Episode 1: Hafez al-Assad Cautiously Receives 1st Letter from Saddam, Tests him Before Replying

Asharq Al-Awsat Publishes Secret Letters between the Syrian, Iraqi Presidents in the mid-1990s

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (C) is pictured at the opening session of an emergency Arab summit in Amman, Nov. 8, 1987. (Reuters)
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (C) is pictured at the opening session of an emergency Arab summit in Amman, Nov. 8, 1987. (Reuters)
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Episode 1: Hafez al-Assad Cautiously Receives 1st Letter from Saddam, Tests him Before Replying

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (C) is pictured at the opening session of an emergency Arab summit in Amman, Nov. 8, 1987. (Reuters)
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (C) is pictured at the opening session of an emergency Arab summit in Amman, Nov. 8, 1987. (Reuters)

In the mid-1990s, then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein initiated two secret communication channels with his Syrian counterpart, Hafez al-Assad. But the latter had “doubts” about Saddam’s intentions, based on past experiences and his role in thwarting the implementation of the “Joint National Action Charter” between Syria and Iraq in 1979.

Thus, he subjected Saddam to several tests to prepare the ground with the Arab countries and the Iraqi opposition, before making public steps to end the hostility between the Baathist regime in Baghdad and Damascus, by exchanging secret messages, which Asharq Al-Awsat is revealing for the first time.

Those letters are part of the many documents that late Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam carried from his office to Paris, when he left Syria in 2005 and announced his defection from the regime at the end of that year. Asharq Al-Awsat contacted the Iraqi envoy, Ambassador Anwar Sabri Abdul Razzaq Al-Qaisi, who confirmed the authenticity of the documents.

In his first letters in August 1995, Saddam was rushing to reopen the two embassies that were closed in 1982, hold high-profile and public political meetings and open the borders. But Assad decided to hold Arab consultations before responding concretely to the Iraqi president’s proposals, in order to ensure “the achievement of the interests of the Arab nation and the two brotherly countries,” according to Khaddam.

In August 1995, Iraqi ambassador, Rafeh al-Tikriti, requested a meeting with Syrian Ambassador Abdulaziz al-Masri, whom he met on the same day and informed that he had received a personal message from his leader, Saddam, to be conveyed to Assad.

The letter read: “I affirm that the step we are taking towards Syria with the aim of building trust and rapprochement between the two countries is very serious, and that any past sensitivity shall not be repeated. The experiences of the past have their own circumstances. We must forget them and start again with open hearts during this dangerous stage.”

In late August 1995, Anwar Sabri Abdul Razzaq Al-Qaisi, the Iraqi ambassador to Qatar, contacted the Director General of the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, Yahya Bakour, asking him to inform Damascus of his desire to pay a visit with another message from Saddam.

Khaddam recounted: “Assad discussed the two letters with me and Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Sharaa, and decided to agree to the secret presence of the Iraqi ambassador and limit his contacts with me. The concern was to ensure that contacts take place with the Iraqi ambassador in Qatar and not in Ankara, for many reasons, including information security, due to the possibility that the (Syrian and Iraqi) embassies in Ankara were infiltrated by several intelligence services…”

“On September 5, 1995, I received Anwar Sabri Abdul Razzaq in the evening. It was a cordial meeting during which we reviewed the relations between the two countries and the role of Baghdad in disrupting these relations, including the alleged plot in July 1979.”

Khaddam quoted the Iraqi ambassador as telling him: “Warm greetings from the Iraqi president to President Hafez and to you. Saddam stresses that Iraq’s desire to restore normal relations with Syria was not due to the American pressure and an intentional insistence on continuing the siege. Rather, this desire stems from considerations related to Arab national security and fateful interests.”

The ambassador added that Saddam believed that the US-Zionist scheme was evident, and that Jordan had become a part of it.

The scheme aims to harm not only Iraq, but also Syria and all Arab interests, and the goal is not to weaken and divide Iraq, but rather to invade the Arab region politically, militarily and economically, the Iraqi ambassador told Khaddam.

Saddam was also quoted as saying that Iraq seeks, with an open mind and sincere intentions, to hold dialogue with all Arab parties, without exception, in order to clear the air and conclude Arab reconciliation on definite objectives.

Khaddam said: “I presented the letter to President Hafez, and he discussed it with me at length in light of the dark past in the relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, he saw that the answer should be positive and friendly, in which he would ask for a meeting to test the seriousness of the Iraqi position.”

On Sept. 13, 1995, the Syrian vice president received the Iraqi ambassador and told him the following: “President Hafez affirms that the situation the Arab nation is going through and the threats facing Iraq and Syria require the two sides to take the initiative, without delay, to overcome obstacles and differences and stop the deterioration...”

“The main danger is the Jordanian role, which, as we said earlier, has become a major part of the US-Zionist strategy… Therefore, it is important to reinstate normal relations at this particular time between the two brotherly countries - Iraq and Syria - which are capable of building a unified and effective Arab stance to face challenges...”

According to Khaddam, the Iraqi ambassador received the letter with great satisfaction, and seemed very excited for his immediate return to Iraq.

On September 19, the Iraqi ambassador in Ankara met his Syrian counterpart, and informed him that Baghdad had received the Syrian leadership’s response with satisfaction, and that it was up to the Syrian president to determine the nature, level and extent of dialogue and cooperation.

Khaddam recounted: “For us, the situation was worrisome because of the American and Jordanian action on the one hand, and the past experiences with the Iraqi leadership and the bitterness and pain we experienced… Moreover, the rapid rapprochement, without any Arab preparation, will lead to confusion in our Arab relations and tension with the nationalist movement within the Iraqi opposition…”

On Feb. 2, 1996, he received Anwar Sabri, who conveyed a message from Saddam, saying: “The continuation of the siege on Iraq, under the pretext of the country’s non-compliance with international resolutions, is posing more than a challenge… The situation that the Arab nation is currently going through does not constitute a threat to the Arab national security only, but rather to the positions and future of the Arab identity, through the proposals of the Middle Eastern concept, which has become adopted and worked for by more than one Arab country.”

The ambassador added: “President Saddam stresses that what is required of Iraq and Syria, the two pillars of the Arab nation at this stage, is to move quickly and before it is too late, to stop the state of Arab deterioration, through the return of fraternal relations, no matter how deep the differences are… The Arab world is threatened by disintegration, especially if we monitor the recent American statements, which found support from an Arab party that has become part of the American-Zionist scheme, i.e. Jordan. The latter has adopted the idea of establishing a military alliance led by America, in which Israel, Jordan and Turkey assume a role, under the pretext of protecting peace gains…”

According to the minutes of the meeting, the ambassador said: “Despite the positive points achieved in the recent Iraqi-Syrian meetings, President Saddam believes that they are not up to the level of challenges we are facing at this stage. These challengers are represented by the suspicious Jordanian role and the nature of the alliance with the Zionist entity in redrawing the map of alliances in the region.”

Therefore, Saddam, according to the message conveyed by the Iraqi ambassador in Doha, “suggests the need to open the oil pipeline that passes through Syria, and to make technical steps to turn this pipeline into one of the five outlets that Iraq will rely on to export oil during the implementation of the United Nations proposal, or after the lifting of the blockade, as well as for the Syrian ports to be the commercial port of Iraq.”

The Iraqi ambassador continued: “President Saddam urgently suggests the following: Restoring diplomatic relations between the two brotherly countries; initiating political contacts at the highest levels, to determine priorities for the building of relations; launching security talks between the two countries at the level of the chiefs of the security; and opening the borders according to procedures agreed upon by both sides.”

Khaddam said that he conveyed the message to Hafez al-Assad, who was confident that the Iraqi leadership’s proposal was of great benefit to Syria, but at the same time he feared an Iraqi retreat.

He recalled: “I agreed with President Assad to prepare a draft response that would keep the path of dialogue open in order to explore the possibility of reaching a serious agreement on the one hand, and to create a suitable atmosphere, especially with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which were the most affected by the invasion of Kuwait and the most sensitive among the Gulf states to this issue, on the other.”

“On Feb. 4, 1996, I submitted the draft letter to the president, who approved it, then summoned the Iraqi ambassador to inform him that Mr. President presents his greetings to his brother President Saddam, expresses his satisfaction with his initiative, and shares his concern about the situation in the region and the conspiracy aimed at dismantling the Arabs and abolishing the Arab identity (...) After King Hussein announced his project, we reached a conclusion that it was in the interest of the Arab nation to make contacts with a number of Arab countries (…) and then we received your initiative. Therefore, in the coming days, contacts will be made with these countries at a high level, with the aim of convincing them of our aforementioned directions.”

In the second episode: Saddam proposed a “secret summit” with Assad in 1996 to confront “Israel’s aggression” against Lebanon.



Israel Is Tightening Its Grip on East Jerusalem with Evictions of Palestinians, Demolitions

This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)
This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)
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Israel Is Tightening Its Grip on East Jerusalem with Evictions of Palestinians, Demolitions

This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)
This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)

Fakhri Abu Diab fought for decades to save his home. But when Israeli authorities arrived with bulldozers two years ago, he was powerless to stop them.

He and his wife now live among shards of memory: a bicycle where his bedroom stood; the garden where he planted tomatoes as a boy; a portrait of his late mother painted on a wall, based on a photograph lost in the demolition. Their mobile home, set up amid the rubble, is also marked for removal.

They are “trying to erase my memories, my childhood, my history,” he said, wiping away tears.

For decades, Israel has worked to expand the Jewish presence in annexed east Jerusalem — the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and home to major Jewish, Christian and Muslim sites. Settlers have exploited discriminatory policies and archaeological claims to evict Palestinians far from the region's war zones.

Activists say those efforts have gone into overdrive in recent years, as Israel is no longer constrained by US pressure and attention has shifted to Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.

Over 260 homes and other structures were demolished in 2025, a 70% increase from three years earlier, with some neighborhoods seeing the most evictions in decades, according to Ir Amim, an Israeli anti-settlement group that closely tracks such policies. There have been at least 116 demolitions so far this year, it said.

It’s “an intensity and scope that we have never seen,” said Aviv Tatarsky, a researcher at Ir Amim. “Israel can decide, yes, this neighborhood, we want to erase it ... No one is going to stop us.”

People look from a rooftop at the rubble of a Palestinian building demolished by Israeli military in the town of Jabaa in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, near Jerusalem June 3, 2026. (Reuters)

Israeli government supports settlement growth

Israel captured east Jerusalem, along with the West Bank and Gaza, in the 1967 Mideast war. The Palestinians want all three territories for their future state, and the UN and much of the international community consider them to be illegally occupied.

Israel considers all of Jerusalem to be its unified capital and says residents are treated equally by law.

Palestinians in annexed east Jerusalem are eligible for Israeli citizenship, but unlike Jews, they must apply for it — a long, uncertain process. Most choose not to because it would recognize Israel’s claims to the city. That leaves them with few ways to challenge housing policy, largely set by Israel’s Parliament.

Rights activists say that in addition to supporting the development of major Jewish settlements, which many Israelis view as ordinary neighborhoods, authorities have severely limited the growth of Palestinian neighborhoods, making it virtually impossible to obtain housing permits.

Last year, nearly 9,000 permits were approved for Jerusalem’s Jewish residents and fewer than 700 for Palestinians, according to Bimkom, an Israeli rights group. Palestinians make up some 40% of Jerusalem's population and are concentrated in the east.

Israeli officials say the discrepancy exists because Palestinians rarely apply for permits. Many Palestinians say it’s futile.

When Palestinians build without permits, they face the threat of demolition. Settler groups meanwhile exploit an array of laws to purchase or take over Palestinian properties.

Previous US administrations have pressed Israel to slow or suspend settlement projects, viewing them as an obstacle to resolving the conflict. US President Donald Trump broke with that tradition in his first term, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

The US State Department said in a statement that it's up to Israeli authorities to set policy in Jerusalem, and that it expects them to respect due process and the rule of law.

The neighborhood is near major religious sites

Abu Diab's neighborhood, al-Bustan, extends through a valley just outside the Old City, with the dome of the Al-Aqsa Mosque visible above the towering walls. Named for the orchards that once grew there, the neighborhood is now a crowded jumble of low concrete blocks and demolition sites.

It's part of the larger district of Silwan, home to some 20,000 Palestinians and coveted by settlers because it is near major religious and archaeological sites. The mosque is the third holiest in Islam, and the hilltop where it stands is the holiest site for Jews, who refer to it as the Temple Mount because it was where the two Jewish temples stood in antiquity.

The Jerusalem municipality said the homes in al-Bustan are being demolished because they were built without permits in areas not zoned for housing. A park and public parking lot will be established there for the benefit of all residents, it said in a statement.

The municipality said it put forward plans for alternative housing in the neighborhood but that residents did not show “serious intentions” to reach an agreement.

Abu Diab has been battling demolition orders in court since 2004. Part of his home was built before 1967, but his growing family expanded it without permits because it was impossible to get them, he said.

In February 2024, police gave him and his wife minutes to pack before demolishing their home. Since then, they have lived in the mobile home, their suitcases packed.

They are among some 1,500 Palestinians in al-Bustan whose homes could be demolished at any time.

People walk past the rubble of a Palestinian building demolished by Israeli military in the town of Jabaa in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, near Jerusalem June 3, 2026. (Reuters)

Settlers move in as Palestinians are evicted

A short distance away, in the congested Batan al-Hawah neighborhood, settlers are moving in as Palestinians are evicted.

Zuhair al-Rajabi and dozens of his extended family were ordered out in January, when Israel's Supreme Court ruled against them after more than a decade of legal action.

Thumbing through papers in his living room, he pulled out a document from 1966 saying the property is his. He says he has to leave by July but has nowhere to go, as rents are high in Jerusalem. “The problem, in short, is that they don’t want us here,” he said.

March marked the highest rate of state-led evictions in the neighborhood in decades, with 15 families forced out and hundreds more people at risk, according to B'Tselem, an Israeli rights group.

Israeli laws allow settlers to reclaim properties that were owned by other Jews before the 1948 war surrounding Israel's creation. Palestinians who fled or were driven from their homes in what is now Israel during that conflict are barred from returning. Authorities have also transferred state-held land to settler groups.

The Batan al-Hawah evictions show “the cooperation between settler organizations and state institutions, based on discriminatory laws, toward a shared goal — the Judaization of east Jerusalem and the replacement of Palestinian residents with Israeli settlers,” said Yair Dvir, a spokesperson for B’Tselem.

The Israeli judiciary, in a statement, said courts rule on the merits of each case based on the circumstances, applicable law and established precedent, and denied colluding with private organizations.

Daniel Luria, the executive director of Ateret Cohanim, one of the main settler organizations in east Jerusalem, said it was working to correct a “monumental historical injustice” by helping Jews to return to what had been a Yemenite and Sephardic Jewish neighborhood up until the early 20th century, when he says they were expelled by Arabs and then again by the British.

Since 2004, around 50 Jewish families have moved into the neighborhood and more are eager to join them, he said. “There's never going to be a Palestinian state,” he added.

An Israeli flag waves above the home where Khalil Basbous was evicted in January. The 68-year-old moved into a relative's house around the corner but walks past his former home every day.

“It’s mine,” he said, wiping tears from his face and softly touching an olive tree he had planted by the door. “I have no doubt that I will return.”


Why Iran Risked an Attack on Israel

Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
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Why Iran Risked an Attack on Israel

Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)

At first glance, Tehran’s retaliation for Israeli attacks in Lebanon might seem like a reckless act that risks rekindling a devastating regional war.

For Iran, those strikes were necessary — part of a more aggressive posturing that marks a strategic shift by its new rulers. For them, the lesson of the war has been that forceful retaliation has allowed them to survive, and even emerge with leverage against their more powerful enemies, reported the New York Times on Monday.

“Iran wants to project strength, and that they have the power to escalate,” said Omid Memarian, an Iran expert at DAWN, a Washington-based foreign policy think tank. “They are sending the message that they are ready to resume war if necessary.”

For the past decade under Iran’s previous supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, Tehran had been more cautious about striking Israel and the United States. In 2020, Tehran pursued only limited retaliatory strikes against Washington after the United States assassinated one of its most powerful military leaders, Qassem Soleimani. And it limited its entire retaliation to strikes on a single US base in Qatar during the 12-day war last June.

In recent weeks, Iranian officials largely tolerated Israeli strikes on its most important ally, the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah. It criticized those attacks, warning that the group should be included in the regional ceasefire it agreed upon with Washington in April. Yet as long as Israel’s strikes were contained to southern Lebanon, Iran did not respond.

Iran warned that calculus would change if Israel expanded those strikes to the southern outskirts of Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, where Hezbollah is dominant. On Sunday, Israel did just that.

“Iran’s attack in defense of Lebanon was not merely a military response; it was the formal declaration of a strategic doctrine,” said Sadegh Larijani, the chairman of Iran’s powerful Expediency Council, which advises Iran’s supreme leader.

“If any component of the Axis of Resistance is attacked, the response will extend beyond geographical borders and will alter the regional balance of power,” he said, using Iran’s term for the network of allied armed groups in the region that includes Hezbollah.

With its actions, Iran wants to show it is serious about defending its regional armed allies. That position had been undermined by its former leaders when they refrained from retaliating against Israeli attacks in 2024 that badly degraded Hezbollah and killed its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, reported the New York Times.

Since the US-Israeli war began in February and killed much of Iran’s top former leadership, including Khamenei, Iran’s new rulers believe their willingness to act more aggressively — from blockading the vital Strait of Hormuz to attacking its Gulf neighbors — has been a major success, continued the report.

To them, analysts say, being more aggressive allowed them to not only survive Washington and Israel’s attacks, but to inflict economic pain and emerge with strategic leverage through control of the strait, a crucial global shipping route for oil and gas.

Iran’s new leaders have also found US President Donald Trump more responsive to their more aggressive strategy. Last week, he convinced Israel not to strike Beirut. On Monday, after Israel’s strikes on Beirut’s outskirts and Iran’s retaliation, he called for both sides to step back.

After his comments, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps quickly announced that it would halt its attacks but said it may attack again if Israel pursues strikes in southern Lebanon, a near certainty.

Such strikes may also offer Iran the opportunity to test the relationship between Trump and Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said Memarian, the analyst.

“They understand there’s a gap between Israeli and US objectives,” he said, “and they want to put pressure on Trump to contain Israel.”

But the defense of Hezbollah is not only about testing or posturing. Iran assessed the group’s ability to continue attacking northern Israel during the recent war as critical to giving Iran room to focus its attacks on its Gulf neighbors, said Hamidreza Azizi, an Iranian security expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Allowing Israel to weaken Hezbollah further, he said, would therefore be militarily costly for Iran in a future conflict, which it deems inevitable.

Iran also saw its retaliation as necessary, he said, because it views Israel’s attacks as part of an apparent US-Israeli strategy to try to quietly erode its strategic gains in the recent conflict even as it tries to negotiate a deal to end the war with Washington.

For weeks, US forces have been quietly escorting vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. Many analysts describe this as a US attempt to alleviate pressure on the global economy while it tries to increase the economic pressure on Iran by reinforcing its own blockade of Iranian vessels. Iran worries that Israel’s efforts to weaken Hezbollah are another facet of that strategy.

The Iranians believe the United States and Israel “are using the ceasefire to shape the realities on the ground in a way that would erode the leverage Iran has achieved during this war,” Azizi said.

Tehran’s willingness to retaliate forcefully also shows how unlikely Iran thinks it is Trump, who is about to host the World Cup games, and faces a deepening global economic crisis ahead of midterm elections this fall, to rejoin the fray.

“They don’t think Trump is going to go to war,” said Farzan Sabet, an Iran analyst at the Geneva Graduate Institute in Switzerland. “But even if he does, they’re fairly confident they can manage it.”

*Erika Solomon for the New York Times


Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
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Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 

Israel is pressing forward with firepower, evacuation warnings, and limited ground incursions, while Hezbollah is responding with drones and direct engagements along advanced positions north of the Litani River.

Yet behind this reciprocal escalation, the deterrence equation that governed the border throughout the years following the 2006 war appears to be facing an unprecedented test, as military operations expand and reach areas that until recently were considered beyond the immediate danger zone.

Airstrikes that now reach as far as Zahrani, clashes around Zawtar al-Sharqiya, and Israel’s gradual advance toward the outskirts of Nabatieh all indicate, according to Lebanese military assessments, that the confrontation has entered a different phase.

In this new stage, drones alone are no longer capable of maintaining a deterrent balance, while Israel is pursuing a policy of mounting military pressure aimed at reshaping realities on the ground ahead of any potential settlement or negotiations.

Drones Do Not Create Deterrence

Retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Hisham Jaber, head of the Middle East Center for Studies argued that the drones used by Hezbollah do not achieve genuine deterrence against the continued expansion of Israeli air and ground operations.

He maintained that Israel’s ongoing airstrikes and ground incursions demonstrate that the deterrence equation is no longer functioning.

Jaber also linked battlefield developments to the erosion of the deterrence that had existed after the 2006 war, arguing that “the deterrence that lasted from 2006 to 2023 was real and effective.” However, he said Hezbollah’s entry into a war of attrition after opening its support front for Gaza led to the collapse of that equation.

He further warned that Israel’s objectives may not be limited to Zawtar and its surroundings but could expand farther north.

A Policy of Depopulation and Prolonged Attrition

Jaber said Israel’s policy of warnings and evacuations is designed to empty areas of their civilian populations.

“Once Israel evacuates an area of its residents, it becomes able to strike any movement within it,” he explained. “At that point, anyone traveling by car or motorcycle becomes a potential target.”

He added: “My greatest concern is that southern Lebanon may already have entered a prolonged war of attrition, because current battlefield indicators do not suggest a quick path toward ending this escalation or returning to the previous rules of engagement.”

Assessing both the military and political landscape, he argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “will not stop the war in Lebanon at this stage, regardless of the losses incurred,” noting that Israel “has not yet achieved any of its declared military or political objectives.”

He added that “Tel Aviv has failed to disarm Hezbollah and has also been unable to impose the conditions it seeks on Lebanon.”

According to his assessment, current developments indicate that “things will not return to the way they were,” arguing that the conflict has entered a new phase that will have lasting consequences for southern Lebanon and the balance of power there.

As for Hezbollah, Jaber said the group also “cannot simply halt the war midway through, given the complexities of the battlefield and the interwoven regional and international calculations.”

No Deterrent Balance Exists

For his part, retired Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou argued that “the drones used by Hezbollah have failed to establish a deterrent balance against Israel’s intensive air campaign,” stressing that “Israel is inflicting far greater damage and losses than it is receiving.”

He explained that fiber-optic-guided FPV (First-Person View) drones suffer from technical limitations related to both range and payload capacity.

“In practical terms, the range of these drones is between three and 15 kilometers and may reach around 20 kilometers as a reasonable upper limit,” he said. “The cable connecting the drone adds weight and affects its operational capabilities.”

Helou argued that claims of their use at distances of up to 60 kilometers are “militarily unrealistic.”

He added that “Hezbollah is attempting to achieve battlefield effects and inflict casualties through drones, but developments on the ground show that Israel is imposing far greater damage on both Hezbollah and Lebanon.”