Anger over Tunisia’s Pandemic Failures Fuels Political Crisishttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3109581/anger-over-tunisia%E2%80%99s-pandemic-failures-fuels-political-crisis
Anger over Tunisia’s Pandemic Failures Fuels Political Crisis
People stand in a school during a vaccination campaign against coronavirus disease (COVID-19) managed by the army, in Jendouba, west of Tunis, Tunisia July 30, 2021. (Reuters)
Anger over Tunisia’s Pandemic Failures Fuels Political Crisis
People stand in a school during a vaccination campaign against coronavirus disease (COVID-19) managed by the army, in Jendouba, west of Tunis, Tunisia July 30, 2021. (Reuters)
Waiting in line to receive a COVID-19 jab from the Tunisian army, Zubeir Bin Ammar was in little doubt that the military and President Kais Saied were succeeding where the government he removed from power had failed.
“May God bless the army and the president. I hope they let him rule because we live in a country that was run by mafia,” said Bin Ammar, a teacher. He showed scant concern as to whether Saied’s actions on July 25 constituted a coup and a threat to Tunisia’s young democracy, as his political adversaries claim.
“He followed the people on the streets, not political parties,” said Bin Ammar, who is married with children and lives in Jendouba, 150 km (93 miles) west of the capital Tunis.
Failures in dealing with spiraling COVID-19 cases in Tunisia stoked anger at the government in the weeks leading up to Saied’s decisions to sack Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and suspend parliament, with support from the army.
Coupled with a deep economic malaise, the COVID-19 crisis brought many Tunisians into the streets in protest at the government and the main parties in parliament, including the mainstream Islamist Ennahda, before Saied’s decision.
So far, around 940,000 people have been fully vaccinated among a population of 11.6 million. Tunisia has reported around 18,000 deaths and more than half a million infections. At one point last month it had the worst infection rate in Africa.
During the recent Eid al-Adha holiday, the government opened walk-in vaccination centers, but was unprepared for the large numbers who showed up to get a shot and, as people crowded into dense queues without social distancing, the supplies ran out.
Discontent
That debacle was the final straw for many people in the government’s handling of the pandemic - and prompted Saied to announce soon afterwards that the military would take it over.
It proved a key moment in a long-running tussle between Saied and Mechichi in a system that gives the president direct control over foreign and military affairs while putting the government in charge of most domestic issues.
Tunisians had chafed for years at economic stagnation and deteriorating public services as politicians bickered. Saied, elected in 2019 as a political independent, was seen by many Tunisians as ready to challenge the dominant political parties.
When the pandemic descended on Tunisia last year, a tough initial lockdown delayed infections but hit poorer Tunisians by preventing them from working.
Subsequent attempts to impose lockdown measures were quickly rejected as unaffordable and the number of infections soared.
The hardship was felt most acutely in poorer regions like Jendouba in Tunisia’s northwest that vaccines were slow to reach. Years of misgovernance had meanwhile undermined a public health sector that was once a point of national pride.
“In every household we have a funeral and we have pain and wounds,” said Hatem Hawawi, whose 71-year-old aunt Mehreza died of COVID-19. He decried what he called years of government neglect to maintain the health system.
“We don’t want to hold one or two people accountable. That doesn’t work. The government did not give value to the citizen,” he said.
Deploying the army to join the pandemic response appeared popular in Jendouba despite the possibility this could undermine the military’s apolitical reputation - after it stood aside in 2011 to allow the revolution.
“They should have given this responsibility to the army (already),” said Ammar.
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.
The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.
Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.
The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.
Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.
The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.
Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.
Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.
On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.
The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.
As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.
Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.
The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.
Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.
A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.
The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.
The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.
Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.
The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.
The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.
Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.
Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.
The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.
An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.
Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.
New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.
Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.
Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.
The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.
Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.
Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.
Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scarshttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5239365-gaza-girls-take-boxing-heal-war%E2%80%99s-scars
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.
Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.
After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.
"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.
Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.
"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.
Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.
One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.
"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.
- Call for aid -
One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.
In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.
"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.
He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".
The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.
The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.
With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.
Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".
"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.
Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?https://english.aawsat.com/features/5238035-iran-pushing-houthis-toward-military-action-against-washington
Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP)
As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.
The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.
Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.
They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.
Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.
The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.
Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.
Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.
That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.
Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.
Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.
Visible readiness
In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.
In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.
While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.
He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.
In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.
On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.
Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.
Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.
Open options
After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.
Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.
Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.
In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.
As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.
Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.
The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.
According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.
This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.
Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.
However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.
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