Russia Consolidates its Gains in 2024 and Prepares for The Rift in the Western Camp to Widen

Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)
Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)
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Russia Consolidates its Gains in 2024 and Prepares for The Rift in the Western Camp to Widen

Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)
Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)

Both regional and international conditions seem to favor Russian President Vladimir Putin at the end of the year. 2023 was more turbulent and concerning than any other in the past ten years, both domestically and internationally. Russia faced dangerous turns and major challenges.
The armed rebellion led by the Wagner Group and supported by prominent generals and a large part of the public nearly plunged Russia into domestic chaos mid-year. However, the Kremlin emerged victorious from this decisive internal battle, hitting its opponent with a knockout blow and launching a broad internal purge, which diminished the threat of the proliferation of arms and political ambitions among various influential groups.
Living conditions have been unstable. At the beginning of the year, the Russian economy seemed to be faltering under the weight of 11 sanction packages. By autumn, however, there were signs of improvement across the board. Russia began adapting to its economic isolation from the West, improving its response to the difficult implications, and recording growth in several sectors of the economy.
Over the past year, it became apparent that betting on a military victory against Russia was misguided. The Kremlin has shifted priorities and, after breaking through in Bakhmut mid-year, stopped focusing on broad advancements. Instead, it fortified the “de facto” lines on the map it had established after annexing regions of Ukraine, allowing it to thwart the Ukrainian-Western counter-offensive.
Internationally, the wind blew in the Kremlin’s favor. It benefited from the growing schisms in the Western camp over military aid to Kyiv and the effectiveness of the economic pressure being applied to Moscow. The Gaza war added to Moscow’s gains. The limited global impact of Kremlin-sponsored regional alliances, such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Commonwealth of Independent States, has not prevented Moscow from developing policies that accumulate benefits for itself and its allies.
According to the Kremlin and broad segments of the public in Russia, the worst is behind them. It seems like Moscow is preparing to reap the benefits of this new year.
Ukraine Freezing The Conflict
In 2024, Putin's strategy involves maintaining the current maps and freezing the conflict in Ukraine. Prominent analysts do not expect any major offensives from the Kremlin in the first half of the year. The Kremlin believes there are strong reasons for this. It believes that Moscow does not need significant changes on the ground that could alter the existing power balance, at a time when the country awaits a crucial election in March. The fact that we all know the outcome does not diminish its significance. It could reinforce Putin's maintenance of power for life. While some had been worried after his controversial wartime decisions, Putin has managed to remain in the Kremlin. This election will solidify “Putinism” in Russia for a long time after the West had expected its collapse.
In this context, we can identify several of Putin's objectives for his war in Ukraine.
Russian forces have effectively managed to freeze the conflict along the entire frontline and prevent any significant breakthroughs. Success is now measured in meters of territorial gains or losses. Experts say that Moscow could tighten its siege on Avdiivka (Donetsk) without launching a large-scale attack, a risk that could come at a heavy price in Russian soldiers’ lives that the Kremlin would rather avoid and believes it can without risking Putin's “popularity.”
The second element is that Moscow is partially winning the "war of attrition." That is why it seeks to widen the rift in the West and expects European unease to grow. Western nations are joining Slovakia, Hungary, and the Netherlands and beginning to advocate dialogue with Moscow.
Moscow believes it can capitalize on the depletion of Western weapons and ammunition, which indicates that the cost of supplying Ukraine will increase in the next phase. This has led some Western countries to support the establishment of joint defense industries with Kyiv as an alternative to supplying military arms and technologies manufactured in NATO countries.
The Kremlin is betting that freezing the conflict paves the way for widening the rift in the West and further shrinking Kyiv's room for maneuver, especially as it expects and solicits domestic conflicts in Ukraine as the postponed presidential election approaches.
Experts don't expect significant military developments in Ukraine before mid-next year. It will likely be tied to Ukraine's domestic situation and the extent to which the Western alliance will weaken.
The year 2024 is expected to be critical in determining the conflict's outcome as it nears its final quarter.
Reinforcing The Allies Front
Despite the limited cohesion of Russia’s regional alliances over the past year, and their frail support for the Kremlin's anti-Western stance, Moscow managed to make several breakthroughs. These include expanding alternative trade routes to counter Western sanctions and increasing the use of national currencies in trade within the Shanghai and BRICS frameworks, and bilaterally with strategic allies like China, which account for about half of Russia's foreign trade. This trend is expected to continue in the new year, with Moscow aiming to enhance alternative supply routes, particularly the North-South corridor, in cooperation with China, Iran, and South Caucasus countries, and to improve trade terms with its allies.
In terms of international relations, the Kremlin is working to solidify its alliance with countries in the Global South, challenging US dominance in dealing with regional disputes. This strategy became more pronounced with the outbreak of the Gaza War. That is why Moscow is looking to expand collaboration with Africa, setting the stage through the reorganization of Wagner-like groups in various African countries. This lays the foundation for Russia’s persistent and direct intervention in domestic politics, as well as allowing it to help some African countries resist Western pressures.
Similarly, Moscow seeks to invigorate the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and expand the influence of the BRICS on regional policies. However, internal divergences among the members of these two blocs, such as the differences between China and India, were obstacles to achieving this in the past year.
With regard to its relationship with its most prominent ally, China, the latter will become the “senior” partner in 2024 after Moscow had sought to establish parity in the past. Russia and China are planning to launch joint projects in several fields in 2024 to enhance coordination of foreign policies and bolster joint strategic initiatives. This includes plans for massive projects in shipbuilding, technology, and green energy. Notably, China has now replaced the European Union as Russia’s primary trading partner. In 2023, the volume of bilateral trade increased by 23 percent, rising to 201 billion dollars.
Iran, A Strategic Ally
Continuing to strengthen its relationship with Iran is among the main Russian policy decisions for the new year, as it is Russia's most prominent regional partner. The consolidation of this partnership in the Ukrainian war, with Tehran playing a prominent role in supplying Moscow last year, has allowed the two countries to build upon this partnership. It is beginning to evolve through agreements on joint industries being developed in both civilian (automobile manufacturing, aircraft assembly...) and military sectors. Military cooperation primarily entails cooperation in drone manufacturing and continuing the development of their defense missile industries. In this context, there is also talk of Russia potentially granting Iran a long-awaited deal for the latest generation of “Sukhois.”
The Russians and Iranians believe that the two sides will sign a new and comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in the first half of 2024. The two countries have been drafting this agreement for two years now. It is expected to take their bilateral relations to a new level, and after a final draft that covers all areas of future cooperation, has been agreed to, all it awaits is the formal signing ceremonies.
Regionally, the two countries are not hiding their intention to close the gap in their positions on the hot issues, especially with regard to the Iranian nuclear deal and the ongoing conflict in Syria, which is also expected to enter a new phase in the new year.
Syria, A Battlefield Once Again
The war in Ukraine and the positions adopted by Tel Aviv, which has overtly supported Kyiv, as well as the repercussions of the ongoing war in Gaza, have led to a significant shift in Russia's priorities in Syria.
Nowhere was this more evident than in Moscow's shift to a less cautious and sensitive approach to maintaining the delicate balance it had established between its relations with Iran on the one hand, and Israel on the other. This shift can be seen in the increased frequency of Russian condemnation of Israeli strikes on Iranian positions in Syria, and in the fact that Moscow has walked back on its commitment to reach a deal with the West that “regulates Iran’s presence” in Syria. Limiting Iran’s presence in parts of the country was a prominent issue in discussion between the heads of the national security councils of Russia, the United States, and Israel, as well as the previous understandings to keep Iran away from 'sensitive' locations such as the front lines in the Golan Heights.
Currently, Moscow seems inclined to ease its commitments in this regard. Towards the end of the year, Moscow poured cold water on Western reports that Russia was ready to mediate the renewal of an agreement to keep Iran 80 kilometers away from the Golan. Moreover, there are reports of Moscow facilitating the transfer of Iranian supplies through Syrian airports under its control, providing an alternative to the airports regularly bombed by Israel.
Additionally, Moscow has, at times, directly or indirectly encouraged the expansion of attacks on US bases in Syria and Iraq.
Experts believe that Moscow is likely to continue along this course in the next phase. It seems to prefer remaining cautious and preventing things from escalating into a full-blown clash that could lead to the expansion of the Gaza war into a regional conflict.
That means that Syria is about to become an active conflict zone once again, albeit one that is to a certain extent “contained” by external actors, as Moscow is expected to abandon its efforts to regulate Iran’s presence in the country. At the same time, experts anticipate that the coming year will see Russian-Israeli and Russian-American understandings regarding “collision avoidance protocols” weaken, though not so to an extent that leads to direct confrontation.



Ould Cheikh Ahmed Moves From Mediation to OIC Leadership

Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed arrives in Jeddah with firsthand experience of some of the region’s most complex crises. (Organization of Islamic Cooperation)
Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed arrives in Jeddah with firsthand experience of some of the region’s most complex crises. (Organization of Islamic Cooperation)
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Ould Cheikh Ahmed Moves From Mediation to OIC Leadership

Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed arrives in Jeddah with firsthand experience of some of the region’s most complex crises. (Organization of Islamic Cooperation)
Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed arrives in Jeddah with firsthand experience of some of the region’s most complex crises. (Organization of Islamic Cooperation)

After more than three decades in UN posts and crisis zones, Mauritanian diplomat Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed is set to take the helm of the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The organization’s foreign ministers elected him Thursday to succeed Chadian Hissein Brahim Taha, whose term ends in November.

Born in 1960, Ould Cheikh Ahmed holds a degree in economics from France’s University of Montpellier, a master’s degree in human resources development from Britain’s University of Manchester and an advanced certificate in economics and social policy analysis from the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance.

He spent most of his career within the United Nations system, moving between development work, humanitarian operations and crisis management. At the United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF, he held several senior posts, including director of change management in New York, deputy regional director for Eastern and Southern Africa and representative in Georgia.

But it was the Middle East that shaped the most prominent chapter of his career.

From 2008 to 2012, Ould Cheikh Ahmed served in Syria as the UN resident coordinator, humanitarian coordinator and resident representative of the United Nations Development Programme. He moved to Yemen in 2012 to take on similar UN roles until 2014, before being appointed deputy special representative of the UN secretary-general and deputy head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.

In January 2015, he took charge of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response as the health crisis posed a major international challenge.

Yemen, however, remains the defining political assignment of his career.

Then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Ould Cheikh Ahmed special envoy for Yemen on April 25, 2015, succeeding Jamal Benomar. His mandate was to work with the Security Council, Gulf states, regional governments and the Yemeni parties to pursue a political settlement.

He later led Yemen peace talks in Kuwait in 2016, bringing the Yemeni government, the General People’s Congress and the Houthis together for direct negotiations. The talks explored ways to halt the fighting and establish security and political arrangements.

They ended without a final agreement but placed the Mauritanian diplomat at the center of one of the region’s most complex conflicts.

After his assignment in Yemen, Ould Cheikh Ahmed returned to Nouakchott and entered national diplomacy. He served as Mauritania’s minister of foreign affairs and cooperation from 2018 until early 2022, before becoming the director of the cabinet of President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani in June that year.

His career has spanned humanitarian work, international mediation, and state diplomacy. That record now brings him to a different mission in Jeddah, home to the OIC General Secretariat, with direct experience of some of the region’s most difficult crises.

Crisis management has been a constant throughout his career: bringing Yemen’s warring parties closer together, working in Syria and Libya under the UN umbrella, and representing his country’s foreign policy.

As the organization’s new secretary-general, Ould Cheikh Ahmed will face a broader test, moving from managing mediation efforts to forging consensus among 57 member states.

The OIC Charter does not limit the secretary-general’s role to diplomatic representation. It tasks him with following up on resolutions adopted by Islamic summits and meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, coordinating the work of the organization’s bodies, and raising issues that could advance or impede its objectives.


After Six Months of Iran War, US Goals Have Shifted. The Strait of Hormuz is Now a Top Concern

Vessels are seen in the Strait of Hormuz, off the port city of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (Photo by Atta KENARE / AFP) /
Vessels are seen in the Strait of Hormuz, off the port city of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (Photo by Atta KENARE / AFP) /
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After Six Months of Iran War, US Goals Have Shifted. The Strait of Hormuz is Now a Top Concern

Vessels are seen in the Strait of Hormuz, off the port city of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (Photo by Atta KENARE / AFP) /
Vessels are seen in the Strait of Hormuz, off the port city of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (Photo by Atta KENARE / AFP) /

When President Donald Trump launched the war with Iran in late February, he initially forecast it would last four to five weeks. Six months later, there's still no off-ramp in sight despite Trump's repeated assertions that the war has been won or a deal to resolve it was nearly complete.

A June memorandum of understanding designed to pave the way to end the war has fallen by the wayside. US stockpiles of key weapons have diminished, and the Trump administration has pivoted to pressuring Iran economically rather than launching more strikes, The Associated Press said.

As the shape of the war has morphed over the last half year, so have the goals for the conflict.

One of the prime goals now — reopening the Strait of Hormuz — was not one of Trump's original objectives. The waterway had been a vital shipping lane through which about 20% of the world's oil passed.

But Iran seized on it as a chokepoint for the global economy and it has been largely closed since the war started, driving up prices for fuel and fertilizer needed for farms and creating economic and political pressure in the US.

The US has had tactical success on its goals to degrade Iran's military capabilities. But some of the other key objectives Trump laid out at the start of the conflict remain unfulfilled — and others have shifted.

Here’s a look at the objectives and what we know about where they stand:

Stop Iran from having a nuclear weapon

Last June, Trump declared that the US had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program. But when the war started, his aides justified the strikes by warning that Iran had been just weeks away from developing a bomb.

One of the most pressing questions has been what will be done with a stockpile of about 970 pounds (440 kilograms) of enriched uranium that Tehran could potentially use for a weapon. The material is believed to be buried under three sites bombed by the US and Israel last year. Trump said in a May 29 social media post that it would be retrieved by the US “in close coordination and conjunction with Iran, plus the International Atomic Energy Agency, and DESTROYED.”

Iran has not said whether it would consent. Without permission from Iran, experts have said seizing it would be a dangerous mission requiring a sizable deployment of US troops into the country.

Officials said that Tehran reaffirmed in the June memorandum of understanding that it would not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The deal called for Iran to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. But many other details about Iran's program were left for future negotiations, and it's unclear how much progress, if any, was made before talks quickly fell off.

Reopen the Strait of Hormuz

Trump has said that a proposed deal with Iran would include the reopening of the strait and the US ending its blockade of Tehran’s ports, but at other times he has suggested the international waterway would somehow become American territory and indicated the US could impose a toll on passing ships.

Trump also has repeatedly said that the strait is open, including during an interview on Wednesday on conservative commentator Glenn Beck’s radio show.

“It’s a functioning strait. Yes, every once in a while, there’ll be a drone or a rocket or something shot, but it is a very functioning strait,” Trump said.

Destroy Iran's ability to fire missiles

One of the prime objectives laid out by the administration was to “destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground."

Trump said in late March that Iran's missiles “are mostly decimated" and that 90% of their missiles and launchers were knocked out.

By mid-May, that shifted to a more conservative estimate, with the president saying that 82% of Iran's missiles were gone.

Iran has shown its ability to still launch attacks in the region, including drone strikes on ships sailing through the strait.

As recently as July, the US military still had Iranian military targets to strike, with its Central Command announcing it was striking “Iranian military command centers, air defense and coastal surveillance sites, maritime capabilities, missile and drone launch sites and communications networks.”

Destroy Iran's defense industrial base

Early in the war, the president and his administration sometimes listed this as a standalone objective. Other times, it has fallen off their list.

US Central Command has said its targets for strikes in Iran have included weapons production and missile and drone manufacturing facilities.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told lawmakers in early June that Iran has had “massive destruction” of its defense industrial base and “80 to 90% of attrition. It will take years for them to rebuild it.”

Eliminate Iran's navy and air force

The US and Israel quickly established air superiority in the skies above Iran, where they flew largely unchallenged.

Rubio told lawmakers that Iran still has drone capabilities, but it lacks the ability to use swarms of drones to attack targets, as it did at the start of the war. He also said Iran does not have a navy anymore, and relies on small craft outfitted with machine guns that harass ships and sometimes drop mines in the water.

Trump on Wednesday said that Iran's navy and air force are “totally gone."

Protect America's Middle Eastern allies

Trump, in a March social media post, added another objective for the US: “Protecting, at the highest level, our Middle Eastern Allies ...".

The US maintains thousands of troops on bases and other installations in the region, but Trump has been unclear on how far he'd be willing to go to protect Middle East allies from threats in the long term. In June, when the US said Iran fired missiles at Kuwait and Bahrain, the US launched strikes on Iran in response.

In mid-August, Trump threatened in an interview that the US would bomb Oman if it “gets in the way," using an expletive for emphasis.

Cut off support for Iranian proxy groups

In March, Trump and his administration repeatedly said degrading Iran's proxy terror networks was a key goal.

As time has gone on, administration officials have offered fewer updates about this objective, which the president described as ensuring that “the region’s terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or the world and attack our forces” and “ensuring that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund, and direct terrorist armies outside of their borders.”

Early on, the US struck Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq. But the biggest focus has been Israel's war in Lebanon against Hezbollah, which Iran backs. Iran has insisted that the fighting in Lebanon must be stopped as part of any deal with the US, Israel and the Lebanese government announced a deal, which was mediated by the US, for Israeli forces to leave southern Lebanon in exchange for Hezbollah's disarmament — something an administration official described as a “huge step,” speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to address the issue on the record. But the militant group has refused direct talks and its leader has said it will not disarm.


Death of Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah: The Libyan Who Escaped the Noose of the Lockerbie Case

A photo shows late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi with Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah (second from left) upon the latter's arrival in the capital Tripoli, a day after his definitive acquittal in the plane bombing case (Tripoli, February 1, 2001) (Getty Images)
A photo shows late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi with Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah (second from left) upon the latter's arrival in the capital Tripoli, a day after his definitive acquittal in the plane bombing case (Tripoli, February 1, 2001) (Getty Images)
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Death of Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah: The Libyan Who Escaped the Noose of the Lockerbie Case

A photo shows late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi with Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah (second from left) upon the latter's arrival in the capital Tripoli, a day after his definitive acquittal in the plane bombing case (Tripoli, February 1, 2001) (Getty Images)
A photo shows late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi with Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah (second from left) upon the latter's arrival in the capital Tripoli, a day after his definitive acquittal in the plane bombing case (Tripoli, February 1, 2001) (Getty Images)

On August 25, 2026, in a quiet corner of the Libyan capital Tripoli, the life of Libyan citizen Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah came quietly to an end at the age of nearly 70.

His death officially closes one of the most mysterious and compelling chapters in the history of the diplomatic and intelligence conflict between East and West. It also closes a living chapter in the case of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which was traveling from Frankfurt to New York via London when it exploded over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in 1988, an incident that reshaped international politics for decades.

For an entire decade, the name of this man, who began his career as a low-ranking airline employee, echoed through the corridors of the United Nations Security Council. His photograph appeared on television screens around the world and in newspapers for years as the "second suspect" in the most horrific act of aerial terrorism of the 20th century.

Fhimah was an unwilling participant in a unique legal and political saga in which the details of his everyday life on the island of Malta became the basis of an international case that nearly brought an entire country to the brink. He later stood behind the glass of the historic Camp Zeist courtroom in the Netherlands and heard the word "acquitted" pronounced by Scottish justice at the dawn of the new millennium. He returned home carrying an acquittal that politics had been unable to grant him for years.

His death has reopened the memories of the era of crippling sanctions and international isolation, reminding the world of the story of a man who lived at the heart of the storm and died in complete seclusion, far from the political turmoil that had nearly consumed him.

Forgotten Beginnings: From Tripoli to Luqa Airport

Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah was born in 1956 in the Souq al-Jumaa area on the outskirts of the Libyan capital, Tripoli. He progressed through his career until he joined Libyan Arab Airlines. In the mid-1980s, he was sent to work as an airline official, dispatcher, and station manager for the company at Luqa Airport in Malta.

The position appeared routine for the young employee, had it not intersected with the intense intelligence conflict unfolding across the Mediterranean between the former Libyan regime and the United States and its Western allies.

At the time, Fhimah did not know that his signature on cargo documents and the timing of his shifts at the Mediterranean airport would later become key evidence cited in the international indictment prepared by senior investigators in Washington and London.

The Night the Plane Fell and the International Storm Began

On December 21, 1988, the sky over the Scottish town of Lockerbie was torn apart when a Boeing 747 operated by Pan Am, Flight 103, exploded while traveling from Frankfurt to New York, killing 270 people.

After three years of complex joint investigations by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Scottish police, two Libyan nationals were formally accused in November 1991: Abdelbaset al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah.

At the time, Western investigators alleged that Fhimah had used his position and contacts at Malta's airport to facilitate the passage of a bomb-laden brown Samsonite suitcase. The suitcase contained a timed bomb concealed inside a cassette recorder and was allegedly placed aboard a Libyan Airlines flight bound for Frankfurt, from where it was transferred to the doomed Pan Am flight.

Historic Handover and Trial on Neutral Ground

Tripoli initially refused to hand over its citizens, placing Libya under severe international sanctions and an air and economic blockade imposed by the UN Security Council in 1992.

Libya endured a decade of deep isolation and economic paralysis until difficult diplomatic efforts led by Arab and African parties produced a unique legal and historic settlement.

Under the settlement, Libya agreed in 1999 to hand over the two suspects for trial before a special Scottish court, but on neutral ground at Camp Zeist, a former US military base near Utrecht in the Netherlands, under Scottish criminal law.

Camp Zeist Shock: Historic Acquittal and Return

On January 31, 2001, the world held its breath as Scottish judges delivered the verdict millions had been awaiting. While his associate Abdelbaset al-Megrahi was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, the court definitively acquitted Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah of all charges and ordered his immediate release from behind the bulletproof glass enclosure.

The judges based his acquittal on insufficient evidence and major gaps in the witnesses' account, particularly that of Maltese clothing merchant Tony Gauci. The defense also conclusively established that Fhimah was not in Malta but was in Sweden on a business trip when the bomb-laden suitcase was checked in.

Voluntary Seclusion Until His Final Days

Following his acquittal, Fhimah returned immediately to Libya, where he received a hero's welcome in Tripoli from both officials and the public. He was portrayed as living proof that Western justice itself had established the innocence of the Libyan state from the full American account of events.

Yet the man, exhausted by years of fear, uncertainty, and detention, made a firm decision to stay completely out of the spotlight and politics. He lived the rest of his life as an ordinary citizen among his family in Tripoli, refusing to give press interviews that might reveal the secrets of that era.

The announcement of his death and the official mourning that followed brought a complete chapter of the bitter Libyan-Western conflict to a close.