Though it originally emerged in Europe, "the thirties" has become a universal term and concept. It refers to nationalist and youth movements, fascist and semi-fascist, impressed by violence and might. They try to stand in for their states, which they decry as weak and disintegrating, and each of them is led by an infallible leader.
These movements spread in large parts of the world, including the Arab world (the Young Egypt Party (Misr El-Fatah), the Syrian Nationalists…). They found ideal models they could aspire to replicate in the fascist regimes of Germany, Italy, and Japan, a tripartite that swiftly formed an alliance and caused the eruption of the Second World War.
"The twenties" of the twenty-first century could become a universal expression and concept, especially if Russia invades Ukraine and what some are calling a resumed Cold War- or maybe a Third World War- begins. The strong rise and proliferation of populism over the past decade have already paved the way for this stage, with even strong democracies like the United States and Britain not left unscathed.
If this scenario unfolds, we could be facing clear points of convergence and points of divergence that are no less clear. Among the similarities is the recent Russo-Chinese agreement reeking of hostility to democracy that was concluded by Vladimir Putin and Xi Xinping, which is reminiscent of the establishment of the Axis in 1940. Another is the reasons prompting warnings against the dangers of a policy of appeasing Putin that mirrors the 1938 Munich Pact signed by the prime ministers of Britain and France, Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, and Adolf Hitler.
We also have the prevalence of anti-war sentiments in the United States. In World War II, such anti-war sentiments meant it took the attack on Pearl Harbor to push Washington to participate in the war. On the cultural side, be it among the left or the nationalists, there are the apologies. Some who claim that NATO's expansion to the East is the reason for the tensions rather than the nature of the Russian regime. They make these claims as though joining NATO had been the issue in Syria when the Russians invaded. This reminds us of the argument that the Treaty of Versailles' humiliation of Germany after the First World War offers a better explanation for what would happen than the nature of the Nazi regime.
Then, based on bitter political experiences, it became clear that a fascist leader, or even an extremist populist, rising to power gives rise to the specter of catastrophe for the whole world. This threat demands fostering a form of political globalization that contemplates limiting the principle of sovereignty such that it does not imply respect for strong countries' sovereignties and the violation of weaker neighboring countries' basic rights sovereign states.
Finally, and this is the most important matter in the end and the most consequential for the others, the German, Italian and Japanese regimes of yesterday and the Russian and Chinese regimes today are either non-democratic or opposed to democracy. They fear nothing like they fear democracy's expansion.
On the other hand, among the many differences is that today's authoritarian regimes are not ideological. Indeed, they are not fascist in the strict sense of the term. They could be derided as such under the weight of anger and enthusiasm, but the epithet does not seem to be substantiated by economic and social conditions similar to those of Europe in the thirties. This difference manifests most clearly when the comparison is with China. It is despotic, authoritarian, and expansionist, but the excessive use of the label fascist (or communist for that matter) may not be appropriate.
Another significant difference, in the 1930s, much of what came to be known as the "Third World" had still been colonized. This explains nationalist passions' prevalence among the youth movements sympathetic to the Axis countries. It also helps explain this empathy itself, though it does not sum it up.
Today, with decolonization having begun after the end of the Second World War, colonies no longer exist, and independent and tyrannical states have risen to the occasion. Using nationalism as a pretext for fighting the West has become difficult to attribute to oppression and victimization, except for the peoples who were not granted states, like the Palestinians and Kurds. In any case, the sympathies that may emerge for the Russo-Chinese Axis are unlikely to yield better outcomes than those of sympathizing with fascism and later on the Soviet camp.
Naturally, many non-democrats may sympathize with the democratic camp. However, these are not anti-democratic theorists, and they do not cling to any of the arguments that are put forward to repudiate it. The theories popular today about the West and democracy's frailty and uniting peoples against it are on the rise in countries like Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba… The paradox here, in any case, is the following: the Iranian state is currently the most supportive of parties and forces that re hostile to democracy on the one hand and, on the other, threatening every form of stability based on the nation-state formula.
Iran is also among the largest and strongest countries sympathetic, in its way, with Russia and China, hostile to the West politically, culturally, and in values, and preaching "heading East" through its subordinates. However, the world could nonetheless see Western countries agree with it at any moment!
If the scenario of war breaking out in Ukraine plays out, the appeasement of Iran would be among the prominent signs of weakness on the domestic front of the countries facing Russia and its allies.
