US Threatens to Sink Russia Deeper in Syrian ‘Quagmire’

American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)
American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)
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US Threatens to Sink Russia Deeper in Syrian ‘Quagmire’

American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)
American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)

American officials have been clear in their message to Russia over Syria: We must either work together to reach a settlement, which includes a change in the regime’s behavior and implementation of six key conditions, or raise the cost of the Syrian “quagmire”. The second option is a reminder to Moscow of the American experience in Iraq and the Soviet experience in the Afghan conflict, which has been raging since 1979.

Six conditions
In early 2018, US Special Representative for Syria Engagement, James Jeffrey, and his deputy, Joel Rayburn, presented President Donald Trump with a number of suggestions on the Syrian conflict. They agreed on six American points that would lead to normalizing relations with the Syrian government: 1) Ending support for terrorism, 2) cutting military ties with Iran and its militias, 3) ending hostile acts against neighboring countries, 4) abandoning weapons of mass destruction and the chemical weapons program, 5) the Damascus government must introduce changes on the ground that will allow refugees to voluntarily return home – effectively the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2254, and 6) putting war criminals on trial.

Speaking at a seminar earlier this week, Rayburn said the first four conditions have been demanded by Washington even before the anti-regime protests erupted in 2011. These are conditions that are demanded from any Syrian government. People come and go, but any Syrian government must commit to these conditions because they impact American national security.

In May, Jeffrey said: “I've never seen a regime that poses more threats to its region and to the American idea of how the world should be organized.”

These six conditions have become a central part of the Caesar Act that was approved by Congress, signed by Trump and went into effect in June.

Pressure tools
Washington holds a number of pressure cards to achieve its demands:

1) It has troops deployed in northeastern Syria. Rayburn had encouraged Trump to keep some 500 soldiers deployed east of the Euphrates River and more than a hundred at the al-Tanf base shortly after he announced in October 2019 that he wanted to withdraw troops from Syria

2) It provides logistic and intelligence support for Israeli raids on Iranian positions in Syria.

3) It is exerting pressure on the European Union to keep its economic sanctions on Damascus and preventing it from normalizing diplomatic ties with it.

4) It is preventing Arab countries from restoring Syria’s membership in the Arab League and also discouraging them from restoring political or diplomatic ties with it.

5) It is supporting Ankara’s efforts to bar regime forces from returning to northwestern Syria and trying to turn the Idlib ceasefire into a nationwide ceasefire.

6) It is coordinating with western and Arab countries at the UN over the Syrian chemical weapons file and human rights violations. It is also seeking to hold regime officials to account over their crimes. A Security Council meeting will be held to that end.

7) It is supporting the peace process, led by UN special envoy Geir Pedersen, aimed at introducing constitutional reform and implementing resolution 2254.

8) It is increasing economic sanctions, the last of which was the implementation of the Caesar Act.

Caesar messages
American officials believe the Caesar Act delivered four key messages. They noted the significance of it being approved by both Republicans and Democrats at Congress. Rayburn said that pressuring Bashar Assad’s regime was not a point of contention in Washington, rather there was consensus over the issue. The consensus has dashed the hopes of parties of dreaming or promoting potential American policy change. Nothing will change even after the presidential elections in November, he added.

The Act also eliminated dreams of a military victory for the regime. Rayburn said that the regime and its loyalists believed that once they achieve military victory on the ground, then the money will begin to flow in Syria and they will all reap the benefits. This is not true, he said. There is no light at the end of the tunnel and the situation will not go back to how it was.

The Act was also message to regional countries to discourage them from investing in regime-held regions in Syria, Rayburn said. Anyone making such a move will risk being slapped with sanctions and being left out of the American financial system. Washington has, however, been trying to exempt northeastern and northwestern Syria from the sanctions. American officials have been clear in addressing “Arab and regional friends”, continued Rayburn, saying that no one was exempted from sanctions.

The last message is aimed at deterring the military machine. Rayburn explained that the process of reaching justice and accountability is often slow, but the American message is clear: It will never forget. Regime loyalists will now realize that the day when they will be held to account will come sooner or later. This should prompt them to change their calculations.

Syrian ‘quagmire’
American officials believe that these “tools” will persuade Russia to change its course in Syria on the medium- and long-terms. They will therefore, continue to impose economic sanctions under the Caesar Act. Rayburn said this will be the “summer of Caesar” with some one hundred individuals and entities set to be blacklisted in order to raise the cost of the Syrian quagmire.

Jeffery had previously said that the Russians did not have a “political way out” of their problems in Syria. “Our job is to present them through the UN and our support for the UN, with a way forward, but that requires them distancing themselves to some degree from Assad and from the Iranians,” he added.

Rayburn believes that the Russian can influence Damascus. Pressure can also push Moscow towards joining serious negotiations aimed at implementing the above-mentioned six conditions. The alternative would see it sink even deeper in the Syrian quagmire.

Jeffery had on more than one occasion said that his mission when he assumed his post two years ago was to transform Syria into a quagmire for the Russians. “We are pursuing what we think is a smart policy,” he stated, saying the American military presence is aimed at cracking down on ISIS and supporting military operations carried out by other countries, such as Israel and Turkey, while also focusing on economic and diplomatic pressure.

“This isn't Afghanistan, this isn't Vietnam,” he explained. “This isn't a quagmire. My job is to make it a quagmire for the Russians.”

Rayburn explained this position further. When the Russians intervened militarily in Syria five years ago, they did not believe that they would have such a result today, he said. He echoed Jeffery’s statements on the quagmire, wondering if Russia would still want to have the same result five years from now. Military involvement is very costly and there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

He added that when the regime captured eastern Aleppo in late 2016, it believed that military victory and the end of the war were near. It thought that it could reap the rewards of the victory. He said that this was not true. The conflict cannot be resolved through the military machine, but with politics. Anything other than that would mean the war will last forever, he warned, citing the conflict in Afghanistan which is still ongoing.



Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
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Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)

When Israeli and US strikes killed Ali Khamenei at the start of the Middle East war, Iran's security chief Ali Larijani became even more powerful than he had been for decades.

Israel's Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Tuesday that Larijani had been killed, though Iran's authorities have not confirmed his death.

Larijani had since the start of the war played a far more visible role than the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public since he was appointed to replace his slain father.

The security chief, on the other hand, was seen walking with crowds at a pro-government rally last week in Tehran, in a sign of defiance against Israel and the US.

His killing, if confirmed, would be a major blow against Iran, undermining a key figure seen as capable of navigating both ideology and diplomacy.

- Pragmatist -

Adept at balancing ideological loyalty with pragmatic statecraft, Larijani was central prior to the war to Iran's nuclear policy and strategic diplomacy.

Bespectacled and known for his measured tone, the 68-year-old was believed to enjoy the confidence of the late Khamenei, after a long career in the military, media and legislature.

In 2025, after Iran's last war with Israel and the US, he was appointed head of Iran's top security body, the Supreme National Security Council -- a position he had held nearly two decades earlier -- coordinating defense strategies and overseeing nuclear policy.

He later became increasingly visible in the diplomatic arena, travelling to Gulf states such as Oman and Qatar as Tehran cautiously engaged in nuclear negotiations that were ultimately scuppered by the war.

- 'Canny operator' -

"Larijani is a true insider, a canny operator, familiar with how the system operates," Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group's project director for Iran, said before the Middle East war began.

Born in Najaf, Iraq in 1957 to a prominent Shiite cleric who was close to the Islamic Republic's founder Khomeini, Larijani's family has been influential within Iran's political system for decades.

Some of his relatives have been the targets of corruption allegations over the years, which they denied.

He earned a PhD in Western Philosophy from the University of Tehran.

A veteran of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq war, Larijani later headed state broadcasting IRIB for a decade from 1994 before serving as parliamentary speaker from 2008 to 2020.

In 1996, he was appointed as Khamenei's representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). He later became secretary of the SNSC and chief nuclear negotiator, leading talks with Britain, France, Germany and Russia between 2005 and 2007.

He ran in the 2005 presidential elections, losing to populist candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with whom he later had disagreements over nuclear diplomacy.

Larijani was then disqualified from running for president in both 2021 and 2024.

Observers viewed his return as the head of the SNSC as signaling a turn reflecting his reputation as a conservative capable of combining ideological commitment with pragmatism.

Larijani supported the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with world powers which unraveled three years later after US President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement.

In March 2025, Larijani warned that sustained external pressure could alter Iran's nuclear posture.

"We are not moving towards (nuclear) weapons, but if you do something wrong in the Iranian nuclear issue, you will force Iran to move towards that because it has to defend itself," he told state television.

Larijani repeatedly insisted negotiations with Washington should remain confined to the nuclear file and defended uranium enrichment as Iran's sovereign right.

- Violent repression -

Larijani was among officials sanctioned by the US in January over what Washington described as "violently repressing the Iranian people", following nationwide protests which erupted weeks earlier due to the rising cost of living.

According to rights groups, thousands of people were killed in the government's brutal crackdown of the protests.

Larijani acknowledged that economic pressures had "led to the protests", but blamed the violence which ensued on foreign involvement by the United States and Israel.


Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
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Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)

Western diplomatic sources have outlined to Asharq Al-Awsat the tight inner circle surrounding Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, shedding light on the key figures shaping decision-making at a critical moment for the country.

According to these sources, any serious discussion of a comprehensive ceasefire in the ongoing war with Israel and the US is unlikely to begin until this inner circle concludes that the country has reached a point of military exhaustion and that prolonging the conflict would only deepen its strategic predicament.

The sources also dismissed claims over Khamenei’s lack of experience over decision-making. Khamenei has long been involved in the decision-making process within the office of his late father, former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, they stressed. He has also maintained extensive ties with Iran’s military leadership, particularly within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

A key figure in this circle is Mohsen Rezaei, appointed by Mojtaba Khamenei as a senior military adviser. Often described as a “man of war”, Rezaei is also believed to have been among those who advised Khomeini to accept the ceasefire with Iraq at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when Iranian forces were reportedly exhausted.

The sources identified several influential figures in the Supreme Leader’s inner circle. The most prominent among them is parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander who is said to have played a leading role during last year’s 12-day conflict with Israel.

Other key figures include General Ahmad Vahidi, the commander of the IRGC, who previously served as minister under both presidents Ebrahim Raisi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and was the first commander of the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the IRGC.

General Rahim Safavi, a senior adviser during the tenure of the slain Khamenei, General Ali Abdollahi, head of operations at the armed forces’ general staff, General Majid Mousavi, commander of the IRGC’s missile unit, and Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, head of its naval forces, are also part of the new supreme leader’s inner circle.

Despite the heavy blows, the Iranian regime has so far succeeded in preventing any fragmentation within its military and leaderships, the sources noted.

Developments indicate that Iran’s military leadership had preprepared a strategy aimed at making any war against it extremely costly for both the region and the global economy.

This strategy, they said, rests on two main pillars: first, “drawing Gulf states into the theater of war through missile and drone attacks under the pretext of targeting US presence”; and second, “causing widespread or total disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.”

The sources added that Tehran is betting on what it perceives as US President Donald Trump’s limited patience for prolonged conflict, especially amid rising oil prices, which Iran hopes could approach $200 per barrel, the proximity of US midterm elections, and the lack of broad public support for war.

On the other side, US and Israeli forces have escalated strikes in an effort to demonstrate the scale of destruction inflicted on Iran’s military arsenal and defense industries.

The objective of regime change appears to have receded in favor of a strategy of attrition, one that could compel Iran to scale back what the sources described as its “self-destructive behavior.”

The sources suggested that the new supreme leader may initially find it difficult to adopt a flexible or conciliatory stance in his first test of leadership. However, a growing sense that continued attrition could trigger internal unrest — or even raise questions about the regime’s survival — may ultimately lead senior military figures to conclude that preserving the system justifies accepting painful compromises.

They also warned that missile and drone attacks targeting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries could prove counterproductive, particularly as they have largely struck civilian targets.

The sources stressed that the Gulf states’ significant regional and international standing could form the basis for mounting global pressure on Iran to agree to a ceasefire. When that moment comes, Tehran may find that the war has set it back by years.


Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
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Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)

Cheap and deadly, Iranian-designed Shahed drones have inflicted major damage in the Middle East war, and have anti-jamming and other capabilities that make them difficult to stop.

- Offline navigation -

Designed to explode on impact, Shahed drones connect to GPS to register their location shortly before or after takeoff, then typically turn off their receivers, said Thomas Withington, a researcher at Britain's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

The drones then travel long distances towards their target using gyroscopes that measure their speed, direction and position -- known as an "inertial navigation system".

"GPS is going to get jammed by whatever is protecting the target," Withington told AFP.

"If you look at a map of GPS jamming at the moment in the Middle East, you see that there's a lot of jamming... By not using the GPS, you avoid that."

The drones can then return to GPS just before impact for a more precise strike, or remain offline.

"It's not always necessarily very accurate, but it's as accurate as it needs to be," said Withington.

- Anti-jamming mechanisms -

Russia has been making Shahed-style drones to use in its war in Ukraine.

The US-based Institute for Science and International Security found in 2023 that those drones used "state-of-art antenna interference suppression" to remove enemy jamming signals while preserving the desired GPS signal.

Anti-jamming mechanisms were found in the wreckage of an Iranian-made drone that struck Cyprus in the opening days of the Middle East war, a European industry source told AFP.

"They have put (the Shahed) together using off-the-shelf parts, but it has... many of the capabilities that US military GPS equipment has," Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, told AFP.

Defending against them now requires sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.

"The Shaheds have been upgraded," said Ukrainian air force spokesman Yuriy Ignat.

- Stealth materials -

The Shahed is built from "lightweight radar-absorbing materials", such as plastic and fiberglass, a 2023 RUSI paper said.

Their small size and low altitude allow them to slip through aerial defense systems.

- Other positioning systems? -

Some experts think Iran is using multiple positioning systems, making it easier for its drones to dodge jamming.

Serhii Beskrestnov, a technology adviser to the Ukrainian defense ministry, said Iran is using the BeiDou system, a Chinese rival to the US-developed GPS.

And the Russia-made version of Shaheds uses both BeiDou and the Russian equivalent, GLONASS, he said.

Others suspect Iran may be using LORAN, a radio navigation system developed during World War II.

LORAN, which does not require satellites, largely fell out of use when GPS emerged.

But Iran said in 2016 it was reviving the technology, which requires a network of large ground-based transmitters, though experts have not confirmed it is active today.

- Counter-strategies -

Militaries have mainly defended against Shaheds by shooting them down with cannon fire, missiles and interceptor drones, with the United States and Israel also developing lasers.

But jamming can work, as Ukraine has shown, as can "spoofing", which involves hacking into the drone's navigation system to change its destination.

Ukraine used electronic warfare to neutralize 4,652 attack drones from mid-May to mid-July 2025 -- not far off the number it shot down in the same period, 6,041, according to AFP analysis of Ukrainian military data.

Its experts insist that electronic and conventional defenses are often used in tandem against the drones.