How Watermelon Imagery, a Symbol of Solidarity with Palestinians, Spread Around the Planet https://english.aawsat.com/features/4794931-how-watermelon-imagery-symbol-solidarity-palestinians-spread-around-planet%C2%A0
How Watermelon Imagery, a Symbol of Solidarity with Palestinians, Spread Around the Planet
People shout slogans in front of the German embassy during a pro-Palestinian gathering in Belgrade, Serbia, Sunday, Nov. 12, 2023. (AP)
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How Watermelon Imagery, a Symbol of Solidarity with Palestinians, Spread Around the Planet
People shout slogans in front of the German embassy during a pro-Palestinian gathering in Belgrade, Serbia, Sunday, Nov. 12, 2023. (AP)
Over the past three months, on banners and T-shirts and balloons and social media posts, one piece of imagery has emerged around the world in protests against the Israel-Hamas war: the watermelon.
The colors of sliced watermelon — with red pulp, green-white rind and black seeds — are the same as those on the Palestinian flag. From New York and Tel Aviv to Dubai and Belgrade, the fruit has become a symbol of solidarity, drawing together activists who don't speak the same language or belong to the same culture but share a common cause.
To avoid repressive censorship, Chinese dissidents once pioneered “algospeak,” or creative shorthands that bypass content moderation. People around the world began using algospeak to subvert algorithmic biases on TikTok, Instagram and other platforms.
The internet is now teeming with pictorial signs — pixelated images, emoji and other typographical codes — that signal political dissent. The watermelon emoji is the latest example.
Here's how the watermelon went from being a symbol of protest in the West Bank and Gaza to a global sign of solidarity with Palestinians online.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT After the 1967 Mideast war, the Israeli government cracked down on displays of the Palestinian flag in Gaza and the West Bank. In Ramallah in 1980, the military shut down a gallery run by three artists because they showed political art and works in the colors of the Palestinian flag — red, green, black and white.
The trio was later summoned by an Israeli officer. According to artist and exhibit organizer Sliman Mansour, an Israeli officer told him, “It is forbidden to organize an exhibition without permission from the military, and secondly, it is forbidden to paint in the colors of the Palestinian flag.” The officer mentioned a watermelon as one example of art that would violate the army's rules, Mansour told The Associated Press last week.
In protest, people began to wave the fruit in public.
“There are stories of young men who defiantly walked the streets with slices of the fruit, risking arrest from Israeli soldiers,” Jerusalem-born author Mahdi Sabbagh wrote. “When I see a watermelon, I think of the unbreakable spirit of our people.”
From the mid-90s, when Israelis and Palestinians reached interim peace deals, until the current nationalist Israeli government took office a year ago, raising the Palestinian flag receded as a major issue. Three decades later, “it became a national symbol” again, Mansour said.
A year ago, Israel’s far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir banned Palestinian flags in public places. This effort was met with fervent opposition. In response, Zazim, an activist group of Arab and Jewish Israelis, plastered taxis in Tel Aviv with large watermelon stickers that read: “This is not a Palestinian flag.”
“Our message to the government is clear,” the organization said in a written statement. “We’ll always find a way to bypass any absurd ban and we won’t stop struggling for freedom of expression and democracy — whether this involves the Pride flag or the Palestinian flag.”
For some, embracing the colors of the flag is about striving for freedom and equality rather than necessarily statehood.
“I’ve never cared for flags or nationalism,” says Mayssoun Sukarieh, an expert in Middle Eastern studies at King’s College London. “But when it comes to Palestine, it’s a flag of a colonized people who never saw independence. And because it has been banned, it becomes more of a symbol of resistance than it is of nationalism.”
WATERMELON EMOJI Watermelons have long been a staple of food in the region, with some dishes, like a popular salad in southern Gaza, originating with Bedouin Arab tribes.
Increasingly, young activists have adopted the watermelon emoji in calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. Emojis may confuse algorithms that advocates say tech companies deploy to suppress posts with keywords like “Gaza” and even just “Palestinian.”
“With the watermelon (emoji), I think this is actually really the first time where I’ve seen it widely used as a stand-in. And that to me marks a notable uptick in censorship of Palestinian content,” says Jillian York, the director for international freedom of expression at the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
The Berlin-based York has analyzed Meta’s policies. While “shadow banning,” or the limited visibility of certain posts, can be difficult to discern, advocacy and nonprofit organizations studying digital rights in the Middle East say they have tracked stark biases, especially on the Meta platforms Facebook and Instagram. Meta hasn't said much directly about this but cites a statement it released in October.
“Censorship is somewhat obvious” on Instagram, York said. In mid-October, people began to notice that if one’s Instagram bio said “Palestinian” in English alongside the Palestinian flag emoji and “Praise be to God” in Arabic, the app translated the text to “Terrorist.” Meta released a public apology.
Watermelons are not the only symbol to catch on with activists. Other signs of global Palestinian solidarity include keys, spoons, olives, doves, poppies and the keffiyeh scarf. In November, to connect with the peaceful message of Armistice Day, when many Brits traditionally wear red poppy pins, protesters this year passed out white poppy pins, to commemorate victims of all wars. On the holiday, scores of protesters wearing poppy pins marched across London calling for an end to the war in Gaza.
In the United States, Jewish Voice for Peace amplified watermelon imagery in calling for a ceasefire in Gaza last month. The group held signs in New York in the colors of the Palestinian flag and with triangular watermelons, leveraging the triangle symbol of ACT UP, the historic AIDS activist group.
Jason Rosenberg, a member of both organizations, said, “Our reinvented image shows that our fight for liberation and fight to end the epidemic is intrinsically connected to the Palestinian struggle."
SEED IMAGERY Another reason the watermelon might resonate: It has seeds. There is a saying, often attributed to the Greek poet Dinos Christianopoulos, that is popular among activists: “They wanted to bury us; they didn’t know we were seeds.”
“You might be able to smash a watermelon. You might be able to destroy a fruit, but the seed is a little harder to crush,” says Shawn Escarciga, an artist who created the coalition's design. “It’s really powerful that life can come out of something so small and something so resilient — and that it can be spread so, so easily.”
The image of a watermelon punctuated by bold, triangular seeds was held up at the groups' protest at Manhattan's Lincoln Center, and has since proliferated online. That often happens — art emerges from protest movements and then enters the mainstream.
“Artists have always been at the forefront of revolution, resistance, politics, in varying degrees,” Escarciga says.
Israel’s air, ground and sea assault in Gaza has killed more than 24,000 people, some 70% of them women and children, according to the Health Ministry in the Hamas-ruled territory. The count does not differentiate between civilians and combatants.
Throughout, activists around the world have continued to call for peace and a permanent ceasefire. Israel says ending the war now, before Hamas is crushed, would give a victory to the militants who attacked southern Israel on Oct. 7 and killed some 1,200 people and took about 250 hostage.
“We’re seeing Palestinian flags being banned, even the emoji online being flagged — and, you know, the word ‘Palestine’ being censored online,” Escarciga said. “But having this image that transcends language, that transcends culture, that transcends algorithms — can really reach people.”
Assad in Syria and Lebanon: Quarter of a Century of Dictatorship and Destructionhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5095045-assad-syria-and-lebanon-quarter-century-dictatorship-and-destruction
People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
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Assad in Syria and Lebanon: Quarter of a Century of Dictatorship and Destruction
People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
Hazem Saghieh
The advent of the 21st Century brought with it historic developments. The most significant for Syria and Lebanon took place on June 10, 2000 with the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Many openly mourned his passing. Many having experienced firsthand the cruelty of the ruler. In secret however, they said: “This is the first time Assad does something useful.”
Hafez was in effect the president of two countries. Weeks before his death, he met with US President Bill Clinton in Geneva to discuss resuming negotiations between Syria and Israel. On May 25, 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in line with an electoral pledge made by Ehud Barak.
The day was a calamity to Assad’s Lebanese and Syrian supporters, who saw in the withdrawal the end of their excuses to carry arms outside state control. So, they described the move as a “conspiracy” and suddenly, like a magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat, they cited Israel’s continued occupation of the long-forgotten Shebaa Farms. Israel had occupied the area from Syria in 1967. Calls for war mounted, demanding that Israel withdraw or suffer the consequences. Soon after, however, tensions eased, and Hezbollah declared the withdrawal a “liberation” achieved with the support of “Syria’s Assad”.
Training Bashar and Lebanese politicians
Syrians recalled the story of a peasant from Daraa who headed to Damascus to attend Hafez’s funeral. On his way, he saw a billboard that read: “The Assad (Arabic for lion) is immortal and does not die.” So the peasant turned back and returned home believing that the news of Hafez’s death were rumors spread by enemies.
The peasant wasn’t completely wrong or so it would seem when Hafez’s son, Bashar, came to power to follow in his father’s footsteps. Despite the changes the new young ruler introduced to the country and his marriage to a “modern” British-born woman, the apple did not fall far from the tree, and he maintained his father’s iron-fisted grip on power.
Bashar forged ahead along his father’s destructive path and where better to gain experience than in Syria’s favorite training ground: Lebanon.
Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and US President Bill Clinton meet in Geneva in 2000. (Getty Images)
In 1998, two years before he came to power and four years after his older brother Bassel’s death, Bashar was put in charge of the Syrian military presence in “brotherly” Lebanon, where 40,000 Syrian soldiers were deployed. As part of Bashar’s training, he documented his relations with Lebanese politicians, the majority of whom bowed their heads to the lowliest of Syrian officers.
Three Lebanese figures stood out for Bashar. Two had his unabashed admiration and one was an abhorred thorn in his side:
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was the leader of the resistance party and enjoyed Bashar’s full support. He was viewed as the man of the 2000 liberation. He represented to Bashar everything that he could not achieve because he inherited power, while Nasrallah earned his way to the top. However, Hafez had the upper hand over Nasrallah when negotiating with Iran; the young inexperienced Bashar did not.
Bashar’s admiration of Nasrallah stemmed from what he could never achieve, while his admiration for Emile Lahoud stemmed from what was possible. The Lebanese army and naval commander was chosen by Damascus to be president in 1998. Lahoud, the commander of the very modest Lebanese navy, was as much a military man as Bashar, the ophthalmologist, was a doctor.
With the very little time needed to run the navy, Lahoud spent his leisure hours oiling himself up to tan under the sun at the Bain Militaire resort in Beirut. In all likelihood, Bashar was drawn to Lahoud because of their shared weakness in articulating words and putting sentences together, following that up with weak laughter, leaving their statements utterly meaningless.
The thorn in Bashar’s side was wealthy businessman and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who lavished gifts on Syrian officers hoping for political leniency in return. This was not the type of wealthy man who Bashar was drawn to. Bashar looked up to the wealthy man whose sole ambition was to keep his riches from being seized.
Articles spoke about how Hariri was the one who was building Syria’s relations with the world, and he was the one who proposed to Damascus that it follow the “Chinese model” whereby power remains in the hands of the rulers, while freedom is introduced to the markets. Bashar resented Hariri for this and his sentiment deepened because Hariri was a Sunni leader and Bashar was Alawite. The Sunnis make up the majority in Lebanon and Syria where Alawites are a minority.
Rumors abounded that Hariri not only wanted to be the leader of the Sunnis in Lebanon, but in Syria as well. No wonder Bashar was suspicious. Rumors also spread that Hariri sought regional peace whereby the Palestinians and Israeli would continue where they left off in Oslo in 1993. Perhaps what irked Bashar the most about Hariri was that he was a self-made man.
From left to right: Former Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, slain former PM Rafik al-Hariri and slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (AFP file)
Regional tumult and crimes in Lebanon
The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon removed the Syrian regime’s excuse for keeping its forces deployed in Lebanon. Hafez’s death encouraged people to speak out. The man of the moment was late Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, who in September 2000 sponsored a Maronite call on Syria to pull out its troops. Sfeir forged ahead. In April 2001, he blessed the establishment of the Qornet Shewan gathering that marked the beginning of the emergence of an anti-Syria opposition.
The gathering brought together Christian politicians and helped extend bridges to Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, both of whom were upset with Bashar and his employee in Lebanon, Lahoud. In the summer of 2001, Sfeir sponsored a major reconciliation between the Christians and the Druze. Both sects were seen as the backbone of Lebanon’s national identity.
On August 7, Christian society was rattled by student protests held by supporters of the Lebanese Forces and former army commander Michel Aoun, who was in exile at the time. The protesters were summarily rounded up and imprisoned in shocking scenes. Hundreds were detained without any legal justification and for simply demanding freedom and the withdrawal of Syrian troops.
The region was in store for more tumult. In 2003, the US invaded Iraq and a year later Syria’s Kurds in Qamishli were encouraged to revolt against the regime. Bashar responded to the unrest by shipping terrorists to Iraq where they caused so much death and destruction. Washington soon began to mount its pressure on Bashar to ease meddling in Lebanon.
Bashar responded with a bombshell in Beirut. He remained steadfast in extending Lahoud’s term in office in 2004 despite deep opposition in Lebanon. In September later that year, the UN Security Council issued resolution 1559 that calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the dismantling of all militias. It was as clear as day that Bashar and Hezbollah were the main targets of the resolution.
Bashar and Nasrallah were determined to retaliate against the resolution and Jumblatt and Hariri were seen as the main targets. Jumblatt had joined the opposition, while Hariri, who openly opposed the extension of Lahoud’s term – in what was seen as a direct insult to Bashar – was suspected of having played a major role in the issuance of resolution 1559.
And so, Beirut would be struck with disaster on February 14, 2005. Hariri was assassinated in major car bombing that would also claim the life of minister Bassil Fleihan and 21 people. A slew of crimes and assassinations would ensue against politicians and journalists who were vocal in their opposition to Bashar and Nasrallah.
Lebanon would soon become divided into two camps: one known as “March 8”, named so after holding a large rally on that day in 2005 to “thank Syria’s Assad” for its role in Lebanon, and “March 14”, also named so after a rally on that day that dwarfed the first and that protested against Hariri’s killing and demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian forces.
The forces would eventually withdraw from Lebanon on April 30, 2005. Nasrallah eagerly gifted the head of the Syrian security apparatus in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh, the “rifle of resistance” because he wanted the Syrian troops to quit Lebanon with their heads held high, not weak and humiliated. Hariri’s “curse” would haunt Ghazaleh and his predecessor Ghazi Kanaan. Their mysterious fate would be added to countless others who died under the Assad rule.
Syrian forces deployed in Lebanon. (AFP file)
Ghazaleh was named to his post in Lebanon in 2002. He followed in Kanaan’s bloody footsteps of killing and torture. They had set up base in the town of Anjar in the Bekaa and the Beau Rivage Hotel in Beirut, both of which became synonymous with the Syrian regime’s oppression. They also sponsored drug and weapons smuggling networks whose revenues they reaped, along with the regime and their allies in the “Axis of Resistance”.
Ghazaleh was known for his utmost loyalty to the regime. Perhaps it was because he was a Sunni and needed to prove himself to his Alawite masters. Kanaan, a Alawite, didn’t need to go that far and years later would go on record and speak proudly of his friendship with Hariri.
At any rate, with Syrian troops out of Lebanon, the regime feared that all of its plotting to kill Hariri would be revealed. So, Ghazaleh, the regime’s secret keeper and owner of the “rifle of the resistance” was killed in 2015. Kanaan was shot and killed in his office in 2005. He was shot with two or three bullets, but the regime famously preferred to call his death a suicide. A few years later, two of his brothers also committed “suicide” - also using two or three bullets.
Tying the brother to the sister
Throughout the hegemony of “sister” Syria over “brother” Lebanon, the latter was under the Baathist theory of “Lebanon’s Arabism”. Describing what the regime did to Arabism is an insult to the word. In reality, it required that Lebanon stand by Syria and non-Arab Iran, through thick and thin, against Egypt, Iraq and Arab Gulf and Maghreb. For the first time in Lebanon’s modern history, it had an official ideology that identified “friend” and “foe”, replacing freedom of expression that was a hallmark of Lebanon’s official stances.
Hafez had also tightened the bond between Damascus and Beirut with the 1991 treaty of “Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination” that tied Lebanon’s foreign policy to Syria’s. Damascus was also granted the final say in administrative and public appointments, especially security and military ones. It was allowed to name judges and ministers and outline media policies of various outlets.
This form of “Arabism” continued under Bashar, who at first attempted to display some openness towards Syria and Lebanon. He gave some breathing room for civil society activists in Syria and Lebanese banks opened branches in Syria. Bashar also approached Christian Lebanese parties that are traditionally opposed to the Assads.
War with Israel
Bashar’s relative “openness” led to the establishment of the “Beirut-Damascus Declaration” in May 2006. It was signed by hundreds of Syrian and Lebanon intellectuals and activists and called on the Syrian government to “correct” relations with Lebanon and respect its sovereignty and independence and end its series of political assassinations. The declaration marked the end of the openness. The Syrian signatories soon found themselves in jail or fired from their jobs.
Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon left Hezbollah and its allies isolated. They were also confronted with a national agenda championed by the March 14 movement. Syrian voices chimed in solidarity with the Lebanese people. Hezbollah and its allies therefore sensed the need to shift attention elsewhere. And as usual, what best way to do that than sparking a war with Israel? Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, leading Israel to declare war on the party.
Hezbollah would declare “divine victory” some 33 days later. Soon after, Iran-backed Hezbollah would assume in Lebanon the role once played by Ghazaleh. Iran’s role in Lebanon would become more pronounced, while Syria still held sway, albeit in back alleys, instead of the rooftops.
Lebanese mourners hold up a sign during the funeral of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut, Lebanon, February 16, 2005 (Reuters)
A deadly duality emerged: a popular and parliamentary majority represented by Fuad Siniora’s government on the one hand, and the “divine victory” camp whose weapons and alliances would prevent the establishment of any stable form of rule on the other. The camp obstructed the government functioning and crippled the entire capital with a sit-in in Downtown Beirut that extended for over a year.
In May 2007, members of the so-called Fatah al-Islam group killed 27 Lebanese soldiers in their sleep. Clashes soon ensued in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp between the group and the army. Later, it would be revealed that the leader of the group, Shaker al-Absi, was working for Syrian intelligence. He had been imprisoned in Damascus and later released. He was tasked with sending terrorists to Iraq. After the Nahr al-Bared battle, he fled to Damascus and was later unsurprisingly killed in mysterious circumstances.
With Hezbollah and its allies holding sway in Lebanon, meeting constitutional deadlines became impossible. It took six months to elect Michel Suleiman president and that was only after Hezbollah and its allies turned their weapons against the Lebanese people in May 2008. The Doha conference was held to restore calm and end the political impasse and Suleiman was elected president.
Even after the crisis was resolved, Hezbollah continued to obstruct political life when things did not go in its favor even though the 2009 parliamentary elections, just like the 2005 polls, handed the March 14 camp a majority.
Syrian revolution and Assad’s downfall
The Syrian revolution erupted in 2011 and people in Lebanon hoped that it would positively impact their country and sweep away the rot and corruption that had been eating away at it. Voices of solidarity rose with the Syrian people, this time calling for freedom and dignity, not Arabism and resistance. Thugs affiliated with Damascus loyalists and Hezbollah soon cracked down on people expressing solidarity.
The northern city of Tripoli suffered the brunt of the crackdown. Its close proximity to Syria had always made it a prime target for the regime’s oppressive practices. In 2013, two mosques in the city were bombed, leaving 49 people dead and over 800 wounded. Unsurprisingly, the terrorist group that had claimed responsibility for the attack was actually affiliated with Damascus.
In 2012, scandal shook Lebanon when former minister Michel Samaha was busted for smuggling explosives from Syria to Lebanon where he planned on carrying out bombings. Ali al-Mamlouk, Bashar’s security advisor, was the mastermind behind the plot.
Ousted Syrian President Bashar all-Assad. (SANA file)
In 2019, as the sanctions tightened around the regime, it turned to Lebanon to ease the strain. The regime’s financial ties to Hezbollah were deepened during that phase, especially when it came to smuggling captagon.
While Syria kept a low profile in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s role in Syria grew more prominent. It reached a glaring peak in 2013 when it intervened militarily in Syria to help the regime fight the opposition seeking its ouster.
On the official level, Lebanon had sought to distance itself from the conflict in Syria. The Baabda Declaration was issued in 2012, stressing that Lebanon would keep a distance from the unrest. All parties, including Hezbollah, had agreed to it. Iran, Hezbollah’s backer, had other plans and soon the party scrambled to the aid of its ally, sowing death and destruction in Syria.
On August 4, 2020, Beirut was in store for yet another tragedy. Ammonium nitrate unsafely stored at the Beirut port mysteriously detonated, destroying swathes of the capital and killing over 200 people. The explosion was the third largest non-nuclear explosion in history. A lot was written about how associates of the Assad regime, who were complicit in shady deals and smuggling operations, had been storing the nitrate at the port.
The claims gained ground when Hezbollah thwarted investigations into the explosion. The party had no problem dispatching its enforcer and security official Wafik Safa to threaten the judge in charge of the probe to shut it down. And so it was, and the investigations have been stalled for years.
Much can be said about the Syrian refugees who fled to Lebanon during their country’s conflict. Strong bonds were forged between them and the locals, but they also strained Lebanon’s already fragile economy, fueling resentment and racism against them.
The Syrian regime collapsed on December 8 and Bashar fled to Moscow. The Lebanese people shared the Syrian people’s delirium in seeing the downfall of their oppressor.
However, Lebanon is not out of the woods yet. Members of the regime fled Syria to Lebanon and local authorities are demanded to arrest them, otherwise risk jeopardizing relations with the new rulers in Damascus. But everyone can safely say, that at the moment, the past 25 years of oppression, death and ruin at the hands of the regime are truly over.
