The trilateral meeting between Russia, Türkiye, and Syria may have been the most significant event towards the end of 2022. Iran did not take part in the discussions on this sensitive strategic matter. This meeting was not without preludes but was rather preceded by several meetings and statements, including Erdogan affirming that a meeting with Assad is not off the table.
There are no enemies in politics, and this announcement was preceded by the Syrian leadership backing down on its demand that Türkiye pulls out of Syria before talks can take place. This comes at a time when Putin needs to cool things down in Syria to focus on the Ukrainian crisis and when Iran is busy dealing with the protests and the fate of its regime. However, is Erdogan serious about engaging with Assad? Can he solve the Syrian crisis?
Türkiye has doubtlessly gone back to the principle of "zero problems." This has meant warming relations with Israel and the Gulf states. This shift in his position on Syria is natural, as it is directly tied to Türkiye's security and the role Türkiye plays In the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and even Europe. Realpolitik is behind Türkiye's reversal of its position, as it seeks to maximize its gains in a volatile region that poses threats to Turkish security.
In fact, Türkiye has made unexpected rapprochements to protect its security, and it has turned its back on ideological religious partnerships that had been the pillar of its foreign policy. We must recognize that Türkiye's leadership knows that it is part of a big global game, one that might be too big for Türkiye to handle. It knows that any misstep could have disastrous consequences, especially given its experience in the First World War, which cost Türkiye its great empire. Based on all of this, we can read the dialogue between Syria and Türkiye as a ploy that aims to achieve the following:
First, overcoming the stagnation in Syria, especially since the struggle between the US and Russia will complicate things further, and the Kurds are growing in strength, be that in northern Iraq or Syria, which is a strategic threat to Türkiye's national security. Since maintaining the state is the first aim of realpolitik, Türkiye believes that, even in the worst of cases, moving things along in Syria will benefit Türkiye. That is because progress on this front would let Türkiye know what all the players would settle for, and if agreements are concluded, it can curb threats to its security. Moreover, Türkiye could compel the US to make a better offer through this move, especially since Türkiye believes that the US does not have a plan for the future of Syria.
Second, Erdogan's character allows him to make strategic leaps, as he believes in realpolitik and has become famous for being politically mercurial. He thus believes that Türkiye is now capable of entering the bazaar of negotiations and making maximum gains. Indeed Russia needs Türkiye, which controls Russia the Black Sea, and it needs Türkiye's cooperation in the Asian countries neighboring Russia. Additionally, the pair coordinate in Libya and Syria. Furthermore, the US also needs Turkish cooperation in Ukraine, NATO, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. That is why Erdogan believes that he earned the right to hold talks with his friend Putin about Türkiye's security in Syria, which the Turkish presents would also be a service to a surrounded Russia. For his part, Putin believes that cooling things in Syria or resolving the crisis, in light of the escalating threats by Türkiye, would present an opportunity to drag Erdogan into holding bilateral talks with Assad through which they would come to a mutually beneficial agreement. However, Erdogan is aware that this will not be smooth sailing and that no tangible results will come of this process in the short term. This course does, nonetheless, open the door to bidding in the international and regional Syrian bazaar. He knows that Türkiye would benefit more than any of the other players because it is the most powerful among them by virtue of its location, the number of refugees it hosts, and its support for Islamic movements.
Third, Erdogan believes the Arab states want to distance Assad from Iran and that this desire has yet to crystallize into a project that can convince weighty regional powers. For this reason, he sees dialogue with Damascus without Iran's participation with support from Russia, which enjoys positive relations with the Gulf states, would enhance these countries' view of Türkiye's role because it would be the godfather of an agreement that satisfies the Arabs. Also, Erdogan believes that an agreement with Assad that receives Arab support would guarantee the security of his borders, stimulate his economy, and facilitate other solutions tied to Türkiye's national security in places like Libya, which would have implications for ties with Greece. This course would explain Iran's absence as stemming from Türkiye seeking to avoid provocation of the Arab countries suffering from Iran's interference in their affair, its threats to Arab national security, and its role in weakening these countries' national fabric.
Fourth, Erdogan is aware that speaking to Assad puts his image in danger, as he has painted himself as the leader of the faithful - a man who reads the Quran and defends Muslims and the oppressed. This made him a popular figure in the Muslim world, and shaking hands with Assad, whom Erdogan has accused of being a war criminal, would obliterate that image. Erdogan has, however, left the door to reversing course open, with his Minister of Defense Hulusi Akar making clear that the only goal of the dialogue would be to fight terrorism, that Türkiye seeks to ensure its security and safeguard its borders, and that the Syrian crisis must be resolved in a comprehensive manner and in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 2254 that stipulates the peaceful transfer of power. All of this points to the fact that, in contrast to the claims being made in the Syrian media, there will be no meeting between Assad and Erdogan anytime soon. Rather, the prospects of such a meeting are tied to progress in technical and then political talks, with the Turkish foreign minister stressing that only Erdogan will only meet with Assad after seeing progress on this front. In other words, Erdogan only wants to meet Assad if their meeting crowns a Turkish diplomatic victory through the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution, which Iran would not accept.
This assessment affirms that Erdogan is not enthusiastic about meeting Assad because saving Assad would spoil Erdogan's image and, in the long term, his security. Putin, on the other hand, does not want to sacrifice Assad; because of the latter's strategic importance, Putin will not allow for his removal from power. Those sitting at the negotiating table are, of course, trying to show that they are engaging with one another in good faith, but they have poisonous daggers behind their backs that they will wield the moment they feel threatened.
