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Russia Consolidates its Gains in 2024 and Prepares for The Rift in the Western Camp to Widen

Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)
Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)
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Russia Consolidates its Gains in 2024 and Prepares for The Rift in the Western Camp to Widen

Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)
Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)

Both regional and international conditions seem to favor Russian President Vladimir Putin at the end of the year. 2023 was more turbulent and concerning than any other in the past ten years, both domestically and internationally. Russia faced dangerous turns and major challenges.
The armed rebellion led by the Wagner Group and supported by prominent generals and a large part of the public nearly plunged Russia into domestic chaos mid-year. However, the Kremlin emerged victorious from this decisive internal battle, hitting its opponent with a knockout blow and launching a broad internal purge, which diminished the threat of the proliferation of arms and political ambitions among various influential groups.
Living conditions have been unstable. At the beginning of the year, the Russian economy seemed to be faltering under the weight of 11 sanction packages. By autumn, however, there were signs of improvement across the board. Russia began adapting to its economic isolation from the West, improving its response to the difficult implications, and recording growth in several sectors of the economy.
Over the past year, it became apparent that betting on a military victory against Russia was misguided. The Kremlin has shifted priorities and, after breaking through in Bakhmut mid-year, stopped focusing on broad advancements. Instead, it fortified the “de facto” lines on the map it had established after annexing regions of Ukraine, allowing it to thwart the Ukrainian-Western counter-offensive.
Internationally, the wind blew in the Kremlin’s favor. It benefited from the growing schisms in the Western camp over military aid to Kyiv and the effectiveness of the economic pressure being applied to Moscow. The Gaza war added to Moscow’s gains. The limited global impact of Kremlin-sponsored regional alliances, such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Commonwealth of Independent States, has not prevented Moscow from developing policies that accumulate benefits for itself and its allies.
According to the Kremlin and broad segments of the public in Russia, the worst is behind them. It seems like Moscow is preparing to reap the benefits of this new year.
Ukraine Freezing The Conflict
In 2024, Putin's strategy involves maintaining the current maps and freezing the conflict in Ukraine. Prominent analysts do not expect any major offensives from the Kremlin in the first half of the year. The Kremlin believes there are strong reasons for this. It believes that Moscow does not need significant changes on the ground that could alter the existing power balance, at a time when the country awaits a crucial election in March. The fact that we all know the outcome does not diminish its significance. It could reinforce Putin's maintenance of power for life. While some had been worried after his controversial wartime decisions, Putin has managed to remain in the Kremlin. This election will solidify “Putinism” in Russia for a long time after the West had expected its collapse.
In this context, we can identify several of Putin's objectives for his war in Ukraine.
Russian forces have effectively managed to freeze the conflict along the entire frontline and prevent any significant breakthroughs. Success is now measured in meters of territorial gains or losses. Experts say that Moscow could tighten its siege on Avdiivka (Donetsk) without launching a large-scale attack, a risk that could come at a heavy price in Russian soldiers’ lives that the Kremlin would rather avoid and believes it can without risking Putin's “popularity.”
The second element is that Moscow is partially winning the "war of attrition." That is why it seeks to widen the rift in the West and expects European unease to grow. Western nations are joining Slovakia, Hungary, and the Netherlands and beginning to advocate dialogue with Moscow.
Moscow believes it can capitalize on the depletion of Western weapons and ammunition, which indicates that the cost of supplying Ukraine will increase in the next phase. This has led some Western countries to support the establishment of joint defense industries with Kyiv as an alternative to supplying military arms and technologies manufactured in NATO countries.
The Kremlin is betting that freezing the conflict paves the way for widening the rift in the West and further shrinking Kyiv's room for maneuver, especially as it expects and solicits domestic conflicts in Ukraine as the postponed presidential election approaches.
Experts don't expect significant military developments in Ukraine before mid-next year. It will likely be tied to Ukraine's domestic situation and the extent to which the Western alliance will weaken.
The year 2024 is expected to be critical in determining the conflict's outcome as it nears its final quarter.
Reinforcing The Allies Front
Despite the limited cohesion of Russia’s regional alliances over the past year, and their frail support for the Kremlin's anti-Western stance, Moscow managed to make several breakthroughs. These include expanding alternative trade routes to counter Western sanctions and increasing the use of national currencies in trade within the Shanghai and BRICS frameworks, and bilaterally with strategic allies like China, which account for about half of Russia's foreign trade. This trend is expected to continue in the new year, with Moscow aiming to enhance alternative supply routes, particularly the North-South corridor, in cooperation with China, Iran, and South Caucasus countries, and to improve trade terms with its allies.
In terms of international relations, the Kremlin is working to solidify its alliance with countries in the Global South, challenging US dominance in dealing with regional disputes. This strategy became more pronounced with the outbreak of the Gaza War. That is why Moscow is looking to expand collaboration with Africa, setting the stage through the reorganization of Wagner-like groups in various African countries. This lays the foundation for Russia’s persistent and direct intervention in domestic politics, as well as allowing it to help some African countries resist Western pressures.
Similarly, Moscow seeks to invigorate the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and expand the influence of the BRICS on regional policies. However, internal divergences among the members of these two blocs, such as the differences between China and India, were obstacles to achieving this in the past year.
With regard to its relationship with its most prominent ally, China, the latter will become the “senior” partner in 2024 after Moscow had sought to establish parity in the past. Russia and China are planning to launch joint projects in several fields in 2024 to enhance coordination of foreign policies and bolster joint strategic initiatives. This includes plans for massive projects in shipbuilding, technology, and green energy. Notably, China has now replaced the European Union as Russia’s primary trading partner. In 2023, the volume of bilateral trade increased by 23 percent, rising to 201 billion dollars.
Iran, A Strategic Ally
Continuing to strengthen its relationship with Iran is among the main Russian policy decisions for the new year, as it is Russia's most prominent regional partner. The consolidation of this partnership in the Ukrainian war, with Tehran playing a prominent role in supplying Moscow last year, has allowed the two countries to build upon this partnership. It is beginning to evolve through agreements on joint industries being developed in both civilian (automobile manufacturing, aircraft assembly...) and military sectors. Military cooperation primarily entails cooperation in drone manufacturing and continuing the development of their defense missile industries. In this context, there is also talk of Russia potentially granting Iran a long-awaited deal for the latest generation of “Sukhois.”
The Russians and Iranians believe that the two sides will sign a new and comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in the first half of 2024. The two countries have been drafting this agreement for two years now. It is expected to take their bilateral relations to a new level, and after a final draft that covers all areas of future cooperation, has been agreed to, all it awaits is the formal signing ceremonies.
Regionally, the two countries are not hiding their intention to close the gap in their positions on the hot issues, especially with regard to the Iranian nuclear deal and the ongoing conflict in Syria, which is also expected to enter a new phase in the new year.
Syria, A Battlefield Once Again
The war in Ukraine and the positions adopted by Tel Aviv, which has overtly supported Kyiv, as well as the repercussions of the ongoing war in Gaza, have led to a significant shift in Russia's priorities in Syria.
Nowhere was this more evident than in Moscow's shift to a less cautious and sensitive approach to maintaining the delicate balance it had established between its relations with Iran on the one hand, and Israel on the other. This shift can be seen in the increased frequency of Russian condemnation of Israeli strikes on Iranian positions in Syria, and in the fact that Moscow has walked back on its commitment to reach a deal with the West that “regulates Iran’s presence” in Syria. Limiting Iran’s presence in parts of the country was a prominent issue in discussion between the heads of the national security councils of Russia, the United States, and Israel, as well as the previous understandings to keep Iran away from 'sensitive' locations such as the front lines in the Golan Heights.
Currently, Moscow seems inclined to ease its commitments in this regard. Towards the end of the year, Moscow poured cold water on Western reports that Russia was ready to mediate the renewal of an agreement to keep Iran 80 kilometers away from the Golan. Moreover, there are reports of Moscow facilitating the transfer of Iranian supplies through Syrian airports under its control, providing an alternative to the airports regularly bombed by Israel.
Additionally, Moscow has, at times, directly or indirectly encouraged the expansion of attacks on US bases in Syria and Iraq.
Experts believe that Moscow is likely to continue along this course in the next phase. It seems to prefer remaining cautious and preventing things from escalating into a full-blown clash that could lead to the expansion of the Gaza war into a regional conflict.
That means that Syria is about to become an active conflict zone once again, albeit one that is to a certain extent “contained” by external actors, as Moscow is expected to abandon its efforts to regulate Iran’s presence in the country. At the same time, experts anticipate that the coming year will see Russian-Israeli and Russian-American understandings regarding “collision avoidance protocols” weaken, though not so to an extent that leads to direct confrontation.

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Features

Atef Najib in Court: Reconstructing the Story of the ‘First Spark’ in Syria’s Uprising

Atef Najib at the Damascus courthouse on April 26, 2026. (Reuters)
Atef Najib at the Damascus courthouse on April 26, 2026. (Reuters)
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Atef Najib in Court: Reconstructing the Story of the ‘First Spark’ in Syria’s Uprising

Atef Najib at the Damascus courthouse on April 26, 2026. (Reuters)
Atef Najib at the Damascus courthouse on April 26, 2026. (Reuters)

The arrest of schoolchildren in the southern Syrian city of Daraa in March 2011 is widely regarded as the spark that ignited the Syrian uprising. What began as a local incident evolved into nationwide protests and, eventually, a devastating civil war.

Fifteen years later, the case has resurfaced as Syrian authorities pursue accountability for abuses committed under Bashar al-Assad's regime, placing former Daraa Political Security Department chief Atef Najib at the center of one of the conflict’s defining episodes.

As transitional justice efforts gather pace under President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government, the “Daraa children case” has become a key test of whether Syria’s judicial institutions can confront the legacy of arbitrary detention, systematic torture, and repression.

Asharq Al-Awsat interviewed two of the children detained at the time, now adults, whose testimonies revisit the events behind the slogan, “It’s your turn, Doctor”—a reference to Assad—that was scrawled by children on a school wall and became synonymous with the uprising’s beginning.

Fifteen years later, they said that the central question is no longer who wrote the slogan, but how it became the pretext for mass arrests and the torture of children.

Their accounts reconstruct the sequence of events while reinforcing the broader conclusion that what happened inside Syria’s security branches transformed a local incident into a turning point in the country’s history.

Naif Abazeed: Childhood in the interrogation cells

Naif Abazeed was 13 when he was arrested. His name has long been associated with writing the famous phrase, but he firmly rejects that claim.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the only graffiti he ever wrote was his own name and that of a friend on a wall at Daraa al-Balad Preparatory School in 2009.

He also disputed the widely circulated account placing the graffiti at Al-Arbaeen School, saying others appropriated his story while changing the location and timeline.

Abazeed said he never met Atef Najib. Instead, he identifies then-Col. Louay al-Ali as the officer who interrogated and tortured him.

While his testimony shifts attention to al-Ali’s direct role during the investigation, it does not absolve Najib. Rather, it distinguishes between the officer who conducted the interrogations and the security chief who commanded the apparatus responsible for the children’s detention.

Under international law, command responsibility extends beyond those who personally commit abuses to include superiors who knew, or should have known, about the violations and failed to prevent or punish them.

One of the children, now an adult, seen at the Al-Arbaeen School. (Getty Images)

Arrested at school

Abazeed recalled security officers arriving at his school after police had searched his home earlier that morning.

Al-Ali introduced himself as an education official investigating graffiti supposedly bearing the student’s name alongside that of a girlfriend.

Instead, the interrogation centered on the phrase, “It’s your turn, Doctor,” which had already been erased.

The boy was told he would be questioned briefly. Instead, he was taken to a Political Security Branch detention facility, where he said he was confronted with instruments of torture, beaten with cables and sticks, suspended, and forced into the “tire” stress position.

“I told them I had written nothing except my name in 2009,” he said. “The officer insisted I had written something else.”

Unable to withstand the abuse, Abazeed said he eventually confessed to something he had not done. He added that he only learned after his release that another student had actually written the phrase.

He also recounted being handed paper and ordered to write down everything that had appeared on the school walls. When the phrase was missing, the interrogator allegedly dictated it word by word while continuing to beat him until he repeated it in full. Only then did he understand that “Doctor” referred to President Bashar al-Assad.

The interrogation did not end there. Abazeed revealed that he was pressured to identify accomplices and, under torture, named classmates and neighbors, drawing more children into the investigation.

Demonstrators hold posters on the day Atef Najib, a brigadier general and former head of the Political Security Department in Daraa during Syria's ousted President Bashar al-Assad's rule, who is accused of committing war crimes, attends a trial session at the Palace of Justice, in Damascus, Syria, April 26, 2026. (Reuters)

Another victim’s testimony

Samer Ali al-Sayasneh, another child detained in 2011 after being accused of burning a police kiosk near Al-Arbaeen School, has also testified against Najib in court.

He holds Najib fully responsible for the escalation in Daraa, from arbitrary arrests to orders that led to the deadly shootings at Omari Mosque and a nearby gas station.

According to al-Sayasneh, no security branch would have acted without Najib’s authorization, making any attempt to exonerate him implausible.

The legal case

Lawyer Noha al-Masri told Asharq Al-Awsat that prosecutors are relying primarily on Syrian law, including Law No. 16 of 2022, provisions of the Syrian Penal Code, and Legislative Decree No. 20 of 2013.

She said the abuses committed in Daraa in March 2011 could also meet the international definition of crimes against humanity because they formed part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians.

Al-Masri stressed that criminal responsibility extends beyond direct perpetrators to those who planned, ordered, supervised, or knowingly allowed the abuses to occur, reflecting the established principle of command responsibility under international humanitarian law.

She added that victims’ testimony, videos, medical reports, and official documents together could provide the foundation for one of the most significant trials in modern Syrian history - one likely to shape future accountability cases.

Syrian law also allows victims to seek compensation for the physical, psychological, material, and moral harm they suffered.

Strengthening the evidentiary record, she underlined, depends on corroborating witness testimony with videos, official documents, and medical and human rights reports.

Features

Israel Struck an Iranian Steel Facility. Was it a Valid Military Target?

This video grab taken on April 3, 2026, from undated UGC images shared on social media on April 1, 2026, shows thick plumes of smoke rising following airstrikes in Baharestan, in Iran's central Isfahan province. (Photo by various sources / AFP)
This video grab taken on April 3, 2026, from undated UGC images shared on social media on April 1, 2026, shows thick plumes of smoke rising following airstrikes in Baharestan, in Iran's central Isfahan province. (Photo by various sources / AFP)
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Israel Struck an Iranian Steel Facility. Was it a Valid Military Target?

This video grab taken on April 3, 2026, from undated UGC images shared on social media on April 1, 2026, shows thick plumes of smoke rising following airstrikes in Baharestan, in Iran's central Isfahan province. (Photo by various sources / AFP)
This video grab taken on April 3, 2026, from undated UGC images shared on social media on April 1, 2026, shows thick plumes of smoke rising following airstrikes in Baharestan, in Iran's central Isfahan province. (Photo by various sources / AFP)

Washington: Yeganeh Torbati

Over the course of the Iran war, US and Israeli warplanes hit missile depots and launchers, security forces’ headquarters and air defense systems.

Yet not all of the targets during the six-week campaign were traditional military sites.

On March 27, and again a few days later, Israeli airstrikes pounded a vast steel complex just outside Isfahan called Mobarakeh Steel, and another one in the southwest of the country.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserted that his country’s strikes had slashed Iran’s steel production capacity and eliminated revenue for the powerful Revolutionary Guards, whose repression underpins the Iranian government.

Companies like Mobarakeh illustrate the complexities inherent to Iran’s economy. While Iran’s clerical leadership and security forces are deeply enmeshed in the country’s most profitable and important businesses, those same companies are vital to the livelihoods of millions of ordinary Iranians, regardless of whether they have deep ideological allegiance to the government.

The attacks shut down major parts of the Isfahan plant for weeks, idling over 20,000 workers and choking off the supply of steel to domestic manufacturers. “I felt like my own home had been destroyed,” said Mostafa, a former employee, who asked to speak on condition of anonymity to avoid retribution by the government.

The United States and Iran have lurched between peace talks and exchanges of fire in recent weeks. Their negotiations were expected to cover the economic benefits Iran might receive in return for long-term limits on its nuclear program.

The interim ceasefire agreement, signed last month, could result in as much as $300 billion for Iran’s reconstruction and economic development. But that now seems a distant prospect, after Trump said this week that he believed the temporary truce was “over.”

If any investment does flow to Iran, companies like Mobarakeh will undoubtedly come into focus because of their importance to Iran’s economy, as well as their affiliation with Iran’s most powerful security forces.

Trump has frequently threatened to attack Iranian infrastructure, and if war restarts, there will be scrutiny over any such strikes.

On Thursday, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps accused the United States of striking a railway bridge that connected the country with Turkmenistan.

A spokesman for US Central Command confirmed that the United States struck the railway bridge, describing it as military logistics infrastructure that enabled a flow of weapons and other military supplies to key areas.

Mobarakeh has provided revenue to an investment fund belonging to a state-run militia, the Basij, which answers to the Guards, according to the US Treasury.

A 2021 report by Iran’s Parliament identified the investment fund as a major shareholder of Mobarakeh.

Recent financial statements from Mobarakeh show that its shareholders include an investment fund ultimately controlled by Iran’s supreme leader.

Although the statements do not show a link to the Guards, they often obscure their ownership through proxy investors.

In justifying the strikes on steel facilities, Netanyahu said they would deprive the regime “of both financial resources and the ability to produce many weapons.”

Mobarakeh executives did not respond to a request for comment, and it is unclear if the steel produced at Mobarakeh was used in making Iran’s weapon systems.

“Mobarakeh Steel products might not be directly used in missile production, but the company is most probably engaged in research and development of modern high-strength steel alloys for future large-scale production,” said Farzin Nadimi, a senior fellow with the Washington Institute and an expert on Iranian military affairs.

He added, “Mobarakeh Steel products, though, are more likely used in producing missile transporter-launcher vehicles.”

International law prohibits strikes on industrial sites that serve civilians, unless the facility makes an effective contribution to military action and striking it confers a definite military advantage, international law experts said.

The dominant international view rejects the idea that generating revenue for military operations is enough to qualify a civilian site as a military target, said Susana SaCouto, director of the War Crimes Research Office at American University’s Washington College of Law.

Miad Maleki, a former US Treasury official, said that while he believed the complex was a legitimate target for sanctions, he doubted that it should have been hit in military strikes.

“These are the Iranian people’s assets, and it’s going to hurt the economy even way beyond the Islamic republic,” he said.

“It does employ many people and pay salaries for many people,” Maleki added. “But at the same time, it’s really just a major source of revenue for a lot of corrupt actors.”

Opaque ownership

Built by an Italian business group, Mobarakeh became operational in 1992 and was a symbol of Iran’s industrial development and rebuilding after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.

People with ties to the Revolutionary Guards moved into leadership positions at the plant starting in the late 1990s, two former employees said, declining to be named to avoid repercussions from Iran’s government.

For instance, Mehdi Taj, a former senior Guards commander, served on the complex’s board of directors and held an executive position there in the early 2000s.

Taj is now the director of Iran’s soccer federation, which did not respond to a request for comment.

And a privatization drive carried out in the mid-2000s transferred portions of state-owned companies, like Mobarakeh, to powerful and opaque players such as the Guards and conglomerates that answer to Iran’s clerical leadership.

In 2008, a consortium led by Mehr Eghtesad Iranian Investment Company, an outfit belonging to the Basij, purchased 45% of Mobarakeh’s shares.

As of 2021, Mehr Eghtesad was one of Mobarakeh’s largest shareholders, with a nearly 14% stake, according to a parliamentary report written that year.

The Basij is one of the primary forces that the regime deploys to suppress protests, including the recent nationwide demonstrations in December and January. Those protests arose over discontent with Iran’s currency crisis and perceived economic mismanagement by the government.

Mehr Eghtesad’s owner, a bank, in 2020 merged with another Iranian bank, Bank Sepah, which did not respond to a request for comment.

Mobarakeh earned roughly $1.6 billion in net profit in 2024-2025. The US Treasury said in 2018 that the company “has provided millions of dollars” annually to Mehr Eghtesad.

“Some part of the economy is run through the government, but some larger part of the economy is run through the shadow government or Revolutionary Guards,” said Mahdi Ghodsi, an economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.

One relatively new shareholder of Mobarakeh, according to documents filed with the Tehran Stock Exchange, is a company belonging to Astan-e Quds-e Razavi, an Iranian foundation that the United States put sanctions on in 2021 for being controlled by Iran’s former supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. The company owned 1.79% of Mobarakeh as of last year.

Other major owners include several state-owned pension funds. Iran’s pension funds have been struggling for years to make payments to retirees, and the destruction of key sectors of the economy is likely to worsen that problem.

Iranian legislators investigated possible corruption by managers at Mobarakeh in 2021 and blamed many of its issues on the flawed process of privatization, saying it was “now governed by completely opaque ownership alongside entirely state-controlled management.”

A ‘beloved’ company

Interviews with some of the people who used to work at Mobarakeh present another image of the company.

For aspiring engineers growing up in Isfahan, working at Mobarakeh was a “dream job,” said Maryam, who now lives outside Iran. She and some other former employees whom The New York Times spoke to requested that they not be fully identified, for fear of repercussions for speaking publicly.

Some said they felt they were at a prestigious, state-of-the-art company that was contributing to the country and cared about their well-being.

“Even before I was born, my father was working in steel,” said Maziyar Shokrani, who, like his father, worked at Mobarakeh.

Shokrani began working there as a lawyer in the mid-2000s, taking a bus each day to the sprawling plant 40 miles outside Isfahan. “I know my entire life and existence to be from steel,” he said.

Mobarakeh also donated funds to build stadiums and educational institutions and supported poor families in the area surrounding the complex, said Mostafa, the former employee, who now lives outside Iran.

“It was beloved in that region,” Mostafa said. “Any industry that hit a snag, or any group that had a problem, they had some hope that Mobarakeh Steel would arrange for some kind of support.”

The Iranian news outlet Rouydad24 reported in early May that of 27,000 workers, just 2,000 were still working at the plant. Iranian officials have said that Mobarakeh is being rebuilt more quickly than expected, and in early June the company relaunched a furnace that had been damaged in the strikes.

In interviews, former employees had differing views about who was to blame for the strikes on Mobarakeh.

“More of the blame should be cast with the Guards, because it deliberately and consciously took the country’s economy down this path,” said Shokrani, who now lives outside Iran.

In the minds of Iranians, the United States and Israel were closely linked in their conduct of the war, said Abbas Kamranian-Marnani, a mechanical engineer who worked at Mobarakeh or its contractors for a decade and now lives in Europe. “They worked mostly toward the destruction of infrastructure and the destruction of Iran,” he said.

Kamranian-Marnani said strikes like the one on the steel plant had caused Iranians to lose hope in the idea of better relations with the United States.

A senior US military official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, said they did not know of any US role in the steel strikes.

The New York Times

Features

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa: The Emir Who Transformed Qatar

Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa: The Emir Who Transformed Qatar

Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)

With the passing of the Father Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Qatar closes the chapter on one of the Gulf region's most significant political and development success stories of recent decades. His name became synonymous with the most profound transformation in the country's modern history, as Qatar evolved during his reign from a state with a limited international profile into an influential player in regional and global politics, economics, and media.

Sheikh Hamad is widely regarded as one of Qatar's defining leaders and the architect of its modern renaissance. Under his leadership, the country underwent sweeping economic, social, and cultural transformation. During his reign, Qatar's gross domestic product expanded more than twenty-fourfold, while GDP per capita increased nearly sixfold.

Born in Doha in 1952, Sheikh Hamad graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1971. He then joined the armed forces, rising through the military ranks before being appointed Crown Prince and Minister of Defense in 1977. On June 27, 1995, he assumed power, and in June 2013 handed authority to his son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, in a smooth transfer of power widely regarded as one of the region's rare peaceful successions.

A Strong Economy

Sheikh Hamad's economic strategy centered on harnessing Qatar's vast natural gas wealth to build a strong and diversified economy. During his years in power, the country's GDP grew dramatically, average incomes rose sharply, and exports of liquefied natural gas ushered in a new era in Qatar's history. Following the first LNG shipment in 1996, Qatar became the world's largest exporter of liquefied natural gas by 2006, generating enormous revenues that financed major investments in infrastructure, education, healthcare, and public services.

Expanding Qatar's International Role

On the international stage, Qatar adopted a far more active foreign policy, positioning itself as a mediator in a number of regional and international conflicts. Among its most prominent diplomatic efforts were its role in Lebanon during the 2006 war and the country's political crisis in 2008.

Qatar also took a leading role in supporting the Palestinian cause, particularly through economic assistance to the Gaza Strip and by providing a platform for negotiations aimed at ending the conflict there. In 2012, Sheikh Hamad became the first Arab leader to visit Gaza after Hamas took control of the territory.

He also forged close strategic ties with the United States. During his reign, Al Udeid Air Base was established in 1996. Qatar financed almost the entire construction of the base, at a cost exceeding $1 billion, as part of a strategy to strengthen its defense capabilities and deepen military cooperation with the United States following the Gulf War. By 2002, it had become one of the most important US. military bases outside the United States.

Qatar also participated in the international conference supporting post-Gaddafi Libya in Paris. During Sheikh Hamad's rule, Doha became a major supporter of the Syrian cause, providing extensive political and humanitarian backing to the Syrian opposition, an approach that continued in subsequent years.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, Qatar pursued a foreign policy built on relative neutrality and open channels with opposing parties, allowing it to serve as a mediator in regional and international disputes. Over time, this approach became one of the country's most effective instruments of soft power, transforming Doha into a permanent venue for negotiations and political dialogue.

Today, the Qatari capital is widely recognized as one of the world's leading hubs for mediation and conflict resolution, a role first established under Sheikh Hamad and later expanded during the reign of Sheikh Tamim.

Soft Power

Just one year after assuming power, Sheikh Hamad launched the Al Jazeera Media Network in 1996. The network quickly became one of the Arab world's most influential media platforms, giving Qatar an outsized voice in regional political discourse. As the Arab world underwent profound political change, Al Jazeera emerged as one of Qatar's most powerful instruments of influence, elevating the country's international profile far beyond its geographic size.

The World Cup

Qatar's hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup was far more than a sporting event. It was a strategic national project and a defining milestone that reshaped the country's standing on the global stage.

By hosting football's biggest tournament, Qatar became both the first Arab nation and the first Middle Eastern country to stage the World Cup, earning unprecedented global visibility across the media, political, and economic spheres while reinforcing its image as a nation capable of organizing events of the highest international caliber.

The tournament also became one of Qatar's most effective soft power tools. Rather than relying solely on traditional forms of influence, Doha used sport to strengthen its international image, showcase its organizational capabilities, and capture the world's attention.

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani leaves behind a lasting legacy in Qatar's modern history. His name is inseparable from the country's transformation from an economy largely dependent on natural resources into a state wielding influence through a diverse set of instruments, including economic strength, global investment, media, diplomacy, and sport.

Many of the defining features of Qatar's current policies remain rooted in the foundations he laid during his years in power, making his legacy one of the Gulf region's most significant political and developmental transformations in recent decades.