We are seeing contradictory indications regarding the trajectory region’s multiple crises. Some are positive and optimistic, while others are negative and pessimistic. This is strengthening ambivalence and complicating projections about the future.
On the one hand, we have seen signs of Arab openness to Syria in the aftermath of the devastation wreaked by the earthquake in Syria and Türkiye, which demands humanitarian and national solidarity. Preludes of this openness began to emerge before the calamity. The Emiratis showed early signs of openness to President Bashar al-Assad, who had visited the Emirates before Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed visited Damascus when the Emirati embassy reopened in 2018, following a diplomatic hiatus that began with the eruption of the revolution in Syria.
We saw two major developments in this regard last week. First, Assad visited Oman and met with Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said. Second, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan gave a statement saying that a “consensus is building in the Arab world that isolating Syria is not working and that dialogue with Damascus is needed at some point.” This position taken by the Saudis could lay the groundwork for several other Arab states, especially Gulf states, to take this course.
In the same context, we cannot ignore the fact that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi has called on UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed to provide more aid to Syria. Nor can we ignore the fact that he has spoken with President Assad, calling him for the first time since Sisi took power in 2014. Moreover, Assad received a similar call from the King of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, who had not contacted him in a decade.
Added to the Arab states’ reassessment of their position vis a vis the Assad regime, we have seen reports of indirect talks between the US administration and Iranian officials aimed at ensuring the release of American prisoners held in Iran, with Britain, Qatar, and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani taking part.
There have also been leaks regarding efforts to resume negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. These new talks would take a different form to that seen in Vienna, and they could pave the way for parallel negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, through which it is hoped an understanding between them could emerge.
Indications of an escalation between Iran and Israel have been building as well. The war of words and the routine Israeli military operations on Syrian territory have evolved into consequential attacks, like that on the facility in the heart of the capital Damascus, where Iranian experts had been meeting to discuss the development of drones. It left 15 people dead and immense damage in its wake. Earlier on, Iran had hit an Israeli-linked cargo ship flying a Liberian flag off the coast of Oman, causing minor damages.
This escalation comes amid Israel’s determination to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and the latter enriching uranium of 84 percent purity, leaving Iran on the cusp of becoming a nuclear power.
This could precipitate a regional nuclear arms race, a regional war, or a swift resumption of negotiations. The latter is the least likely outcome because of Iran’s demands and its imperious and ambiguous behavior, which is unacceptable to the US, especially given the strengthened military cooperation between Iran and Russia, as Washington refuses to appease Russia’s allies in its war on Ukraine.
Indeed, the region has been put in flux by these two dynamics. The first dynamic is propelled by the Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who seek calm and political and economic stability to allow for development. They are thus working to conclude settlements or compromises with Iran that safeguard this climate. Relations with Iran will not necessarily be warm and friendly. Instead, the objective is to ensure stability and reduce tensions in areas where disputes are playing out. Deescalating the war in Yemen is the priority of the Gulf states, while other areas of dispute, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, are of secondary importance.
The second dynamic, which pushes against the first, is fueled by Israel, which is escalating against Iran through every means available to it. The former is particularly concerned with putting an end to Iran’s nuclear program and Iranian expansion on its borders, albeit while its attacks continue to orbit around the Assad regime. These are two different dynamics, but they are emerging amid increasingly open and robust relations between Israel and the Gulf states, especially the UAE and Bahrain.
The two dynamics open the door to the US playing a role in preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power, which would avert new conflicts in the region and quell tensions in conflict zones. Developments could be cooking slowly in Iraq, which plays a mediating role between Washington and Tehran, as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The openness to the Assad regime, though limited to the Arab world, is outside this framework.
Lebanon, which has become accustomed to seeing its crises mushroom, with one crisis growing from the other, might also be affected if Washington manages to create balance between the two dynamics in the region. The war in Yemen has not stopped, and as we have mentioned, it would be the cornerstone of any settlement, but resolving the conflict there is more difficult than any other.
Meanwhile, even if the US does indeed manage to create this kind of balanced role or pressure, this would not imply a decline in Iran’s regional influence. Indeed, it is worth noting that Tehran’s allies seek to enhance their autonomous political, security and financial foundations through their independent activities, be they legitimate or criminal and illegal. These allies are seeking to reduce their dependence on Iranian financial support - without, however, limiting or weakening their political and ideological ties to it. The armed factions loyal to Tehran in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon have begun moving in this direction.
It is worth noting all the scenarios that have been discussed here are tied to Iran’s actions, be they negative or positive. Thus, the answer to the question of whether the emergence of the Iranian-Russian axis in the aftermath of the Ukrainian war, which has entered its second year, will hinder regional settlements is crucial in this regard. It is especially consequential if the reports of a comprehensive defensive and high-tech partnership between the two countries are true.
Another matter that must be noted is that, after the recent shelling of Damascus, Iran announced that it would provide Syria with air defense missiles. Furthermore, Moscow will probably continue to protect Tehran from Security Council reprisals over the regime’s non-compliance with its obligations regarding its nuclear program.
In short, the Ukraine war may well have engendered a shift in Moscow’s strategic calculations. Its assessment may have shifted so much that it now sees the help it provides Iran as a way to undermine US interests in the region by destabilizing it further and benefiting from the Arab openness to its ally (Assad). It is thus vital that Arab countries do their utmost to compel Moscow to limit its transfer of military technology to Iran, as such transfers would pose threats to regional security and increase Iran’s influence in Syria.
