Elias Harfoush
Lebanese writer and journalist
TT

Three Obstacles in Franjieh’s Path

The support of Lebanese parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri and Hezbollah for former deputy Suleiman Franjieh does nothing to facilitate the resolution of the presidential crisis in Lebanon. On the contrary, Franjieh’s name being thrown into the mix complicates the task of filling the presidential seat that has been vacant since October.

To start with, we offer a reminder that Franjieh has not announced his candidacy himself, though there are rumors that he might do so in the next few days. We can assume that Berri and Hezbollah announcing Franjieh’s candidacy in this manner “embarrassed” the man to the same extent that it brought him joy. It is no surprise to see these two parties supporting him; indeed, their support is a foregone conclusion.

However, Franjieh may have been embarrassed because the man had insisted, after meeting with Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi just over a month ago, that he is not Hezbollah’s candidate and that when he decides to run, he would announce the decision himself. He then added that he sought to be a “consensual” candidate with the capacity to be open to all parties. This speech makes clear that Franjieh is aware of the implications of being put forward as Hezbollah’s candidate and how difficult this makes “marketing” his election domestically and regionally.

As for the complications that I believe putting Franjieh forward as a candidate will engender, they can be limited to three:

1 - Opposition by the blocs opposed to the prospect of a Franjieh - the Lebanese Forces, Kataeb party, independent Sunni deputies, several change-minded deputies, and potentially deputies in the Democratic Gathering bloc (the Progressive Socialist Party) and the Free Patriotic Movement - would push them to boycott the parliamentary session of his election. They would prevent the quorum from being met, meaning nullifying the session because less than two-thirds of the deputies (86) would be present.

While the opposition parties had previously rejected the idea of obstructing sessions through a boycott, they now find themselves with no other option. Hezbollah and Berri insist on an “axis of resistance” candidate and a repeat of Michel Aoun’s presidency.

2 - Another problem is tied to support for his presidency among the country’s Christians. It has become common knowledge that the occupants of Lebanon’s three key positions (the presidency, parliament and government) should represent their sects or be accepted by them.

The irony here is that Hezbollah had exploited this custom to justify its support for Aoun’s election in 2016, arguing that he enjoyed broad support among Christians after he had garnered the support of the Lebanese Forces, which was added to the support of the Free Patriotic Movement that he led.

Meanwhile, Franjieh’s standing in the Christian community today is incomparable. The Marada Movement he leads only has one deputy in parliament, his son Tony. For their part, the Lebanese Forces and Free Patriotic Movement can count on the support of the majority of Christian deputies in parliament between them. Thus, they are considered most worthy of naming the president of the republic, whether he is a member of one of their parliamentary blocs or a figure they compromise on.

Of course, it could be said that Hezbollah is not very concerned with the Christian community being represented in the governance of the country. What matters to Hezbollah, above all, is that the president reassures the party and refrains from “stabbing the resistance in the back.” However, it is doubtful that Berri will go to the end in his support of a candidate without broad Christian backing.

3 - This leads us to the third complication brought about by the support of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement for Franjieh. Overcoming the dichotomy of the two names openly facing off today, Franjieh and MP Michel Mouawad, has been made more difficult. Given the terms or dictates that Hezbollah imposed (as it always does) when it announced the adoption of Franjieh’s candidacy, even identifying a “consensual” candidate has become far-fetched.

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said it clearly: “We have not put Franjieh’s name forward as a ruse or to improve our negotiating position; he has the qualities we want to see in a president.” He then reminded the Lebanese and anyone who may be concerned: “We were tested for two and a half years after the previous elections,” referring to the fact that, at the time, he got what he wanted in the end.

With this statement, he signaled that the party is willing to obstruct the entire process until everyone acquiesces to its choice once again. The head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, Mohammad Raad, also threatened “a hundred years of waiting” if the Lebanese do not accept the candidate that Hezbollah has chosen for them.

However, Hezbollah’s intransigence can do nothing this time but perpetuate the presidential crisis. The political forces opposed to Hezbollah’s candidate are convinced that giving in would be worse than prolonging the presidential vacuum.

Three obstacles that Suleiman Franjieh’s supporters will struggle to overcome: ensuring that the quorum is met during the election and securing Christian “cover” for this president, which is impossible given the opposition of the two largest Christian blocs and Patriarch al-Rahi’s refusal to discuss any particular figures or endorse any candidate.

Moreover, Franjieh can no longer fit the image of a “consensual” candidate that he had aspired to after Hezbollah took the initiative, announced its support, and stressed that he met the party’s criteria.