In the Lebanese crisis, or what some call the Lebanese question, the malfunction does not end with the failure to develop solutions. Rather, it goes further, as it is almost impossible to understand the actions of the political forces in the country, especially those opposed to Hezbollah and the Axis of Resistance. Indeed, they have failed to answer one simple question that may seem simple on the surface but is at the heart of the intractable state of affairs in Lebanon: Are the political forces genuinely convinced that electing a president is the solution?
Could a solution emerge if radical agreements regarding points of major contention (the most prominent of which are the hold that the Syrian-Iranian axis, as well as its local, regional and foreign allies, have over the country’s geostrategic position) do not bring this president to office? In other words: To which axis does Lebanon belong, the Western or Eastern axis? Is it aligned with the Gulf states that are open to the world or the Iranian-Syrian Axis of Resistance? Once this question is resolved, its sub-questions will be easy to overcome, from the controversies surrounding political, financial, economic and social reforms to how the country is administered, how positions are allocated, to the powers of different branches of government, to the form of the executive takes, how the government is formed, and many others.
In 2008, the Doha Agreement was reached following Hezbollah’s incursion on Beirut and the Mountain, which was referred to as the Black Shirts War. The deal struck in Doha led to the election of Army Commander Michel Sulieman. Then, in 2016, the Lebanese Forces, the Future Movement, and the Free Patriotic Movement struck a deal to elect Hezbollah’s candidate, Michel Aoun, as president. This deal emerged after Hezbollah disrupted the election of a president for over two years, and in return for the election of Aoun, Hariri was elected prime minister.
Both of these experiments failed par excellence. The first was nullified after Hezbollah got involved in the Syrian war, walking back on the terms of the Baabda Declaration that it had agreed to in 2012, which stressed that Lebanon would adopt a policy of neutrality and stay away from regional and international axes and conflicts. As for the second, it did not endure for more than a year, and it precipitated the most severe financial, economic and political collapse in the history of modern Lebanon. It also fortified Hezbollah’s grip on the country, allowing an Iranian official to brag that Tehran controlled four Arab capitals.
Bringing up the Doha Agreement and the deal of 2016 comes within the context of the reports that the French are trying to develop a Doha-style settlement. This new deal would lead to the election of a president without altering the current balance of power in the country, allowing Hezbollah to maintain control over all the facets of the state and monopolize decision-making. In fact, such an agreement would be little more than a repeat of previous failure experiences that were failed attempts at managing the crisis at best.
While the winds of change have been felt in different parts of the region since the Saudi-Iranian agreement, they have yet to blow in Beirut. Meanwhile, it has had implications for more difficult and delicate crises, including the Yemen war and Saudi relations with the Assad regime.
Several actors have expressed extreme positions. The most prominent of which is the warning of the head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, Sayyed Hashem Safieddein. “Lebanon is going through a very dangerous phase in which it is going from crisis to total chaos … However, today, we call on some Lebanese to make use of everything that is happening to accelerate the recovery of the country, as delays do not serve their interest.
Another example we should mention is the recent statement of Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem, who gave the Lebanese two choices: Suleiman Franjieh or a vacuum. The rockets fired at Israel from South Lebanon also sent a message, and they coincided with the visit of Hamas Political Bureau Ismail Haniyeh to Beirut. It was also around this time that Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi - in an interview addressed directly to the people of Gaza - stressed his country’s determination to continue supporting the resistance.
We should not ignore Iran’s expansion in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon either. It has been manifested in parades in support of Iran. Finally, the cherry on top was the latest visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian to Beirut and its timing. He began his visit with a meeting that brought him together with Hezbollah officials, not the top brass of the Lebanese state. After that, he met several Hezbollah deputies at his country’s embassy in Beirut. In conclusion, Lebanon is becoming increasingly rooted in the Axis of Resistance by the day. So long as this is the case, could any settlement, be it a second Doha agreement or a deal struck in Paris or Cairo, bear fruit?
We should not be dragged into the claims being made by some in the Lebanese “opposition” media, who are claiming that Paris has withdrawn its support for Suleiman Franjieh’s candidacy and that the French Foreign Ministry and the Presidency are in dispute around this issue. This analysis sees the matter through a factional, local Lebanese lens and is based on the foreign ministry’s claim “France has no preferred presidential candidate” and its call on the Lebanese to choose their own leaders.
We must set things straight. We are talking about the position of a major Western country that has strong ties with Lebanon. Its stance probably does not diverge from that of its allies, be they in Europe or the US. While this does not imply that the positions of these countries are identical, nor does it mean that France does not have an eye on its economic interests, especially with Iran.
What it does mean is that these allies agree on two fundamental matters: preserving a minimal degree of domestic security and stability and avoiding trouble on the borders in order to allow for the extraction of gas from Lebanese waters.
This can only be achieved by bringing Hezbollah on board. As we have previously mentioned, it is the strongest of the weak local actors. None of the forces opposed to Hezbollah could be considered reliable partners capable of carrying out his commitments. This is due to the deep schism between these opposition parties, and Western powers are under no illusions about the domestic balance of power. That is why France supports Hezbollah’s candidate, while the United States is silent, and some Arabs are turning a blind eye.
Does this reading of the current state of affairs mean that Suleiman Franjieh’s accession to the presidency is Lebanon’s interest? Of course not, especially since it would reaffirm that Hezbollah is the gatekeeper of the Presidential Palace. Is Suleiman Franjieh’s election as president inevitable? Politics is variable; nothing is set, so nothing is inevitable. The most pressing question for the Lebanese “sovereignist” opposition remains the same. Can the Lebanese crisis be boiled down to the election of a president?
Would any other figure, even from within the ranks of the opposition, make a difference without a serious settlement with Hezbollah? The answer is no. The difference would be purely nominal. It might slow things down, but the result will be the same so long as the political and security decisions remain in the hands of Hezbollah. Only once these decisions are made by the state, government, and constitutional institutions can things change.
Lebanese Forces chief Samir Geagea was right last week. He said that “Franjieh can make commitments regarding the matters in his hands, but how can he commit regarding what is not his when the matter is in the hands of Hezbollah?” However, he overlooked the fact that no other figure who comes to power amid the current balance of power would have a grip over Hezbollah. Thus, we reiterate this point for the thousandth time: whatever the position in government, so long as the status quo does not change, changing it is null and void. Maintaining the vacuum would be better; it could perhaps allow the opposition to fill this vacuum by coming together and forming a united force that could draw international and Arab support. They could thus garner the confidence of the international and Arab communities and develop realistic strategies for engaging with Hezbollah; building on a mistake can only lead to a mistake.
