Has Iran Inherited Syria’s Role at the Shebaa Farms ‘Mailbox’?

Israeli forces fire artillery from their position on the border with Lebanon after a barrage of rockets were fired from Lebanon, Friday, Aug. 6, 2021. (AP)
Israeli forces fire artillery from their position on the border with Lebanon after a barrage of rockets were fired from Lebanon, Friday, Aug. 6, 2021. (AP)
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Has Iran Inherited Syria’s Role at the Shebaa Farms ‘Mailbox’?

Israeli forces fire artillery from their position on the border with Lebanon after a barrage of rockets were fired from Lebanon, Friday, Aug. 6, 2021. (AP)
Israeli forces fire artillery from their position on the border with Lebanon after a barrage of rockets were fired from Lebanon, Friday, Aug. 6, 2021. (AP)

In July 2001 Hezbollah struck the position of an Israeli radar. The move was an act of retaliation to Tel Aviv’s attack on a Syrian military radar in Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley region. That attack was, in turn, a response to Hezbollah’s shelling of positions in the disputed Israeli-occupied Shebaa Farms region.

Twenty years later, the Iran-backed party struck an open area in the Shebaa Farms and Israel retaliated with artillery fire. The attacks were a sign of their commitment to the “rules of engagement” in place since 2006 after testing how much they can be changed and after southern Lebanon has become tied to the “shadow war” playing out between Israel and Iran on land and at sea.

How has the “southern front” become more connected to Tehran than to Damascus? What do the Shebaa Farms have to do with the Golan Heights? Is there a connection between the escalation in Syria’s Daraa and the test in southern Lebanon?

After he became prime minister in 2001, Israel’s Arial Sharon attempted to change the “rules of the game” in Lebanon. He retaliated to Hezbollah attacks by ordering raids on Syrian forces in Lebanon – a first since 1982. Previously, such attacks were limited to Lebanese targets.

At the time, Damascus was in control and averted any direct confrontation with Israel. That role was relegated to Hezbollah. All sides, therefore, conveyed messages through the Shebaa Farms that acted as a form of “mailbox” after Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000. The new rules were: An Israeli radar in return for a Syrian one, with Hezbollah executing the order.

Several developments have since taken place in Lebanon, Syria and the region that have altered this equation:

One: After the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, Damascus declared that Shebaa was Lebanese territory occupied by Israel. The United Nations, however, says that it is in fact Syrian territory that has been occupied since 1967. Then Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa informed then UN chief Kofi Annan that Syria views the territory as Lebanese, granting Hezbollah free reign to “resist” Israeli occupation.

Two: The death of Syrian president Hafez Assad in June 2000 and his son Bashar’s assuming of power changed the equation between Damascus and Hezbollah. When paying his respects at Hafez’s grave in al-Qardaha in 2001, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah vowed to “liberate the Shebaa Farms.”

Three: The Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005. The assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005 prompted the withdrawal. Ahead of the pullout, Hezbollah staged a “loyalty to Syria” march. Soon after, the party would begin to hold greater sway in Lebanon, while Iran’s influence in the region would outmatch Syria’s and its traditional allies.

Four: Syria and Israel, through American mediation, were on the verge of signing of a peace deal in late February 2011, just days before the eruption of the Syrian protests. American mediator Frederic Hof had drafted the deal that would include Damascus severing “military ties” with Iran and Hezbollah and “neutralizing” any threat to Israel. In return, Syria would reclaim the Golan Heights according to the June 4, 1967 border.

At the time, Hof recalled that Bashar had informed him that the Shebaa Farms were Syrian territory, not Lebanese. Bashar falsely predicted that Lebanon would soon follow in striking peace with Israel should Syria make a similar deal. Such a move would have inevitably impacted Iran and Hezbollah’s influence.

Five: The eruption of anti-regime protests in Syria in March 2011 gave way to Hezbollah and Iran’s eventual intervention in the country to defend their ally in Damascus. They would later reinforce their military presence in various Syrian regions, especially the south. The Golan Heights would become “tied” to other Iranian “fronts” in the Middle East.

Six: Russia intervened militarily in Syrian in September 2015 to support the regime and help it reclaim territory after it was on the brink of collapse. Syria was therefore, turned into a Russian base and starting point for its expansion in the Middle East. Moscow would sponsor various deals and settlements, including one in mid-2018 that called for Iran and its allies to pull out from the South and the area bordering the Golan.

Seven: Israel would soon begin carrying out raids against Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria in an attempt to impose “red lines” that include preventing Iran from establishing military bases, preventing the delivery of precision missiles to Hezbollah and preventing Tehran and the party’s military entrenchment in the Golan. The United States in turn entrenched itself in the al-Tanf base on the border between Syria, Jordan and Iraq in an attempt to block the Tehran-Damascus-Beirut route. In 2020, Israel announced that it had carried out over 50 air strikes against Syrian targets and fired over 500 projectiles and rockets.

Eight: Syria transformed into a “mailbox” between Iran and Israel after the assassination of Jihad Mughnieh, the son of prominent Hezbollah operative Imad. Jihad was killed by an Israeli strike on the Golan Heights in early 2015. The ensuing escalation was “limited and agreed” to be restricted to the Shebaa Farms in line with the “rules of the game” that had been in place after the July 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

In February 2018, Syrian air defenses shot down an Israeli F-16 jet in retaliation to Israeli strikes that were prompted by an Iranian drone’s breach of Israeli airspace. Tel Aviv responded by carrying raids against Syrian and Iranian positions. That was the first time that Israel and Iran directly confronted each other since the 1979 Iranian revolution. It also marked the widest Israeli attack against Syrian forces since Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

Golan had by now become one of the arenas where retaliations can play out. At the time, an Iranian Mahan Air jet flew over the al-Tanf base to test the American response. An American F-15 flew very close to the Iranian aircraft and shots were fired from Syria Quneitra towards the Golan, prompting Israeli helicopter fire.

Nine: For the first time, Russia began to detail Israeli strikes on Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria. At the same time, reports said Damascus had received a new anti-aircraft defense system that would protect Syria against Israeli strikes. Simultaneously, Russia was exerting efforts to meet its commitments in the deal on southern Syria, specifically in Daraa, amid complaints from Jordan, Israel and the US over Iranian attempts to advance in the area.

Ten: Iranian sources confirmed the July 29 drone attack on an Israeli tanker in the Gulf of Oman that left a Briton and Romanian dead. This marked the first escalation of its kind between Israel and Iran. The drone attack was retaliation to Israeli raids in June on central Syria that killed senior members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and Hezbollah.

Those attacks were followed up last week with rocket fire from southern Lebanon on northern Israel, not the Shebaa Farms nor the Golan. Israel consequently fired back with air strikes, not artillery fire, on Lebanon – the first such attacks since 2006.

The two sides would soon, however, return to limiting their retaliatory attacks to Shebaa – the old mailbox. This time around, the messages were being exchanged between Tel Aviv and Tehran that are waging both a “shadow” and direct war. As it stands, new Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett is unhappy with the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear deal, while Iran’s new President Ebrahim Raisi is keen on burnishing his credentials on the Arab “fronts”.



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.