The first edition of the Lebanese civil war ended in 1990, after the Syrian army entered the Baabda Palace and ministry of defense, with General Michel Aoun, the country’s prime minister at the time, fleeing to the French Embassy.
February 14, the day Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in 2005, marks the 18th anniversary of the outbreak of this war’s second edition.
We will not get into the debate about whether the first war (1975 - 1990) had been a civil war or, as some claim, a war waged on Lebanese territory by others. The real question is whether the first edition of the war actually ended in 1990 or became latent until Hariri’s convoy was blown up, in what was a political earthquake that changed the form and trajectory of its predecessor after the circumstances in Lebanon, the region and the world had changed.
We start with the repercussions of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq that “sparked” extremist Islamic groups into existence and almost handed the country over to Iran. Then came the Arab Spring and its last stage that was the 2011 revolution against the Bashar al-Assad regime and the ensuing Russian reentry into the region.
We also have the outbreak of the conflict between Iran and the Gulf that broke out after the Velayet-e-Faqih’s sectarian expansion into the Levant. Lebanon was the focal point, and the assassination of a Lebanese and Arab Sunni figure of the stature of Hariri was only a sign of this project’s ultimate goals crystalizing.
All of this culminated in the US retreating from the region, Europe meekly standing aside, the souring of US relations with its Arab allies, and a radical shift in the Arab-Israeli conflict after the Abraham Accords and normalization.
The new edition of the war rages on, and no solutions or potential settlements are on the horizon. Some may ask, why should we consider this phase an extension of the Lebanese war that broke out in 1975? This is a valid question. Indeed, the 1975 war witnessed armed clashes, conflict lines, kidnappings, foreigners being taken hostage, mass liquidations, car bombings, and assassinations that took the lives of two presidents, a prime minister, and several politicians and clerics, including the grand mufti.
This edition of the war also saw two Israeli invasions, one in 1978 and another in 1982, when the Jewish state’s forces entered the capital, Beirut. It saw several Arab and international peace initiatives, and military interventions by Arab and international forces, ending with the Taif Agreement and the entry of the Arab Deterrent Force, which was subsequently reduced to the Syrian army.
The new edition of the Lebanese war is more complex and difficult than the first for internal and external factors. The latter will be discussed on another occasion. First and foremost, among the internal factors is the introduction of armed Palestinian groups, which remained in the country until 1982, and the entry of the Assad regime’s army and intelligence services, which remained in the country for over 29 years (1976 - 2005).
Today, we have a totally different state of affairs on our hands. Iran’s hegemony is evident but difficult to approach and deal with because it is hidden under a Lebanese cloak.
When the Palestinians and Syrians were in the country, demanding that these foreigners leave was easy, legitimate and natural. In the end, this call received direct international support, especially from France and the US. This led to the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, with its ally Iran taking direct control.
Demanding that the foreign actor withdraw tomorrow is difficult. This fact may have never been more evident as emphatically as it was in Paris last week. The five participants could not agree on a statement. They thus left it to the Lebanese, calling on them to elect a president and implement reforms, making no reference to Hezbollah. They cannot deny that it is a Lebanese actor despite its total dependence on Iran.
The second factor is that the current war is of a political, not sectarian, nature. Despite the dominance of Hezbollah, which has military, financial and intelligence capabilities that have allowed this sectarian political force to exert unprecedented influence in the modern history of Lebanon. It was mindful of the importance of giving other sects a kind of safety and security, as well as allowing Beirut to remain a diverse space that maintains a minimal degree of its former luster.
Nonetheless, we should bear in mind that the capital has been subjected to profound cultural and social changes as a result of Iran’s role and its influence on the Shiite community, which it exerts through Hezbollah, and its implication for every segment of Lebanese society. Indeed, Hezbollah has appealed to a segment of Christians through a delusional project, the alliance of minorities, under the pretext of protecting them and safeguarding their rights.
The third factor is the unprecedented disruption and paralysis of state institutions. In fact, things have become so dire that we can now call the country a failed state. During the 1975 war, state institutions continued to function when security conditions permitted, and political disputes did not, in themselves, hinder presidential elections or the formation of governments.
The fourth factor is that only one militia has its hands on an illegitimate arsenal. This has other parties marginalized. At the very least, it has undermined their influence. Meanwhile, the one armed party has become stronger than most of the region’s regular armies. The latent threat of its use is always there. At times, this threat is explicit. This arsenal casts a shadow over the internal balance of power, granting those who possess it the reigns of political power.
The fact that a single party has a monopoly on illegitimate arms is one of the reasons that the acute political conflict has not morphed into a military conflict or a militia war like the one that began in 1975. Nonetheless, a mafia war continues through the assassinations of opposition figures.
The fifth factor is that Lebanon’s economy and society have changed over the past 18 years. We have seen a transfer of wealth that left the middle class losing out. This class is suffering from a decline that threatens its political, economic, social and cultural influence. This shift culminated with the collapse of the national currency and banking sector, and the evisceration of bank deposits, as well as the collapse, to different degrees, of the health and education services and tourism
The sixth factor is that over one million displaced Syrians are in the country. It is difficult to imagine these persons returning to Syria in the near or even the medium term due to many factors. The most notable of these considerations is the unprecedented degree of violence, which has reached the point of ethnic cleansing at times, that the country has seen. Cities, villages, and infrastructure have been wiped out. We should also account, here, for the demographic shift engendered by the emigration of the Lebanese. The majority of those leaving the country are young, educated professionals and other well-off segments of society, as well as mostly Christians.
The Lebanese missed the opportunity to end the 1975 war when they replaced the armed Palestinian groups with the Syrian regime’s army, which fully controlled Lebanon until 2005. They also missed the opportunity to end it through the implementation of the Taif Agreement after Aoun refused to hand over power to the elected president, Rene Moawad, choosing to wage his reckless wars instead.
Another opportunity was squandered in 2005, when, on the one hand, US and French interest was at its peak and, on the other, the Syrian army left the country.
At this juncture, in 2005, a historic opportunity to end the Lebanese crisis that could have contained Hezbollah through the implementation of Resolution 1559 arose. It was lost because of the Quadripartite Alliance and the miscalculations of all Lebanese parties. Because of Hezbollah’s strength and the fact that other parties made the losing bet of Lebanonizing the party, the party managed to turn against everyone and replicated the role that had previously been played by the Syrian regime. The war thus continued.
In conclusion, the ongoing war that began in 2005 has most of the disadvantages of the 1975 war. However, it added another form of violence to the political and military violence - economic, social, financial, educational and healthcare violence. Much of what we had seen during the first phase of the war witnessed was seen again in the second phase, albeit in different ways.
This time, the violence was manifested in targeted assassinations of the foundational figures of the state and the country. With all the domestic, regional and international developments that have unfolded since 2005, the local and international settlements that had been tenable for a long time have become outdated. They will have no core impact on the Lebanese crisis.
