With last week’s diplomatic tango between US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, China and the US took their first step towards putting an end to the hostile rhetoric that has marked disputes between the two countries in recent years. They have begun directly engaging with one another and pledged to establish a stable framework for managing their political relationship, which is crucial for global stability.
Over their twelve-hour discussions, the two men took the gloves off and put all the thorny disagreements between the two great powers on the table, from Taiwan to Ukraine, to how each country sees the other, their aspirations, and the strategies they have adopted to achieve these goals. These talks were enough to pour cold water over talk of a new Cold War, which has become a popular characterization of Sino-American relations.
Beyond a doubt, the success of the meeting in Vienna will introduce a new stage in the relations between the two countries. It will precipitate a shift in the US stance on China and its rise on the global stage. This comes after the Biden administration took its attempts to mobilize the world against China too far, and it failed to frame their dispute as an ideological struggle between democracies and totalitarian regimes.
Washington was surprised to see the countries of the world, from the Middle East to Asia, Africa, and Europe, deliberately avoid falling into the traps they had faced because of the rivalry and cosmic drama engendered by the clash between the US and the Soviet Union. In fact, nothing shapes contemporary international relations more than the efforts of countries across the world to establish pragmatic and fruitful relations with both China and the US and to avoid falling into the trap of choosing one over the other as they did during the Cold War.
Most of these countries are skillfully managing their economic interests and hedging against potential economic, environmental, and technological risks. Complex dynamics determine their policies, which leaves Washington little room to engender acute political polarization.
None of Washington’s allies attests to the crystallization of this trend in international relations better than French President Emanuel Macron. After his trip to China with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, he called for European “strategic autonomy.”
“The question Europeans need to answer ... is it in our interest to accelerate [a crisis] on Taiwan? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the US agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” Macron then added that Europe should avoid getting “caught up in crises that are not ours, which prevents it from building its strategic autonomy!” He also voiced concerns regarding Europe’s increasing dependence on US arms, energy, and the Dollar, stressing that there is now an urgent need to strengthen Europe’s defense industry and reduce dependence on the US dollar for trade outside the region.
Macron made these statements as China was trying to persuade the continent to turn away from the US project of confrontation, as shown by the first visit of its kind by the Chinese foreign minister. France has not taken such positions since De Gaulle was in power (between the late 1950s and the late 1960s), and Marcon’s statements coincided with a very difficult European Union reassessment of how to develop its China policy.
For his part, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrel says that their ties are three-dimensional. Europe sees China as a rival, partner, and competitor, and this view has been made even more complicated by the Ukrainian-Russian conflict and China aligning closer to Moscow than Kyiv.
While Europe seeks to develop a strategy that hedges against risks by making it less excessively dependent on China to avoid falling into the same pitfalls of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, it is also mindful of the significance of its economic ties with China. Moreover, Europe is weary of the excesses of US protectionism and subsidies.
Indeed, these measures undermine European companies at a time when they are already struggling as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the pandemic. All these complications mean Europe has no easy options in balancing its ties with China and the US. This is an opportunity China can make use of, as it means the US cannot count on the kind of unconditional European backing seen during the Cold War when Western economic interests and values were coherent and clear.
Like Europe, the Global South is also largely aware of the need to maintain strategic flexibility in dealing with China and the US. Nothing speaks to this fact and undermines the American position more than the position of India. Indeed, the largest democracy in the world has hesitated to condemn the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Instead, India has managed to turn the conflict into an economic opportunity by making Russia, which offers it discounted prices, its largest crude oil supplier.
India has also succeeded in presenting itself as a neutral mediator in the Ukraine crisis, though its efforts to establish a consensus on condemning the Ukrainian crisis, during last March’s G20 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi, failed due to the unresolved disagreements among great powers. Its diplomatic efforts seem to be geared more towards carving out a space for India in international politics than taking sides in a complex geopolitical arena.
In turn, the countries of Southeast Asia are also showing great confidence in recalibrating to accommodate the escalating competition between the United States and China through bilateral relations amongst themselves and their ties to China and the US, or their efforts to build strong inter-governmental international organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which benefits from attractive economic and financial indicators at a time when a global recession seems a real threat.
Most African countries did not react differently to those of Europe and the Middle East or India. In fact, they share the grievance of Russia and China regarding the global order to a greater extent than most other actors, and they have backed calls for restructuring global institutions to make them more fair and inclusive. No place on Earth suffered more from the injustices of the international order than Africa. It has been denied serious and sustainable development policies and has borne the brunt of the colonial legacy of the West.
This trend in international politics, as well as the ease with which countries can avoid choosing between Washington and Beijing, is reinforced by the West’s massive crisis of credibility. The rules it has set for the global system are seen as unfair, and it is seen as taking an irresponsible approach to the financial, economic, and environmental crises facing humanity.
It was extremely disappointing (and this is just one of many examples) to see the West ideologize climate issues and employ them politically to gain an economic edge over China and pit countries against China, even if this comes at the expense of these countries’ interests. Meanwhile, the West has done nothing to recognize or pay for its historical responsibility for today’s environmental conditions.
The pretext of “complying with international law” cannot stand alone. It must be accompanied by a historical awareness of the need to address the implication of the liberal West’s colonial past, efforts to build more just and robust alliances and partnerships across, and recognition of and respect for changing power dynamics.
The fact that China and the US have begun to engage in dialogue is good news for everyone betting on global political stability, which is a necessary condition for prosperity. Understanding the dynamics of the triangular relationship between the US, China, and the rest of the world - in isolation of the norms, rules, and polarizations of the Cold War - heralds the emergence of a new approach in international relations rooted in justice, diversity, and interdependence.
