عربي English Türkçe اردو فارسى
Logo
Latest News
Features

Damascus ‘Thwarts’ Settlement as it Eyes Reconstruction

UN special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen holds a press conference at the United Nations Offices in Geneva. (AFP)
UN special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen holds a press conference at the United Nations Offices in Geneva. (AFP)
TT
TT

Damascus ‘Thwarts’ Settlement as it Eyes Reconstruction

UN special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen holds a press conference at the United Nations Offices in Geneva. (AFP)
UN special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen holds a press conference at the United Nations Offices in Geneva. (AFP)

Damascus is set to host in the coming hours United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Martin Griffiths.

UN special envoy, Geir Pedersen, meanwhile, is being made to wait for an invitation to visit the Syrian capital as it mulls its priorities for the coming phase. Damascus will welcome international aid and push forward the implementation of the UN resolution on cross-border aid with its new phrasing. The resolution was extended in early July.

Damascus is setting its sights on the reconstruction and relief funds, while delaying negotiations over a political settlement and the UN-sponsored talks in Geneva related to the constitutional committee.

In July, the United States and Russia reached a “historic settlement” that was extension of the cross-border aid resolution. Washington was forced to make concessions over the duration of the resolution and the finer details an accept Moscow’s introduction of new phrasing to the resolution.

The resolution now speaks of “early recovery”. The resolution reads: “The Security Council welcomes all efforts and initiatives to broaden the humanitarian activities in Syria, including water, sanitation, health, education, and shelter early recovery projects, undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other organizations, and calls upon other international humanitarian agencies and relevant parties to support them.”

“The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to brief the Council monthly and (…) to include in his reports overall trends in United Nations cross-line operations, in particular on the implementation of the above mentioned activities on improving all modalities of humanitarian deliveries inside Syria and early recovery projects, and detailed information on the humanitarian assistance delivered through United Nations humanitarian cross-border operations, including the distribution mechanism, the number of beneficiaries, operating partners, locations of aid deliveries at district-level and the volume and nature of items delivered.”

Griffiths’ meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad in the coming hours will be an opportunity for Damascus to offer its interpretation of the resolution and its priorities in regards to “cross-line” operations between the three zones of influence inside Syria and the contributions to the “early recovery projects” that take the country closer to reconstructions.

Damascus will likely also pressure Griffiths to take a clearer position on the “unilateral” western sanctions and Ankara’s closure of a water pumping station east of the Euphrates River.

Damascus’ stances are pushing it closer from those of Moscow and Tehran that stand in contrast to Washington and the West that are prioritizing cross-border aid. The US and western countries view the aid as a matter of life or death and have accused Damascus of obstructing deliveries of aid to northeastern regions that are held by Washington’s allies.

Furthermore, western countries refuse to take part in any reconstruction project in Syria before making sure that irreversible progress is achieved in the political process. This position implicitly agrees that sanctions, isolation and pledges to contribute in reconstruction are “means to pressure” Damascus to make internal and geopolitical concessions.

The clash in positions between Damascus and the West over aid will not extend to the political arena as the government continues to refuse to welcome Pedersen despite Russia’s intervention to facilitate such a visit.

Damascus is “angry” with the envoy for helping mediate a meeting between Daraa representatives and his issuing of a statement expressing his concern over the deteriorating situation there. It is also upset with the way negotiations have been held with the head of the government delegation to the constitutional committee talks in Geneva. The negotiations have focused on the agreement on the working mechanism of the committee and working paper that the envoy had presented at the beginning of the year.

Pedersen, meanwhile, wants to head to Damascus to “negotiate” over the UN constitutional mechanism. In April, he had sent a document to government delegation head, Ahmed al-Kuzbari, and opposition “negotiations committee” delegation head, Hadi al-Bahra, tackling the steps to kick off the committee’s work in drafting the constitution. Bahra agreed to the document despite his reservations, while Kuzbari had instead proposed discussing the constitution rather than draft it.

President Bashar Assad had made his position clear over the drafting of the constitution during his swearing in ceremony in July. He said: “You have proven once again the unity of the battle of the constitution and nation. You have proven that the constitution is a priority that is not open to debate or compromise.”

He said that efforts to draft the new constitution aim to put the country “at the mercy of foreign forces”, citing “Turkish agents” at the committee talks – a reference to the opposition negotiations committee delegation.

Moscow will be pleased with Damascus’ presentation to Griffiths of its interpretation of the aid resolution extension.

Sights are now set on Moscow to act to persuade Damascus to welcome Pedersen, who had recently met with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Russia. Perhaps he would meet with Miqdad on the sidelines on the UN General Assembly in New York in September.

Most Viewed

 
 
Features

‘Too Dangerous to Go to Hospital’: A Glimpse into Iran’s Protest Crackdown

Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
TT
TT

‘Too Dangerous to Go to Hospital’: A Glimpse into Iran’s Protest Crackdown

Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)

Young protesters shot in the back, shotgun pellets fired in a doctor's face, wounded people afraid to go to hospital: "Every family has been affected" by the deadly crackdown on Iran's recent wave of demonstrations, said one protester.

Speaking to AFP in Istanbul, this 45-year-old engineer who asked to be identified as Farhad -- not his real name -- was caught up in the mass protests that swept his home city of one million people just outside Tehran.

With Iran still largely under an internet blackout after weeks of unrest, eyewitness testimony is key for understanding how the events unfolded.

Angry demonstrations over economic hardship began late last year and exploded into the biggest anti-government protests since the 1979 revolution.

"On the first day, there were so many people in the streets that the security forces just kept their distance," he told AFP.

"But on the second day, they understood that without shooting, the people were not going to disperse."

As the protests grew, the security forces began a major crackdown under the cover of a communications blackout that began on January 8.

In an interview on the European side of Istanbul, this quietly-spoken oil industry worker said he was in his car with his sister on the night when the shooting began.

"We saw about 20 military people jumping from cars and start shooting at young people about 100 meters away. I saw people running but they were shooting at their backs" with rifles and shotguns, he told AFP.

"In front of my eyes, I saw a friend of ours, a doctor, being hit in the face by shotgun pellets," Farhad said. He does not know what happened to him.

Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have accused the security forces of firing rifles and shotguns loaded with metal pellets directly at protesters' heads and torsos.

"I saw two people being carried, they were very badly injured, maybe dead," Farhad said.

A lot of people also died "in their cars because the bullets were coming out of nowhere".

- 'Afraid to go to hospital' -

The scale of the crackdown is only slowly emerging.

Despite great difficulty accessing information, the Norway-based NGO Iran Human Rights says it has verified the deaths of 3,428 protesters killed by the security forces, but warned the final toll risks reaching 25,000.

Those who were injured were often too afraid to go to hospital, Farhad said.

"People can't go to the hospital because the authorities and the police are there. Anyone with injuries from bullets or shotgun (pellets) they detain and interrogate," he said.

"Doctors have been going to people's houses to give them medical assistance."

He himself was beaten with a baton by two people on a motorbike and thought his arm was broken, but did not go to hospital because it was "too dangerous".

Many "opened their homes to let the demonstrators inside and give them first aid", including his sister and her friend who took in "around 50 boys, and gave them tea and cake".

There were a lot of very young people on the streets and "a lot of girls and women", he told AFP, saying he had seen children of "six or seven" shouting slogans against Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei.

The security forces were also staging spot checks for anyone with protest-related injuries or footage on their phones, he said.

"It's so dangerous because they randomly check phones. If they see anything related to this revolution, you are finished. They are also making people lift their shirts to look for signs of bullet or shotgun injuries.

"If they see that, they are taken for interrogation."

Speaking just before he flew back to Iran -- "because I have a job to go to" -- he insisted he was "absolutely not afraid".

Despite everything, people were still ready to protest "because they are so angry", he explained.

He is convinced US President Donald Trump will soon make good on his pledge to intervene, pointing to recent reports of US warships arriving in the region.

"The system cannot survive -- in Iran everybody is just overwhelmed with this dictatorship. We have had enough of them."

Features

Trump Balances War Threats and Brinkmanship with Iran

US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
TT
TT

Trump Balances War Threats and Brinkmanship with Iran

US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)

All indications suggest that US military action against Iran may be imminent. Yet the paradox is that edging toward the brink of confrontation may itself be part of negotiations being conducted under intense pressure.

Mutual threats, naval and air deployments, and deterrence messages are carefully calibrated to demonstrate seriousness without sliding into a war that President Donald Trump’s administration does not want.

Trump has repeatedly spoken of an “armada” in the region, while at the same time saying Tehran is sending signals of readiness to negotiate, a deliberate dual track aimed at keeping the adversary uncertain.

This tension between preparing for a strike and keeping the door to a deal ajar aligns with Farzin Nadimi's assessment. Nadimi is a senior Iran analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Nadimi said he cannot predict what the US president will ultimately decide, adding that regardless of what Trump says to the media, the military buildup points to limited, focused strikes or a scaled-down military campaign.

According to Nadimi, such a campaign would intend to punish and deter the Iranian regime, weaken its ability to retaliate against the United States and its allies, and or disrupt oil flows from the Gulf.

The implication is that the buildup is not mere showmanship but the creation of an operational environment that enables a rapid strike if the political channel fails, without becoming mired in a prolonged war.

Calibrated options

The entry of the US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and its strike group into the US Central Command area of operations in the western Indian Ocean shortens the timeline for possible action if a political decision is taken.

This has coincided with additional air reinforcements, including the deployment of F-15 fighter jets.

Together, these elements give Washington a ladder of options: a limited strike, a series of time-phased military strikes, or a defensive posture designed to raise the cost of any Iranian retaliation against US bases and allies.

But a “limited strike” is not just a technical choice; it is a political one, conditioned on answering a central question: what exactly does Washington want to achieve, and what is the “off-ramp” that would allow it to declare success and return to negotiations?

Here, Nadimi voices skepticism. He expressed doubts about the ability to achieve these objectives with such limited means.

A “mini” campaign may appear attractive because it avoids full-scale war, but it may not ensure deterrence or protect energy flows if Tehran opts for asymmetric retaliation, explained Nadimi.

Iran’s threats as a constraint

On the other side, Tehran and its regional allies have raised the tone of their threats. Iranian officials have warned of a “more painful” response if attacked, while statements from Hezbollah, Iraqi factions, and Yemen’s Houthis signal readiness to join any confrontation.

Such rhetoric serves the purpose of deterrence and boosting morale within the axis, but it carries a structural risk: the higher the ceiling of threats, the narrower the space for de-escalation.

The likelihood grows that an undisciplined actor, a faction or militia, could ignite an action that forces everyone into a “a cycle of retaliation,” widening the conflict beyond the calculus of a “limited” strike.

This is why Washington, according to reports, has focused on sending warning messages to Baghdad and to armed actors that any targeting of US forces would be met with direct retaliation against militias. The aim is to curb slippage that could turn a single strike into multiple fronts.

At the core of US concern is not only Iran’s ability to retaliate, but where it might do so. US bases across Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf are vulnerable targets in any escalation.

The buildup, therefore, has a clear defensive dimension, reinforcing interception systems and maritime and air defenses to contain missiles and drones.

While this is meant to protect forces, it also seeks to keep escalation in check: deterring or neutralizing retaliatory strikes so they do not force Washington into larger steps.

Alternatives to war

If force is used, the most likely scenario would involve limited, time-phased strikes targeting air defenses, missile sites, command-and-control nodes, and possibly sensitive facilities, before stopping at a point that allows a return to the political track.

The stated or implicit goal would be “punishment” and “deterrence” without ground entanglement.

Iran, however, always retains room to respond below the threshold but in painful ways, through proxies, disruption of shipping, or gradual attrition that embarrasses Washington and its allies and pushes them toward harder choices.

Here again, Nadimi questions whether limited tools would suffice, noting that success is not measured by the number of missiles launched on the first night, but by Washington’s ability to prevent Tehran from redefining the battlefield and its timing.

Targeting the leadership

In such crises, the question of “decapitation” often arises: could Washington move to target Iran’s leadership?

Nadimi addresses this cautiously, saying that targeting the supreme leader would be conceivable only “if there were a high probability of success and a low risk of casualties among US forces.”

He stresses the need to remember “the fundamental differences between Iran and Venezuela,” underscoring that what might be imagined in one political or security environment cannot be simply transplanted into Iran’s far more fortified and complex system.

Still, Nadimi adds that “the possibility of an internal operation should not be ruled out,” a phrase suggesting that the most dangerous scenarios may not begin with a missile, but with an internal rupture or movement intersecting with external pressure.

The heaviest factor in Washington’s calculations is not fear of immediate military defeat, but uncertainty about “the day after” if the system were shaken or lost control.

Iran is a large country with a complex institutional and security structure. Any major fracture could unleash a chain of scenarios, including factional conflict, security vacuums, economic turmoil, refugee flows, and immediate shocks to energy markets and the region.

Seen through this lens, the US buildup is also a negotiating tool: a threat sufficient to open doors without assuming responsibility for the consequences of collapse.

In sum, the Trump administration appears to be holding two threads at once: building up forces to make a strike an immediate option, and signaling enough pressure to force Tehran to consider negotiations, while trying to keep any confrontation below the threshold of a “mini campaign,” not a full-scale war.

Features

Gazans Long for Reopening of ‘Lifeline’ Rafah Crossing

A gate at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, in Rafah, Egypt, January 27, 2026. (Reuters)
A gate at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, in Rafah, Egypt, January 27, 2026. (Reuters)
TT
TT

Gazans Long for Reopening of ‘Lifeline’ Rafah Crossing

A gate at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, in Rafah, Egypt, January 27, 2026. (Reuters)
A gate at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, in Rafah, Egypt, January 27, 2026. (Reuters)

With Gaza's vital Rafah border crossing expected to soon reopen, residents of the war-shattered territory are hoping to reunite with family members, or are looking to leave themselves.

The Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt is the Palestinian territory's only gateway to the outside world that does not lead to Israel and is a key entry point for both people and goods.

It has been closed since Israeli forces took control of it in May 2024, except for a limited reopening in early 2025, and other bids to reopen failed to materialize.

Following a US-brokered ceasefire that took effect in October, Rafah is expected to reopen for pedestrians, after visiting US envoys reportedly pressed Israeli officials to reopen the crossing.

"Opening the Rafah crossing means opening the door to life for me. I haven't seen my wife and children for two years since they left at the beginning of the war and I was prevented from travelling," said 48-year-old Mahmud al-Natour, who hails from Gaza City.

"My children are growing up far away from me, and the years are passing by as if we are cut off from the world and life itself," he told AFP.

Randa Samih, 48, also called the crossing "the lifeline of Gaza," but is worried about whether she would be able to leave.

She had applied for an exit permit to get treatment for her injured back, which she fears might not be serious enough to be allowed out.

"There are tens of thousands of injuries in Gaza, most of them more serious than mine," she said.

"We'll die or our health will decline before we get to travel."

- 'Limited reopening' -

Gaza, a tiny territory surrounded by Israel, Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea, has been under Israeli blockade even before Hamas's attack sparked the war.

Palestinian gunmen took 251 people hostage on October 7, 2023, in an attack that killed 1,221 others, most of them civilians.

Israel's retaliatory offensive has killed at least 71,662 Palestinians, according to figures from the health ministry in Hamas-run Gaza that the United Nations considers reliable. The ministry does not say how many of the dead were fighters, though its data shows that more than half were women and children.

Ali Shaath heads the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), created as part of the ceasefire agreement. He announced last week that Rafah would reopen in both directions.

Israel said it would only allow pedestrians to travel through the crossing as part of its "limited reopening" once it had recovered the remains of the last hostage, Ran Gvili.

His remains were brought back to Israel later on Monday.

A Palestinian official told AFP on condition of anonymity that "estimates indicate that the Rafah crossing could be opened in both directions by the end of this week or early next week".

A member of the NCAG told AFP that the technocratic committee would be responsible for sending lists of travelers' names to the Israeli authorities for approval.

Outward travel will initially be limited to patients, the injured, students with university admission and visas, and holders of Egyptian citizenship or other nationalities and residency permits, the source said.

- 'Burning with anticipation' -

Gharam al-Jamla, a displaced Palestinian living in a tent in southern Gaza, told AFP she counted on the crossing's opening for her future.

"My dreams lie beyond the Rafah crossing. I applied for several scholarships to study journalism in English at universities in Türkiye. I received initial acceptance from two universities there," the 18-year-old said.

She added she would then want to return to Gaza "to be one of its voices to convey the truth to the world."

Gaza's civil defense agency spokesman, Mahmud Bassal, appealed for the full reopening of Rafah to allow the entry of unlimited aid and equipment for reconstruction.

"There are thousands of bodies under the rubble, including children, women and people with disabilities, which have not been recovered since the beginning of the war," he said.

The civil defense is a rescue force operating under Hamas authority.

Mohammed Khaled, 18, said he wanted to move on from the war.

"I'm burning with anticipation," he told AFP.

"I haven't seen my mother and sisters for two years. My mother traveled for medical treatment, and they only allowed my sisters to accompany her."

Khaled said he also hoped to be able to travel to have surgery for a shrapnel injury sustained during the war.