The prospect of international intervention has become the talk of the town in Sudan. The debate rages on in living rooms and on social media. As one would expect, the debates can be very acrimonious. Rivals accuse one another of exploiting Sudanese blood, treachery, taking orders from abroad, collusion with foreign actors, and seeking political victory at any cost, even if this means destroying the entire country. International intervention is explained differently by different actors, and it is clearly not categorically rejected in principle. However, parties support or oppose it based on whether it would serve their interests, and those opposed to intervention limit it to boots on the ground.
That is why government spokespersons rejected the foreign intervention of IGAD while welcoming the intervention of neighboring countries. They also previously welcomed the negotiations in Jeddah. Meanwhile, Rapid Support Forces spokespersons have claimed they would support any settlement that would lead to a ceasefire, but no real test has been put to this position.
One fact that some ignore is that domestic efforts to contain the conflict and avert military clashes were crushed once the first shots were fired on the morning of April 15. Both sadly and astonishingly, these efforts continued into the early dawn. A decisive meeting had been scheduled for Saturday afternoon, but, of course, it was not held. Following an “if you’re not with us, you’re against us” mentality, groups opposed to the war were vilified, trust collapsed, and domestic efforts were rendered futile, opening the door to regional and international efforts.
The faction most closely linked to the current government and military leadership considered the resolutions of the IGAD Quartet Group of Countries, which met in Addis Ababa on July 10, a form of unwarranted foreign meddling. IGAD did not recognize the Sudanese government as fighting an insurgency, which is what the government wanted. Instead, they dubbed both sides “conflicting parties.” Moreover, IGAD declined the government’s request that IGAD replace Group Chairman Kenyan President William Ruto, whom the government has called biased. Finally, the resolutions suggested that East African Response Force (EARF) forces could be deployed to keep the belligerents apart.
On the other hand, all parties welcomed the conference of Sudan’s neighboring countries, which Egypt called for and held on Thursday, July 13. Although it also called both sides “conflicting parties,” it called for a ceasefire and broad consultations involving civil forces as well. Moreover, it proposed a mechanism for foreign ministers to meet to follow up on the recommendations. Those who were excited by this development overlooked the fact that no Sudanese faction, including the government, was invited. Instead, they highlighted a paragraph stating that the conflict is a domestic Sudanese matter. No one stopped to ask why the presidents of seven countries and two international organizations were convening to discuss a domestic Sudanese matter...?
What matters now is that the statement of the Cairo conference, although it added nothing new, was accepted by all the belligerents and political forces. More importantly, the conference gave Egypt its role back and opened a window. Indeed, it had been excluded from the Quartet Committee, which included Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United States, and the United Nations. This led Egypt to oppose the Framework Agreement and attempt to create an alternative.
It is now obvious that the prospects of IGAD mediation have significantly dwindled. In fact, it may no longer be a viable option, as it is rejected by one of the factions. Moreover, the organization and committee members, especially Kenyan President William Ruto and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, have burned their bridges with the government with their stern statements regarding the leadership vacuum in Sudan. It would be difficult to convince the international community to back international or regional military intervention that does not have the consent of the Sudanese government. If such an intervention were to be made, it would invigorate and mobilize extremist Islamic groups.
Furthermore, it is hard to wrap one’s head around the insistence on the Kenyan President continuing to lead the Group when he could have left the position to someone else, thereby making IGAD intervention more viable.
Two options remain on the table. One is that the mechanism proposed by neighboring countries gets adopted swiftly and both parties are compelled to hold negotiations under the auspices of IGAD, the African Union, and the United Nations - this could succeed given the strong relationship between the government, especially General Burhan, and Egypt. Alternatively, talks could be held again in Jeddah after it is supplemented with IGAD proposals and those put forward after the summit that brought together neighboring countries. Jeddah talks are also viable because they are backed by the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both of which hold significant political and economic weight in the region.
Whether the belligerents meet in Jeddah or sit at a table in neighboring countries, the outcome is similar. A consensus has developed around the need for a ceasefire, separating the forces, and dialogue that engages civic forces to discuss the future of the country without the use of force.
