Understanding Iran and Why It Distrusts Britain

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Understanding Iran and Why It Distrusts Britain

Getty Images
Getty Images

The English Job by Jack Straw

The subtitle of Jack Straw’s new book promises to help the reader in “understanding Iran”. However, what one gets in 390 pages might best describe as a misunderstanding of Iran today, a misunderstanding that has prevented Britain, along with other Western powers, to develop a realistic Iran policy and has helped prolong the crisis caused by the Islamic Republic unorthodox behavior in the international arena.

Straw’s misunderstanding, perhaps caused by his “absolute infatuation” with his imaginary Iran, has three aspects.

The first is that he thinks that because Iran, as he reminds the reader, is an ancient civilization, has produced great poets, weaves exquisite carpets and offers one of the world’s hautes cuisines, deserves indulgence for its weird activities in other domains such as hostage-taking, hate-mongering, human rights violations and the export of terror in the name of revolution. It is like offering indulgence to Stalin because one appreciates Pushkin and Tchaikovsky and enjoys a dish of borscht with a glass of “little water’ on the side. In another register, what would you say if we gave Hitler a pass because we like Schiller, Beethoven and potato salad? That Cyrus the Great was a great king and, arguably, even the founder of human rights, as Straw suggests, does not justify, citing just one example, the mass murder of Syrians by a mercenary army led by the Iranian mullahs.

The second “misunderstanding” concerns Straw’s strange belief that the Khomeinist ruling elite includes a “reformist” faction that craves close relations with Western democracies, and must, therefore, be supported to weaken and eventually get rid of the “ hardline” faction led by “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei. But, who are the “reformists” Straw claims to have discovered in Tehran? He cites a number of names among them former Presidents Hashem Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami, the current president Hassan Rouhani, former presidential candidates Hussein Moussavi and Mehdi Kariba, under both house arrest, and lower rank current or former officials such as Muhammad-Javad Zarif, Kamal Kharrazi whom Straw calls “ my old friend”, and Mostafa Tajzadeh.

The trouble is that Straw is unable to cite a single reform proposed, let alone carried out, by his “reformist” faction in Tehran. Worse still, he forgets that there have been more executions and political arrests under Khatami and Rouhani than during the supposedly “hardline” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency.

The third misunderstanding is that in dealing with the Islamic Republic, all choice is limited to just two options: swallowing whatever Iran does or launching a full-scale war against it.

Straw was one of the most zealous advocates of the war to destroy Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, asserting that the Ba’athist regime was beyond reform.

However, when it comes to the Islamic Republic, the former British Foreign Secretary becomes a dyed-in-wool peacenik. The only sane way is to use diplomacy to change Tehran’s behavior. In an elliptic manner, Straw claims some credit for what we now know as the Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action (JCPOA), or the “Iran nuclear deal” concocted by the Obama administration. Straw first sold the ideas to President George W Bush’s Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2006 just before his boss, Prime Minister Tony Blair, moved him to another post.

In the past two decades, Straw has visited Iran seven times, five as Foreign Secretary. In one visit he was part of a British parliamentary delegation with Lord Lamont and, the current Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn then working for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard’s Press TV channel. In one private visit, he and his wife, along with a couple of friends, were harassed and in the end hounded out of Iran by one of the nine security agencies operating in the Islamic Republic.

Straw is critical of President Donald J Trump for rejecting secret diplomacy when Tehran’s leaders see any public attempt at rapprochement as humiliating for their regime. He claims that the “nuclear deal” would have been completed with further secret talks about other issues of interest to Western powers, including the Islamic Republic’s intrusion in the internal affairs of several Arab countries. The first JCPOA could have been followed by other JCPOAs, even dealing with human rights issues, with the ultimate aim of marginalizing and eventually clipping the wings of the “Supreme Guide”.

Nevertheless, Straw offers no evidence than any deal made with the Islamic Republic in the past 40 years has had a long-lasting impact on the Khomeinist strategy and behavior. The Khomeinist rulers of Iran have perfected the art of diplomatic cheat-retreat-advance. Whenever their bones began to creak, they offered some concessions, which were subsequently withdrawn once the pressing of the bones ceased. More importantly, perhaps, Straw fails to realize that his “moderates” including Rouhani and Khatami, lack the popular support base needed to marginalize Khamenei let alone get rid of him.

Straw has adopted several erroneous assumptions, commonplace among so-called “Iran analysts”, including the division of authorities in the Khomeinist system between elected and un-elected officials. In that context, we are invited to believe that Khamenei, supposedly un-elected, enjoys less legitimacy than, say Rouhani, who is elected. However, the fact is that the Assembly of Experts, itself elected by popular vote, elects Khamenei. At the same time, Rouhani, like his predecessors, could not become president without an edict (hukm tanfizi) from the ”Supreme Guide”. In other words, it matters not one farthing who is or isn’t elected in a system in which all elections must either be regarded of equal value or rejected as fake from the start.

Straw is also wrong in believing that the Islamic Majlis, which he wrongly calls “The Iranian Consultative Assembly”, is subordinate to the Council of the Guardians which he calls, again wrongly, a solely “a creature of the Supreme Guide”.

To buttress his assumption that the mullahs have an almost natural claim to ruling Iran Straw exaggerates the role played by Shi’ite clerics in Iranian politics over the past five centuries. A fatwa issued by an obscure ayatollah to forbid smoking tobacco is blown out of proportion as an earth-shaking event. Clerics did play a role in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 but only as second fiddle. The mullahs also supported the Shah in dismissing Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq in 1953, an event that Straw dubs a “coup d’etat” plotted by British Intelligence and the CIA. The fact

that the Shah had already appointed and dismissed Mossadeq as prime minister on two occasions without anyone talking of coup d’etat is conveniently ignored.

Straw hates the Pahlavi Shah and tries hard to present them in as bad a light as possible, possibly to justify the mullahs’ revolt in 1979.

Straw also exaggerates the role the British played in Iran. Iran’s own corrupt ruling elite, especially in the final decades of Qajar rule, used intervention by Britain and Russia, the two imperialist enemies of Iran at the time, as an excuse to explain away their own corruption and ineptitude.

No foreign power could impose its will on even the weakest nations without the assistance of at least some elements in that nation’s ruling elite. True the Persian expression” It’s all the work of the English!” reflects abiding resentment about the role played by Britain in Iranian affairs for over a century. However, the expression is more often used as a joke rather than a serious comment on history. There was never a major British human presence in Iran few Iranians ever saw even a single specimen of the vilified “Inglisi”. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was operating in less than one per dent of Iranian territory and , at its peak, employed under 200 non-Iranians, most of them Sikh guards and drivers from Punjab. Also, Britain never featured among Iran’s top five trading partners and couldn’t compete with France and Germany, and from 1960 onwards the United States, as poles of attraction for Iranians seeking higher education abroad.

The British did invade Iran, in conjunction with the Soviets, in 1941, not 1942 as Straw says, but did not “occupy the whole of Iran” as he seems to believe. In fact, the British Expeditionary Force, largely consisting of recruits from colonial India, was stationed in five localities in Iran and from 1943 onwards were put under US command until total withdrawal two years later. The myth of “The English Job”, like its French equivalent “perfide Albion” is designed to perpetuate enmity between two nations that, when all is said and done, experienced the attraction-revulsion that marks many human relatio0ns in history.

The popular novel “Dear Uncle Napoleon” by Iraj Pezeshkzad uses the “this is an English job” as a joke. Incidentally, it was written in 1970 not in the 1940s as Straw asserts.

Straw’s book, an enjoyable read, includes too many factual errors and dicey speculations to be cited here. I doubt if Ayatollah Khamenei’s second son Mujtaba has any chance of succeeding him as “ Supreme Guide”, even if the regime survives. Straw also exaggerates the status of Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani who now heads the Expediency Council. Straw may be admiring of Larijani because he speaks “fluent English” but the fact is that he lacks a genuine status within the Shi’ite clergy.

Khamenei’s mother tongue is not “Turkic”, a non-existent language, but Persian as his mother hailed from Isfahan and claimed descent from the poet Kamaleddin Ismail. Khamenei’s father was from Azerbaijan and spoke Azeri, an Altaic language.

The late Ayatollah Khomeini couldn’t have extensive knowledge of Greek philosophy as most works by the Greeks, including Plato and Aristotle cited by Straw, are still not translated into Persian or any other languages of the Muslim world.

Some of Straw’s assertions are too weird to merit comment. For example, he says: “Iran is the most secular of societies, people laugh at what the mullahs have to say.”

And, yet, he believes that mullahs are bound to rule Iran seemingly forever. But even then he is not sure of his analysis. He writes: “Just below the surface, Iran is far from calm, the regime {is} going one way, the majority of the population another.”

From an apologist for the Islamic Republic, this is something!



Culture Being Strangled by Kosovo's Political Crisis

The cinema has been waiting for much-needed repairs for years. Armend NIMANI / AFP
The cinema has been waiting for much-needed repairs for years. Armend NIMANI / AFP
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Culture Being Strangled by Kosovo's Political Crisis

The cinema has been waiting for much-needed repairs for years. Armend NIMANI / AFP
The cinema has been waiting for much-needed repairs for years. Armend NIMANI / AFP

Kosovo's oldest cinema has been dark and silent for years as the famous theater slowly disintegrates under a leaky roof.

Signs warn passers-by in the historic city of Prizren that parts of the Lumbardhi's crumbling facade could fall while it waits for its long-promised refurbishment.

"The city deserves to have the cinema renovated and preserved. Only junkies gathering there benefit from it now," nextdoor neighbor butcher Arsim Futko, 62, told AFP.

For seven years, it waited for a European Union-funded revamp, only for the money to be suddenly withdrawn with little explanation.

Now it awaits similar repairs promised by the national government that has since been paralyzed by inconclusive elections in February.

And it is anyone's guess whether the new government that will come out of Sunday's snap election will keep the promise.

'Collateral damage'

Cinema director Ares Shporta said the cinema has become "collateral damage" in a broader geopolitical game after the EU hit his country with sanctions in 2023.

The delayed repairs "affected our morale, it affected our lives, it affected the trust of the community in us," Shporta said.

Brussels slapped Kosovo with sanctions over heightened tensions between the government and the ethnic Serb minority that live in parts of the country as Pristina pushed to exert more control over areas still tightly linked to Belgrade.

Cultural institutions have been among the hardest-hit sectors, as international funding dried up and local decisions were stalled by the parliamentary crisis.

According to an analysis by the Kosovo think tank, the GAP Institute for Advanced Studies, sanctions have resulted in around 613 million euros ($719 million) being suspended or paused, with the cultural sector taking a hit of 15-million-euro hit.

'Ground zero'

With political stalemate threatening to drag on into another year, there are warnings that further funding from abroad could also be in jeopardy.

Since February's election when outgoing premier Albin Kurti topped the polls but failed to win a majority, his caretaker government has been deadlocked with opposition lawmakers.

Months of delays, spent mostly without a parliament, meant little legislative work could be done.

Ahead of the snap election on Sunday, the government said that more than 200 million euros ($235 million) will be lost forever due to a failure to ratify international agreements.

Once the top beneficiary of the EU Growth Plan in the Balkans, Europe's youngest country now trails most of its neighburs, the NGO Group for Legal and Political Studies' executive director Njomza Arifi told AFP.

"While some of the countries in the region have already received the second tranches, Kosovo still remains at ground zero."

Although there have been some enthusiastic signs of easing a half of EU sanctions by January, Kurti's continued push against Serbian institutions and influence in the country's north continues to draw criticism from both Washington and Brussels.

'On the edge'

Across the river from the Lumbardhi, the funding cuts have also been felt at Dokufest, a documentary and short film festival that draws people to the region.

"The festival has had to make staff cuts. Unfortunately, there is a risk of further cuts if things don't change," Dokufest artistic director Veton Nurkollari said.

"Fortunately, we don't depend on just one source because we could end up in a situation where, when the tap is turned off, everything is turned off."

He said that many in the cultural sector were desperate for the upcoming government to get the sanctions lifted by ratification of the agreements that would allow EU funds to flow again.

"Kosovo is the only one left on the edge and without these funds."


Saudi Culture Ministry Concludes Intangible Cultural Heritage Documentation Project in Al-Ahsa

Saudi Culture Ministry Concludes Intangible Cultural Heritage Documentation Project in Al-Ahsa
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Saudi Culture Ministry Concludes Intangible Cultural Heritage Documentation Project in Al-Ahsa

Saudi Culture Ministry Concludes Intangible Cultural Heritage Documentation Project in Al-Ahsa

The Saudi Ministry of Culture concluded the project to survey, document, and archive intangible cultural heritage in Al-Ahsa Governorate by holding a workshop in the governorate, attended by stakeholders and relevant entities, as part of the ministry’s efforts to preserve national cultural heritage and strengthen Saudi cultural identity, reported the Saudi Press Agency on Thursday.

The project included a field survey covering various cities and villages across Al-Ahsa, during which diverse elements of intangible cultural heritage were identified and documented. These included oral traditions, performing arts, skills associated with traditional cultural crafts, social practices, and knowledge related to nature and the local environment.

The work was carried out in cooperation with concerned entities, specialized experts, and local practitioners.

The workshop reviewed the project’s final outcomes and presented reports on documentation and digital archiving activities.

It discussed mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of these efforts and the transmission of this cultural legacy to future generations, contributing to greater community awareness of the value and importance of intangible cultural heritage.


Hail Region Pavilion Showcases Heritage Artifacts at Camel Festival

The pavilion aims to connect visitors to Hail's history and social legacy - SPA
The pavilion aims to connect visitors to Hail's history and social legacy - SPA
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Hail Region Pavilion Showcases Heritage Artifacts at Camel Festival

The pavilion aims to connect visitors to Hail's history and social legacy - SPA
The pavilion aims to connect visitors to Hail's history and social legacy - SPA

Hail Region pavilion at the Ministry of Interior’s Security Oasis exhibition, part of the 10th King Abdulaziz Camel Festival in Al-Sayahid, features heritage artifacts that reflect the region's renowned hospitality.

The display includes ancient trays and copperware from nearly seventy years ago.

According to SPA, these traditional food preparation and serving vessels have garnered significant interest from visitors. They document daily life in old Hail and its deep-rooted social traditions, particularly in gatherings and special occasions.

The pavilion aims to connect visitors to Hail's history and social legacy, fostering appreciation for national heritage and ensuring cultural preservation for future generations.