In his upcoming memoir, Lebanese former President Amin Gemayel recounts details of three meetings he held with late Syrian President Hafez Assad, Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, Prime Minister Abdul Rauf al-Kasm and Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa in the 1980s when Lebanon was in the throes of its 1975-90 civil war. In December 1985, the Tripartite Accord was signed in Damascus between Lebanese Amal movement leader Nabih Berri, who would later become the country’s longest serving parliament speaker, Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt and then leader of the Lebanese Forces, Eli Hobeika.
Gemayel traveled to Damascus in January 1986 to express his reservations over the accord, which introduced major changes in Lebanon’s system of rule. The accord was reached among members of the Syrian leadership without consulting any Lebanese official. The agreement limits the jurisdiction of the president and transfers the executive authority to a “ministerial council” that is formed of militia leaders, who were involved in the war.
The following excerpts are part one of a three-part series on Gemayel’s memoirs:
On January 13, 1986, I traveled to Damascus to hold the 11th summit with the Syrian president. We held three work meetings that took up a total of ten and a half hours. The meetings were attended by Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, Prime Minister Abdul Rauf al-Kasm and Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa.
The memoir published excerpts of the meetings, which have been verified by the Lebanese and Syrian presidencies.
“The first of the work meetings was held as soon as I arrived in Damascus. We first spoke of the developments in the al-Metn region” in Lebanon, before Gemayel briefed them on the details of his consultations in Beirut. He also briefed them on legal local and foreign consultations on the accord.
“The Lebanese people appreciate Syria’s efforts in ending the crisis. They are all convinced of the need to benefit from these efforts because the war has stretched for ten years, and it must end based on national constitutional and legal bases,” I said.
I relayed to them the reservations expressed by Lebanese parties on the Tripartite Accord, but they also were quick to explain that their rejection was “not directed against Syria, especially its president.”
“We are before a historic opportunity to primarily reach a solid and permanent solution to the Lebanese situation and secondly, address Lebanese-Syrian relations,” I stated. I was banking on Lebanese-Syrian cooperation and submitted my comments on the accord, which was delivered to me by Sharaa.
I noted that the accord “revises” Lebanese coexistence based on eliminating sectarianism. He told me: “The situation in Lebanon is charged with sectarianism. Syria itself, had experienced the same thing with the Muslim Brotherhood. I support liberating Lebanese society from this obstacle, but this demands finding the natural guidelines. I fear that the speedy and blunt treatment of this issue would backfire.”
“Lebanon is not Syria, which does not suffer from the same problem. Neither is it Iraq, where Islam is the religion of the state. We want to liberate Lebanon from this issue, without embarking on reckless adventures,” Sharaa said.
Assad added: “Does this mean that ending the sectarian system will lead us to the unknown? What does it entail to eliminate political sectarianism?
I responded: “We must find actual guidelines. Those who believe that the president of the republic is in control of the situation are wrong. The prime minister can stop it, and therein lies real partnership. I have no problem in eliminating it, but that will leave behind some problems.”
“What sort of problems?” asked Assad.
I responded: “We cannot accept the elimination of sectarianism as stipulated in the accord. Some consider sectarianism a privilege and others view it as a guarantee. I see it as a means of control.” The accord ultimately aims on ending the “Lebanese state or the Lebanese will.”
“Ending?” Assad asked incredulously.
I responded: “Yes, ending it. This system does not exist anywhere in the world, except in the Swiss cantons. If you do not have a strong ruling leadership, then you cannot implement the agreement. We have not held a vote at cabinet since 1943. It is unfortunate that those who took part in the agreement have never once been part of rule. One of its articles spoke of the jurisdiction of the ministerial council, which takes its decisions through complete quorum. What would happen if one member were absent?”
“I believe during the transitional period,” said Assad.
“Who knows when the transitional period ends! The accord speaks of taking major decisions through the ministerial council and the regular ones through the government. The state ministers who make up the ministerial council are naturally members of the cabinet. Jurisdictions will thereby contradict each other, which will consequently obstruct all state agencies.”
“The accord cannot possibly be implemented and it will produce the exact opposite goals it wants to achieve, which is Lebanon’s unification. It will lead to the emergence of cantons,” I warned.
I then listed other reservations, to which the Syrian president remarked: “So you are baulking at eliminating sectarianism, the collective or consensual leadership and the ministerial council.”
I explained that I had reservations over “collectiveness and consensus. We need a strong authority that can back constitution-building and lead to a strong state. The accord aborts the role of the head of state. Why? The constitution stipulates that the president enjoys wide jurisdiction, as if he were a dictator, but in practice, the situation is very different. Ever since the time of President Riad al-Solh, it is the prime minister who holds procedural authority. No decree can pass without the approval of the prime minister and concerned minister. This is the constitution.”
Khaddam objected to this.
Assad urged me to continued.
“If we want to defend democracy in Lebanon, then it would be a major mistake to have the cabinet appoint lawmakers, especially since we would be naming 200 MPs. We would be subjecting parliament to the will of government,” I continued.
I listed yet another reservation, saying that the accord allows the people who have ruined the country to become its protectors. “This does not resolve the country’s problem,” I noted. “If we allow them to resolve all problems, then we won’t reach a solution. The fighters told us what they want from us, but have we told them what we want from them? Take for example their weapons. Did they buy them from their own money or did they collect the money from the port revenues, state resources and civilian pockets?”
“You bought them and we are buying them from you,” responded Assad.
I continued: “As for bilateral relations … I have reservations over the bilateral relations article stipulated in the accord. Relations should be ratified through bilateral agreements.”
Assad replied, however: “We have been clear. It is through consensus from all parties. We have not asked this since 1976. This is a consensual demand from all Lebanese leaderships.”
“We agree on bilateral relations between a state and another. We are talking here about a constitutional document that should not address these issues, which should be limited to the foreign ministers of both countries. Agreements would then be ratified and submitted to a vote at parliament.”
“So, the relationship with Syria should not be included in this document?” asked Assad.
“It can be referred to, but the details should be included in bilateral agreements,” I urged. “Syria respects itself and as does Lebanon. It is not overeager to impose any relationship with Lebanon … There are no differences over the core issues in this matter.”
This concluded the first round of talks. The second round was resumed later that day at 7:15 pm.
Assad kicked off the meeting by saying: “We tolerated a lot for Lebanon throughout 11 years. We have never dealt with it as a card to control, but approached it from a principled and sentimental position. One people and one country. All the Arab nation is a single country. The colonialists produced these entities. Some 500,000 Lebanese sought refuge in Syria during the latest unrest.”
“Eight hundred thousand,” interjected al-Kasm.
“We contacted the fighters and militias. You recall how I told them to reach an agreement,” said Assad. “The fighters met. You should not be led to believe that we set the agreement. Had we done so, neither Hobeika, Berri, Jumblatt nor Amin Gemayel would have liked it. They agreed and differed. We relayed messages between them … I told them to meet in Beirut and I think they did. They then approached us and the accord was born. I have reservations over it, but I will repeat again that if we were the ones who drafted it, no one would have liked it,” revealed Assad. “Sectarianism? We in Syria have rejected it a while ago. Does the accord call for its immediate elimination?”
“No. That will take place after the transitional period,” replied Khaddam.
“The gatherers agreed on what they described as jurisdictions. We agree to any accord that ends the war, including its good and bad articles. Any attempt to impose a point of view will abort an agreement. This is our political and military view. We sent you the accord when they agreed on it. The accord does not reflect the position of the president, prime minister, ministers, Amal, the Lebanese Forces or PSP. The accord only reflects a form of rapprochement and represents the warring parties,” stated Assad.
He later informed me that he will take my reservations into consideration and relay them to the fighters. He then said: “Sheikh Amin, no Lebanese president has even exercised his authority, neither Franjieh nor Sarkis. You have exercised more than both of them. No one can ignore the historic ties between Syria and Lebanon. They spoke of special relations, so how can you go against a popular agreement? God does not separate Lebanon from Syria.”
“All that is needed is finding factors that preserve the unity of the country. I am not clinging to maintaining sectarianism … The accord stripped the president of his privileges. Regardless of this, a non-harmonious government, possibly one hostile to the president, may be formed. What then happens to binding parliamentary consultations? I would then act as a ballot box? Let parliament do that. I do not understand the point of equally sharing power among three entities. Are we punishing sectarianism in the country? Are the Maronites being punished for supporting the honest Arab position on Syria?” I asked.
Khaddam said the accord will be implemented immediately and that it will be introduced as a “new constitutional norm.”
“The accord has been institutionalized,” echoed Assad.
“Three people have drafted this treaty? Are they now a constitutional entity?” I wondered.
“Under normal circumstances, this would not be acceptable. But given that the current circumstances are not, then anything goes,” remarked al-Kasm.
“Will the constitution be suspended?” I asked.
“The constitution is already suspended,” responded Khaddam.
“This is completely unacceptable,” I declared.
To this al-Kasm asked: “Does the constitution stipulate any where that the president must be Maronite?”
“No, this is just a norm,” said Khaddam. “The accord stipulates that the president will act as head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces. He decides over war and peace, dissolves parliament, approves the budget, issues amnesty … this accord transformed the president from a ruler to a leader.”
“You are practicing more jurisdiction that the Syrian president,” Assad told me.
“The accord will be submitted to parliament, which will approve it and it will become a constitutional norm. This is a political settlement,” added Khaddam. “An agreement can be reached or the fighting will continue. The conflict first emerged as Christian-Muslim, but it has now changed. We can either speak of a settlement or declare one party victor over the other, which would spell disaster.”
At this, I relented for the accord to be submitted to parliament, saying that I will agree to it if the lawmakers do.
“The accord aborts constitutional institutions. This is my opinion and I will stick to it. I am asking the president to keep the bare minimum of this state. Collective leadership will lead to cantons on the ground and eliminating the president from procedural authority will paralyze the state,” I warned.
At this Assad, reiterated that I was exercising more jurisdiction that he does.
The third work meeting was held the next day. I reiterated my objection of the accord, saying it weakens the state. “I cannot agree to it without first referring to the legitimate constitutional authorities.”
“Do these authorities still stand?” asked Assad. “There are no institutions in Lebanon. There is no police and no army. Rather there are several armies. We are not imposing anything. We are not demanding anything. The gatherers reached an agreement. They believe that those who were present when the accord was signed are Lebanon and the state. Why don’t you accept this? They represent 80 or 90 percent of the fighters. According to my information, the majority of leaders in Lebanon are Muslim, except for the heads of the Kataeb party, and Lebanese Forces, which is affiliated with the Kataeb, as well as some Christian and Muslim clergy. Sheikh Amin, the opportunity at hand may not be repeated. The more blood is shed, the wider the divide will grow.”
I replied: “If we consider the notes I submitted yesterday, you will find that they can be applied and that way, we would ease some of the negative aspects of the accord. If my request embarrasses anyone, then we will submit it to parliament, which will relieve me of this responsibility. If the fighters want to occupy Baabda, then I don’t mind. It would be a revolt. I am keen on my duties and I will not take on a responsibility that I do not agree to.”
“If parliament approves it, then will you agree?” asked Assad.
“It will become law and I am bound to implement it,” I replied.
“There are now two options: Discussing it with the fighters or sending it to parliament,” said Assad.
“I will study the accord with you because discussing it with the fighters is pointless. They may not want it and hold me responsible for, which would lead to the resumption of the shelling and fighting,” I noted. “I am ready for any policy you decide on.”
“This is not a policy, but a treaty,” clarified Assad. “We will submit it to the ‘brothers’, because this is an accord between Lebanese parties, not with Syria.”
Before departing, Gemayel said: “I would like to declare my solidarity and sympathy with you. I did not receive anything after my election and now I am being held accountable for everything. We must succeed. Despite this, my conscience is clear because I have performed my duties to my country.”
Assad insisted on accompanying me to the airport despite his poor health. I seized the opportunity while we were alone in the car to assert to him that I was not opposed to reform, on condition that it take into consideration Lebanon’s interests and that they pass through a more representative official authority, rather than an alliance of militias.
Assad listened to me attentively and I believe I convinced him of my great keenness to find a solution to the crisis and maintain good relations with Syria. Khaddam, however, who is less courteous in behavior, declared to reporters at the airport: “Amending the accord is out of the question and those behind it are the ones in control in Lebanon.”
He then added with deliberate goading: “There won’t be a 12th or 13th summit.”
Part two continues on Saturday.
