At 100 Days, Russia-Ukraine War by the Numbers

A view of the city of Mariupol on June 2, 2022, amid the ongoing Russian military action in Ukraine. (AFP)
A view of the city of Mariupol on June 2, 2022, amid the ongoing Russian military action in Ukraine. (AFP)
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At 100 Days, Russia-Ukraine War by the Numbers

A view of the city of Mariupol on June 2, 2022, amid the ongoing Russian military action in Ukraine. (AFP)
A view of the city of Mariupol on June 2, 2022, amid the ongoing Russian military action in Ukraine. (AFP)

One hundred days into Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the war has brought the world a near-daily drumbeat of gut wrenching scenes: Civilian corpses in the streets of Bucha; a blown-up theater in Mariupol; the chaos at a Kramatorsk train station in the wake of a Russian missile strike.

Those images tell just a part of the overall picture of Europe's worst armed conflict in decades. Here's a look at some numbers and statistics that - while in flux and at times uncertain - shed further light on the death, destruction, displacement and economic havoc wrought by the war as it reaches this milestone with no end in sight.

The human toll
Nobody really knows how many combatants or civilians have died, and claims of casualties by government officials - who may sometimes be exaggerating or low-balling their figures for public relations reasons - are all but impossible to verify.

Government officials, UN agencies and others who carry out the grim task of counting the dead don't always get access to places where people were killed.

And Moscow has released scant information about casualties among its forces and allies, and given no accounting of civilian deaths in areas under its control. In some places - such as the long-besieged city of Mariupol, potentially the war's biggest killing field - Russian forces are accused of trying to cover up deaths and dumping bodies into mass graves, clouding the overall toll.

With all those caveats, "at least tens of thousands" of Ukrainian civilians have died so far, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Thursday in comments to Luxembourg's parliament.

In Mariupol alone, officials have reported over 21,000 civilian dead. Sievierodonetsk, a city in the eastern region of Luhansk that has become the focus of Russia’s offensive, has seen roughly 1,500 casualties, according to the mayor.

Such estimates comprise both those killed by Russian strikes or troops and those who succumbed to secondary effects such as hunger and sickness as food supplies and health services collapsed.

Zelenskyy said this week that 60 to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are dying in combat every day, with about 500 more wounded.

Russia's last publicly released figures for its own forces came March 25, when a general told state media that 1,351 soldiers had been killed and 3,825 wounded.

Ukraine and Western observers say the real number is much higher: Zelenskyy said Thursday that more than 30,000 Russian servicemen have died - "more than the Soviet Union lost in 10 years of the war in Afghanistan"; in late April, the British government estimated Russian losses at 15,000.

Speaking on condition of anonymity Wednesday to discuss intelligence matters, a Western official said Russia is "still taking casualties, but ... in smaller numbers." The official estimated that some 40,000 Russian troops have been wounded.

In Moscow-backed separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine, authorities have reported over 1,300 fighters lost and nearly 7,500 wounded in the Donetsk region, along with 477 dead civilians and nearly 2,400 wounded; plus 29 civilians killed and 60 wounded in Luhansk.

The devastation
Relentless shelling, bombing and airstrikes have reduced large swaths of many cities and towns to rubble.

Ukraine’s parliamentary commission on human rights says Russia's military has destroyed almost 38,000 residential buildings, rendering about 220,000 people homeless.

Nearly 1,900 educational facilities from kindergartens to grade schools to universities have been damaged, including 180 completely ruined.

Other infrastructure losses include 300 car and 50 rail bridges, 500 factories and about 500 damaged hospitals, according to Ukrainian officials.

The World Health Organization has tallied 296 attacks on hospitals, ambulances and medical workers in Ukraine this year.

Fleeing home
The UN refugee agency UNHCR estimates that about 6.8 million people have been driven out of Ukraine at some point during the conflict.

But since fighting subsided in the area near Kyiv and elsewhere, and Russian forces redeployed to the east and south, about 2.2 million have returned to the country, it says.

The UN's International Organization for Migration estimates that as of May 23 there were more than 7.1 million internally displaced people - that is, those who fled their homes but remain in the country. That's down from over 8 million in an earlier count.

Land seized
Ukrainian officials say that before the February invasion, Russia controlled some 7% of Ukrainian territory including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014, and areas held by the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk.

On Thursday, Zelenskyy said Russian forces now held 20% of the country.

While the front lines are constantly shifting, that amounts to an additional 58,000 square kilometers (22,000 square miles) under Russian control, a total area slightly larger than Croatia or a little smaller than the US state of West Virginia.

The economic fallout in Russia and Ukraine ...
The West has levied a host of retaliatory sanctions against Moscow including on the crucial oil and gas sectors, and Europe is beginning to wean itself from its dependence on Russian energy.

Evgeny Gontmakher, academic director of European Dialogue, wrote in a paper this week that Russia currently faces over 5,000 targeted sanctions, more than any other country. Some $300 billion of Russian gold and foreign exchange reserves in the West have been frozen, he added, and air traffic in the country dropped from 8.1 million to 5.2 million passengers between January and March.

Additionally, the Kyiv School of Economics has reported that more than 1,000 "self-sanctioning" companies have curtailed their operations in Russia.

The MOEX Russia stock index has plunged by about a quarter since just before the invasion and is down nearly 40 percent from the start of the year. And the Russian Central Bank said last week that annualized inflation came in at 17.8 percent in April.

Ukraine, meanwhile, has reported suffering a staggering economic blow: 35% of GDP wiped out by the war.

"Our direct losses today exceed $600 billion," Andriy Yermak, the head of Zelenskyy’s office, said recently.

Ukraine, a major agricultural producer, says it has been unable to export some 22 million tons of grain. It blames a backlog of shipments on Russian blockades or capture of key ports. Zelenskyy accused Russia this week of stealing at least a half-million tons of grain during the invasion.

... And the world
The fallout has rippled around the globe, further driving up costs for basic goods on top of inflation that was already in full swing in many places before the invasion.

Crude oil prices in London and New York have risen by 20 to 25 percent, resulting in higher prices at the pump and for an array of petroleum-based products.

Developing countries are being squeezed particularly hard by higher costs of food, fuel and financing, according to economist Richard Kozul-Wright of the UN Conference on Trade and Development.

Wheat supplies have been disrupted in African nations, which imported 44% of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine in the years immediately before the invasion. The African Development Bank has reported a 45% increase in continental prices for the grain, affecting everything from Mauritanian couscous to the fried donuts sold in Congo.



ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
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ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)

The issue of ISIS detainees transferred from prisons in northeastern Syria to Iraq has moved to the forefront of Baghdad’s security and political agenda, coinciding with intensified efforts to form a new government and determine the next prime minister.

Long confined to narrow security and technical discussions, the issue has entered broader political debate following Iraqi steps to receive a number of the detainees inside its territory, in coordination with concerned international parties. While the move carries direct security implications, it has also unfolded against a highly sensitive domestic political backdrop.

On Friday, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, in a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron, urged “countries around the world, particularly European Union states,” to repatriate their nationals held as ISIS detainees, following their transfer from Syria to Iraq.

 

An Iraqi border guard at a checkpoint along the Syrian border in Sinjar, January 22, 2026 (AP)

From a Border Liability to a Domestic Challenge

For years, the presence of thousands of ISIS members in detention facilities beyond Iraq’s direct control has been a persistent security concern for Baghdad, given the proximity of those prisons to the Iraqi-Syrian border and the region’s fragile security conditions. The transfer of some detainees into Iraq has shifted the challenge from a cross-border threat to a domestic issue requiring complex security, judicial, and logistical arrangements.

Iraqi authorities say handling the detainees falls within the state’s responsibility toward its citizens and individuals accused of crimes committed on Iraqi soil, while also reducing the risk of a potential security breakdown at detention sites outside the country.

At the same time, political circles have raised questions about the security burden, societal repercussions, and Iraq’s capacity to manage the issue over the long term.

Where Security and Politics Converge

The renewed focus on the detainee issue has coincided with a sensitive phase of negotiations among political forces within the Coordination Framework coalition over government formation and the selection of a prime minister.

Although fundamentally a security matter, the timing has propelled the issue into political debate, particularly as international actors welcomed steps taken by the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, while regional players monitored developments in Baghdad with caution.

On Friday, US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack praised what he described as Baghdad’s “exceptional leadership” and its firm commitment to helping protect the international community from the continuing threat posed by ISIS detainees, speaking on behalf of the US president and secretary of state.

Some political factions view the handling of ISIS detainees as a test of the Iraqi government’s ability to manage complex issues in coordination with the international community. Others see it as a highly sensitive issue that must be handled independently of political pressure or diplomatic signals between capitals with influence over Iraqi affairs.

 

Iraqi border guards are deployed along the Syrian border amid tight security measures (AP)

Complex Domestic Calculations

Within Iraq, debate over the detainees is inseparable from concerns about the possible resurgence of extremist cells, prison attacks, or escape attempts — scenarios Iraq has experienced in the past. As a result, security discussions have focused on intelligence readiness, securing detention facilities, and expediting judicial procedures for suspects.

Politically, most parties are careful to avoid appearing lenient on terrorism, yet they differ on the timing and approach to managing the issue, particularly amid a political transition whose outcome remains unsettled.

The detainee issue also highlights Baghdad’s effort to strike a balance between responding to international security concerns and asserting its sovereignty and national interest. Countries concerned with foreign fighters and ISIS dossier are pushing for lasting solutions, while Iraqi authorities are keen to prevent the country from once again becoming a theater for the fallout of regional and international conflicts.

In this context, the issue of ISIS detainees is no longer merely an isolated security concern; it has become a complex issue intertwining considerations of border control, sovereignty, security readiness, internal political tensions, and sustained international attention to the ISIS group.


Greenland Galvanizes Europe to Confront New US Reality

Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
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Greenland Galvanizes Europe to Confront New US Reality

Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)

Europe may have rallied to see off President Donald Trump over Greenland, but its leaders recognize the confrontation is unlikely to be the last in dealings with his increasingly strident version of the United States.

The stakes could hardly be higher, given the $2 trillion trading relationship between the European Union and the US and the dominant role Washington continues to play in the NATO alliance and in support of Ukraine against Russia.

This week, ​in the space of a few hours at the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Trump first ruled out taking Greenland by force and then removed the threat of new tariffs on eight European states standing in his way - hailing instead a vague deal for the Arctic island with NATO chief Mark Rutte.

European leaders believe Trump backed down in part because - in contrast to their more accommodating stance in last year's tariff negotiations - this time they made it clear he was crossing a red line by asserting that Greenland's status as an autonomous territory of Denmark was non-negotiable.

"All this shows that you cannot let the Americans trample all over the Europeans," said a European Union official, who requested anonymity to speak candidly about US ties.

"We did the right thing to push back, to be firm in what we said, but it is not over. My sense is that we will be tested constantly on issues like this," ‌the official told ‌Reuters.

While Europe may have learned the value of standing up to Trump, the challenge is ensuring it ‌is ⁠less ​exposed next time.

"It's ‌a hard route, and it's going to take time," said Rosa Balfour, director at Carnegie Europe, adding that Europe had "far more leverage than it has dared to use".

EUROPE NOT SEEKING A SPLIT

An emergency summit of Europe's leaders on Thursday called for last year's EU-US trade deal to be put back on track after lawmakers suspended its ratification in protest over Greenland.

"Despite all the frustration and anger of recent months, let us not be too quick to write off the transatlantic partnership," German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said in Davos beforehand.

While seeking to stabilize the partnership, Europe is also taking steps aimed at "de-risking" it given the open antipathy from Trump, whose new national security strategy accuses the continent of freeloading on defense and demands it open its markets to US companies.

Europe is only too aware of how long it can ⁠take to get agreement among 27 nations with different histories, politics and economies, which was highlighted in taunts this week by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.

Two EU officials said the Greenland row has accelerated discussions on ‌how the approach taken on Ukraine - in which countries offer security guarantees on a voluntary basis ‍and no one has a right of veto - can be extended.

"We should ‍do more with coalitions of the willing and leave it open for others to follow if they want," said one, adding that joint efforts to ‍boost Europe's development of artificial intelligence technology could be one example.

Coalitions such as the "E3" group comprising France, Germany and Britain focusing on security matters also allow non-EU states to take part, which speaks to others on the rough end of Trump policies.

"The middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu," Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said in a Davos speech to warm applause.

Another route is using the leeway afforded by EU law.

In December, EU states used an emergency provision ​to indefinitely immobilize hundreds of billions of dollars of Russian assets. That removed the risk of a pro-Moscow country like Hungary blocking the roll-over of the measure at some point and forcing the EU to return the money.

NEW EUROPEAN DOCTRINE

Europe also plans to toughen ⁠up on economic policy.

Next month it will kickstart legislation that will include "Made in Europe" requirements on strategic sectors and strengthening conditionality clauses for any foreign direct investment in the EU.

"Some provisions were originally conceived to reduce reliance on China but in reality they will help us to de-risk from other markets," European Commissioner for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy Stephane Sejourne told Reuters.

"This will totally change the European doctrine on those sectors," Sejourne added.

Unlike Canada, there is no plan in Europe to pivot more towards China to compensate for transatlantic strains. But the bloc is actively pursuing others in a diversification drive.

While the impact of higher US tariffs on European goods is not clear - in fact Europe's trade surplus with the US initially rose over the course of 2025 as companies front-loaded exports ahead of the new levies - recent data shows that German companies nearly halved investments there last year.

After the signing of the EU-Mercosur pact this month - the largest in EU history - European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said it is now "on the cusp" of a deal with India.

However, nobody is saying Europe can redress the imbalance with the US overnight, particularly on security.

Despite European commitments to a defense spending surge and even calls for an EU army, analysts say it will be years before its military might is up to ‌tasks which now include bolstering Arctic security.

The question is whether the past few weeks provide a catalyst for Europe to start reducing its US dependencies.

"All this is not surprising," Swedish deputy Prime Minister Ebba Busch said of Trump's showing in Davos.

"The EU needs to toughen up," she told Reuters.


Possible ‘Emergency Exit’ for Iraqi Factions, But Not for Everyone

An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 
An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 
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Possible ‘Emergency Exit’ for Iraqi Factions, But Not for Everyone

An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 
An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 

Since protests erupted in Iran, political elites in Iraq have quietly debated whether the “Islamic Revolution” in Tehran might be nearing a rapid collapse. Yet the more cautious question circulating in Baghdad is different: what if the Iranian system survives, but weakened and stripped of its tools, for years to come?

This question now resonates within the corridors of the Coordination Framework, the coalition most closely tied to regional power dynamics. It appears to be repositioning itself amid shifting centers of influence, but not before paying a price.

Figures from Shiite parties and armed factions, as well as researchers interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat, say anxiety over Iran’s trajectory is palpable in Baghdad, though rarely expressed openly for ideological reasons and because of what they describe as a chronic inability to produce independent national policies.

Pressure on Shiite forces has been building for months. Washington is pushing to dismantle militias and sever their operational and economic ties with Iran. Tehran is weighed down by sanctions and protests whose sparks have reached even the bazaars. Meanwhile, the Coordination Framework is attempting to engineer a governing formula capable of surviving these pressures.

It is widely believed that the heavy presence of armed factions’ representatives in parliament - holding more than about 80 seats - is part of a broader strategy to adapt to US pressure, whether Iran’s system collapses or remains weak for years.

Accordingly, Shiite political actors appear compelled to move from the era of militias toward the state, though only after establishing a strong central power within state institutions, in order to avoid confrontation with Washington and prepare for the possibility of Iran’s declining influence.

Over time, it has become clear that avoiding confrontation with the United States requires not only reducing Iranian influence but also constructing local power under the umbrella of a national political settlement.

A situation resembling Saddam Hussein

Since 2003, Shiite parties have rarely debated Iran’s future publicly. There is a prevailing belief that discussing the fate of a system led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is ideologically taboo for those who profess absolute loyalty to him, according to a senior leader in the Coordination Framework.

Many also dismiss the possibility of Iran’s collapse altogether. But Hisham Dawood, a researcher at the French National Center, argues that the impact of maximum sanctions on Iranian society cannot be ignored. He said sanctions do not overthrow regimes as much as they reshape societies, shifting them from a culture of living to one of survival.

In private gatherings, Iraqi politicians have begun drawing an analogy that alarms Shiite groups. They note that Tehran’s system is approaching a condition similar to that of Saddam Hussein’s regime after the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent economic embargo, a crushed social base and a leadership gradually stripped of its traditional tools.

Aqeel Abbas, a researcher on US affairs, does not believe Iran’s system will collapse but is convinced that its behavior will change. On that basis, Shiite forces may seek to adapt in order to weather the storm.

This trajectory, however, does not appear sufficient in Washington’s eyes. The United States is not searching for treasure but for the key. US presidential envoy Mark Savaya wrote that militias are merely a symptom of a deeper disease in Iraq. For months, he has been shaping among Shiite circles in Baghdad a narrative of sustained pressure within a broader American strategy.

Groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq have shown striking flexibility compared with their past. The faction that once fought the Americans now stands as one of the main pillars of government and parliament and is reportedly planning to dominate both in the next legislative cycle, according to associates of its leader, Qais al-Khazali.

During his election campaign months ago, al-Khazali welcomed US investments. Yet Washington continues to press for the removal of his representative in parliament from the post of deputy speaker, according to information leaked from meetings held by Acting Chargé d’Affaires Joshua Harris with Coordination Framework officials.

A Western diplomat who served in a mission between Baghdad and Damascus during the fight against ISIS explains US behavior toward Shiite factions: after months of “power diplomacy” in exchange for avoiding military targeting, the Americans are not seeking a truce but a decisive blow followed by a deal on their terms. Savaya’s role, he says, is likely to clarify and enforce those conditions.

More than weapons

Spokespersons for armed factions declined to comment on questions about their plans for dealing with US pressure. But a senior figure in an armed faction, speaking anonymously, said they had reached a stage of “confrontation without masks — no intermediaries, no maneuvering.”

Aqeel Abbas believes Shiite forces may attempt to transform existing militias into local forces under new names, limited to protecting the system inside Iraq without regional roles or provoking the United States and Israel.

Theoretically, such a shift could satisfy Washington. But the faction leader warned that the confrontation goes beyond weapons: the Americans, he said, want the core of influence and resistance. “We tried to confine the crisis to weapons, but now they are pressing on our existence, our economy, and our ideological ties. What room for maneuver remains except defending our dignity?”

He added that such questions are being raised in Baghdad faster than they are answered in Tehran.

Iran “that cannot be defeated”

Hisham Dawood divides Shiite reactions in Baghdad into three groups.

The first consists of pro-Iran forces with direct ideological ties to Tehran, which do not view the Iraqi state as the ultimate framework of political belonging but rather as a field of action within a transnational project. These forces, Dawood argues, are prepared to bear high costs - even if they affect the Iraqi state - so long as they serve what they consider a religious obligation toward Tehran.

Indeed, many factions place near-absolute confidence in Iran. A faction leader who was active in Syria before the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime said some battles are managed according to logic that transcends local calculations, and that the final decision is not always in the hands of those who pay the price on the ground. He argued that without Iran, the Islamic Revolution would have no meaning.

The second group comprises forces that have governed Iraq since 2003 and occupy a more complex position. They are not overtly pro-Iran ideologically or organizationally, but they remain deeply influenced by Tehran for historical and sectarian reasons, and out of fear that Iranian influence could reshape internal Shiite alignments.

These forces seek to present themselves as holders of national legitimacy, yet in decisive moments they still defer to Tehran. Many observers believe this dynamic was reflected in what was described as Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s “concession” to Nouri al-Maliki over the premiership - an attempt, according to a senior Shiite leader, to restore Maliki’s centrality through a new-old alliance.

Pro-Iran groups mobilized demonstrations in central and southern cities, carrying images of Khamenei and Iranian flags. But the Coordination Framework issued only one statement urging diplomatic solutions and warning of economic challenges and falling oil prices. This has revealed a leadership caught between traditional power calculations and growing risks.

The third group consists of a popular majority with weak political representation, which views the continuation of the Iranian model in Iraq as a source of political stagnation, economic crisis, social paralysis, and international isolation.

The Sadrist movement may represent part of this majority. Dawood argues that it is politically reduced to an image of Iranian extension, a simplification that imposes a heavy symbolic and political cost.

Most Iraqi Shiite forces - except some ideological actors - appear ready to strike deals with Washington, provided their interests within the Iraqi state are guaranteed, in a manner resembling the model the United States is testing in Syria.

Meanwhile, attempts to create a strong institutional umbrella to fill the vacuum have emerged through the prominent role of the Supreme Judicial Council. On the eve of the legislative elections, Judge Faiq Zaidan urged adherence to constitutional timelines for forming Iraq’s leadership. Weeks later, he began publicly naming factions that must limit weapons. Iraqi elites now speak of an alternative governing umbrella that could fill the vacuum with the force of law.

An emergency exit

A Western diplomat believes this is the first time in years that Shiite groups may be forced to reconsider options that appear unrealistic, not only for Washington but even for Tehran. He pointed to the fate of the Syrian Democratic Forces as a warning for those who bet on open and absolute hostility.

While these developments paint a suffocating picture for Shiite factions, they also open an emergency exit from the old game toward new alliances.

A former government adviser described such an exit as a search for new alliances during a period in which Iran remains an ideological umbrella but without claws. He argued that pressures on armed factions leave no luxury of choice: Shiite forces must first build sustainable local partnerships and then balance relations with emerging centers of power in the region and the Arab world.

Yet this emergency exit may not accommodate all Shiite players within what Dawood describes as a fragmented state. The central question remains open: will the United States seek to preserve pluralism among Shiite political and factional actors, or will it prefer to support a centralized authority with an authoritarian grip, as some actors in Baghdad now advocate?