Iraqi PM to Asharq Al-Awsat: Our Country Won’t Be Arena for Settling Scores

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani sits down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat in Baghdad.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani sits down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat in Baghdad.
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Iraqi PM to Asharq Al-Awsat: Our Country Won’t Be Arena for Settling Scores

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani sits down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat in Baghdad.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani sits down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat in Baghdad.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced that Iraq and Saudi Arabia are capable of forming a regional axis that can act as a foundation for stability in the region and world. In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, he revealed that he agreed with Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister, on a roadmap to develop bilateral relations that would begin with ministerial visits and later the convening of the Saudi-Iraqi coordination council with the aim of carrying out projects over three years.

Sudani stressed that Baghdad will continue to play its role in hosting the Saudi-Iranian dialogue, revealing that a new meeting will be held between them soon.

The PM denied that Iran or the United States had interfered in the formation of his government that has now been in office for a hundred days. “The government was completely formed through Iraqi efforts. I was not influenced in any way, shape, or form by foreign meddling,” he assured.

On how Iraq can deal with both its allies – the US and Iran – given the tensions between them, the PM stated: “We don’t want Iraq to be an arena for settling scores. We are not siding with one party against the other. Rather, we are keen on strengthening our relations based on mutual interests and respect and refraining from meddling in internal affairs.” He added, however, that Iraq’s interests will remain the top priority.

Furthermore, Sudani underlined Iraq’s “pioneering role in the region with its Arab brothers, as well as Iran.” He stressed that “Iraq is destined to be Arab. This is Iraq’s natural state.”

The PM spoke at length about the internal situation in Iraq and the measures his government has taken in regards to administrative and security reforms, combating corruption and reclaiming looted funds.

After a hundred days in office, are you optimistic or skeptical? I won’t ask you if you regret taking on this challenging task.

Of course, I have no regrets because I know the extent of the mission and responsibility. I agreed to be designated as prime minister. I am optimistic. After a hundred days in office, the government is clear in carrying out its tasks and priorities on various levels, whether in its foreign relations or on the local level. Locally, the government has prioritized tackling poverty, creating job opportunities, improving services, carrying out economic reform and combating terrorism.

Has your experience so far confirmed what you have previously declared that corruption in Iraq was more dangerous than the COVID-19 pandemic?

That is why I have called it the “corruption pandemic”. This is the threat that is confronting the Iraqi state. It is more dangerous that COVID-19 and ISIS.

How much money has been squandered after the fall of Saddam Hussein?

I used to follow up on corruption regarding the theft of taxes when I was still a lawmaker. I was hoping that this issue would be the first to have been addressed when I became prime minister, but, unfortunately, the majority of the suspects have fled and helped smuggle the funds outside of Iraq.

According to preliminary calculations by audit agencies, some 3 billion dinars (2.5 billion dollars) have been stolen. Seeking greater transparency, our government contracted an international auditing firm to determine the exact amount that was stolen.

The squandering of funds goes back to 2003. There are no official statistics related to this issue. Corruption takes several forms. It could take place in the operational budget or the investment budget. It can take place outside the budgets, taking the shape of financial and administrative corruption.

It has been said that some 600 billion dollars have been squandered in less than two decades.

Why not 700 or 500 billion? These are estimates and figures, but they don’t give us the real picture. Neither we, nor the audit agencies are capable of giving an exact figure given the several budgets and projects related to investment. What sets this government apart, however, is its insistence on restoring the money that has been looted.

Can the government reclaim funds from powerful figures?

By applying the law, we can. We have kicked off the process and some important politicians have been arrested and looted funds have been reclaimed from them. Unfortunately, corruption can be found everywhere. Among minor employees, where surprisingly, the most damage can be made.

However, we can’t accuse everyone of being corrupt. There is an army of honorable people who have preserved public funds and stood against the corrupt. We must stand by those people and encourage them.

How is it possible that a rich country like Iraq can suffer from frequent power cuts? Is corruption to blame?

Yes, corruption and poor management and planning. In 2003, power production did not exceed 3,800 megawatts. Now, we have exceeded 21,000 megawatts, but that was also accompanied by greater expansion and growing needs. In the past, each house used to boast a fan. Now, each house has air conditioners and various appliances.

We have come across various problems, such as corruption and poor management and planning. In late 2013, just as we had resolved the electricity problem, we were confronted with ISIS and consequently, ended up taking several steps back.

Moreover, another glaring problem is the fact that only 10 percent of electricity taxes are collected throughout the country. This is due to the general attitude in that the people believe the state should assume this responsibility. Another reason is that the frequent power cuts weaken the government position. The people simply refuse to pay taxes for services that are not provided.

In addition, Iraq does not have a culture of power-saving. Whenever the power comes on, the people rush to turn on the air conditioners to cool their homes.

Has the rate of taxation increased?

As of yesterday, taxes have only reaped 600 billion dinars (around 400 million dollars) a year. The figure should be in the billions. On gas alone, we are spending 7 billion dollars a year by importing it from Iran. We are buying electricity at around 2.5 billion dollars. The expenses are massive and the taxes are minimal.

Will Iraq witness a deep reform process?

We have no choice but to carry out economic reform and diversify sources of income. We can no longer solely rely on oil revenues to cover budget expenses. We must look into alternatives, such as agriculture, industry and tourism. We must support the private sector so that it can create job opportunities.

Will unpopular decisions be taken next?

This government is destined to take reform decisions, which are often painful, but they will eventually benefit everyone.

I fear for the interest of Iraq and its people. When it comes to these two issues, I don’t care about my popularity and life. The interest of Iraq and its people are my compass.

What about the issue of the smuggling of dollars that we have been reading about?

After 2007, the central bank took the right step in tackling inflation and addressing the state of the dinar. During the 1990s, when Iraq was under the blockade, we would monitor the rise and fall of the dollar. Fluctuations would impact food prices.

What the central bank did was allow the selling of the currency. The trade mechanism was very common and it should have been revised and regulations should have been introduced. That did not happen and traders would go about reaping as much dollars as possible to transfer them abroad. At one point, 300 million dollars were being sold per day.

Are the dollars being smuggled to Türkiye and Iran?

The smuggling is ongoing all over the world. Several regional countries are witnessing a collapse in their local currency. I won’t go into names, but they certainly need dollars. Some of those complicit in the process here are money exchangers and banks. They are making major profits by selling dollars that are being transferred to neighboring and regional countries.

Are you optimistic that this issue can be addressed?

Yes. This process can be tackled through economic, financial and banking reform in Iraq. We have carried out a series of measures to reform the banking and financial systems according to international standards. The government’s primary concern is maintaining the prices of essential goods and providing them at reasonable costs to the people.

You received a telephone call from US President Joe Biden, who underscored his country’s commitment to the strategic partnership with Iraq. An Iraqi delegation is preparing to visit Washington. What will you ask from the US?

We agree with Biden on activating the strategic framework agreement, which elevates relations between Iraq and the US to economic, cultural, social and educational levels. The agreement is clear and was ratified by the Iraqi parliament. It must be activated. Our ties with the US should not be limited to security aspects, no matter how important they are.

The US is a strategic partner to Iraq and we can benefit from its expertise in improving the situation in Iraq on all levels. The US is a major power and Iraq is tied to it through agreements, the most important of which is the strategic framework pact. We are cooperating in combating ISIS. All political forces have stressed that they support relations between Iraq and all nations as long as it is in its interest. We have an interest in maintaining ties with the US and we don’t mind that.

How does Iraq reach common ground between Iran’s influence and the role of the US?

This is a dilemma that is always on the table. We are dealing with it as follows: Iran is a neighboring country with which we share several religious, cultural and social factors. Iran has stood by the political process from the start and stood by us in the war against ISIS. We are therefore, maintaining this relationship.

Of course, several Iraqi political powers enjoy positive ties with Iran and this is the case in several regional countries. These ties should be positive as long as they adhere to non-interference in the affairs of the other.

As for the US, it helped in the process of change that took place after 2003. The US was part of the international alliance that helped Iraq defeat ISIS. Today, we view the US as a partner with whom we want to develop ties.

Yes, relations are strained between the US and Iran, but this will definitely not take place at Iraq’s expense. We don’t want Iraq to be an arena for settling scores. We are not taking sides against another. We are keen on strengthening our relations according to common interests, mutual respect and refraining from meddling in the internal affairs of others.

Do you fear that Iraq will suffer repercussions as a result of the deterioration of ties between Iran and the West after the former’s weapons emerged in Ukraine?

We always seek stability. This stability won’t happen except through easing tensions. The Russian-Ukrainian war is not only having an impact on Europe, but the entire region. We live in a volatile region that needs more understanding, dialogue and an end to interference. We oppose any interference in any other country in times of conflict because that will only deepen this crisis.

The Russian-Ukrainian crisis can be resolved when meddling by all world countries comes to an end and when both parties come together to hold dialogue. Dialogue is the best way to avert tragedies in these countries and the region.

Iraq has been devastated by wars and blockades. It knows their impact. This is where we are coming from. There can be no solution to crises without dialogue. Foreign meddling will only prolong any crisis.

You are the first prime minister since 2003 to head a government that does not have members of the Sadrist movement. Has a truce or deal been reached with the movement? Don’t you worry that the economic crisis may lead to a revolt of some kind or push the Sadrists to take to the streets?

The Sadrist movement is a main and effective player in the political process, whether it is represented at parliament or government. We respect its decision to withdraw from parliament and we want it to remain active in political life.

A revolt by the movement or youths or any other side is a sign of a failure in implementing our government program and in fulfilling our pledges to the people. Of course, such a failure will be rejected by all segments of society, not just one political party or that.

The current situation cannot tolerate such a failure. The current coalition that formed this government is concerned with and responsible for the current stage in Iraq.

Is the Coordination Framework still pleased with the leanings of your government?

Of course, the Framework is the largest Shiite bloc. It nominated the prime minister to his post. It struck a deal with other blocs to form the government coalition. So, the success or failure of the government will be on the Framework, the government itself and the coalition.

Days ago you met with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah. How do you describe the current relationship with Saudi Arabia?

The relationship is good. Everyone is keen on maintaining this relationship given Iraq and Saudi Arabia’s weight on the Islamic, Arab, economic and geographic levels. We can easily form a political-economic axis that can act as a foundation for the region and establish a stable regional system and become a cornerstone for global stability.

Iraq and Saudi Arabia are capable of doing so and we are serious about that. I had discussed this with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and found him very receptive, as usual, and eager to achieve this goal. When I took part in the Arab-Chinese summit in Riyadh, we came up with a work schedule that covers mutual visits.

This was followed by a visit by the foreign and trade ministers to Baghdad. Our ministers also visited Saudi Arabia. Meetings are being held to prepare for holding a meeting of the Iraqi-Saudi coordination council either in Baghdad or Riyadh. All of these issues were agreed with the Crown Prince during our meeting in Riyadh.

I have met Crown Prince Mohammed on a number of occasions when I was a minister and once after I became prime minister. It was during the Arab-Chinese summit that we held bilateral talks.

How to do you view the changes taking place in Saudi Arabia?

It is an experience that is worthy of respect and expertise must be exchanged to benefit from it. Saudi Arabia has taken a significant leap in properly investing in its resources. I witnessed this development firsthand when I was industry minister. I visited Ras al-Khair, al-Jubail and Riyadh. I witnessed the essence of Saudi industry and found that it was advanced and helped in securing a sizable amount of global market needs.

On the political level, Saudi Arabia is playing a major role. The Arab-Chinese summit was a step in the right direction. It is important for Arab and regional countries. We must contribute in easing tensions and regional crises to forge ahead with development and growth, which demand stability.

Can we expect a new round of Saudi-Iranian dialogue in Baghdad soon?

It will be held soon, God willing. At the request of our brothers in Saudi Arabia and Iran, we want the continuation of this relationship, which we view as essential because stability is consolidated whenever views align in the region.

Arrangements are underway for the dialogue to be held soon. We are seeking to raise the level of representation from security officials, to diplomatic ties, sponsored by Iraq. I am personally involved in the process.

Have Turkish-Arab dialogue rounds been held in Baghdad?

We believe they have been restricted to security coordination. We are keen on security coordination with all regional countries given our security agencies’ experience in uncovering terrorist plots. We want to share this information with regional countries. This includes Egypt, Jordan, Gulf countries, Iran, Türkiye and even European countries. Our security agencies have the means of infiltrating and dismantling terrorist cells.

Aren’t you worried about ISIS?

No, ISIS is just a terrified gang that has sought refuge in its dens. We are striking them every day and everywhere. They can no longer hold ground, as they are just four or five mobile groups that are targeting citizens and locations. Work is ongoing to crack down on those terrorists.

Have the security agencies uncovered a plot against your life?

No, they have not.

Iraq is suffering from the spread of illegal weapons. How much progress has the state made in combating this phenomenon?

When we were fighting ISIS, we sought out anyone capable of carrying weapons. ISIS was targeting innocent civilians and villages, cities and neighborhoods. The fight produced various armed factions. After the victory against ISIS, previous governments did not carry out the necessary effort in the security reform process.

Our government has. It issued an order to form a committee, headed by me, to carry out reform at security agencies. Among the top priorities is cracking down on the illegal possession of arms. The weapons must be restricted to security agencies that were formed according to the law. There will no longer be any weapons outside these agencies.

Dialogue will be used to resolve these problems. The predicament is that some sides are tying the possession of their weapons to the presence of foreign forces in Iraq that they believe to be illegal and unconstitutional. Several Iraqis support this view. If the foreign presence is regulated within the constitution and law, then they will no longer have the excuse to carry weapons.

Will the Arab summit be held soon?

Yes, but a date has not been set yet. I believe it will be held in Riyadh.

Will Syria attend?

We hope it will. It is about time that we kick off serious efforts in restoring Syria’s membership at the Arab League. An understanding must be reached because Syria’s stability is paramount to the region. Any terrorist threat against Iraq comes from Syria. Any instability in Syria will impact Jordan, Lebanon and other regional countries.

It is very important to hold dialogue with the Syrian government to help ease the suffering of the Syrian people, who are enduring challenging living and economic conditions.

Iran has accused alleged groups in Kurdistan of playing a role in the Isfahan attack. Are you worried that Iran may carry out any major action in Kurdistan?

This was one of the predicaments that the government has faced. It was also confronted with the violations that have taken place on the Iraqi-Turkish border. These issues have been discussed with Iran. Agreements were reached over having the official federal forces control the border, hand over wanted suspects through arrest warrants, and preventing any group from setting up camp or any armed presence.

What about ties with Syria?

They are limited to the official capacity and I have not visited Syria. No one from Syria has officially visited Iraq since I assumed my post.

Did you know [slain Iranian Quds Force commander] Qassem Soleimani or have you met him?

I would see him at general meetings. He would be part of official delegations at ministries and we would meet.

Has Iran supported your government?

Iran has never interfered in the negotiations to form the government.

You were never contacted by [current Quds Force commander] Esmail Qaani?

Never.

Not even the American ambassador?

Not even the American ambassador. The government was formed through a purely Iraqi process. I was not influenced by any direct or indirect meddling. Iraqis are proud of their Iraqiness and no true Iraqi would abandon their principles for others.

You have spoken about the “Arab depth”. Doesn’t that bother Iran?

Never. Iran has no problem with this. Iraq is an Arab nation and has played a pioneering role for hundreds of years. This is our natural role. We are proud of its role because it will help in establishing stability in the region, including Arab countries and neighbors, Syria and Iran alike.

What about interests with the Gulf? Did you discuss this with the Iranians?

Yes, and on the highest levels. Iraq is destined to be Arab. This is its normal position. It will not take on a role that is alien to it.



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.