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Asharq Al-Awsat Exclusive: Technical Error Foiled Hamas Plan to Attack Ashkelon Prison on Oct. 7

Israelis take cover in a bomb shelter while sirens sound as rockets from Gaza are launched towards Israel, in Ashkelon, southern Israel (Reuters)
Israelis take cover in a bomb shelter while sirens sound as rockets from Gaza are launched towards Israel, in Ashkelon, southern Israel (Reuters)
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Asharq Al-Awsat Exclusive: Technical Error Foiled Hamas Plan to Attack Ashkelon Prison on Oct. 7

Israelis take cover in a bomb shelter while sirens sound as rockets from Gaza are launched towards Israel, in Ashkelon, southern Israel (Reuters)
Israelis take cover in a bomb shelter while sirens sound as rockets from Gaza are launched towards Israel, in Ashkelon, southern Israel (Reuters)

Hamas was planning to storm Ashkelon Central Prison, close to the Gaza Strip, during the al-Aqsa Flood operation on Oct. 7 to free hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, in a mission that would have constituted another unprecedented blow to Israel.
In a special report, Asharq Al-Awsat revealed the details of the attack, which was supposed to target the prison but failed due to a technical error that led the attacking group to a nearby settlement instead of the prison.
Sources in the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip told Asharq Al-Awsat that one of the first groups affiliated with the elite unit of the al-Qassam Brigades had a mission to reach Ashkelon Prison, which contains hundreds of Palestinian prisoners in an attempt to liberate them, but the mission failed.
Sources close to the command of al-Qassam Brigades revealed that one of the groups consisted of 23 fighters and was explicitly assigned to reach Ashkelon Prison and free prisoners from it.
Another group's mission was to infiltrate a military base in the Ashkelon area before moving on to assist those already at the prison.
The sources reported that the group set off towards Ashkelon, crossed the border, and reached Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, where it clashed with Israeli security forces. They also arrived in the Netiv HaAsara settlement.
Initial investigations showed the mistake resulted from the designated guide in charge of GPS and maps, who made a directional error leading the group southwards.
Precise intrusion plan
According to the sources, the plan to storm the prison was carefully drawn up and in sufficient detail, and al-Qassam wanted it to constitute a solid blow to Israel, among other strikes on Oct. 7.
They explained that the plan relied on attacking the main gate of the prison using explosives and anti-tank missiles to blow up the gate and security positions along the prison fence, alongside rocket fire from Gaza towards the prison, with a signal from the group that it was there.
Ashkelon Prison is about 13 kilometers from the nearest border point in the northern Gaza Strip, southeast of the city.
The plan also relied upon the cooperation of the prisoners to rise and riot, which would assist the group.
However, the Qassam command did not receive any signals from the group that it had reached the prison, and it later became clear that it had arrived in Sderot, so it was instructed to wait.
The group engaged in clashes that lasted for hours with the Israeli police and army forces, which led to the Israeli forces losing control of the town after two al-Qassam groups met there.
It appears that this was one of the reasons for the continued clashes in Sderot for about three days after the Palestinian attackers barricaded themselves inside the police station and settlers' homes.
The sources confirmed that the al-Qassam Brigade did not abandon the plan to storm the prison.
Four members who participated in the storming of kibbutz Zikim were instructed to continue to try and reach the prison but were repelled by Israeli security forces before being targeted by air strikes.
- Support unit
The al-Qassam leadership had sent "elite" support units to the groups that led the storming of the border with Israel to facilitate their tasks, especially after their success in capturing dozens of Israelis.
The troop's support succeeded in killing, wounding, and capturing more Israelis and transporting those who were captured into the Gaza Strip.
The entire attack was aimed at capturing Israeli soldiers to push Tel Aviv into an exchange deal after it ignored four detainees held by Hamas. The operation later expanded in an unplanned manner.
Al-Qassam Brigades did not conduct any extensive investigation into the failure of its members to reach Ashkelon Prison due to the ongoing war for more than 130 days.
- Why Ashkelon?
In Israel, Ashkelon Central Prison is known as "Shikma Prison," number 713 in the Southern District. It was established during the British Mandate as a headquarters for the British Army stationed in the city to receive official British delegations.
After the defeat of 1967, it was transformed into the Ashkelon Police Station. With the escalation of the Palestinian national resistance against the occupation and a significant increase in the number of prisoners, the Israeli army leadership issued a military decree opening the Ashkelon prison.
With the increase of Palestinian resistance and operations against Israel, increasing the number of detainees among them, there was an immediate need to open a prison, and it was decided that this building would become a maximum security prison.

Ashkelon Central Prison began receiving Palestinian prisoners at the beginning of 1969. It holds about a thousand detainees. Each prisoner is allotted one and a half meters of space, and the rooms are often crowded. They are forced into compulsory labor, leading to riots and collective strikes.
The prison is famous for its damp cells that do not receive sunlight and the harsh, unbearable heat.

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Arab World

Victims of Iraq’s Tishreen Protests Prepare to Sue Badr Organization Leader

Some Iraqis with disabilities were among the victims of the crackdown on the 2019 Tishreen protests (Reuters)
Some Iraqis with disabilities were among the victims of the crackdown on the 2019 Tishreen protests (Reuters)
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Victims of Iraq’s Tishreen Protests Prepare to Sue Badr Organization Leader

Some Iraqis with disabilities were among the victims of the crackdown on the 2019 Tishreen protests (Reuters)
Some Iraqis with disabilities were among the victims of the crackdown on the 2019 Tishreen protests (Reuters)

Reactions continued to mount in Iraq over controversial remarks by Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri about the involvement of armed factions in suppressing the 2019 Tishreen protest movement, amid reports of moves to take legal action against him.

Defending the factions and what he described as their role in protecting the current political system, both by fighting ISIS and by confronting attempts to undermine its foundations, al-Amiri said the factions were responsible for quelling what he called the “Tishreen sedition,” referring to the popular protests that erupted in October 2019.

His remarks appeared to be a slip of the tongue, particularly as they came nearly seven years after the mass uprising, which claimed thousands of victims at the hands of what was then referred to as the “third party,” whose identity has never been revealed. The protesters’ sole slogan was: “We want a homeland.”

Al-Amiri is one of the leading figures in the Shiite Coordination Framework and a member of a three-man committee that also includes former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. The committee was formed to mediate between the Iraqi government, on one side, and armed factions refusing to surrender their weapons, on the other.

Al-Amiri made the controversial remarks at a public gathering several days ago, saying: “It was the resistance that courageously stood against the Tishreen sedition and preserved the state and the political system.”

His comments angered the families of protesters killed in the demonstrations, as well as those who were wounded.

Slip of the tongue

Al-Amiri’s remarks appeared intended to justify caution over demands that the factions surrender their weapons, particularly those that have said their arms are rooted in ideological commitments and tied to the ongoing confrontation between the United States and Iran.

His comments also followed a visit to Iraq last week by Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

But the remarks, widely described as a “slip of the tongue,” triggered a wave of criticism from victims of the Tishreen movement. Some drew a direct connection between al-Amiri’s statement that armed factions had confronted the “sedition” in 2019 and the unidentified “third party” accused of killing protesters.

The armed factions had not previously stated a position on accusations that they were the mysterious “third party.”

Al-Amiri’s comments, however, appeared to suggest that the party’s identity was now known, prompting victims’ families to begin pursuing legal action.

Al-Amiri has not personally responded to interpretations of his remarks. However, a Shi’ite politician close to the Coordination Framework told Asharq Al-Awsat that al-Amiri’s comments, as he intended them, were a defense of the factions’ position at a pivotal moment.

“The Tishreen movement was supported by regional and international parties and was indeed the most serious movement against the political class at the time, even though its slogans were patriotic,” the politician said.

“Attempts at the time to demonize the so-called third party as hostile to both sides — the government and the protesters — led to accusations against Baathists and others, including Israelis,” he added. “Those attempts were aimed at achieving one objective: protecting the political process from threats, as the ruling political class perceived them.”

The source said al-Amiri “could not have found stronger evidence of efforts to protect the political system than what the factions had done, perhaps without realizing the repercussions.”

“The factions protected the political system through one method: confronting the protesters and attempting to suppress them, which led to further casualties,” he said.

Asked why al-Amiri had not clarified his remarks to ease the fierce backlash, which is expected to move into the courts, the Shi’ite politician said: “Any justification or retraction would weaken his position and increase the accusations against the factions at a time when they are facing intense pressure to disarm.”

“He therefore appears to prefer confronting the protesters’ families, even if that produces legal consequences that may not be in his favor,” he added.

Impunity

Dozens of families of victims of the Tishreen movement have begun completing documents proving that their relatives were killed or wounded in clashes with security forces while taking part in the 2019 protests.

They plan to submit the documents as part of formal lawsuits before Iraqi courts following the Badr leader’s remarks.

The families, who have appointed lawyers to represent them in cases against al-Amiri, are undoubtedly aware that the courts may not convict him directly because his remarks were political.

Their likely objective, however, is to restore the reputations of their relatives who were killed or wounded after the authorities branded protesters at the time with harsh labels such as “agents” and “children of the embassies.”

Legal expert Ali al-Tamimi told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the killing of protesters constitutes genocide under Iraqi law and is not subject to a statute of limitations.”

“The attacks against protesters in Baghdad, Nasiriyah, Karbala and Najaf constituted acts of terrorism under Iraqi law and its definition of terrorism,” he said.

“These crimes are not subject to a statute of limitations or the passage of time under the convention barring statutory limitations for genocide crimes and can therefore be pursued at any point in the future,” Tamimi added.

Arab World

Lebanon: Post-Ali al-Taher…Israeli Political Pressure Mounts

(FILES) A photograph taken from the southern Lebanese area of Nabatieh shows smoke as it rises from the site of Israeli strikes that targeted the hilltops of the mountainous area of the strategic Ali al-Taher Ridge on August 14, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
(FILES) A photograph taken from the southern Lebanese area of Nabatieh shows smoke as it rises from the site of Israeli strikes that targeted the hilltops of the mountainous area of the strategic Ali al-Taher Ridge on August 14, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
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Lebanon: Post-Ali al-Taher…Israeli Political Pressure Mounts

(FILES) A photograph taken from the southern Lebanese area of Nabatieh shows smoke as it rises from the site of Israeli strikes that targeted the hilltops of the mountainous area of the strategic Ali al-Taher Ridge on August 14, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
(FILES) A photograph taken from the southern Lebanese area of Nabatieh shows smoke as it rises from the site of Israeli strikes that targeted the hilltops of the mountainous area of the strategic Ali al-Taher Ridge on August 14, 2026. (Photo by AFP)

Israel’s announcement that it has established what it called “operational control” over Ali al-Taher ridge marks a new phase in southern Lebanon, raising questions that go beyond the site’s fate: what comes next militarily, and how the development could shape forthcoming negotiations.

The Israeli military said troops from its 36th Division had gained “operational control” above and below ground in the area. It said Hezbollah fighters had been killed and others had fled, while operations continued to destroy underground facilities.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the ridge no longer posed a threat to Israel. Defense Minister Israel Katz said Israeli forces would not withdraw from what he described as a “security zone” in southern Lebanon until Hezbollah was disarmed.

He said control of the Ali al-Taher ridge marks the end of a phase in consolidating Israeli control over this area.

Hezbollah questions Israel’s claim

Ihab Hamadeh, an MP from Hezbollah’s Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc, questioned whether Israel had secured full control of Ali al-Taher.

He said the continuing bombardment contradicted claims of complete control on the ground and that Israel had released no images showing its forces entering the facility or seizing the weapons it said were there.

Mahmoud Qamati, deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, said Israel had tried to portray Ali al-Taher as a “vast military facility” when it was, in fact, “a collection of defensive positions.”

Separately, Israel’s Maariv newspaper quoted an Israeli military source as saying 15 bodies had been found inside tunnels in the area.

Leverage in Rome

Academic and political researcher Hayat Hariri told Asharq Al-Awsat that the developments at Ali al-Taher were far from routine.

“What happened at Ali al-Taher ridge was not an ordinary military development, as some in Hezbollah and among its allies are trying to portray it,” she said.

“Nor can it be placed in the same category as sites that witnessed previous confrontations, because Ali al-Taher’s importance lies in its strategic location and its impact on the broader battlefield in southern Lebanon.”

Hariri said operational control of the ridge would give Israel influence over a broad swathe of southern Lebanon.

“The ridge overlooks Nabatieh and the Marjayoun plain as far as the Upper Galilee, giving it considerable military and strategic importance,” she said.

“More dangerously, any advance beyond Ali al-Taher could make it easier to move toward Iqlim al-Tuffah, Jabal al-Rayhan and the Jezzine district.”

“If Israel continues along this path, then, in my assessment, it is moving toward entrenching a buffer zone stretching from Naqoura to the western Bekaa and geographically linked to the Syrian theater — a vision Israel has discussed in various forms since 2023.”

Hariri said the battlefield developments, led by those at Ali al-Taher, would give Israel additional leverage over Lebanon in the anticipated negotiations in Rome.

“Israel will try to argue that the Lebanese state was unable to push Hezbollah to hand the site over to the Lebanese army and that the Israeli military was the force that completed the mission on the ground,” she said.

“If Israel succeeds in establishing its narrative that the Lebanese state remains unable to address Hezbollah’s weapons and deployment, it may gain additional room to act, though that would not necessarily mean heading toward an all-out war.”

Hariri said the development would increase political pressure on the Lebanese state and give Israel a new bargaining chip in the next round of talks in Rome.

“Even the delay in negotiations can be read in light of the developments at Ali al-Taher,” she said. “Before going to the negotiating table, Israel wants to strengthen its position on the ground and try to impose a new security and political reality in southern Lebanon, then negotiate from that position.”

Limits of a military advance

Retired Brigadier General Khalil al-Jamil, a former commander of the Lebanese army’s South Litani Sector, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the fall of Ali al-Taher represented the loss of an important strategic position, but said Israel’s claim of control required closer scrutiny.

“My assessment is that Israel has not yet secured the entire site,” Jamil said. “It has begun establishing control over the surface and moving across it, while continuing to strike the tunnels and facilities beneath it.”

“What Israel calls operational control means, at this stage, that its forces can move across the ridge, its bulldozers are operating there, and it has established fire control over the surrounding area and begun entering parts of the site.

“It does not necessarily mean Israel has entered and fully secured every tunnel and underground facility.”

Jamil said Ali al-Taher was particularly important to the Nabatieh area.

“To the west, it overlooks Nabatieh and its surroundings, including Shoukin, Mayfadoun, Kfar Jouz and Kfar Rumman,” he said. “To the east, it overlooks the valley stretching toward Iqlim al-Tuffah and Jezzine and as far as Khardali.

“Controlling it, therefore, expands the area Israel can monitor and dominate with fire.”

Jamil said, however, that higher ground remained nearby, most notably al-Rayhan, Sujud, and Jabal al-Rafi, all of which overlook Ali al-Taher and the surrounding area.

“What happened is an Israeli military achievement and a loss for Hezbollah, but it is not a strategic loss on a scale that would mean the collapse of the front,” he said.

Arab World

Asharq Al-Awsat Reveals Details of Operation to Kidnap Senior Hamas Official

Locals gather at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City, 01 September 2026. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
Locals gather at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City, 01 September 2026. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
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Asharq Al-Awsat Reveals Details of Operation to Kidnap Senior Hamas Official

Locals gather at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City, 01 September 2026. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
Locals gather at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City, 01 September 2026. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER

Sources in Hamas have revealed new details about the operation to kidnap the group's senior security official, Moeen al-Arabid, last Tuesday by an Israeli special forces unit that carried out a rare operation deep inside Hamas-controlled territory west of Gaza City.

The operation killed Samah al-Arabid, the abductee's wife, and wounded two of his sons, his daughter, and two of his bodyguards. Two children who were in the area when the Israeli special forces unit carried out the operation were also killed.

How the operation began

Sources familiar with the investigation told Asharq Al-Awsat that the security operation began about two months ago, when officers from Israel's Shin Bet security agency posed as representatives of an international aid organization that would provide assistance to Palestinians by setting up small businesses, including stalls selling vegetables, drinks and other goods in the target area, specifically along what is known as Villas Street in the Katiba neighborhood, west of Gaza City.

According to the sources, Shin Bet used Palestinian operatives, including women, to run the project and supply them with vegetables every day, presenting them as aid from the organization. The proceeds from the sales were supposedly to benefit those participating in the project.

The operatives later asked them to monitor certain homes and track the movements of specific individuals in the area, including al-Arabid.

The sources said it later emerged that those running the project had been collaborating with Shin Bet. On the day of the operation, new individuals appeared at some of the stalls, while others had been there since the previous day selling vegetables. They were later identified as Shin Bet operatives who had arrived in the area and concealed their weapons inside the stalls. When the operation began, they took part in the attack before disappearing and withdrawing from the area.

This was not the first time Israel has used the cover of international organizations to conduct operations inside the Gaza Strip. A similar incident occurred when an Israeli special forces unit infiltrated Al-Shifa Hospital in March 2024 before military reinforcements arrived at the site. That operation subsequently continued for two weeks, during which Hamas members and operatives from its various security and military branches were killed or captured, including commanders from the Al-Qassam Brigades.

Prior presence

Regarding the latest operation west of Gaza City, the sources said the Israeli special forces operatives do not appear to have entered the area beforehand except for several brief visits, apparently to gain a clearer picture of the area and finalize plans for the operation.

Instead, they relied on surveillance carried out by the collaborators. According to the investigation so far, those collaborators apparently did not know the precise objective of the operation or the actual plan. Some also documented on camera whatever their Israeli handlers instructed them to record.

The investigation indicates that some of the Shin Bet operatives who carried out the operation had been in the area one or two days earlier in moving vehicles. At least one of those vehicles was later targeted and destroyed by Israeli aircraft after the operation.

Zero hour

When the attack began, the special forces unit attempted to catch al-Arabid off guard by opening fire on him as he emerged from his home with one of his bodyguards. He managed to fire back, while the Israeli forces fired rounds containing an anesthetic agent at him.

Another bodyguard opened fire on the force, while two of al-Arabid's sons and his wife also fired at the attackers. All were subsequently wounded by gunfire. At the same time, a small quadcopter drone dropped a bomb on the house.

The attack killed his wife and critically wounded one of his sons. His other son's eye had to be surgically removed. He had been due to get married that same day. Other members of the family and bodyguards were also wounded.

According to the injured people interviewed as part of the investigation, al-Arabid attempted to escape through the rear of the house during the ensuing clashes. He was surprised by another Israeli force waiting there. Although wounded and crawling, he continued to fire at them. They then detonated a stun grenade near him before taking him captive.

One source said the initial denial that al-Arabid had been abducted resulted from his son's insistence that his father had managed to escape. The family did not know that another Israeli force was positioned at the rear of the house and had captured him, leading to confusion in the initial reports about what had happened.

The investigation found that after al-Arabid fled, the Israeli special forces searched the wounded in an attempt to establish his identity before leaving them behind. Some were bleeding at the scene, including his wife. The force later captured him in the street behind the house as he attempted to escape despite his injuries.

Arrests of collaborators

According to one source, at least 36 suspects have been arrested so far and are being questioned over suspected involvement in assisting the Israeli special forces unit. The source said some of those arrested have confessed to collaborating with Israel, while investigations are still underway.

In an account broadly consistent with information provided to Asharq Al-Awsat sources, Gaza's Al-Hares security platform reported that three collaborators, including a woman, had been arrested. They allegedly posed as an international relief organization to facilitate movement in the area and gather intelligence.

Their confessions reportedly indicated that the special forces unit arrived at the scene only hours before the operation was exposed and had no prior presence in the area. They also said the outbreak of clashes prompted the special forces to call for assistance from Israeli aircraft.

Hamas previously arrested dozens of suspects following a similar operation in 2018, when an Israeli special forces unit infiltrated the Gaza Strip and conducted extensive activities there for several months.

Another abduction attempt

Separately, Al-Quds Brigades, the armed wing of Islamic Jihad, said early Friday that armed groups had attempted to abduct one of its members on Al-Jameiza Street in the town of al-Qarara, northeast of Khan Younis.

The group said the armed men entered the area with support from Israeli drones. They were discovered, triggering clashes that left several members of the group dead or wounded.

It said Israeli drones intervened to assist the special forces in withdrawing from the area. Members of the force then killed one of the Al-Quds Brigades members, Fadi al-Abadala, after shooting him and leaving him at the scene.

A field source told Asharq Al-Awsat that al-Abadala arrived at Nasser Medical Complex with his hands bound, indicating that the abduction had apparently succeeded. The source said he may have been interrogated before the abduction attempt and subsequently executed, adding that the investigation into the incident is ongoing.