Lebanon's Deputy for Forces of Change Ibrahim Mneimneh fearlessly voiced his stance, as he is known to do. Despite being one of the rare steadfast politicians in the country, Mneimneh and his fellow Forces of Change deputies have demonstrated flexibility. They have exhibited unwavering commitment to making principled decisions without reservation, even if it entails moral and symbolic sacrifices or a potential dampening effect.
Reconciling political realism and revolutionary idealism, Mneimneh and the majority of his Forces of Change allies chose to drink the poisoned chalice. They opted to support the candidate around whom the opposition “intersected,” former Finance Minister Jihad Azour, against the candidate of hegemony, former Minister Suleiman Franjieh.
It was not only the Forces of Change deputies who emerged from the October uprising that took the chalice of poison. Other forces and politicians that took part in the “uprising” did as well, as Azour does not meet their aspirations. This course brought the Forces of Change closer to the traditional opposition, which had been harsh with the Change deputies and made repeated attempts to put them under its wing since they entered parliament.
Indeed, the traditional opposition parties tried to co-opt the Forces of Change by exploiting their political inexperience and their inability to organize, which was due to their having lost their role and become fragmented. One gain the Forces of Change deputies reaped by making this choice is that it brought them back to the forefront of the political scene, as it showed that their votes can carry enough weight to tip the balance.
After the June 14th parliamentary session, the Forces of Change ceased to be a fleeting fad. They showed themselves to be a mature bloc with the play politics without losing their identity. Indeed, they did not choose to vote for Azour to enhance their bargaining power in negotiations over shares of state power and largess. After seeing the way they carried themselves, no one will continue to believe that their support can be drawn unconditionally.
Their decision also creates a bulwark against accusations that they have created a sharp dichotomy between the opposition and the parties that have taken part in governing the country, as converging on this question with the traditional opposition, despite the negatives that come with it, does not imply that the Change deputies are ready to overlook the past actions of these parties. Nor does their willingness to cooperate with the traditional opposition necessarily imply a fully-fledged partnership on every matter. Moreover, framing their vote against Franjieh as stemming only from their opposition to Hezbollah is untenable. To take a stand against him is to take a stand against attempts to put the regime as a whole back together.
Since Minister Azour was nominated as the candidate opposed to Minister Franjieh, Hezbollah’s propaganda machine has been ramping up its attacks on the Forces of Change, especially from South Lebanon. In fact, the party has gone as far as accusing the individuals and groups associated with the Forces of Change of treachery and conspiring against the resistance.
Hezbollah’s assault is indicative of the crisis that the party finds itself in after trying to exploit the virtue of resistance to impose its hegemony on Lebanese compatriots who had begun resisting decades before Hezbollah’s emergence. Nonetheless, the Forces of Change did not vote against the party just to score political points. Their votes were also made in response to the animosity that the party showed for the uprising early on, with accusations that it was controlled by foreign actors and claims that sympathizers in the South were the puppets of “embassies.”
Hezbollah tried to nip this movement in the bud, flexing its muscle to defend a handful of corrupt politicians it believed were loyal allies, only for these allies to abandon the party at the first turn. Now, Hezbollah is dealing with the fallout of what it had done to the sons and grandsons of the first resistance fighters of the South, whom it has been intimidating and threatening since the election.
Activist Firas Hamdan, who took a bullet from the authorities before being elected deputy by Southern constituents, as well as the “Pulse of the South,” “the Masses October 17,” and leftist, liberal, civil, cultural, and social southern elites associated with the Forces of Change, were pivotal to establishing a minimum of common ground among the Change deputies.
Indeed, the Shiite Duo left them faced with the choice between a bad candidate and a worse one because of its contempt for anyone who does not share its view.
More specifically, the recent parliamentary session showcased two crucial observations. Firstly, it became evident that the regime cannot be overthrown with a single decisive blow, so exploiting its contradictions helps to dismantle it. This necessitates the traditional opposition and the "October" forces to reconcile their divergences and find a common ground. Secondly, the Forces of Change have emerged as a cohesive bloc capable of tipping the scales if they persist in their current approach.
Thus, the lesson of the 14th session is unambiguous to the Forces of Change: United we stand; divided we fall.
