The Saudi-Iranian agreement to reestablish diplomatic ties and avoid interfering in the domestic affairs of regional states, heralded the cooling of tensions and conflicts in the Middle East, creating an air of optimism. However, it seems that the region continues to emit destabilizing vibrations.
The rulers of Sudan have caught these vibrations, introducing a new phase that will spiral in unpredictable ways if the armed conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces does not end swiftly.
The infighting could turn into a destructive war in a country that is already embroiled in existential struggles (from the secession of the South to the regional conflict in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan to the Darfur question) that have drained its resources and derailed developmental projects in favor of military spending.
The ongoing clashes are the result of a series of complications that followed the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019. With civilians demanding to be involved in the transition to democratic rule, a mixed government of civilian and military figures was formed. After another military coup in October 2021, it collapsed. In December, a framework for the transfer of power to civilians was agreed upon, but talks on how to implement it immediately broke down.
The Rapid Support Forces were formed by Mohammad Hamdan Daglo in 2013. They grew out of the Janjaweed militia, which fought fierce battles against the rebels resisting the Bashir regime in Darfur. General Daglo also formed a military task force that intervened in the conflicts in Yemen and Libya. It controls some gold mines in Sudan and has been accused of committing human rights abuses.
The plan to integrate the Rapid Support Forces into the army, who will lead the new force once this happens, and which of the two men will be top dog, are the main points of contention between Daglo and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the commander of the armed forces and the de facto ruler of the country.
Whatever the catalysts for the battles in Sudan, however, the presence of paramilitary auxiliary forces is the primary source of instability in the country (as well as the region as a whole), and it has been the primary hindrance to Sudan’s transition to civic democratic rule.
In fact, auxiliary forces have a long history in the Middle East. It begins with the Ottoman Empire’s formation of the Janissaries, the Mansure Army, and the Bashi-bazouks. However, the contemporary paramilitary auxiliary forces are a counterweight to the regular armies of the region, who have a penchant for launching military coups.
One example is the so-called “Defense Companies” that were led by Rifaat al-Assad in Syria. Originally tasked with defending the regime of his brother Hafez al-Assad and the Syrian capital from foreign and domestic incursions, it was incorporated into the Syrian army and renamed the “Fourth Division” in 1984.
Another is the Iraqi Republican Guard of Saddam Hussein, which was entrusted with protecting him, his presidential palace, and the capital, Baghdad. Nonetheless, another force was closer to him, the Special Republican Guard, which was more powerful than the army.
Still, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, formed by Khomeini in the aftermath of the revolution and tasked with protecting the regime from domestic and foreign enemies, is probably the most prominent example.
Auxiliary paramilitary forces seem to have become more appealing in recent decades. Regimes seeking to ensure their survival are not the only ones using them anymore. Indeed, regional and international powers have come to make use of such groups, changing how wars are fought and introducing new concepts like “proxy war,” “hybrid security,” and “non-state actors”.
The American experience in Afghanistan during the Cold War comes to mind here. Washington resorted to supporting Islamist forces in their war against the communist government of Hafizullah Amin. However, Iran is nevertheless the ultimate pioneer of using foreign groups to wage proxy wars and further its interests. It backs the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and of course Hezbollah, which is tightening the noose around the neck of the Lebanese state with its sectarian arsenal and the roles it has played in the region.
In Syria, several militias backed by regional and international powers have emerged, some fighting alongside the regimes and others against it.
As for the Palestinian Hamas movement, it has imposed itself on the Palestinian Authority. After rejecting the Oslo Accords between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel, Hamas exploited it to ascend to power. It thereby created a fatal schism in Palestinian politics and left the Palestinians with two leaderships at loggerheads with one another. Even in Israel, we see the current fanatical government considering the formation of a national guard controlled by extremists that would be an auxiliary to the army.
While tensions in the region render it fertile ground for the growth of militias and armed groups that run from a distance, even Europe has not been spared from this scourge. Indeed, Russia has deployed paramilitary forces as part of its war against Ukraine, mirroring its experience in Syria and Africa. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s president has also called for the establishment of a so-called International Legion to support the Ukrainian army and legislation organizing what his government has called “national resistance.”
The rising prominence of paramilitary auxiliary forces is among the most consequential changes in how the world, not just our region, works. As well as its implications for international relations, it also doubtlessly has repercussions on the concept of national statehood and national armies.
First of all, the spread of paramilitary auxiliary forces in the region reflects the deep crisis facing the nation-state in the region. State institutions are weak in most of the countries in the region, and these countries have failed to impose their authority, monopolize the legitimate use of violence, build a state of citizens who enjoy rights and freedoms, face economic and social challenges, and consolidate their legitimacy. Moreover, they have not established a framework for the transfer and exercise of power, and they have failed to embrace diversity and crystallize a united national identity.
The crisis of state building has become more and more apparent since the “Arab Spring” and the ensuing communal conflicts. In Yemen and Libya, as in other places, the heterogeneous revolutionary forces failed to offer alternatives to the toppled regimes. Over the decades that followed the establishment of Arab states, we saw early omens of armies’ politicization. Military coups would thus become the defining feature of Arab political life for almost four decades.
Today, with the ideological and political cover that their early predecessors had enjoyed amid the revolutionary and nationalist wave sweeping through the region, it has become obvious that today, the armies have no doctrine; they have become mirrors of societies whose members identify with sub-national, rather than national, affiliations.
Globally, non-state actors are becoming increasingly popular alternatives to state bodies. In 2014, President Barack Obama publicly called for the formation of an Iraqi National Guard to allow Iraqi Sunnis to “liberate themselves” from ISIS, an idea that essentially mirrored US support for the Sunni Awakening Movement against al-Qaeda in 2006-2007.
In Libya, the United Nations proposed the formation of a body similar to a “National Guard” called the “Libyan Civil Army” in 2012. The idea was for this force to ensure stability and police the country while the regular army underwent training.
The US deal with the Taliban suggests that the Afghan state, which the Americans helped stabilize, is no longer a viable partner in the transition process. Today, France addresses Hezbollah as the most powerful party in Lebanon. All that has happened and is happening seems to be part of a new chapter in politics and the global order.
This new chapter has emerged as a result of the growing roles and activities of these armed groups since the Iranian revolution in 1979, which also saw the US support the armed (jihadist) organizations pushing back against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Going back to Sudan, the infighting shows that both belligerents seek to circumvent the civilian movement, demanding a democratic transition. If these skirmishes persist, the countries sliding back to authoritarian rule or sliding chaos and civil war will become a very real possibility.
