Damascus Documents in Geneva Negotiations: Incitement against the Regime is High Treason

Damascus Documents in Geneva Negotiations: Incitement against the Regime is High Treason
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Damascus Documents in Geneva Negotiations: Incitement against the Regime is High Treason

Damascus Documents in Geneva Negotiations: Incitement against the Regime is High Treason

“You are neither my friend nor my brother, you are just a colleague,” said one of the members of the Damascus delegation to a representative from the “other party” during the meetings of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva, which concluded on Friday evening.

These verbal comments do not reflect the depth of the gap between the parties to the talks. This rift, however, was highlighted in the texts of the counter proposals, which were obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat.

A document submitted by the head of the pro-government delegation, Ahmed al-Kuzbari, stated that a person, who violates the political system of governance, by using force, threats, incitement, or by provoking aggression on the territory of the state, communicating with hostile parties and dealing with any external party in any way that harms national interests, shall be convicted of high treason.

In another document, the pro-government delegation said: “The law shall criminalize anyone, who calls for the consolidation of subnational identities that affect the unity and security of society.”

It added: “The Constitution preserves cultural diversity within the framework of national unity,” pointing out that harming the army is “a crime punishable by law.”

UN Envoy Geir Pedersen

The seventh round of the Constitutional Committee meetings ended on Friday. While UN envoy Geir Pedersen did not announce a new date for the next round, the Damascus delegation proposed that they take place at the end of May.

Russian presidential envoy Alexander Lavrentiev, US envoy Ethan Goldrich, his Turkish counterpart Sedat Unal and other Western officials accompanied the negotiations, which were held within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

Pedersen, who as usual avoided a press conference, said in a statement: “The Committee members in the first four days discussed draft constitutional texts on four basic constitutional principles: Basics of Governance, submitted by nominees of the Syrian Negotiations Commission, State Identity, submitted by some of the civil society nominees, State Symbols, submitted by nominees of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and Regulation and Functions of Public Authorities, submitted by nominees of the Syrian Negotiations Commission.”

He continued: “On the fifth day, in line with the agreement, the delegations were expected to submit revisions to reflect the content of the discussions during the previous four days. All delegations offered at least some revisions to some of the texts presented. Some of these embodied amendments indicating an attempt to reflect the content of the discussions and narrow differences. Others contained no changes.”

On the Agreement

The node in the previous rounds was related to the fifth day of the session, as the Damascus delegation refused to reach joint formulations with the delegation of the Negotiations Commission headed by Hadi al-Bahra. This position forced Pedersen to shuffle between Moscow, Damascus and other capitals, until an understanding was reached that the counter-papers would be exchanged on the fifth day.

Some suggested that this meant formulating common texts, while Damascus interpreted it as a request to submit written comments, based on its reading of Pedersen’s invitation letter to the seventh round of talks.

Thus, 15 papers were submitted in response to four documents presented over the four days of the seventh round. These papers, the texts of which were obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat, revealed the depth of the gap between the parties.

State Symbols

Al-Kuzbari said in one of the documents: “Our delegation followed all the discussions that took place during the third day of the meeting on the principle of state symbols, as well as the proposals submitted by other parties about it. Our delegation expresses its dissatisfaction with any of the discussions or proposals presented to amend it, and affirms its adherence to the aforementioned principle, which states the following:

“The symbols of the Syrian Arab Republic represent higher national and well-established cultural values, and express its history, heritage and unity, and they are all unchangeable...

1- The flag of the Syrian Arab Republic consists of three colors: red, white and black. It has two green stars, each with five prongs. The flag has a rectangular shape, its width is two-thirds of its length, and consists of three rectangles of equal dimensions along the length of the flag, the top in red, the middle in white, and the bottom in black. The two stars are in the middle of the white rectangle.

2- “Humat ad-Diyar” is the national anthem of the Syrian Arab Republic.

3- Arabic is the official language of the Syrian Arab Republic.

4- The Syrian lira is the currency of the Syrian Arab Republic and the unit of measurement for its money.

5- The emblem of the Syrian Arab Republic is an Arab shield on which the national flag of the Syrian Arab Republic is engraved in its colors. The shield embraces an eagle holding in its claws a ribbon on which the “Syrian Arab Republic” is written in the Kufic script. At the bottom of the shield are two ears of wheat. The eagle, the ribbon, and the two ears of wheat shall be in golden color, and the writing and wing lines shall be in a light brown color.”

The delegation of the Negotiations Commission presented a document pertaining to state symbols, which read: “The history of the Syrian flag: it appears to the observer that it was subjected to alteration and modification several times, due to events or changes in the state, which, in the view of those concerned, required an alteration or modification, or a return to the adoption of another flag for a reason related to the context of historical events."

Since the Constitution is a text that has a spirit… there is a mutual influence relationship between the constitution and reality, a dialectical relationship represented in the impact of the political reality on the written texts, as well as the adaptation of the texts of the constitution to political developments…

We, in Syria, currently have two flags among the set of historical flags that are approved by millions of Syrians. A group believes that the independence flag (22/02/1932) represent them, while another group states that it is represented by the flag of unity (1/1/1958), which was adopted by [late Egyptian President] Gamal Abdel Nasser.

In our estimation, the revolution, which began with peaceful demonstrations since March 2011, has developed into what we all know. These events and circumstances deserve to be a reason to demand changing the flag again by more than half of the Syrian population.

Looking at the contexts of the Syrian constitutions, we find that the flag, slogan and anthem were referred to a special law that clarifies them:

- Article 6 of the 1950 Constitution states: “the emblem and national anthem of the Republic shall be designated by law.”

- In the 1973 Constitution, Article 6 states: “The law shall specify the state’s flag, emblem, anthem, and the provisions pertaining to each of them.”

The delegation of the Negotiations Commission added: “We are going through a historical stage that calls for change. As it is decided historically and in reality, there is no constitution that remains the same. Rather, it can vary with the change in the circumstances of the social contract that originally established it. We are undoubtedly facing the creation of a new social contract.”

State Identity

The document of the Damascus delegation stated: “Our delegation believes that there is no independent principle called "the identity of the state" in the constitutional sense, but principles or articles in the constitution that reflect this identity, however, to interact with the propositions and discussions that took place, we present the following modified vision":

“1 - Arabism is the basis, the historical origin and the unifying identity of all the people of the region, as well as the unifying framework for all the citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic, culturally, socially, civilly and humanly. It is not a choice governed by an interest or a goal, but rather an affiliation that is broader than being limited to race, religion, sect, language or interest.

2- The Arabic language is the official language of the Syrian Arab Republic. The state, with all its bodies, especially the educational, cultural and media institutions, guarantees its promotion and consolidation as one of the foundations of its national identity.

3 - The Syrian people, with their diverse social fabric, are an integral part of the Arab nation. They are proud of their Arab affiliation and are proud of their nation and its eternal civilizational message throughout history, in the face of all colonial, separatist and terrorist projects aimed at the disintegration of states.

4- The law criminalizes anyone who calls for the consolidation of subnational identities that affect the unity and security of society, and the constitution protects cultural diversity within the framework of national unity.”

Basics of Governance

The proposal submitted by the Negotiations Commission on Monday stated that the “system of governance in the state is republican based on the rule of law, respect for human dignity and the will of the people, and a full commitment to building a free, just and solidarity society.”

It added that sovereignty must be exercised by the people through the means of voting established in the constitution, “allowing them to freely and democratically express their will to choose who exercises power on their behalf, at the national and local levels, within the framework of political pluralism and the peaceful transfer of power.”

The document said that political parties are “an expression of political pluralism.” “Parties are established and they exercise their activities freely within the framework of the laws regulating their work, in a manner that does not conflict with the provisions of the Constitution.”

Al-Kuzbari presented a counter-paper, in which he stated: “Since the title presented by the other party, “Basics of Governance”, does not constitute a constitutional principle, and our delegation made this clear during the meetings, we present the following modified vision, based on a conceptual, not constitutional standpoint:

The Constitution preserves the political system of governance in the state. Any violation of it in any illegitimate way, especially through the use of force, threat of force, incitement, or encouragement of aggression against the state’s territory, communication with hostile parties, and dealing with any external party in any way that harms national interests, shall be condemned on charges of high treason.

“Loyalty to the state, its institutions, its Syrian Arab army and its armed forces is the duty of every citizen. Any intimidation against it, undermining its prestige or its role, or trying to change the structure of state institutions with the aim of weakening it, is a crime punishable by law.

“Political parties express political pluralism and contribute to the formation of the popular will. Any political activity outside the framework of licensed parties is prohibited by law. The creation and financing of parties and organizations is governed by national laws and regulations. Establishing parties, organizations or groupings on the basis of religious, sectarian, regional, ethnic or foreign allegiance is prohibited.”

In response to another paper, entitled, the Work of Institutions, the Damascus delegation presented a document, stating that the title was not a constitutional principle, and thus could not be discussed “before clearly defining the tasks and duties of the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, and the bodies and institutions emanating from them.”

Tension and Calm

The discussions that were taking place under Russian, American, regional and Western “censorship” saw tense and calm moments, amid an atmosphere that lacked warmth. Participants from Damascus stressed their “refusal of friendship or brotherhood.” There were calls to “focus on the richness of discussion and the evolvement of ideas, even with the lack of willingness to translate the progress of the dialogue into final proposals.”

Pedersen emphasized this last point, as he stated that he became “more optimistic at the end of the last session,” where he noticed a greater desire for discussion, dialogue and hearing opinions.

But he also pointed out that the gap remained wide and that the Committee should be governed by a sense of compromise and constructive engagement aimed at reaching a general agreement of its members, in line with the Terms of Reference and Core Rules of Procedure.

Pedersen said that he would soon seek, after consulting with the two co-chairs, to set the date of the next round in May, and that he would communicate with the government and the Negotiations Commission to develop more practical proposals to improve the process.

“Two-and-a-half years after the launching of the Constitutional Committee – an event that took nearly two years to bring about – there is a clear need for this commitment to be embodied in the Committee’s work, so that substantive issues begin to be bridged, and that the Committee begins to move substantively forward on its mandate to prepare and draft for popular approval a constitutional reform,” the UN envoy stated.



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.