Will Ethiopia Take Advantage of Sudan’s Unrest to Resolve Border Dispute?https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/4287951/will-ethiopia-take-advantage-sudan%E2%80%99s-unrest-resolve-border-dispute
Will Ethiopia Take Advantage of Sudan’s Unrest to Resolve Border Dispute?
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the president of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council Abdul Fattah al-Burhan during a previous meeting. (Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Will Ethiopia Take Advantage of Sudan’s Unrest to Resolve Border Dispute?
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the president of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council Abdul Fattah al-Burhan during a previous meeting. (Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
The border dispute between Addis Ababa and Khartoum over Al-Fashaga has returned to the fore, following Sudanese reports about “unusual” movement by the Ethiopian forces in the disputed area since the eruption of the recent unrest in Sudan.
Ethiopia’s prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, denied claims that his forces have entered the Sudanese border area, expressing confidence that the “Sudanese people will not listen to such allegations,” which he described as “false.”
The dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia over Al-Fashaga dates back to the colonial era, and several attempts to demarcate a 744-kilometer border between the two countries were unsuccessful. In 2008, negotiations between them reached a compromise, with Ethiopia recognizing the legal border, and Sudan allowing Ethiopians to continue living there without complications.
However, by the end of June 2022, tension returned again, after Sudan accused the Ethiopian army of capturing and killing seven Sudanese soldiers. According to Sudanese media sources, “Ethiopia took advantage of the bloody fighting in Sudan between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, and entered Al-Fashaga area,” pointing to intense reconnaissance operations carried out by Ethiopian troops in the region.
On the other hand, the Ethiopian prime minister accused some parties of “seeking to achieve political goals by publishing allegations that aim to distort the good-neighborly relations between Ethiopia and Sudan.”
In a statement, Abiy Ahmed said: “At this critical stage, in which the common identity and destiny of the Sudanese and Ethiopian peoples face many challenges, some parties are seeking to achieve their menial political goals by spreading false allegations.”
The border issue “will be resolved through dialogue and discussions,” he stressed, rejecting attempts to take advantage of the current situation in Sudan.
Dr. Abdel-Moneim Hamat, a Sudanese political analyst, ruled out an Ethiopian military intervention in the disputed region, amid the turmoil in Sudan.
In comments to Asharq Al-Awsat, he said: “Abiy Ahmed and his leadership will not adopt this approach in any way, at the present time, especially since he personally intervened more than once as a party to resolve Sudanese internal disputes, just as Sudan did in Ethiopia. Therefore, the Ethiopian government will not risk its reputation and surroundings for a cause that is not essential.”
What Al-Gaddafi’s Inner Circle Said about Musa Al-Sadr’s Disappearancehttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5313568-what-al-gaddafi%E2%80%99s-inner-circle-said-about-musa-al-sadr%E2%80%99s-disappearance
What Al-Gaddafi’s Inner Circle Said about Musa Al-Sadr’s Disappearance
Imam Musa al-al-Sadr. (File photo)
Fifteen years after the fall of Moammar al-Gaddafi’s regime, the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, head of Lebanon’s Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, during a visit to Libya on Aug. 31, 1978, remain unclear. Al-Sadr was accompanied by Sheikh Mohammed Yacoub and journalist Abbas Badreddine. No trace of the three men has ever been found. To date, Lebanese authorities have not disclosed the outcome of contacts they held with the forces that governed Libya after al-Gaddafi’s fall in 2011.
The disappearance of Imam al-Sadr was among the subjects I raised with Libyan officials during conversations about al-Gaddafi, his rule and the abuses committed under his regime. What follows are accounts I heard from them.
Moammar al-Gaddafi. (Reuters file)
Abdel Moneim al-Houni: The killing of al-Gaddafi’s pilot
After the Sept. 1, 1969, coup that brought al-Gaddafi to power, Abdel Moneim al-Houni held several senior posts. He was a member of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council, headed the intelligence service and served as both interior and foreign minister.
I asked Houni about the case of the Lebanese Shiite leader.
“It is clear that Imam al-Sadr was eliminated,” he said. “This is certain, and it is the conviction of every Libyan I have met.”
“I will tell you something. My brother-in-law was a pilot who flew al-Gaddafi’s plane. His name was Najm al-Din al-Yaziji, and he held the rank of lieutenant colonel. Shortly after Imam al-Sadr disappeared, my brother-in-law was eliminated.”
“Family members said his killing was connected to the al-Sadr case. He had transported the imam’s body for burial in southern Libya, in the Sabha area. Relatives say his knowledge of what happened to Musa al-Sadr prompted the Libyan security services to kill him to conceal the secret. These are things that happen in crimes of this kind.”
Jalloud: "I alluded to the disappearance once. He merely replied, ‘Are you accusing me?’ The conversation ended there.”
Jalloud: Khomeini asked only for an explanation
Days after the triumph of Iran’s 1979 revolution, a Libyan delegation led by Abdessalam Jalloud, the Libyan regime’s “number two,” visited Tehran to offer congratulations and met Khomeini.
I asked Jalloud whether Khomeini had raised al-Sadr’s disappearance during the meeting.
“Yes,” he replied. “He expressed the hope that an explanation would be released about the circumstances of the case so that there would be no obstacle to cooperation between the two revolutions.”
“While I was at the hotel, a demonstration was organized outside involving 37 people, led by al-Sadr’s sister and her husband. They chanted slogans, but security personnel affiliated with the revolution quickly removed and dispersed them.”
I asked whether the al-Sadr case later became an obstacle in relations with Tehran.
“No,” Jalloud said. “As I told you before, we gave Iran missiles and played a central role in helping it obtain weapons” during its war with Iraq in the 1980s.
“I met al-Sadr once, in Lebanon in the mid-1970s,” he recalled.
“I did not even know that he was visiting Libya. When I learned of his disappearance, I was deeply distressed for two reasons. The first concerned the man himself and what he represented. The second was that I considered the act vile. It is not an Arab custom to invite someone into your home or country and then turn on him. Such conduct goes against Arab morals and Islamic values. The whole affair was strange and subjected to a severe blackout.”
I asked whether he had ever confronted al-Gaddafi about al-Sadr.
“I alluded to the matter once,” he said. “He merely replied, ‘Are you accusing me?’ The conversation ended there.”
Asked about reports of an altercation between al-Gaddafi and al-Sadr, Jalloud said: “I do not know the details. But I heard years ago that the police officer who impersonated al-Sadr and traveled to Italy using his passport after his disappearance had been placed under heavy guard by Moammar, who feared that he might be abducted after people began talking about his role.”
Asked whether he believed al-Sadr had been killed and buried, he said: “That is what reason tells me. It is impossible that he has remained hidden until now. Before the incident, of course, I had heard al-Gaddafi express annoyance that Iran was sending clerics who wielded influence among Arab Shiites. The truth is that I never imagined matters would go this far.”
Imam al-Sadr speaks at a press conference. (Imam Moussa al-Sadr Center for Research & Studies)
Shalgham: He came to Libya on Boumediene’s recommendation
I asked former Foreign Minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham about al-Sadr’s case.
He said he had met al-Sadr once, when the imam came to Cairo to deliver a lecture while Shalgham was a student there. Shalgham said he was under house arrest when al-Sadr came to Libya.
“There were reports that he came to Libya on the recommendation of Algerian President Houari Boumediene,” Shalgham said. “It was said that he had asked the Algerian president for assistance and that Boumediene advised him to meet al-Gaddafi.”
“It was also said that a dispute arose between al-Gaddafi and al-Sadr over religious issues. That is possible: al-Gaddafi was a Sunni of the Maliki school, while al-Sadr was a Shiite. The claim later emerged that someone had impersonated al-Sadr and traveled to Italy,” he added.
Shalgham continued: “One day, when I was foreign minister, al-Gaddafi and I were walking in Bab al-Aziziya. He said to me, ‘Abdel Rahman, the Italians are your friends, including the foreign and interior ministers. I only want to know the truth about the Musa al-al-Sadr affair.’
“After al-Gaddafi’s regime fell, numerous scenarios circulated. Some spoke of a possible role in al-Sadr’s elimination by Sabri al-Banna, better known as Abu Nidal, the leader of what was called Fatah – the Revolutionary Council,” he said.
“Many wondered whether al-Sadr had received a sum of money and whether that money led to what happened to him. I asked around, but no one confirmed the story about the money. Abdel Moneim al-Houni says al-Sadr was killed in Libya.”
Former Libyan Foreign Minister Ali Abdussalam Treki. (AFP file photo)
Treki: A strange crime
I put the same question to former Libyan Foreign Minister Ali Abdussalam Treki.
“Let us speak honestly: I have no knowledge of the details,” he said.
“Imam al-Sadr did not come to Libya through the Foreign Ministry. The ministry’s only role was to convey an invitation to al-Sadr through the Libyan chargé d’affaires in Beirut. Coordination was subsequently handled by other parties,” Treki explained.
“I did not meet al-Sadr. What I heard was that he was a man of struggle who held Arab nationalist views,” he added.
Treki noted: “We at the Foreign Ministry did not know how or when he arrived. Later, after I left the post of foreign minister, the ministry contacted the Italians. The authorities said at the time that he had left Tripoli for Rome.
“It was later rumored that a heated argument had taken place between al-Gaddafi and al-Sadr, and led to what followed. The story is strange. This serious and regrettable incident brought no benefit to Libya or the Arab nationalist cause and caused extensive damage. It was a strange crime, and I do not know whose interests it served or in what context it occurred,” he stated.
The account of Mismari, the protocol chief and ‘the colonel’s shadow’
Nouri al-Mismari served as chief of protocol with the rank of minister of state and was regarded as “the colonel’s shadow,” accompanying al-Gaddafi at home and on his travels.
I asked him about al-Sadr and let him tell the story.
“Something happened whose significance I did not appreciate at the time,” he said.
“Abdullah Senussi called me. At the time, he was a junior officer in the Military Intelligence Department, whose office was on Shatt Street. The department was headed by Capt. Abdullah al-Hijazi. That was his rank at the time, of course, and he was among those al-Gaddafi called the ‘Free Officers.’”
“Senussi asked me: ‘Is it necessary for the Italian authorities to stamp the passport of someone seeking to enter their territory?’ I replied: ‘Of course. It has to be stamped. Those are the rules followed in every country.’ He ended the call,” said al-Mismari.
“Senussi contacted me later and said: ‘I will send you some passports, and you are required to secure Italian visas for their holders.’ I believe there were three passports, but we are talking about something that happened decades ago. A soldier sent by Senussi came to me and handed me the passports.”
“I had no reason to be suspicious, but I opened them and found that one belonged to Imam Musa al-al-Sadr, may God have mercy on him. I do not recall the other names,” continued al-Mismari.
“I called the Italian ambassador and said we wanted visas for guests who were staying with us. He welcomed the request. I sent the passports, but Senussi soon called again and asked, ‘Is it done?’ I told him the process needed some time and that I would send the passports to him as soon as they were returned to me. That is what happened.”
“I later heard about Imam al-Sadr’s disappearance, and the incident remained in my memory, particularly because it was Senussi who had sent the passports,” he added.
Al-Mismari said al-Sadr never left Libya and that the Italians were innocent and had been deceived. Three people entered Italy, including a tall officer who wore al-Sadr’s clothes. They deliberately left the passports of al-Sadr and his two companions at the hotel, along with the imam’s prayer rug, and later departed using Libyan diplomatic passports.
Nepal Floods Expose Risks to Hydropower in a Warming Himalayashttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5313352-nepal-floods-expose-risks-hydropower-warming-himalayas
An undated handout photo of rescue workers taking part in a rescue operation near the tunnel of the Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project, following deadly flash floods and mudslides, in Rasuwa, Nepal. (Nepal Army/Handout via Reuters)
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Nepal Floods Expose Risks to Hydropower in a Warming Himalayas
An undated handout photo of rescue workers taking part in a rescue operation near the tunnel of the Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project, following deadly flash floods and mudslides, in Rasuwa, Nepal. (Nepal Army/Handout via Reuters)
Workers shoveled thick mud from a flood-ravaged power station in central Nepal this week, trying to restore electricity to more than 20,000 people.
The floods that swept through Nepal and China, killing hundreds and leaving thousands missing, have also overrun hydropower facilities, knocking out about 10% of Nepal’s power capacity.
Once the immediate aftermath of the disaster is dealt with, the question will be how to restore power plants, roads, bridges, schools and health facilities without exposing them to the same vulnerabilities, disaster experts said.
“Authorities have to take a hard look in the mirror now and ask how they will be rebuilding in these places. They will also have to take a close look at other projects in Nepal that have not been built yet, whether they’ll be approved after this event,” said Jakob Steiner, a geoscientist at the University of Graz in Austria, who is currently based in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Rebuilding for resilience, not just replacement Hydropower projects that were operating or under construction were fully or partly destroyed across Rasuwa, Nuwakot and Dhading, among the worst-hit districts.
Hundreds of workers in Nepal are unaccounted for from a dozen hydropower projects, according to the Independent Power Producers’ Association, Nepal. Many had taken shelter in the tunnels but are stuck, waiting to be rescued, according to officials.
“The tunnels are built to access hydropower infrastructure and to divert water,” Steiner said, describing the tunnels as big enough for trucks to pass through.
Apart from the hydropower projects, tens of kilometers of roads, multiple bridges and essential buildings like schools and hospitals have been destroyed.
Ramraj Narasimhan, a senior director with the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, said rebuilding should focus on continuity of services rather than trying to make every structure indestructible.
“If it gets damaged, let it get damaged, but can we build in redundancy in the system?” he said.
That can mean choosing a better location for construction, alternate routes, backup power, improved early warning and financial tools such as insurance to speed recovery, Narasimhan said. Risk assessments should examine where a river bends, where slopes are unstable and where a single failure could cut off several communities.
Narasimhan’s organization estimates that $124 billion worth of Nepal’s infrastructure is exposed to climate-driven disasters, creating the potential for hundreds of millions of dollars in losses each year. A report by the coalition earlier this year found that Nepal’s average annual losses are nearly $760 million from various disasters, while the country’s national disaster funds is only a fraction of this amount.
Climate risks grow for Himalayan hydropower
Climate scientists said the Himalayan region, which is warming faster than many other parts of the world, is particularly at risk from increasing global warming as a result of human-caused climate change.
Climate experts said the flooding adds to evidence that infrastructure planning in the Himalayas should account for disasters that are increasing as the climate warms. Glaciers across the Hindu Kush Himalaya are losing ice at an accelerating rate, while permafrost degradation, unstable slopes, glacial lakes and increasingly erratic rainfall are raising the risks of floods, landslides and debris flows, according to reports by Kathmandu-based climate research group International Center for Integrated Mountain Development.
The stakes are particularly high for Nepal because hydropower is both a foundation of its electricity grid and an important source of economic growth and export revenue. Much of the country’s potential is run-of-river hydropower, Narasimhan said, meaning facilities are closely tied to steep river corridors where land is limited and hazards can cascade quickly.
Steiner said smaller floods can sometimes be managed with diversions that keep debris and high flows away from expensive infrastructure and tunnels. But for events as large as the latest flood, he said, physical defenses may be overwhelmed. In those cases, early warning becomes the critical protection for people.
He said the flood was detected at the China-Nepal border after moving rapidly from its source, leaving little warning time upstream. But there was still time as the flood traveled downstream toward hydropower sites, raising questions about whether warnings could have reached workers sooner.
The disaster is also likely to intensify scrutiny of where future projects are approved. Himanshu Thakkar, coordinator of the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People, said environmental, social and disaster-risk assessments need to reflect the specific landscape and past hazards of each valley, backed by land-use rules and stronger accountability.
Hydropower projects can themselves become “force multipliers” when large structures, debris and altered river channels add to downstream damage, Thakkar said. He argued that Nepal should also consider more decentralized solar power as part of a broader energy mix.
Thakkar said the question now is not only how fast Nepal can rebuild, but what it chooses to put back in the path of the next flood.
72 Hours that Arranged the Succession: Khaddam Recalls What Happened after Hafez al-Assad's Deathhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5313136-72-hours-arranged-succession-khaddam-recalls-what-happened-after-hafez-al-assads
72 Hours that Arranged the Succession: Khaddam Recalls What Happened after Hafez al-Assad's Death
Bashar al-Assad during his father’s funeral in June 2000. (AFP)
Former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam’s recent memoirs tackle the three days that followed the death of the late President Hafez al-Assad on June 10, 2000. He recalled the events from the perspective of someone who was inside the room where the succession was arranged.
The memoirs, edited and introduced by Ibrahim Hamidi, are due to be published in early September by Raff Publishing, a subsidiary of the Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG).
Khaddam contacted Hafez al-Assad to ask permission to travel to Baniyas, leading to a lengthy conversation about health and age in which Assad said: "I have carried burdens beyond my capacity." He ended the conversation with a request: "Call me when you arrive."
Upon Khaddam's return to Damascus on Saturday, he was informed that the presidential palace was calling for him and that "Dr. Bashar" - Assad’s son - was waiting for him at home, at which point he realized that the president had died.
In the reception hall, he found the members of the Syrian command with Bashar and his brother-in-law Assef Shawkat with discussions focusing on how to announced the death. Minister of Defense General Mustafa Tlass informed him that the Regional Command had made two decisions: nominating Bashar for the presidency and amending Article 83 of the Constitution regarding the age of the President of the Republic since Bashar was 34 years old and the constitution required the minimum age to be 40. The People's Assembly was to meet in the evening to approve the amendment.
The memoirs are due to be published in early September by Raff Publishing, a subsidiary of the Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG).
On the evening of Hafez’s death itself, Khaddam recalled that he met with Bashar at his home and suggested promoting him to the rank of general and appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces, "so that he would have a legitimate status in the state" before a referendum.
Bashar asked him whether they should consult Tlass, and Khaddam replied that they would inform him of the decision rather than ask him.
The following day, the proposal was presented to Tlass in the presence of Bashar, whereupon the Defense Minister's face turned pale and he fell silent before stating that he would order the drafting of the decree.
Here, the memoirs record the most striking point of contention: the decree was delayed, and when the director of Tlass's office was asked about the reason, he replied that the General wanted to promote Bashar to the rank of "Lieutenant General" rather than "General", a proposal that would have kept the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Army within the reach of the Defense Minister.
Khaddam revealed his conviction was that Tlass "was not fit for this position," and that he had made a decision to support Bashar "to the end, even if it were at the expense of old comrades."
Bashar al-Assad and Abdul Halim Khaddam at the Syrian parliament in 2000. (AFP)
The memoirs reveal that Bashar’s path to the presidency began in 1994 with the death of his brother Bassel. Khaddam recalled that while everyone was in Qardaha for the burial, he learned that Anisa Makhlouf and her brother Mohammad Makhlouf had met and decided to terminate Bashar’s studies in London so that he could take his brother’s place as Hafez’s eventual successor.
Recalling that period, Khaddam said: "We must not forget that the elder Assad built a regime in which he placed Syrians before two choices: either to accept the regime with all its flaws, or civil war."
The issue is not merely a story of military protocol; it reveals the fragility of the moment of transition in a regime built for decades around a single individual, and how the party, constitution, army, and family intervened within a few short hours to produce a succession intended to appear natural. The details of those 72 hours appear in the book's chapter titled "The Death of Hafez al-Assad."
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