Episode 1: Hafez al-Assad Cautiously Receives 1st Letter from Saddam, Tests him Before Replying

Asharq Al-Awsat Publishes Secret Letters between the Syrian, Iraqi Presidents in the mid-1990s

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (C) is pictured at the opening session of an emergency Arab summit in Amman, Nov. 8, 1987. (Reuters)
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (C) is pictured at the opening session of an emergency Arab summit in Amman, Nov. 8, 1987. (Reuters)
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Episode 1: Hafez al-Assad Cautiously Receives 1st Letter from Saddam, Tests him Before Replying

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (C) is pictured at the opening session of an emergency Arab summit in Amman, Nov. 8, 1987. (Reuters)
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (C) is pictured at the opening session of an emergency Arab summit in Amman, Nov. 8, 1987. (Reuters)

In the mid-1990s, then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein initiated two secret communication channels with his Syrian counterpart, Hafez al-Assad. But the latter had “doubts” about Saddam’s intentions, based on past experiences and his role in thwarting the implementation of the “Joint National Action Charter” between Syria and Iraq in 1979.

Thus, he subjected Saddam to several tests to prepare the ground with the Arab countries and the Iraqi opposition, before making public steps to end the hostility between the Baathist regime in Baghdad and Damascus, by exchanging secret messages, which Asharq Al-Awsat is revealing for the first time.

Those letters are part of the many documents that late Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam carried from his office to Paris, when he left Syria in 2005 and announced his defection from the regime at the end of that year. Asharq Al-Awsat contacted the Iraqi envoy, Ambassador Anwar Sabri Abdul Razzaq Al-Qaisi, who confirmed the authenticity of the documents.

In his first letters in August 1995, Saddam was rushing to reopen the two embassies that were closed in 1982, hold high-profile and public political meetings and open the borders. But Assad decided to hold Arab consultations before responding concretely to the Iraqi president’s proposals, in order to ensure “the achievement of the interests of the Arab nation and the two brotherly countries,” according to Khaddam.

In August 1995, Iraqi ambassador, Rafeh al-Tikriti, requested a meeting with Syrian Ambassador Abdulaziz al-Masri, whom he met on the same day and informed that he had received a personal message from his leader, Saddam, to be conveyed to Assad.

The letter read: “I affirm that the step we are taking towards Syria with the aim of building trust and rapprochement between the two countries is very serious, and that any past sensitivity shall not be repeated. The experiences of the past have their own circumstances. We must forget them and start again with open hearts during this dangerous stage.”

In late August 1995, Anwar Sabri Abdul Razzaq Al-Qaisi, the Iraqi ambassador to Qatar, contacted the Director General of the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, Yahya Bakour, asking him to inform Damascus of his desire to pay a visit with another message from Saddam.

Khaddam recounted: “Assad discussed the two letters with me and Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Sharaa, and decided to agree to the secret presence of the Iraqi ambassador and limit his contacts with me. The concern was to ensure that contacts take place with the Iraqi ambassador in Qatar and not in Ankara, for many reasons, including information security, due to the possibility that the (Syrian and Iraqi) embassies in Ankara were infiltrated by several intelligence services…”

“On September 5, 1995, I received Anwar Sabri Abdul Razzaq in the evening. It was a cordial meeting during which we reviewed the relations between the two countries and the role of Baghdad in disrupting these relations, including the alleged plot in July 1979.”

Khaddam quoted the Iraqi ambassador as telling him: “Warm greetings from the Iraqi president to President Hafez and to you. Saddam stresses that Iraq’s desire to restore normal relations with Syria was not due to the American pressure and an intentional insistence on continuing the siege. Rather, this desire stems from considerations related to Arab national security and fateful interests.”

The ambassador added that Saddam believed that the US-Zionist scheme was evident, and that Jordan had become a part of it.

The scheme aims to harm not only Iraq, but also Syria and all Arab interests, and the goal is not to weaken and divide Iraq, but rather to invade the Arab region politically, militarily and economically, the Iraqi ambassador told Khaddam.

Saddam was also quoted as saying that Iraq seeks, with an open mind and sincere intentions, to hold dialogue with all Arab parties, without exception, in order to clear the air and conclude Arab reconciliation on definite objectives.

Khaddam said: “I presented the letter to President Hafez, and he discussed it with me at length in light of the dark past in the relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, he saw that the answer should be positive and friendly, in which he would ask for a meeting to test the seriousness of the Iraqi position.”

On Sept. 13, 1995, the Syrian vice president received the Iraqi ambassador and told him the following: “President Hafez affirms that the situation the Arab nation is going through and the threats facing Iraq and Syria require the two sides to take the initiative, without delay, to overcome obstacles and differences and stop the deterioration...”

“The main danger is the Jordanian role, which, as we said earlier, has become a major part of the US-Zionist strategy… Therefore, it is important to reinstate normal relations at this particular time between the two brotherly countries - Iraq and Syria - which are capable of building a unified and effective Arab stance to face challenges...”

According to Khaddam, the Iraqi ambassador received the letter with great satisfaction, and seemed very excited for his immediate return to Iraq.

On September 19, the Iraqi ambassador in Ankara met his Syrian counterpart, and informed him that Baghdad had received the Syrian leadership’s response with satisfaction, and that it was up to the Syrian president to determine the nature, level and extent of dialogue and cooperation.

Khaddam recounted: “For us, the situation was worrisome because of the American and Jordanian action on the one hand, and the past experiences with the Iraqi leadership and the bitterness and pain we experienced… Moreover, the rapid rapprochement, without any Arab preparation, will lead to confusion in our Arab relations and tension with the nationalist movement within the Iraqi opposition…”

On Feb. 2, 1996, he received Anwar Sabri, who conveyed a message from Saddam, saying: “The continuation of the siege on Iraq, under the pretext of the country’s non-compliance with international resolutions, is posing more than a challenge… The situation that the Arab nation is currently going through does not constitute a threat to the Arab national security only, but rather to the positions and future of the Arab identity, through the proposals of the Middle Eastern concept, which has become adopted and worked for by more than one Arab country.”

The ambassador added: “President Saddam stresses that what is required of Iraq and Syria, the two pillars of the Arab nation at this stage, is to move quickly and before it is too late, to stop the state of Arab deterioration, through the return of fraternal relations, no matter how deep the differences are… The Arab world is threatened by disintegration, especially if we monitor the recent American statements, which found support from an Arab party that has become part of the American-Zionist scheme, i.e. Jordan. The latter has adopted the idea of establishing a military alliance led by America, in which Israel, Jordan and Turkey assume a role, under the pretext of protecting peace gains…”

According to the minutes of the meeting, the ambassador said: “Despite the positive points achieved in the recent Iraqi-Syrian meetings, President Saddam believes that they are not up to the level of challenges we are facing at this stage. These challengers are represented by the suspicious Jordanian role and the nature of the alliance with the Zionist entity in redrawing the map of alliances in the region.”

Therefore, Saddam, according to the message conveyed by the Iraqi ambassador in Doha, “suggests the need to open the oil pipeline that passes through Syria, and to make technical steps to turn this pipeline into one of the five outlets that Iraq will rely on to export oil during the implementation of the United Nations proposal, or after the lifting of the blockade, as well as for the Syrian ports to be the commercial port of Iraq.”

The Iraqi ambassador continued: “President Saddam urgently suggests the following: Restoring diplomatic relations between the two brotherly countries; initiating political contacts at the highest levels, to determine priorities for the building of relations; launching security talks between the two countries at the level of the chiefs of the security; and opening the borders according to procedures agreed upon by both sides.”

Khaddam said that he conveyed the message to Hafez al-Assad, who was confident that the Iraqi leadership’s proposal was of great benefit to Syria, but at the same time he feared an Iraqi retreat.

He recalled: “I agreed with President Assad to prepare a draft response that would keep the path of dialogue open in order to explore the possibility of reaching a serious agreement on the one hand, and to create a suitable atmosphere, especially with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which were the most affected by the invasion of Kuwait and the most sensitive among the Gulf states to this issue, on the other.”

“On Feb. 4, 1996, I submitted the draft letter to the president, who approved it, then summoned the Iraqi ambassador to inform him that Mr. President presents his greetings to his brother President Saddam, expresses his satisfaction with his initiative, and shares his concern about the situation in the region and the conspiracy aimed at dismantling the Arabs and abolishing the Arab identity (...) After King Hussein announced his project, we reached a conclusion that it was in the interest of the Arab nation to make contacts with a number of Arab countries (…) and then we received your initiative. Therefore, in the coming days, contacts will be made with these countries at a high level, with the aim of convincing them of our aforementioned directions.”

In the second episode: Saddam proposed a “secret summit” with Assad in 1996 to confront “Israel’s aggression” against Lebanon.



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.