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US Threatens to Sink Russia Deeper in Syrian ‘Quagmire’

American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)
American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)
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US Threatens to Sink Russia Deeper in Syrian ‘Quagmire’

American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)
American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)

American officials have been clear in their message to Russia over Syria: We must either work together to reach a settlement, which includes a change in the regime’s behavior and implementation of six key conditions, or raise the cost of the Syrian “quagmire”. The second option is a reminder to Moscow of the American experience in Iraq and the Soviet experience in the Afghan conflict, which has been raging since 1979.

Six conditions
In early 2018, US Special Representative for Syria Engagement, James Jeffrey, and his deputy, Joel Rayburn, presented President Donald Trump with a number of suggestions on the Syrian conflict. They agreed on six American points that would lead to normalizing relations with the Syrian government: 1) Ending support for terrorism, 2) cutting military ties with Iran and its militias, 3) ending hostile acts against neighboring countries, 4) abandoning weapons of mass destruction and the chemical weapons program, 5) the Damascus government must introduce changes on the ground that will allow refugees to voluntarily return home – effectively the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2254, and 6) putting war criminals on trial.

Speaking at a seminar earlier this week, Rayburn said the first four conditions have been demanded by Washington even before the anti-regime protests erupted in 2011. These are conditions that are demanded from any Syrian government. People come and go, but any Syrian government must commit to these conditions because they impact American national security.

In May, Jeffrey said: “I've never seen a regime that poses more threats to its region and to the American idea of how the world should be organized.”

These six conditions have become a central part of the Caesar Act that was approved by Congress, signed by Trump and went into effect in June.

Pressure tools
Washington holds a number of pressure cards to achieve its demands:

1) It has troops deployed in northeastern Syria. Rayburn had encouraged Trump to keep some 500 soldiers deployed east of the Euphrates River and more than a hundred at the al-Tanf base shortly after he announced in October 2019 that he wanted to withdraw troops from Syria

2) It provides logistic and intelligence support for Israeli raids on Iranian positions in Syria.

3) It is exerting pressure on the European Union to keep its economic sanctions on Damascus and preventing it from normalizing diplomatic ties with it.

4) It is preventing Arab countries from restoring Syria’s membership in the Arab League and also discouraging them from restoring political or diplomatic ties with it.

5) It is supporting Ankara’s efforts to bar regime forces from returning to northwestern Syria and trying to turn the Idlib ceasefire into a nationwide ceasefire.

6) It is coordinating with western and Arab countries at the UN over the Syrian chemical weapons file and human rights violations. It is also seeking to hold regime officials to account over their crimes. A Security Council meeting will be held to that end.

7) It is supporting the peace process, led by UN special envoy Geir Pedersen, aimed at introducing constitutional reform and implementing resolution 2254.

8) It is increasing economic sanctions, the last of which was the implementation of the Caesar Act.

Caesar messages
American officials believe the Caesar Act delivered four key messages. They noted the significance of it being approved by both Republicans and Democrats at Congress. Rayburn said that pressuring Bashar Assad’s regime was not a point of contention in Washington, rather there was consensus over the issue. The consensus has dashed the hopes of parties of dreaming or promoting potential American policy change. Nothing will change even after the presidential elections in November, he added.

The Act also eliminated dreams of a military victory for the regime. Rayburn said that the regime and its loyalists believed that once they achieve military victory on the ground, then the money will begin to flow in Syria and they will all reap the benefits. This is not true, he said. There is no light at the end of the tunnel and the situation will not go back to how it was.

The Act was also message to regional countries to discourage them from investing in regime-held regions in Syria, Rayburn said. Anyone making such a move will risk being slapped with sanctions and being left out of the American financial system. Washington has, however, been trying to exempt northeastern and northwestern Syria from the sanctions. American officials have been clear in addressing “Arab and regional friends”, continued Rayburn, saying that no one was exempted from sanctions.

The last message is aimed at deterring the military machine. Rayburn explained that the process of reaching justice and accountability is often slow, but the American message is clear: It will never forget. Regime loyalists will now realize that the day when they will be held to account will come sooner or later. This should prompt them to change their calculations.

Syrian ‘quagmire’
American officials believe that these “tools” will persuade Russia to change its course in Syria on the medium- and long-terms. They will therefore, continue to impose economic sanctions under the Caesar Act. Rayburn said this will be the “summer of Caesar” with some one hundred individuals and entities set to be blacklisted in order to raise the cost of the Syrian quagmire.

Jeffery had previously said that the Russians did not have a “political way out” of their problems in Syria. “Our job is to present them through the UN and our support for the UN, with a way forward, but that requires them distancing themselves to some degree from Assad and from the Iranians,” he added.

Rayburn believes that the Russian can influence Damascus. Pressure can also push Moscow towards joining serious negotiations aimed at implementing the above-mentioned six conditions. The alternative would see it sink even deeper in the Syrian quagmire.

Jeffery had on more than one occasion said that his mission when he assumed his post two years ago was to transform Syria into a quagmire for the Russians. “We are pursuing what we think is a smart policy,” he stated, saying the American military presence is aimed at cracking down on ISIS and supporting military operations carried out by other countries, such as Israel and Turkey, while also focusing on economic and diplomatic pressure.

“This isn't Afghanistan, this isn't Vietnam,” he explained. “This isn't a quagmire. My job is to make it a quagmire for the Russians.”

Rayburn explained this position further. When the Russians intervened militarily in Syria five years ago, they did not believe that they would have such a result today, he said. He echoed Jeffery’s statements on the quagmire, wondering if Russia would still want to have the same result five years from now. Military involvement is very costly and there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

He added that when the regime captured eastern Aleppo in late 2016, it believed that military victory and the end of the war were near. It thought that it could reap the rewards of the victory. He said that this was not true. The conflict cannot be resolved through the military machine, but with politics. Anything other than that would mean the war will last forever, he warned, citing the conflict in Afghanistan which is still ongoing.

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What Syria’s Military Map Looks Like One Year After Assad Ouster

Hama residents set fire to a large banner of Bashar al Assad after armed factions seized the city last December (AFP)
Hama residents set fire to a large banner of Bashar al Assad after armed factions seized the city last December (AFP)
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What Syria’s Military Map Looks Like One Year After Assad Ouster

Hama residents set fire to a large banner of Bashar al Assad after armed factions seized the city last December (AFP)
Hama residents set fire to a large banner of Bashar al Assad after armed factions seized the city last December (AFP)

Syria’s map of control has been shaken to its core since late 2024, when the Deterrence of Aggression offensive erupted and the Assad government fell, unleashing a series of security and military shifts that continued to redraw the country’s landscape through 2025.

But this fluid map is unlikely to hold, according to a study by the Syrian research group Jusoor Center for Studies. With regional and international actors working to head off the chaos and potential partition that threaten wider stability, any near term changes in who controls what are expected to come through political and security pressure rather than a return to large scale battles.

Mahmoud Eibo, one of three researchers who worked on a report on territorial influence in Syria in 2025, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the balance of control shifted sharply after the launch of the Deterrence of Aggression battles on November 27, 2024.

In less than two weeks, the Assad government lost the areas it had held since 2020, which covered more than half of the country.

Iranian withdrawal from Syrian territory

With the government’s fall, Iran’s presence also unraveled after more than a decade of entrenchment. Iran backed militias withdrew from rural Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, the southern provinces and from Al-Bukamal and Al-Mayadin.

Eibo said the militias “withdrew completely” after supply lines linking them to Lebanon and Iraq were severed, which effectively ended Iran’s influence and that of its militias across Syria.

The military role of Hezbollah also came to an end. The group had been one of Tehran’s key proxies in Syria since 2013, when its intervention began with the capture of Al-Qusayr.

But the turning point ended in the same town, after factions in the Deterrence of Aggression campaign seized Al-Qusayr in late 2024 and Hezbollah forces pulled out entirely.

The moment marked a definitive end to Hezbollah’s long military presence in Syria, after the group lost one of its most critical geographic links to Iran through Syrian territory.

Many areas that had been under the indirect influence of Hezbollah and Iran backed factions also slipped out of their orbit and reverted to the authority of the new Syrian state and its security and military institutions in the north.

The largest shift in influence last year came at the expense of the Syrian Democratic Forces, known as the SDF, Eibo said. The Dawn of Freedom operation ended the group’s presence in strategically important areas west of the Euphrates, beginning with the fall of Tel Rifaat and surrounding villages and extending toward Manbij, which cost the SDF one of its key cities in the region.

As a result, the SDF’s influence contracted in northern and eastern Aleppo countryside and the group withdrew eastward toward Raqqa, Hasakeh and parts of Deir Ezzor.

Sweida and the south

In the south, a limited but consequential development emerged in Sweida province. Local groups linked to Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hajri seized parts of the province after government forces withdrew, taking advantage of the security vacuum.

Although the area under their control is geographically small, it created a pocket of influence outside the new government’s authority and added another layer of instability to the southern provinces.

In parallel, Israel capitalized on the collapse of the southern front. It pushed beyond the buffer zone and established a presence in select points and strategic hilltops near the disengagement line.

Although the area is small, the symbolic and intelligence value of the chosen positions gives Israel leverage through monitoring and pressure, keeping the south open to volatility.

What the new map shows

Syria’s territorial map at the end of 2025 reflects a new political landscape dominated by four actors: the Syrian government, the SDF, the National Guard forces in Sweida and Israel, each wielding varying degrees of influence.

The Syrian government remains the primary authority. Beyond its broad political and social control, it holds 69.3% of the country’s territory, covering major cities, most administrative structures and key transport routes. It does not, however, control four provincial capitals: Quneitra, Sweida, Hasakeh and Raqqa.

The SDF controls 27.8% of Syria’s territory, concentrated in the north and east. The expanse is significant but uneven in terms of internal stability. The group faces serious political pressure tied to the implementation of the March 10, 2025 agreement, which is expected to reshape its relationship with the Syrian government.

The National Guard forces in Sweida, loyal to Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hajri, control 2.8% of the country. Their influence is small in size but distinct in nature. The significance lies in their location and in the direct support they receive from Israel, which positions them within a broader framework aimed at prolonging instability in the south.

Their presence overlaps with Israel’s incursion into Syrian territory, which covers 0.1% of the country. Despite the small footprint, the choice of elevated positions and small villages with high surveillance value reflects strategic intent.

Israel is not seeking territorial control, but rather an early warning line and a tighter grip over the border zone, while supporting an environment that prevents full stability in the south. This aligns with its indirect role in reinforcing the position of the Sweida National Guard forces.

Change driven by political pressure

According to Eibo, Syria’s map of control has undergone a fundamental rupture since late 2024, ending a geopolitical phase that had been largely settled since 2020.

The country has entered a more fluid and complex period marked by the retreat of traditional actors and the emergence of new, still unsettled zones of influence.

Although limited security and military shifts continued through 2025, it is unlikely that the current map will hold. Regional and international efforts are focused on avoiding chaos and partition.

Any upcoming change in territorial control will most likely be driven by political and security pressure and by reengineering spheres of influence rather than a return to large scale military confrontations.

Features

Assad’s ‘Trap’: A Night That Shook Tehran’s Allies in Baghdad

A defaced portrait of Syria's ousted President Bashar al-Assad hangs on a wall in the capital Damascus on June 2, 2025. (AFP)
A defaced portrait of Syria's ousted President Bashar al-Assad hangs on a wall in the capital Damascus on June 2, 2025. (AFP)
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Assad’s ‘Trap’: A Night That Shook Tehran’s Allies in Baghdad

A defaced portrait of Syria's ousted President Bashar al-Assad hangs on a wall in the capital Damascus on June 2, 2025. (AFP)
A defaced portrait of Syria's ousted President Bashar al-Assad hangs on a wall in the capital Damascus on June 2, 2025. (AFP)

A senior Iraqi security official urged his driver to pick up speed as they raced toward Damascus airport. He needed to catch a flight back to Baghdad, while alerts kept lighting up his phone.

One message stood out: “The Syrian factions are on their way to the capital.”

It was Saturday evening, December 7, 2024, and the official had just wrapped up a routine mission in northeastern Syria to coordinate border security. But Syria itself was on the edge of a dramatic shift, its old order crumbling and a new one taking shape in the ruins.

At the outskirts of Damascus, the official’s convoy halted, waiting for “extraordinary arrangements” with the emerging authorities. A flurry of sudden, unexpected contacts unfolded between the two sides.

A former Syrian official from the Military Operations Directorate said it was “the first time that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group communicated with an official in the Iraqi government.”

An Iraqi security officer who was present during the arrangements said that “the process went ahead with unexpected ease at the time, and we entered Damascus” alongside members of the group on the morning of December 8, 2024. Then a message arrived like a lightning strike: “Bashar al-Assad has fled.”

Damascus airport was a ghostly stage. Even the officers of the Air Transport Brigade whom the Iraqi official knew had disappeared. No one asked for a ticket or a passport. The diplomatic lane was wide open to the wind. The man boarded a special flight to Baghdad.

As the plane climbed through daylight, the Iraqi security official carried a bag full of questions about the new Syria.

On the same route, but on the ground, Iraqi militias that had been stationed in Syria since 2011 were withdrawing. Convoys moved from the Damascus countryside toward Al-Bukamal near the Iraqi border, making a final one-way journey for hundreds of fighters, leaving behind 15 years of a “Resistance Axis” now collapsing like a mountain of sand.

Exclusive testimonies gathered by Asharq Al-Awsat from Iraqi figures involved in the Syrian file before Assad’s escape reveal how militias withdrew from Syria without coordination or prior arrangements.

The accounts describe what unfolded behind the scenes, including how they viewed the events, and later showed that Tehran, Moscow and Assad had each made separate decisions not to fight in Syria, failing to share essential information with their Iraqi allies until late.

The testimonies also shed light on the reactions of Shiite groups following the collapse of the Assad regime, including calls to strengthen the influence of armed factions in Iraq’s political process and reinforce what became known as “Shiite governance” in Baghdad, in order to “absorb the shock felt by those who had been left behind in Syria.”

Damascus airport after the collapse of the Assad regime. (AFP file)

‘It was not a maneuver... we were deceived’

On November 30, 2024, three days after the launch of Operation Deterrence of Aggression to topple the Syrian regime, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani held a phone call with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

At that time, Syrian opposition factions had seized control of the Aleppo countryside. Sudani told Assad that “Syria’s security is tied to Iraq’s national security.” The following day, the opposition encircled Hama. Sudani did not call Assad again.

In Nineveh, the northern Iraqi province that borders Syria, Shiite militia leaders attempted to send reinforcements to Syria, since “as the Syrian factions advanced, the number of Iran-aligned fighters was far smaller than in previous years.” A militia official in Nineveh said they told their fighters, “You must protect the Shiites and the shrines in Syria,” and many volunteers were eager to join.

Kadhim al-Fartousi, spokesman for Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, which had been active in Syria since 2013, said the group withdrew in late 2023. “Our mission was over,” he said.

Until 2018, Syria was crowded with more than 150,000 fighters from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, according to Iraqi and Syrian security estimates. The Syrian army under the former regime appeared smaller than the foreign forces operating on its territory. By December 2023, something had changed.

The Revolutionary Guard allowed several Shiite groups to leave after consultations with Assad. It was widely said that a “regional deal” had driven this shift.

As part of the partial withdrawal of Iranian-backed forces from Syria in 2023, Assad was attempting to regain Syria’s seat in the Arab League. It required significant time and diplomatic maneuvering to prepare for an almost impossible reintegration with the Arab world, which ultimately did not materialize.

When Operation Deterrence of Aggression began in November 2024, the number of Iranian groups in Syria had fallen to several thousand, but Assad’s return to the Arab fold was not complete.

As opposition factions advanced toward Damascus, the prevailing belief was that Shiite groups were moving to plug a gap that no one had noticed.

On December 2, 2024, dozens of fighters infiltrated Syria at night via an unofficial military road, but United States aircraft struck their convoys near Al-Bukamal. After that, it became clear that those who had been eager to enter Syria were backing off.

The next morning, Syrian opposition forces seized 14 towns in Hama and turned to the battle for Homs. That day, Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah said “it is too early to decide on sending military support to Syria.”

A senior member of a Shiite armed group said he asked his superiors in Baghdad about the first days of Operation Deterrence of Aggression. “Do not worry... Syria may fall to the opposition, but Damascus will hold,” they told him, referring to Assad’s grip on the capital.

“A week later,” he added, “we could no longer comprehend what had happened.”

Before the opposition reached Homs, Shiite groups assumed the advance would stop there. A commander said intelligence reports reviewed by officials in Iraq’s National Security Service, the Popular Mobilization Forces leadership and militia commanders indicated that Russia and Iran would halt the opposition’s momentum and that Homs would be the decisive point.

But Russia used its air superiority sparingly. As opposition factions moved from Hama toward Homs on December 6, 2024, aircraft believed to be Russian struck the Al-Rastan bridge linking the two cities with destructive force, but not enough to prevent convoys from crossing.

Later aerial footage showed Sukhoi jets armed with missiles sitting unused at Russia’s Hmeimim airbase as opposition fighters crossed the bridge into Homs, which was fully taken by dawn on December 7.

At this point, many within the so-called Resistance Axis became convinced that the swift advance of the opposition was not a mere maneuver. The militia commander said they realized “the Iranians had given us conflicting signals... maybe they were deceived too.”

Questions about the roles of Tehran and Moscow remained unresolved. Shiite factions had no clear answers in the months following Assad’s escape.

Today, Fartousi, the Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada spokesman, believes that “the Russian and Iranian position only shifted after the Assad regime retreated, the forces holding the ground collapsed and the battle turned into a confrontation with the people.”

But sources from factions active in Syria since 2013 spoke of “a decision taken early by Iran not to wage a battle in Syria due to far more complex regional calculations.”

According to these sources, “Iran was not confident of favorable outcomes had it confronted the opposition’s advance, because it realized too late that Moscow was acting independently in Syria.”

In the end, the pillars of the alliance between Moscow, Tehran and Assad appeared to be drifting apart, taking separate battlefield decisions that enabled the opposition’s rapid advance and Assad’s even faster escape. What is certain, the Shiite commander said, is that “the Iraqi groups were not central to the discussions that led to what happened.”

By then, more than ten Iraqi factions had spent over a decade on the Syrian front, during which thousands of fighters were drawn into a sea of blood.

Assad shakes hands with Iraqi PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in Damascus. (File photo)

‘And the wheel turns’

At six in the morning on December 8, 2024, former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdulmahdi posted on X about how tables turn and the “aggressor” is overtaken by events. Shock swept through Shiite political forces in Baghdad. Assad had fled and the regime had fallen.

Two days after the liberation, all factions had left Syrian territory and Assad was in Moscow. On December 12, 2024, Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition and a long-time ally of Assad, declared that “the goal of what happened in Damascus is to stir the street in Baghdad.” Public opinion erupted with questions.

Shiite political circles in Baghdad struggled to absorb the shock. Private discussions intensified around “the future of the Shiites in Iraq,” dominated by deep confusion, according to participants in closed-door meetings held in the weeks following Assad’s escape.

They said Shiite decision-makers found no answers regarding what had happened in Syria or Iran’s role, and many struggled to answer how Iraq and the region would change after Assad.

One participant in a private session held in January 2025 said the crisis in Syria was not about Assad’s escape or the collapse of the Resistance Axis, but for Iraqi Shiites it was about “redefining their role after old alliances and balances had crumbled.”

Secondary effects of this difficult debate emerged within Shiite groups. Many within the resistance environment began promoting the concept of a “Shiite federation” stretching from Iraq’s Samarra to Basra on top of vast oil reserves. The idea faded quickly, like cold ash.

Talk of “Shiite governance” intensified. A militia commander said: “Shiite forces in recent months focused on strengthening the domestic scene and consolidating their presence in political life, which explains their active participation in the elections held on November 11, 2025, and the victory of armed factions in seats in the new parliament.”

It appeared that all those who had fought in Syria won seats in the new legislature. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, secured 28 seats. The Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, won 18. The Rights bloc, linked to Kataib Hezbollah, won six. A list affiliated with Kataib Imam Ali won three. The Services Alliance, led by Shibl al-Zaidi, won nine seats.

These groups are now proposing a transitional project built on new Shiite roles, driven by the growing ambition of leaders such as Khazali to craft an umbrella that shields Shiite groups from fragmentation by expanding their influence in both the legislative and executive branches of the state.

In March 2025, Khazali was asked about the new Syria. He said: “It is the duty and interest of the Iraqi state to engage with it, as long as those governments represent their countries.”

A Shiite leader said the moment Assad fled was not a Syrian event as much as “an earthquake in Shiite consciousness inside Iraq,” pushing everyone to reconsider the alliances that had shaped the region for years.

But beneath this transformation lie lingering questions and doubts about “the future of the Iranian doctrine itself,” now facing major disruption after four decades of uninterrupted influence across the region.

“The answer,” the commander said, “has not yet matured.”

Features

New Political, Military Reality in Lebanon a Year after Assad’s Ouster 

People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.
People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.
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New Political, Military Reality in Lebanon a Year after Assad’s Ouster 

People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.
People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria in December 2024 created major political, security and economic changes in Lebanon. Beirut also rid itself of what remained of Damascus’ influence - after Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon in 2005 following 30 years of military and political hegemony - through Assad’s allies, namely Hezbollah.

With the ouster Assad, Lebanon became free to make its political decisions away from the influence of Damascus and its allies. Lebanon and Syria can establish mutual official relations, secure their shared border and improve the trade exchange between them.

Tehran-Beirut route severed

Head of Lebanon’s Saydet al-Jabal Gathering, former MP Fares Souaid told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Lebanon has changed. The most important thing that happened was that the new Syria severed the Tehran-Beirut route that used to supply Hezbollah with all of its security, military and financial means.”

Now, the party has to resort to smuggling to get what it needs, he added. “That option is not secured by military units working for Iran, forcing Hezbollah to approach the new situation in Lebanon with a lot more pragmatism than before.”

He said the party has been forced to take a “humble” approach to “critical issues.”

“We saw how Hezbollah did not quit the government even though it objected to cabinet decisions, especially the one related to imposing state monopoly over arms,” he explained. The decision effectively calls on Hezbollah to disarm.

The party was unable to take any steps to counter the decision because the “real route that has been feeding it has been cut,” Souaid stressed.

Developments, past and present, have shown that anything negative or positive taking place in Syria will impact Lebanon, he went on to say. “If Syria is well, then Lebanon is well.”

He said Lebanon still believes that Syria under President Ahmed al-Sharaa has a promising future and relations between Beirut and Damascus will also be promising.

The relations are already on the right track with the establishment of joint security and military committees sponsored by Saudi Arabia, he remarked. Efforts have already been exerted to secure the shared border between them ahead of demarcation starting from the Shebaa Farms.

Such coordination between Lebanese and Syrian security and military agencies “never happened under Assad rule. So, this is a new development for both countries,” he revealed.

Treaties with Syria

The neighbors currently appeared focused on reshaping their relations in a way that preserves their mutual interests. Souaid acknowledged, however, that pending complex issues remain.

He underlined the need to annul all political, security and economic treaties that were signed during Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon.

Lebanon has appointed an ambassador to Damascus, while the latter has yet to name an envoy to Beirut, he noted.

He also said that the Syrians are prioritizing resolving the issue of Syrian detainees held in Lebanese jails.

The issue is a “black mark” in the relations between the two countries. Lebanon’s justice minister must resolve this file so that it does not complicate efforts to forge good ties, Souaid urged.

Pending files

Lebanon has been perceived as dealing “coolly” with Syria’s insistence on resolving the detainee file.

Some Lebanese officials have for years also complained about Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the burden they have on the state. An informed security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that with Assad’s collapse, this issue was no longer a “major crisis”.

It revealed that half of the Syrian refugees who were in Arsal and the northern Akkar region in Lebanon have returned to their home country. This has been felt by the drop in the numbers of Syrian laborers in Lebanon.

The shared border is another issue of pressing concern for the neighbors.

After Assad’s ouster, Lebanon’s northern and eastern borders are no longer open to the regime’s allies and outlaws, especially drug and other smugglers.

The source said: “The most important achievement on the security level has been curbing the smuggling of weapons from Syria to Lebanon and money from Lebanon to Syria.”

“Captagon factories along both sides of the border have also been destroyed, leading to the dismantling of drug smuggling networks and culminating in the arrest of Lebanon’s most wanted drug smuggler, Noah Zeiter, who was seeking refuge in Syria before Assad’s ouster,” added the source.