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The Historic Meeting between Saudi King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt

On Its 77th Anniversary, Asharq Al-Awsat Recalls the Historic Meeting between the Two Leaders

King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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The Historic Meeting between Saudi King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt

King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Every year on February 14, the Saudis and Americans remember the first meeting that brought together King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman with then US President Franklin Roosevelt in the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal.

The historic meeting was known as the Quincy Summit or the Quincy Meeting, in reference to the USS Quincy battleship, on which the meeting was held, and upon which the Saudi-American relations have been consolidated to this day.

Before that famous encounter, King Abdulaziz had recovered in April 1913 Al-Ahsa from the Ottomans in a preemptive step to block any British-Ottoman agreement to share influence in the Arabian Peninsula. The Anglo-Ottoman agreement was signed in late July 1913, according to which the Ottoman Empire ceded the coast of the Persian Gulf to Britain.

King Abdulaziz had imposed himself on the regional map and put the forces competing for influence before a fait accompli. He was keen on his country’s sovereignty, which made him constantly express friendship and try to avoid confrontation despite his distaste for British policies.

He was also watching - before the outbreak of World War II - American commercial interest in the region, even though the United States did not have the actual political means and saw the Middle East as a British area of influence primarily. Yet, he kept his political options open.

While King Abdulaziz was laying the foundations of his foreign policy, he expressed his keenness to diversify his relations with various countries in a way that enhances Saudi interests. After entering the Hijaz in 1924, influential states began to recognize the nascent kingdom, starting with Russia in 1926 and followed by European countries.

King Abdulaziz tried to get the United States to recognize his state, but America was not willing at the time to move in this direction. The latter monitored the king’s international engagements, foreign relations and trade deals, most notably his agreement with Germany in 1929.

The US government assigned the assistant trade attaché in Alexandria, Ralph Chesebrough, to visit Saudi Arabia to explore the situation. Chesebrough visited Jeddah in the summer of 1930 and prepared a report entitled, “The Economic Sources and Commercial Activities of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and its Appendices.”

The report indicated that trade relations between the two countries were expected to grow and flourish, which encouraged the US government at the time to move towards establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. The United States recognized the Kingdom in 1931.

In 1933, the Saudi government granted oil exploration concessions to Standard Oil of California (Socal). The agreement was signed at Khuzam Palace in Jeddah, Minister of Finance Sheikh Abdullah Al-Suleiman, representing the Saudi government, and lawyer Lloyd Hamilton, representing Socal. But commercial production did not start until 1938.

As World War II broke out in 1939, King Abdulaziz declared neutrality, despite his relations at the time with Britain and its military presence on its borders, and diplomatic relations with Germany.

Interest in Saudi Arabia and its King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman increased after US advisers and policymakers realized that the Kingdom was a potential strategic value for the United States. They saw in it a help in solving some of the problems that President Franklin Roosevelt expected to occur in the region after the war. America provided aid to the Saudi government within the lend-lease program, which amounted to $99 million according to a Senate report.

In 1942, the United States appointed a chargé d’affaires in Jeddah. Since then, official contacts accelerated, and King Abdulaziz received a number of US envoys. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began to occupy a strategic importance in American foreign policy.

In 1944, the US appointed William Eddy at the head of its commission in Jeddah. Eddy was a naval colonel who had previously participated in the First and Second World Wars.

Eddy was born in Sidon to parents who work in missionaries. He grew up speaking Arabic and learning Arab culture and customs. After completing his studies at the prestigious Princeton University, he joined the Navy and enlisted in the government service. After his appointment in Jeddah, Eddy became one of the most prominent architects of Saudi-US relations and one of the witnesses to the historic meeting between King Abdulaziz and President Roosevelt.

Eddy, who passed away in Beirut in 1962, published a book in 1954 entitled, “F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud”, in which he narrated the background of the preparations for the meeting.

Eddy recounted that while he was in Jeddah in February 1945, he was told that President Roosevelt, on his way back from the Yalta Conference—the agreement between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States that discussed how to divide Germany and prosecute members of the Nazi Party and present them as war criminals—wanted to meet King Abdulaziz on board an American barge in the Bitter Lakes of the Suez Canal. Eddy was asked to arrange that meeting.

Arrangements were made and the USS Murphy sailed from Jeddah with King Abdulaziz on board, along with 48 companions.

At 10 a.m. on February 14, 1945 AD, the battleship arrived in the vicinity of the USS Quincy, which was carrying Roosevelt. King Abdulaziz, accompanied by the three princes and two ministers, disembarked, and crossed the bridge between the two ships to meet Roosevelt, who was sitting in his wheelchair on the Quincy. The two leaders spoke for an hour and a quarter before heading to lunch at 11.30.

Admiral Leahy (chief of staff and military advisor to the president) asked Eddy to escort King Abdulaziz in one elevator to the dining-room, while Leahy accompanied Roosevelt in the other.

Eddy recounted that he arrived with the King to the President’s suite, but Roosevelt did not show up! Leahy later said that the president stopped the elevator to smoke two cigarettes away from King Abdulaziz. In fact, Roosevelt was a heavy smoker, and yet he never smoked during his meeting with King Abdulaziz out of respect.

As soon as the two leaders met, charisma and diplomacy prevailed over the encounter. The two men were left to discuss the future and relations of their countries openly and transparently, Eddy’s book read.

After lunch, the meeting was limited to the two leaders only, with the presence of Eddy and Minister Youssef Yassin as translators. The talks lasted until 3:30 in the afternoon, which means that the total duration of the meeting extended over five hours. Then the king returned to the USS Murphy, which set sail.

Eddy sayid that he spent that night with Youssef Yassin to finish drafting the minutes of the talks. After they finished printing the minutes in both Arabic and English, the king signed the Arabic version, and on the following morning, February 15, 1945, Eddy flew to Alexandria, and presented the report to the president, who signed it without making any amendments.

King Abdulaziz asked Roosevelt for friendship and support, and noted that his country was not under occupation or mandate and that he wanted to remain independent.

After that, the president gave his pledge to King Abdulaziz - which he confirmed in a letter he sent on April 5, 1945, one week before his death - that he would not engage in any hostile acts against the Arabs, and that his government would not change its policy towards Palestine without prior consultations with the Arabs and Jews. For the King, the verbal assurances were then an agreement, and did not expect the sudden death of Roosevelt.

According to various sources, the historic meeting between the two leaders, apart from the Palestine, touched on the following issues: guaranteeing the sovereignty of the Kingdom, especially as the world war was still raging and King Abdulaziz did not disregard foreign ambitions in his country; developing the Saudi army and ensuring the independence of the Arab countries under colonialism, as well as the economic aspect relating to freedom of trade, services and the oil relations.

The meeting had political, humanitarian, economic and military dimensions. King Abdulaziz disposed of British influence, affirmed his position on the Palestinian issue, and relieved the monetary link to the pound sterling. Moreover, the Saudi Defense Agency became a ministry.

In 2020, the US State Department’s Office of Historians published an official document about the meeting, the first part of which corresponds to Eddy’s narration on the Palestinian issue, while the second part was about King Abdulaziz’s concern about the French policy towards Syria and Lebanon, whereas the US president affirmed America’s support for the independence of the two countries.

The meeting represented the largest Western-Islamic alliance, and symbolized the integration with the Islamic world with its resources, population, products, oil, strategic location and warm water ports.

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Sudanese Endure Hardship Under the Weight of War

A near-empty market in Khartoum (Asharq Al-Awsat)
A near-empty market in Khartoum (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Sudanese Endure Hardship Under the Weight of War

A near-empty market in Khartoum (Asharq Al-Awsat)
A near-empty market in Khartoum (Asharq Al-Awsat)

For many Sudanese, the question is no longer when the war will end, but how they can make it through another day as prices soar and their ability to secure even the most basic necessities continues to erode.

Each morning brings higher prices for essential goods, shrinking incomes and fewer job opportunities, leaving thousands of families to make painful choices between food, medicine and education.

In the markets, buying and selling reflect more than just an economic crisis. They tell the story of a war whose impact has reached people's tables, turning daily life into a quiet struggle for survival.

The rapid rise in the exchange rate has weighed heavily on markets. Some traders have suspended sales temporarily while they reprice their goods to keep up with constant changes.

At the same time, a deepening liquidity crisis has added pressure on citizens, making it harder to meet basic needs amid the country’s current economic strain.

The US dollar has passed 5,000 Sudanese pounds on the parallel market, up from about 4,200 pounds a few weeks ago, a rise of nearly 20%, according to market dealers. The jump reflects sharp volatility in the currency market as economic pressure persists and monetary stability weakens.

Purchasing power declines

Trader Mohammed al-Rifai said markets were clearly stagnating as purchasing power fell and prices kept rising due to inflation and a stronger dollar.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that “weaker daily earnings for traders, along with the fees and taxes imposed on them, have made continuing business activity more difficult and less worthwhile.”

Trader Abu Aqla Fadlallah described the economic situation as extremely difficult, saying prices of basic goods had reached unprecedented levels and daily needs had become a heavy burden on families.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that “my income is no longer enough to cover my family’s needs and my children’s education.”

He said he sometimes spends an entire day in the market without making a single sale, adding that the country needs effective economic policies that draw on its vast resources and ease citizens’ suffering.

Vegetable seller al-Tijani Mahmoud said weak purchasing power had hit sales directly. The cost of bringing vegetables to market has risen sharply, he said, alongside rent and operating expenses.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he said some traders are forced to sell at a loss to clear their goods, calling for steps to address market imbalances.

Unregulated practices

Economic expert Haitham Mohamed Fathi said higher prices for raw materials used in production, driven by the rise in local exchange rates and higher global fuel costs, had directly pushed up the prices of finished goods.

Fathi told Asharq Al-Awsat that the shutdown of many factories because of the war and the damage they sustained had reduced supply just as demand increased. The result, he said, was higher prices in retail markets and the spread of the informal market.

“Higher global shipping costs, longer transport times, rising internal transport expenses, and the multiplicity of fees and levies between states are all additional factors that have doubled the cost of goods,” he said.

He said some unregulated commercial practices, including excessive price increases aimed at maximizing profits, had further deepened consumers’ suffering.

The economic expert warned that continued disruption in the energy, transport and trade sectors could undermine food security and increase the risk of shortages or unstable supplies of some goods.

He said the agricultural sector could also be affected if production costs continue to rise without sufficient support for farming.

Government measures

To contain the economic crisis, the Sudanese government has stepped up meetings in recent days at the sovereign and ministerial levels to discuss the fallout from the rising exchange rate and the country’s worsening liquidity crisis.

The Sovereign Council said the state was working on a package of measures to stabilize the foreign exchange market, limit the impact of the pound’s decline on living conditions and address market imbalances.

The Sovereign Council held a meeting, chaired by Sovereign Council chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to discuss measures to stabilize the currency market and ease economic pressure, as the pound has recorded a slight improvement in recent days.

In a statement, the council said the meeting discussed several priority national issues, led by economic, security and service-related files, amid the current conditions facing the country.

Daily challenges

Citizen Sumaya Hassan said food prices had risen beyond what she could afford, leaving her in a daily struggle to provide for her children’s basic needs. She told Asharq Al-Awsat that the continuing war and lack of job opportunities had made living conditions harsher and weighed heavily on thousands of families.

Citizen Fatima Hussein said the wave of price hikes had directly affected her family’s life, with basic goods now beyond the means of most citizens.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, she said she had reached Omdurman after a long displacement journey and was still struggling to secure daily necessities. She called for urgent steps to curb rising prices.

Citizen Maysoun Abbas said she was shocked by the sharp rise in the prices of spices and foodstuffs, which she estimated were now about 70% higher than before the war. She said families had been forced to give up many basic needs just to manage living expenses, amid the anxiety and instability imposed by the war.

In Sudan, the war is no longer measured only by the number of victims or the scale of destruction. It is also measured by what it has done to families’ tables and livelihoods. As citizens and traders struggle to adapt to an extremely harsh economic reality, the gap between income and the cost of living is widening.

The need for urgent policies to restore market stability and protect the most vulnerable is growing.

Without a real response to the roots of the economic crisis, high prices will remain another face of the war, and the suffering of millions of Sudanese will continue even after the guns fall silent.

Features

Baghdad Emerges as Next Arena in US-Iran Confrontation

Iraqi factions that fought alongside Iran in the recent war with the United States. (Popular Mobilization Forces media)
Iraqi factions that fought alongside Iran in the recent war with the United States. (Popular Mobilization Forces media)
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Baghdad Emerges as Next Arena in US-Iran Confrontation

Iraqi factions that fought alongside Iran in the recent war with the United States. (Popular Mobilization Forces media)
Iraqi factions that fought alongside Iran in the recent war with the United States. (Popular Mobilization Forces media)

More than a month after winning parliament’s confidence on May 14, 2026, Ali al-Zaidi’s government remains unfinished. Nearly 10 ministerial portfolios are still unresolved, including two central pillars of the Iraqi state: interior and defense.

In Iraq, where governments often emerge only after long bargaining among parties, parliamentary blocs, influence networks and regional powers, the delay may look familiar. But that reading only goes so far.

The incomplete cabinet does not just reflect the usual struggle over posts. It shows, above all, that the deals that brought al-Zaidi to power have not yet produced a real governing balance.

Al-Zaidi has parliamentary legitimacy, but not full command of his executive branch. His government stands legally, but remains politically incomplete.

The central issue is no longer simply whether he can complete the formation of a cabinet. It is how much room he will have to carry out his political, economic and security program.

Will al-Zaidi be merely the manager of a settlement struck by the main forces inside the Shiite camp? Or can he gradually turn that settlement into a real tool for political action and recover even a limited measure of the Iraqi state’s ability to take initiative?

That is why al-Zaidi’s expected visit to Washington in mid-July matters. It is more than a conventional diplomatic trip. Alongside the economic, energy and security files announced for discussion, the visit will be the first real test of his premiership.

It will show whether he can strengthen his international legitimacy, widen his independence from the political forces that brought him to power and define his relationship with the US administration at a time when Washington’s priorities in Iraq appear to be shifting.

Iraq in a new regional equation

Many were struck by the strategic surprise Tehran unleashed, which altered some regional balances. The move disrupted navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and introduced a troubling shift in international law through what Tehran called its “right to control.”

The interim agreement reached by Washington and Tehran allowed for a ceasefire and opened the way for a new phase of negotiations. It is likely to reduce the chances of direct military confrontation in the short term.

But it resolves none of the core disputes that still divide the United States and Iran in the Middle East. On the contrary, their rivalry appears set to move toward arenas where their interests continue to overlap. Iraq comes first among them.

For Baghdad, the shift carries a clear paradox. Relative easing between Washington and Tehran could give Ali Falih al-Zaidi’s government more space to pursue reforms without directly absorbing the costs of regional escalation.

But the same easing could also move the competition between the two powers into Iraqi institutions, turning the Iraqi state into the main arena of conflict.

The Washington-Tehran agreement also reopens the Iraqi file on other geopolitical fronts.

Gulf states are expected to accelerate strategies aimed at consolidating their regional interests, especially in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Türkiye, through its geopolitical strategy in energy and logistical connectivity, will seek to strengthen its position in Iraq. China and Russia, in turn, will try to entrench their presence in what they regard as the “southern front” of the US, and broader Western, offensive in the Eurasian space: Iran, alongside the western front in Ukraine and the eastern front in Taiwan, and the surrounding spaces of connection and influence.

In principle, Iraq should be able to benefit from this renewed competition for regional influence, particularly by attracting economic investment and securing stronger support for normalization and regional integration.

This geopolitical shift will inevitably affect Iraq’s place in the rivalry between Washington and Tehran. For nearly two decades, Iraq’s political system has rested on an ambiguous balance.

It is neither a US protectorate nor an absolute subordinate of Iran. It is an open space for constant negotiation among outside powers, local elites, sectarian parties, armed factions, fragile institutions and a rentier economy.

Despite its fragility, that model delivered a measure of relative stability for years. But current signs suggest it is entering a new phase; one expected to move toward consolidating the state and its institutions.

A shift in US policy

The Trump administration no longer appears fully prepared to accept the implicit logic that governed Iraq in recent years: a form of direct or indirect joint management between Washington and Tehran.

The signals so far point to a US approach built on long-term influence by strengthening Iraqi state institutions. The aim is to use technocratic tools and, perhaps, a greater degree of ideological neutrality to tilt the balance toward Iraqi national interests, especially economic ones, and away from Iranian influence.

Several officials inside the US administration appear to support this view. They argue that Iraq can gradually free itself from reliance on Iranian support if Iraqi state institutions regain credibility and effectiveness.

As the scheduled US military withdrawal in September 2026 approaches, a purely security-driven approach looks insufficient. Repeated operations targeting armed faction leaders and their organizational structures since 2020 have not produced a real shift in the balance of power.

One of the most prominent defenders of this approach is Tom Barrack, who occupies a special place in it. Barrack is the US ambassador to Türkiye and a close associate of Donald Trump.

He is also known for his close relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and for being one of the leading defenders of the effectiveness of centralized, even authoritarian, systems in producing transitions. Today, he is one of the key actors in the Syrian and Iraqi files.

Barrack belongs to a classical school that sees no sustainable influence in the Middle East without central states that possess at least a minimum of political and institutional credibility.

In Syria, this translates into support for a pragmatic path toward normalizing relations with the new authority in Damascus. In Iraq, there appears to be a focus on strengthening Baghdad’s role, without overlooking the importance and status of Erbil.

This is how the recent reactivation of several files should be understood. Efforts to ease tension between Baghdad and Erbil, the push for closer coordination between Baghdad and Damascus, and renewed interest in some regional projects are not merely diplomatic moves.

They all serve one logic: gradually strengthening the Iraqi state’s ability to reclaim its role as the central actor in regional balances.

A settlement of the chronic disputes between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region, whether over the budget, oil exports, energy management or the distribution of powers, would strengthen Baghdad. It would also strengthen al-Zaidi himself.

The same logic applies to Baghdad’s relations with Damascus. US authorities, under Barrack’s influence, now appear to favor pragmatic coordination between the two capitals. This is not so much because Washington supports the new Syrian authority, but because it wants to stabilize a border area that has become vital to regional security.

The Iraqi-Syrian border remains a major strategic challenge in the fight against armed groups, smuggling and illegal transit networks. At the same time, it could again become a space for economic exchange and energy movement if the right political conditions emerge.

In this context, the idea of restarting the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline regains special importance. The project is not only economic. It also carries deep geopolitical meaning. It would give Iraq an additional outlet for oil exports via the Mediterranean, reducing, at least in part, its reliance on existing routes through the Gulf or Türkiye.

More importantly, it would mark Iraq’s return to its historical role as a link between the Gulf, the Arab Levant and the Mediterranean. The project alone would not solve Iraq’s economic crisis. But it would signal a desire to reposition Iraq at the center of regional dynamics rather than leave it as a stage for regional and international competition.

Governing under financial constraints

That horizon remains extremely fragile because of Iraq’s internal economic situation. Al-Zaidi’s government inherited deteriorating financial conditions. The state’s room for maneuver has narrowed sharply because of obligations accumulated in recent years, particularly under Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s government.

Public-sector wages, social spending, domestic debt, and other financial commitments now consume a large share of state resources.

Oil exports add another strain. Negotiations with Türkiye on resuming exports through the port of Ceyhan have not yet been settled, depriving Iraq of an important share of oil revenue. Before the crisis, exports through that route reached hundreds of thousands of barrels per day.

The current crisis is therefore not a passing economic problem or a temporary financial squeeze. It exposes the structural limits of the political and economic model built in Iraq after 2003.

The Iraqi state has gradually become a vast machine for redistributing oil rent. Public salaries, pensions, social assistance, government contracts, public companies and subcontracting networks have become the main tools for organizing political and social balances.

Under this equation, the regular payment of salaries is no longer just a matter of financial management or the state budget. It has become central to the stability of the political system itself. Nearly 5 million government employees depend directly on public finances, along with millions of retirees and social welfare beneficiaries.

Any prolonged disruption could quickly trigger broad social tensions and deepen the fragility of a government already facing several political challenges at once.

The executive’s options remain limited. Government bonds could provide temporary liquidity, but they would not fix deep structural imbalances. Domestic borrowing also remains constrained by weak liquidity inside the Iraqi economy.

Turning to the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund remains possible, but it would come with strict conditions. These could include reforming public companies, rationalizing government spending, improving public financial management, and gradually reducing some forms of state support.

Such measures could reassure international partners. But they also risk feeding social anger in a country where the state remains the largest employer and the main safety net against economic crises.

Factions between institutionalization and reconfiguration

Iraq’s economic crisis is tightly linked to the security question. The state is no longer just a rentier state distributing oil revenues. It has become a space where state institutions overlap with political, administrative, economic and military networks, all of which feed, to varying degrees, on public revenues.

Armed factions no longer draw their power from military capacity alone. They also draw it from a long process of institutionalization over the past two decades.

They now have extensions inside parliament and the executive, a presence in public administration, financial resources, economic networks and offices, protection offices dealing with oil companies, media outlets, social organizations and a measure of “legitimacy” acquired by some of them during the war against ISIS.

Seeing these factions as mere armed groups outside the state no longer reflects Iraq’s reality since 2003. The overlap between the state and the factions is no longer simply an infiltration of state institutions. It has become part of how those institutions function.

This reality also requires moving beyond another simplification often repeated in Western analysis: reducing these factions to “Iranian proxies.” They are not all equally close to Tehran, nor do they all have the same political or military relationship with it. Some have a considerable margin of independence and put Iraqi calculations first.

Others remain more deeply integrated into Tehran’s regional networks. It is therefore more accurate to speak of “Iraqi factions close to Iran” than to reduce them to direct Iranian extensions. That reduction obscures the transformations these groups have undergone inside Iraqi society and the Iraqi state.

The distinction is crucial to understanding current debates over the factions’ future. Part of this network now appears ready to discuss a gradual reorganization of its status.

Negotiations with the government are not centered on immediate disarmament so much as on deeper integration into the Popular Mobilization Forces and a clearer separation between political activity and military command.

Other groups, especially Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, are more cautious about any process that could narrow their independence or redefine their relationship with the state.

The real question, however, is not whether political and military wings can realistically be separated. It is what kind of state Iraq has become. Can politics and weapons truly be separated when both operate inside the same institutional structure? Can traditional models of disarmament and reintegration be applied to groups that no longer stand outside the state?

Today, the factions are not defending their arsenals as much as they are defending their positions inside the state, their share of public resources, their economic networks and a social base that now depends, directly or indirectly, on the jobs, salaries, services and patronage they provide.

Estimates put their membership at between 200,000 and 300,000. Including their families, millions of Iraqis are linked to this system in varying degrees.

Any attempt to restructure the factions or reduce their role will therefore face a highly complex equation: US pressure to confine arms to the state, Iranian influence seeking to preserve part of the regional deterrence system, and broad local interests that view the factions’ survival as a guarantee of their economic and political positions.

Amid this overlap, the question is no longer how to disarm the factions. It is how to rebuild a state.

Time as a factor in the balance of power

This institutional complexity is compounded by another often-overlooked dimension: time.

The United States usually thinks within a relatively short political horizon, shaped by presidential terms, the search for quick results and near-term diplomatic deadlines.

Iraqi factions close to Iran, like Tehran itself, operate on a very different timeline. They know how to wait, postpone decisions, absorb pressure, multiply mediation efforts and turn time into a political resource.

In Iraq, time itself is part of the balance of power. The most entrenched actors are those that can withstand changes of government, international sanctions, shifting political balances and regional crises.

This ability to work according to the logic of the long term explains why repeated attempts to restructure the security sphere have produced limited results. Local forces know that international balances change far faster than Iraq’s internal balances.

These different timelines also help explain how the recent war between Iran, the United States and Israel was received by an important part of Iraq’s political scene.

A belief has gradually taken hold among a broad segment of political actors that Iran emerged from the confrontation politically stronger. This does not mean Tehran suffered no losses or faced no serious pressure.

It simply means the Iranian system did not fall and was not pushed to the margins of the regional equation. For many of its allies, its ability to endure was itself a form of “political victory.”

That reading directly shapes the behavior of Iraqi factions closest to Tehran. Many now ask a simple question: If Iran itself preserved its regional capabilities, why should the factions in Iraq make concessions?

Is there a new US doctrine?

At this stage, it is still too early to say a clear new US doctrine toward Iraq has taken shape. But several indicators suggest that part of the US administration now believes that limiting Iranian influence does not require direct confrontation with Tehran. It runs through the gradual strengthening of the Iraqi state’s credibility and capacity to act.

This approach, however, collides with the Iraqi reality described above. The United States, Iran and Iraq also move according to different clocks.

Al-Zaidi will have to confront several challenges at once. He must restore balance to public finances, preserve existing political settlements, redefine the relationship between the state and the factions, balance Baghdad’s relations with Erbil and Damascus, and maintain a constructive dialogue with Washington without reproducing internal polarization.

The challenge facing the new government is therefore not simply whether it can manage the country’s affairs. It is whether Iraq can rebuild a more credible state within the existing political balances that have provided a measure of relative stability.

In that space between reform and continuity, between state authority and the authority of influence networks, and between different national and regional rhythms, Iraq’s political future will most likely be decided in the years ahead.

Features

Mojtaba Khamenei: Iran’s Unseen Leader Shadowed by Late Father

A bird flies near an Iranian flag and a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
A bird flies near an Iranian flag and a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
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Mojtaba Khamenei: Iran’s Unseen Leader Shadowed by Late Father

A bird flies near an Iranian flag and a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
A bird flies near an Iranian flag and a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters

Mojtaba Khamenei, who has spent his career behind the scenes and is yet to appear in public as Iran's new supreme leader, faces the formidable challenge of occupying the role held by his father for most of the regime's existence.

Iranians knew little about the younger Khamenei when he was named to the lifetime post shortly after a US-Israeli airstrike killed his father Ali Khamenei, supreme leader since 1989, at the start of the Middle East war.

Said to have been wounded himself, Mojtaba Khamenei has issued over dozen written messages as leader that have carried on his father's confrontational ideology, taking aim at Israel and the United States.

In one of his most significant recent interventions, released on June 18, Mojtaba Khamenei said he had given his blessing to talks with the US to end the war despite having a "different view", likely an attempt to stay above the domestic political fray.

Despite the messages and activity on social media channels, there has been no concrete proof that Mojtaba Khamenei is even alive after the February 28 attack that also killed his wife Zahra Haddad Adel and other members of the Khamenei family.

But several Iranian officials have said he was wounded, sparking speculation he could be waiting to recover fully before appearing in public, as well as being mindful of his own security.

With Ali Khamenei's funeral starting Saturday, there will be intense scrutiny for signs of Mojtaba Khamenei emerging, and questions will mount if he fails to appear.

-'Radical' agenda -

Unlike Ali Khamenei, a prominent opponent of the shah who was president in the first decade of the republic from 1981-1989 before becoming supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei has never held a government position before.

But observers believe he was second-in-command at the office of the supreme leader under the veteran chief gatekeeper Mohammad Golpayegani.

He is also seen as close to the leadership of the powerful Revolutionary Guards, a connection that may have proved crucial in his selection by the Assembly of Experts clerical body.

One of the few official insights into the importance of Mojtaba Khamenei came in November 2019 when the US Treasury announced sanctions against him and other senior Iranian officials, including Golpayegani, on the grounds they were pushing Iran's "radical" agenda around the world.

The US said he was designated for representing Ali Khamenei "in an official capacity despite never being elected or appointed to a government position aside from work in the office of his father".

"The Supreme Leader has delegated a part of his leadership responsibilities to Mojtaba Khamenei," the US said, adding that he had "worked closely" with the commanders of the Quds Force -- the Guards branch responsible for operations outside Iran -- and the Basij militia "to advance his father's destabilizing regional ambitions and oppressive domestic objectives".

A sign of his potential sway came during the 2005 presidential elections when former parliament speaker Mehdi Karroubi wrote a letter to the supreme leader complaining that Mojtaba Khamenei had been intervening on behalf of his ultra-conservative rival Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad went on to cause a sensation by defeating former president Hashemi Rafsanjani. Mojtaba was again seen by some commentators as coordinating the crackdown on protests that followed Ahmadinejad's disputed 2009 election victory.

A leaked US diplomatic cable from 2008 published by Wikileaks said that Mojtaba was "seen by many second only to Golpayegani within the office of the supreme leader".

- 'Unlikely' to have father's influence -

According to an investigation by Bloomberg, which cited anonymous sources and Western intelligence agency reports, Mojtaba Khamenei has amassed wealth estimated at more than $100 million.

It reported he has earned money from oil sales channeled into investments in luxury British real estate, hotels in Europe and property through shell companies in tax havens.

Born in his father's home city of Mashhad in northeastern Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei studied theology in the clerical hub of Qom where he also taught.

"The role of Mojtaba Khamenei is unclear," said Thomas Juneau, professor at the University of Ottawa.

"It is very unlikely at this point that he has the degree of influence that his father used to have."