Russia Consolidates its Gains in 2024 and Prepares for The Rift in the Western Camp to Widen

Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)
Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)
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Russia Consolidates its Gains in 2024 and Prepares for The Rift in the Western Camp to Widen

Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)
Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visiting to a military training camp in October (AFP)

Both regional and international conditions seem to favor Russian President Vladimir Putin at the end of the year. 2023 was more turbulent and concerning than any other in the past ten years, both domestically and internationally. Russia faced dangerous turns and major challenges.
The armed rebellion led by the Wagner Group and supported by prominent generals and a large part of the public nearly plunged Russia into domestic chaos mid-year. However, the Kremlin emerged victorious from this decisive internal battle, hitting its opponent with a knockout blow and launching a broad internal purge, which diminished the threat of the proliferation of arms and political ambitions among various influential groups.
Living conditions have been unstable. At the beginning of the year, the Russian economy seemed to be faltering under the weight of 11 sanction packages. By autumn, however, there were signs of improvement across the board. Russia began adapting to its economic isolation from the West, improving its response to the difficult implications, and recording growth in several sectors of the economy.
Over the past year, it became apparent that betting on a military victory against Russia was misguided. The Kremlin has shifted priorities and, after breaking through in Bakhmut mid-year, stopped focusing on broad advancements. Instead, it fortified the “de facto” lines on the map it had established after annexing regions of Ukraine, allowing it to thwart the Ukrainian-Western counter-offensive.
Internationally, the wind blew in the Kremlin’s favor. It benefited from the growing schisms in the Western camp over military aid to Kyiv and the effectiveness of the economic pressure being applied to Moscow. The Gaza war added to Moscow’s gains. The limited global impact of Kremlin-sponsored regional alliances, such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Commonwealth of Independent States, has not prevented Moscow from developing policies that accumulate benefits for itself and its allies.
According to the Kremlin and broad segments of the public in Russia, the worst is behind them. It seems like Moscow is preparing to reap the benefits of this new year.
Ukraine Freezing The Conflict
In 2024, Putin's strategy involves maintaining the current maps and freezing the conflict in Ukraine. Prominent analysts do not expect any major offensives from the Kremlin in the first half of the year. The Kremlin believes there are strong reasons for this. It believes that Moscow does not need significant changes on the ground that could alter the existing power balance, at a time when the country awaits a crucial election in March. The fact that we all know the outcome does not diminish its significance. It could reinforce Putin's maintenance of power for life. While some had been worried after his controversial wartime decisions, Putin has managed to remain in the Kremlin. This election will solidify “Putinism” in Russia for a long time after the West had expected its collapse.
In this context, we can identify several of Putin's objectives for his war in Ukraine.
Russian forces have effectively managed to freeze the conflict along the entire frontline and prevent any significant breakthroughs. Success is now measured in meters of territorial gains or losses. Experts say that Moscow could tighten its siege on Avdiivka (Donetsk) without launching a large-scale attack, a risk that could come at a heavy price in Russian soldiers’ lives that the Kremlin would rather avoid and believes it can without risking Putin's “popularity.”
The second element is that Moscow is partially winning the "war of attrition." That is why it seeks to widen the rift in the West and expects European unease to grow. Western nations are joining Slovakia, Hungary, and the Netherlands and beginning to advocate dialogue with Moscow.
Moscow believes it can capitalize on the depletion of Western weapons and ammunition, which indicates that the cost of supplying Ukraine will increase in the next phase. This has led some Western countries to support the establishment of joint defense industries with Kyiv as an alternative to supplying military arms and technologies manufactured in NATO countries.
The Kremlin is betting that freezing the conflict paves the way for widening the rift in the West and further shrinking Kyiv's room for maneuver, especially as it expects and solicits domestic conflicts in Ukraine as the postponed presidential election approaches.
Experts don't expect significant military developments in Ukraine before mid-next year. It will likely be tied to Ukraine's domestic situation and the extent to which the Western alliance will weaken.
The year 2024 is expected to be critical in determining the conflict's outcome as it nears its final quarter.
Reinforcing The Allies Front
Despite the limited cohesion of Russia’s regional alliances over the past year, and their frail support for the Kremlin's anti-Western stance, Moscow managed to make several breakthroughs. These include expanding alternative trade routes to counter Western sanctions and increasing the use of national currencies in trade within the Shanghai and BRICS frameworks, and bilaterally with strategic allies like China, which account for about half of Russia's foreign trade. This trend is expected to continue in the new year, with Moscow aiming to enhance alternative supply routes, particularly the North-South corridor, in cooperation with China, Iran, and South Caucasus countries, and to improve trade terms with its allies.
In terms of international relations, the Kremlin is working to solidify its alliance with countries in the Global South, challenging US dominance in dealing with regional disputes. This strategy became more pronounced with the outbreak of the Gaza War. That is why Moscow is looking to expand collaboration with Africa, setting the stage through the reorganization of Wagner-like groups in various African countries. This lays the foundation for Russia’s persistent and direct intervention in domestic politics, as well as allowing it to help some African countries resist Western pressures.
Similarly, Moscow seeks to invigorate the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and expand the influence of the BRICS on regional policies. However, internal divergences among the members of these two blocs, such as the differences between China and India, were obstacles to achieving this in the past year.
With regard to its relationship with its most prominent ally, China, the latter will become the “senior” partner in 2024 after Moscow had sought to establish parity in the past. Russia and China are planning to launch joint projects in several fields in 2024 to enhance coordination of foreign policies and bolster joint strategic initiatives. This includes plans for massive projects in shipbuilding, technology, and green energy. Notably, China has now replaced the European Union as Russia’s primary trading partner. In 2023, the volume of bilateral trade increased by 23 percent, rising to 201 billion dollars.
Iran, A Strategic Ally
Continuing to strengthen its relationship with Iran is among the main Russian policy decisions for the new year, as it is Russia's most prominent regional partner. The consolidation of this partnership in the Ukrainian war, with Tehran playing a prominent role in supplying Moscow last year, has allowed the two countries to build upon this partnership. It is beginning to evolve through agreements on joint industries being developed in both civilian (automobile manufacturing, aircraft assembly...) and military sectors. Military cooperation primarily entails cooperation in drone manufacturing and continuing the development of their defense missile industries. In this context, there is also talk of Russia potentially granting Iran a long-awaited deal for the latest generation of “Sukhois.”
The Russians and Iranians believe that the two sides will sign a new and comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in the first half of 2024. The two countries have been drafting this agreement for two years now. It is expected to take their bilateral relations to a new level, and after a final draft that covers all areas of future cooperation, has been agreed to, all it awaits is the formal signing ceremonies.
Regionally, the two countries are not hiding their intention to close the gap in their positions on the hot issues, especially with regard to the Iranian nuclear deal and the ongoing conflict in Syria, which is also expected to enter a new phase in the new year.
Syria, A Battlefield Once Again
The war in Ukraine and the positions adopted by Tel Aviv, which has overtly supported Kyiv, as well as the repercussions of the ongoing war in Gaza, have led to a significant shift in Russia's priorities in Syria.
Nowhere was this more evident than in Moscow's shift to a less cautious and sensitive approach to maintaining the delicate balance it had established between its relations with Iran on the one hand, and Israel on the other. This shift can be seen in the increased frequency of Russian condemnation of Israeli strikes on Iranian positions in Syria, and in the fact that Moscow has walked back on its commitment to reach a deal with the West that “regulates Iran’s presence” in Syria. Limiting Iran’s presence in parts of the country was a prominent issue in discussion between the heads of the national security councils of Russia, the United States, and Israel, as well as the previous understandings to keep Iran away from 'sensitive' locations such as the front lines in the Golan Heights.
Currently, Moscow seems inclined to ease its commitments in this regard. Towards the end of the year, Moscow poured cold water on Western reports that Russia was ready to mediate the renewal of an agreement to keep Iran 80 kilometers away from the Golan. Moreover, there are reports of Moscow facilitating the transfer of Iranian supplies through Syrian airports under its control, providing an alternative to the airports regularly bombed by Israel.
Additionally, Moscow has, at times, directly or indirectly encouraged the expansion of attacks on US bases in Syria and Iraq.
Experts believe that Moscow is likely to continue along this course in the next phase. It seems to prefer remaining cautious and preventing things from escalating into a full-blown clash that could lead to the expansion of the Gaza war into a regional conflict.
That means that Syria is about to become an active conflict zone once again, albeit one that is to a certain extent “contained” by external actors, as Moscow is expected to abandon its efforts to regulate Iran’s presence in the country. At the same time, experts anticipate that the coming year will see Russian-Israeli and Russian-American understandings regarding “collision avoidance protocols” weaken, though not so to an extent that leads to direct confrontation.



Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
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Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights

China has increased purchases of Russian oil and gas since ‌the start of the conflict with Ukraine in 2022, with Moscow and Beijing declaring a "no limits" partnership just days before the war began. The energy relationship between the two countries is expected to be an important topic when presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on Wednesday.

Here are some facts about the energy ties between the two countries:

GAS

Russia's energy giant Gazprom supplies natural gas to China through a 3,000-km (1,865 mile) pipeline called Power of Siberia under a 30-year, $400 billion deal launched at the end of 2019.

In 2025, exports jumped by around a quarter to 38.8 billion cubic meters (bcm), exceeding the pipeline's planned annual capacity of 38 bcm.

During Putin's visit to China in September, the countries agreed to increase annual volumes on the route by an additional 6 bcm, to 44 bcm, a year. In February 2022, China also agreed to buy up to 10 bcm of gas annually ‌by 2027 via ‌a pipeline from Sakhalin Island in Russia's Far East. The countries later ‌agreed ⁠to raise the ⁠volumes to 12 bcm.

Russia's gas exports to China are still a small fraction of the record 177 bcm it delivered to Europe in 2018-19 annually.

Russia's share in European Union gas imports has shrunk during the Ukraine war, particularly in pipeline flows. Russia remained the EU's second-largest liquefied natural gas supplier last year with a 16% share but the gap with the EU's main LNG partner, the United States, widened considerably. Russia and China are still in talks about a new Power of Siberia 2 pipeline capable of delivering 50 bcm of gas per year ⁠from Russia to China via Mongolia.

Gazprom began a feasibility study for the ‌pipeline in 2020, but the project has gained urgency as Russia ‌turns to China to replace Europe as its major gas customer. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said in September that the ‌countries signed a "legally binding memorandum" on the pipeline, but a firm contract is still elusive.

Russia's liquefied natural ‌gas exports to China rose last year by 18.2% to 9.79 million metric tons, according to China's customs data, cited by TASS news agency.

Russia was, after Australia and Qatar, the third-largest supplier of LNG to China, which is the world's largest buyer of seaborne gas.

OIL China is Moscow's top client for oil shipments via the sea and pipelines. Exports have been ‌high amid Western sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine. China's imports from Russia were at 2.01 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2025 (or 100.72 ⁠million metric tons in ⁠total), a decline of 7.1%, according to China's General Administration of Customs. That represented 20% of China's total imported oil by volume.

Yury Ushakov, Putin's foreign policy aide, said Russian oil exports to China grew by 35% in the first quarter of 2026 to 31 million tons.

China, which is the world's top oil importer, primarily buys Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) crude exported via the Skovorodino-Mohe spur of the 4,070-km (2,540-mile) ESPO pipeline, which connects Russian oil fields to refineries in China and from the Russian Far East port of Kozmino. Russia's oil pipeline operator Transneft has said it was expanding the ESPO pipeline to increase exports via Kozmino, seeking to complete the expansion work in 2029. China also imports oil from the Pacific island of Sakhalin, taking Sakhalin Blend and Sokol oil grades. The availability of ESPO Blend oil has remained high since July 2025, when exports had been expanded to 1 million barrels per day. Transneft has kept exports via Kozmino at around this level.

Russia has also agreed to raise its oil exports to China via Kazakhstan through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline by 2.5 million tons per year to 12.5 million tons.


Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
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Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)

Multiple Hamas sources in the Gaza Strip revealed that the movement’s armed wing, the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, is now led by Mohammed Awda, succeeding Ezzedine al-Haddad, who was killed by Israel last Friday after decades of pursuit.

Three Hamas sources in Gaza told Asharq Al-Awsat that Awda had effectively been selected to command the Qassam.

He was close to al-Haddad and remained in regular contact with him, particularly over plans to “rebuild the organizational structure” after the killings of former Qassam commanders Mohammed Deif and Mohammed Sinwar, they added.

Since the Oct. 7, 2023 attack, Israel has eliminated a series of Qassam commanders and key figures involved in planning and directing Hamas’s attack on Israeli communities near Gaza during nearly two years of war in the enclave.

One source said Awda, who headed military intelligence within the Qassam at the time of the Oct. 7 attack, had been offered leadership of the armed wing after the killing of Mohammed Sinwar in May 2025, but declined, leading the role to pass to al-Haddad.

The two other sources said they could not independently verify that account.

Awda appears to face no serious rival for the position as he remains one of the core members of the movement’s military council. The only other surviving member of the original council is home front commander Imad Aqel, whom Hamas sources said did not play a direct role in planning or supervising the Oct. 7 operation, unlike “other commanders who were not informed of the full details or even the zero hour.”

Military intelligence role

Awda previously oversaw military intelligence operations in Gaza, including gathering information on Israeli military positions around the enclave.

Sources said he also supervised the exploitation of surveillance equipment uncovered after an Israeli undercover unit infiltrated Gaza and remained there for an extended period before being exposed in November 2018. Hamas officials at the time described the information recovered from the devices as an “intelligence treasure.”

The military intelligence branch under Awda concentrated heavily on identifying vulnerabilities in the Israeli army’s Gaza Division.

According to the sources, Awda later assumed responsibility for the northern sector after al-Haddad became commander of the Qassam Brigades. In that role, he coordinated with newly appointed commanders in Gaza City and northern Gaza while continuing to oversee intelligence operations.

Early Hamas ties

Sources said Awda’s relationship with Hamas dates back to the first Palestinian intifada, which erupted in 1987. He also spent time in the “Majd” security apparatus established by slain Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar to pursue Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel.

Believed to be in his late forties or early fifties, Awda ranked among the early members of the Qassam Brigades during the second intifada, which began in late 2000.

He is originally from the Khulafaa al-Rashideen area of Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza.

For years, the area functioned as a military hub for the Qassam Brigades. Mohammed Deif and several senior commanders were based there, and it became an early meeting point between Deif and a generation of future Qassam leaders, including Awda.

Although Awda’s career has been closely associated with intelligence and security operations, he also advanced through field command positions.

He served for several years as commander of the central Jabalia battalion, worked in military manufacturing and later headed the “northern brigade” between 2017 and 2019.

During his tenure as northern brigade commander, Awda hosted Mohammed Sinwar, then responsible for overseeing the Brigades’ military and strategic operations.

Hamas sources credit Awda with playing a major role in transforming the military intelligence branch into one of the most influential divisions in the Qassam.

“Awda has always preferred intelligence work and avoided direct field operations,” one Hamas source said. “He also avoids relying on personal guards or drivers, preferring to move alone because of his strict security precautions.”

Awda has reportedly survived several assassination attempts, both before and during the Gaza war. After the ceasefire of Oct. 10, 2025, his father’s home in Jabalia refugee camp was bombed, killing his eldest son, Amr.


In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
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In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)

In a small sewing workshop in southern Gaza, Nisreen Al-Rantisi pulls fabric from a pile and reshapes worn wedding dresses, trying to keep a fading tradition alive amid war and soaring costs.

Families said they have been struggling to find new wedding dresses and many search instead for places that refurbish gowns and other kinds of clothes for their children.

Importers cite delays, high shipping costs, and restrictions on materials, such as the crystals encrusted into the elaborate wedding dresses, as key factors behind the shortages ‌and price hikes.

Many workshops ‌have also been damaged during the conflict.

“We try ‌to ⁠reuse the old ⁠gowns that we have, produce them by fixing them a bit, work on them, wash them, arrange them, shape them,” said Rantisi, adding that work initially relied on a bicycle-powered sewing machine due to electricity shortages.

Rantisi said she used to buy the fabric for about 120 to 150 shekels ($41 to $51) before the war, but now pays around 500 shekels ($171).

“This has caused a big rise ⁠in the cost of bridal dresses and children’s gowns. We ‌are living in a vicious circle ‌from the war that affected us,” she added.

COGAT, the Israeli military agency that controls ‌access to Gaza, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Most ‌of Gaza's more than 2 million people have been displaced, many now living in bombed-out homes and makeshift tents pitched on open ground, roadsides, or atop the ruins of destroyed buildings after two years of war with Israel.

HIGH PRICES BEYOND REACH ‌FOR MOST IN GAZA

Despite the hardships, some couples still find ways to celebrate, with mass weddings held in ⁠Gaza offering a ⁠rare moment of joy amid the devastation.

Shop workers say the war has driven prices beyond reach.

“Before the war, prices were reasonable for everyone,” said Rawan Shalouf, an employee at a bridal shop.

“But now, given the circumstances we’re in, the price of a dress is ridiculous.”

Across Gaza, brides and families are struggling to afford even basic wedding needs. Shahed Fayez, 21, is due to marry in about four days but has been searching in vain for a dress.

“I don’t care about its style, what’s important is that it's new,” she added.

“The cheapest dress is $1,000 or more, that's the minimum, and all we have is less than $200. The entire dowry does not cover the price of a dress.”