Arabs Divided over Syrian-Turkish Normalization and its Conditions 

In this photo released by the official Syrian state news agency SANA, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, left, speaks with United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed in Damascus, Syria, Wednesday, Jan. 4, 2023. (SANA via AP)
In this photo released by the official Syrian state news agency SANA, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, left, speaks with United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed in Damascus, Syria, Wednesday, Jan. 4, 2023. (SANA via AP)
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Arabs Divided over Syrian-Turkish Normalization and its Conditions 

In this photo released by the official Syrian state news agency SANA, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, left, speaks with United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed in Damascus, Syria, Wednesday, Jan. 4, 2023. (SANA via AP)
In this photo released by the official Syrian state news agency SANA, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, left, speaks with United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed in Damascus, Syria, Wednesday, Jan. 4, 2023. (SANA via AP)

The United Arab Emirates – through senior officials - is seeking to join Russia in sponsoring the normalization of relations between Syria and Türkiye. The United States and Arab countries, meanwhile, are seeking to halt the normalization efforts, or at least, place conditions before they can be complete, signaling Arab division over the issue. 

Asharq Al-Awsat learned that Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mikdad will meet with his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu in the presence of Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow on Wednesday. Efforts are underway to arrange for UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed’s participation at the meeting. 

The meeting will pave the way for a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The UAE has offered to host the summit. Should Moscow host the summit, then the UAE will send a high-level delegation to attend. Assad had visited the UAE in mid-2022 where he met with President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed. 

The potential summit was discussed between Assad and Sheikh Abdullah in Damascus on Wednesday. This was the Emirati official’s second visit to the Syrian capital since November 2021. 

Assad described ties between Syria and the UAE as “historic”, adding that it was “natural that they return to the depth that they enjoyed for several decades, in service of their countries and peoples,” reported Syria’s state news agency SANA. 

The UAE FM stressed that his country “supports stability in Syria and its sovereignty over all its territories.” He underscored the UAE’s “commitment to and keenness on supporting efforts to reach a political solution to the Syrian crisis that would restore security and stability and Syria’s unity.” 

Roadmap 

Asharq Al-Awsat also learned that Cavusoglu is planning on visiting Washington on January 16 and 17 to brief American officials on the progress in normalizing ties with Damascus and his meeting with Mikdad. 

He will also brief them on the “roadmap” that Russia is sponsoring on the security, military, economic and political levels and in line with the agreement reached between Russia, Syria and Türkiye’s defense ministers and intelligence chiefs in recent weeks. The roadmap also covers arrangements in northeastern Syria where US troops are deployed in support of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the fight against ISIS. 

A western diplomat told Asharq Al-Awsat that a senior American official will visit Ankara in the coming hours as part of efforts to mediate between Türkiye and the Kurds in northeastern Syria. 

Ankara has been demanding that Moscow and Washington commit to the implementation of the military agreements they signed in late 2019 and that call for the withdrawal of the backbone of the SDF, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), 30 kilometers deep from Syria’s northern border with Türkiye. The withdrawal also includes the regions of Manbij and Tal Rifaat and demands the removal of heavy weapons from the buffer zone. 

The SDF has said that it has fulfilled its commitments and that it will not pull out the Asayish police force and dismantle the local councils. Türkiye is insisting on the dismantling of all Kurdish civilian and military institutions in the area. 

The American mediation is aiming to reach middle ground between Ankara and the Kurds to avert a new Turkish incursion in Syria before the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections set for mid-2023. 

Erdogan is banking on Moscow and Washington’s need for him due to the Russian war on Ukraine. Erdogan has shown more openness towards meeting Assad to agree on arrangements against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and YPG in northeastern Syria and form safe zones for the return of Syrian refugees from Türkiye, which has taken in some 4 million of them. 

Another diplomat has said that Ankara was “uneasy” with the leaks that came out from Damascus in wake of the meeting between the Russia, Syrian and Turkish defense ministers in Moscow that allegedly included an agreement for Türkiye to withdraw from northern Syria. 

Another diplomat revealed, however, that Damascus and Ankara view the PKK as a common threat and they will work against any separatist agenda because it would pose an existential danger to both countries. Syria and Türkiye also agreed to work on reopening the Aleppo-Latakia highway. 

Western coordination 

Sheikh Abdullah’s visit to Damascus took place in wake of American official statements that expressed opposition to normalization with Assad. The statements were issued in wake of the Syrian-Turkish meetings. 

A diplomat revealed that the US State Department was the only party among western countries to release a statement to voice opposition to the normalization. It is working with Paris, Berlin and London to issue a clear joint position that rejects normalization. 

Contacts are underway to hold a meeting between representatives of the US, France, Germany and Britain with United Nations envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen, in Geneva on January 23 ahead of his visit to Damascus to meet Mikdad.  

The meeting will aim to underscore the stance on normalization and support offering funding to electricity and early recovery projects, in line with the relevant UN Security Council resolution that will be up for extension on January 10. Here, the UAE has offered to contribute in financing economic and electricity projects in Syria within the margin allowed by US sanctions and the Ceasar Act. 

Jordan was notably the first party to open higher levels of communication with Damascus. It backed the signing of a truce that covered southern Syria and the deal on easing the escalation between Russia and the US in mid-2018. Amman is now leading Arab efforts to reach a “joint Arab position that sets the Arab conditions in exchange for the normalization, for which a price will be extracted.” 

A western official said Jordan has noted that the smuggling of Captagon, weapons and ammunition across its border from Syria increased after normalization efforts kicked off. Moreover, Iran’s presence in southern Syria, near the Jordanian border, has not decreased. ISIS has also increased its activity there. 

Demands are therefore being made to coordinate efforts to pressure Damascus to offer political and geopolitical steps in the coming phase. 

Meanwhile, an Arab source revealed that a Palestinian Hamas delegation, including the movement’s leader in the Gaza Strip Khalil al-Hayya and leading member Osama Abou Hamdan, will visit Damascus next week. This will mark the first such visit since the Hamas leadership quit Damascus a decade ago. 

The same officials were part of a Palestinian delegation that had met Assad in October. Sources said Hayya and Abou Hamdan’s visit aims to discuss Hamas’ return to Syria and arrange for visits by more leading members to Damascus in the future. 



From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.