update the defense agreement, which allows the US to have a military presence on the island and have Trump sign it with a “gold-plated signature,” Gad said.

But he suggested that's unlikely because Greenland is “handy” to the US president.

When Trump wants to change the news agenda — including distracting from domestic political problems — “he can just say the word ‘Greenland’ and this starts all over again,” Gad said.

Features

US Stance on Iran Protests Balances Threats, Caution

Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
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US Stance on Iran Protests Balances Threats, Caution

Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)

It may still be premature to say Iran’s ruling system is nearing collapse. Yet the unrest that has gripped the country in recent weeks has pushed Tehran into its most severe internal crisis in years.

Protests triggered by economic freefall and the collapse of the national currency have rapidly spread across regions and social classes, shedding their purely economic character and evolving into a direct challenge to the foundations of the political system.

As strikes have expanded, particularly in the bazaar and the oil sector, popular anger has deepened into a political crisis with existential stakes.

At the heart of these developments, the United States factor stands out as one of the most sensitive and influential elements, not only because of the long history of conflict between Washington and Tehran, but also due to the unprecedented tone adopted by US President Donald Trump, and the political and media reaction within Congress, which has reflected a calibrated division over how to approach the Iranian crisis.

From the early days of the escalating protests, Trump opted to depart from traditional diplomatic language. In a series of interviews and statements, he said he was following events in Iran “very closely,” expressing his belief that the country was “on the verge of collapse.”

More significant than his assessment, however, were his public warnings to the Iranian leadership against continuing to suppress protesters.

Trump spoke bluntly of live fire against unarmed demonstrators, arrests, and executions, describing the situation as “brutal behavior,” and stressing that he had informed Tehran that any bloody escalation would be met with “very severe strikes” from the United States.

This language amounts to an attempt at political and psychological deterrence rather than a declaration of an imminent military plan.

It pressures Iran’s leadership and sends a message of moral support to protesters, while simultaneously preserving ambiguity over the nature of any potential US action.

Vice President JD Vance expressed a similar stance, writing on X that Washington supports anyone exercising their right to peaceful protest, noting that Iran’s system suffers from deep problems.

He reiterated Trump’s call for “real negotiations” over the nuclear program, while leaving future steps to the president’s judgment.

Despite Trump’s clear support for the protests, his administration has so far avoided going further on the question of “the day after.”

This hesitation has been evident in its position on Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s late shah, whose name has resurfaced as a figure of the exiled opposition.

While Trump described him as “a nice person,” he stopped short of holding an official meeting, saying it was still too early to determine who could genuinely represent the will of the Iranian people.

This caution reflects US awareness of the sensitivity of the Iranian scene, in light of past experiences in the region, from Iraq to Libya, where early bets on political alternatives led to disastrous outcomes.

Any overt US backing of a specific opposition figure could also give the Iranian authorities grounds to reinforce their narrative of a “foreign conspiracy,” a line already invoked by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and state media.

Alongside political rhetoric, the economic card occupies a central place in US calculations.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described Iran’s economy as on the edge of collapse, pointing to high inflation and a sharp erosion in living standards due to sanctions and mismanagement.

These remarks were not merely technical assessments, but a political message that Washington sees the economic crisis as a pressure point that could accelerate the erosion of the system’s ability to endure.

The economy is not only the spark that ignited the protests, but also one of the keys to their future. Continued strikes, particularly in the oil sector, threaten the main artery of state revenues, compounding pressure and narrowing room for maneuver.

In this context, Washington appears convinced that time is working against Tehran and that allowing the crisis to play out internally may be more effective than any direct intervention.

Another factor closely watched by US decision-makers is the international stance, notably the silence of Russia and China.

These two countries, which have provided Iran with political and economic cover in recent years, appear unwilling or unable to intervene to rescue the system from its internal crisis.

Their silence gives Washington a wider scope to escalate its rhetoric without fear of a major international confrontation.

At the same time, the US administration is keen to avoid appearing as the driver of regime change in Iran. Its declared support remains confined to an ethical and humanitarian framework, protecting protesters and preventing massacres, rather than shaping an alternative system.

This approach seeks to strike a balance between exploiting an adversary’s weakness and avoiding a slide into chaos.

The US response has not been limited to the White House, extending into Congress, where positions have reflected a disciplined division of opinion. The House Foreign Affairs Committee attacked the Iranian system in a post on X, describing it as a dictator that has stood for decades on the bodies of Iranians demanding change.

Within the Republican camp, alignment behind Trump has been clear.

Senator Lindsey Graham wrote that the president was “absolutely right,” that he “stands with the Iranian people against tyranny,” and called to “make Iran great again.”

Senator Ted Cruz said the protests had exposed the system’s “fatally weakened” status and that Iranians were “not chanting for cosmetic reforms, but for an end to clerical rule.”

Democrats, by contrast, expressed solidarity with protesters in a more cautious tone.

Senator Chris Murphy said Iranians deserve their future in their own hands, not through American bombs, warning that military intervention could undermine the movement.

Bernie Sanders said the United States should stand with human rights, not repeat the mistakes of forcibly changing regimes.

In the House, Representative Yassamin Ansari sparked further debate by voicing support for the Iranian people while warning against empowering the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, which she described as “an extremist group lacking legitimacy.”

Republican lawmakers such as Claudia Tenney and Mario Diaz-Balart adopted a harsher tone, calling for clear support for Iranians, “who are bravely demanding freedom, dignity, and basic human rights.”

This divergence reflects a complex US picture. Republicans see the Iranian moment as an opportunity to validate Trump’s pressure and deterrence strategy, while Democrats fear that verbal support could slide into ill-considered entanglement.

Yet both sides converge on a core point: holding Iran’s system responsible for violence and economic collapse and viewing current events as an unprecedented challenge to its legitimacy.

This relative alignment grants Trump room to maneuver domestically without imposing consensus on intervention.

Washington, as reflected in White House rhetoric and congressional debate, prefers at this stage to watch the fractures within Iran deepen, while keeping all options on the table and awaiting what happens on the streets.