Al-Qassam Brigades: Militant Force Shaking Israel - What Do We Know?


A boy carries what appears to be an RPG launcher during an event held by al-Qassam Brigades in the city of Gaza last summer (AFP)
A boy carries what appears to be an RPG launcher during an event held by al-Qassam Brigades in the city of Gaza last summer (AFP)
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Al-Qassam Brigades: Militant Force Shaking Israel - What Do We Know?


A boy carries what appears to be an RPG launcher during an event held by al-Qassam Brigades in the city of Gaza last summer (AFP)
A boy carries what appears to be an RPG launcher during an event held by al-Qassam Brigades in the city of Gaza last summer (AFP)

The surprise assault launched by the al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, along the Gaza border on Oct. 7 of last year, has heralded a notable shift in the Israeli-Arab conflict.

They caught Israeli forces off guard, resulting in the death of over 1,200 Israelis and the capture of around 240 others.

The attack, resembling scenes from a Hollywood thriller, underscores the ongoing struggle.

Since the Oct.7 ambush, Israeli authorities claim to have dismantled a significant portion of the paramilitary group’s infrastructure and taken out as many as 12,000 of its fighters.

But what do we know about the al-Qassam Brigades, currently locked in a protracted conflict with Israel?

Formation, Focus on Prisoner Release

Al-Qassam Brigades were established in early 1988 under the name “Majd,” later changed to its current name.

The group’s security arm, which keeps the title “Majd” to this day, was tasked with hunting down Israeli agents.

One of al-Qassam Brigades’ key founders was Yahya Sinwar, now the leader of Hamas in Gaza and a prime target for Israel due to his alleged involvement in the Oct. 7 assault.

Al-Qassam Brigades gained attention in 1994 with attempts to abduct Israelis, succeeding in their first capture of soldier Nachshon Wachsman in the West Bank.

Wachsman was killed by Israeli forces along with his captors in a military operation near a village between Ramallah and Jerusalem.

Thereafter, the swapping of Palestinian prisoners for kidnapped Israelis became a major goal for al-Qassam Brigades.

This led to intense operations, notably during the group’s “Engineers Phase” in the 1990s, led by Yahya Ayyash.

That phase witnessed several suicide bombings inside Israel, which temporarily halted but resumed strongly during the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000.

Kidnapping Israelis remained a priority for Hamas, especially in 2006 before consolidating control over Gaza in 2007.

Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was then captured by Palestinian militants in a cross-border raid via tunnels near the Israeli border. Hamas held him captive for over five years until his release in 2011 as part of a prisoner exchange deal that saw the release of 1,027 Palestinians from Israeli jails.

Despite years of conflict and attempts to pressure Israel, including capturing soldiers during the 2014 war and infiltrating across borders, the al-Qassam Brigades’ efforts for a prisoner exchange deal have largely been ignored by successive Israeli governments.

Oct. 7, Triggering a Catastrophic Conflict

Al-Qassam Brigades’ desire to kidnap Israelis to pressure their government for a prisoner exchange deal is believed to have prompted their surprise attack along the Gaza border on Oct. 7.

This assault resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Israelis and the capture of hundreds more, including many soldiers, marking an unprecedented event that Israel likened to its worst experience since the Nazi Holocaust.

In response, Israel launched a massive war on Gaza, resulting in the deaths of approximately 30,000 Palestinians and widespread destruction.

Since the war’s onset, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared the objective of “eliminating Hamas” and completely dismantling al-Qassam Brigades.

After about 145 days of conflict, Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant claim to have killed about 12,000 Hamas fighters and disbanded all brigades except for those positioned in the southern Gaza city of Rafah.

However, these figures are disputed, with Hamas initially refuting reports of 6,000 casualties within their ranks.

In the Eye of the Storm: Al-Qassam Brigades’ Situation

Asharq Al-Awsat has tried to shed light on the state of the al-Qassam Brigades using insights from informed Palestinian sources and field reports from Gaza.

According to these sources, Israel has failed to target leaders Mohammed Deif and Marwan Issa, who are top on the assassination list.

They also haven’t been able to reach leaders of the Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Gaza brigades. Meanwhile, Israel has successfully assassinated leaders from other brigades, along with many frontline fighters.

Sources mentioned that precise figures regarding casualties among al-Qassam Brigades couldn’t be provided.

However, they confirmed Israel's success in targeting the group’s leaders and other activists, sometimes through massacres targeting their families. These sources also questioned Israel’s reported figures, suggesting they were misleading.

According to available information, Israel has so far succeeded in assassinating two of al-Qassam Brigades’ leaders: Ayman Nawfal, commander of the central brigade, and Ahmed al-Ghandour, commander of the northern brigade, who was killed along with four other field leaders.

Ayman Siyam, commander of the rocket unit in al-Qassam Brigades, and other officials in Hamas’ military wing, such as Wael Rajab, Rafat Salman, Ibrahim al-Bayari, and Wissam Farhat, have also been targeted.

Despite details about lower-level leaders being currently unavailable, sources confirmed that many have been killed in assassinations, operations, and clashes.

Al-Qassam Brigades: A Flexible Structure

The al-Qassam Brigades once had divisions, battalions, and other units totaling up to 30,000 before the current Gaza conflict erupted.

According to Asharq Al-Awsat sources, the group’s structure is highly adaptable, even during communication blackouts with leadership. In such cases, deputies are appointed to each commander’s position.

The al-Qassam Brigades have an integrated military system, with five brigades: Northern, Gaza, Central, Khan Yunis, and Rafah.

Each brigade has several battalions, factions, and military formations.

Thousands of fighters have been trained by instructors, some of whom received military training outside Gaza, in places like Lebanon, Iran, and Syria.

Israel says al-Qassam Brigades has 24 military battalions, a claim supported by Asharq Al-Awsat sources.

Each battalion has between 600 to 1200 fighters, organized into brigades, factions, and formations. While the exact number of fighters isn’t clear, al-Qassam Brigades’ recent focus has been on recruiting young people.

Before the war, estimates suggest that al-Qassam Brigades numbered between 25,000 to 30,000 fighters.

Their structure includes various specialized units within each brigade, such as military judiciary, manufacturing, monitoring, combat support, intelligence, and more.

Although they lost some capabilities during the current conflict due to Israel neutralizing many tunnels and hiding spots, fighters in al-Qassam Brigades still display strong combat abilities in ongoing clashes in Gaza.



Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
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Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)

When Israeli and US strikes killed Ali Khamenei at the start of the Middle East war, Iran's security chief Ali Larijani became even more powerful than he had been for decades.

Israel's Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Tuesday that Larijani had been killed, though Iran's authorities have not confirmed his death.

Larijani had since the start of the war played a far more visible role than the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public since he was appointed to replace his slain father.

The security chief, on the other hand, was seen walking with crowds at a pro-government rally last week in Tehran, in a sign of defiance against Israel and the US.

His killing, if confirmed, would be a major blow against Iran, undermining a key figure seen as capable of navigating both ideology and diplomacy.

- Pragmatist -

Adept at balancing ideological loyalty with pragmatic statecraft, Larijani was central prior to the war to Iran's nuclear policy and strategic diplomacy.

Bespectacled and known for his measured tone, the 68-year-old was believed to enjoy the confidence of the late Khamenei, after a long career in the military, media and legislature.

In 2025, after Iran's last war with Israel and the US, he was appointed head of Iran's top security body, the Supreme National Security Council -- a position he had held nearly two decades earlier -- coordinating defense strategies and overseeing nuclear policy.

He later became increasingly visible in the diplomatic arena, travelling to Gulf states such as Oman and Qatar as Tehran cautiously engaged in nuclear negotiations that were ultimately scuppered by the war.

- 'Canny operator' -

"Larijani is a true insider, a canny operator, familiar with how the system operates," Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group's project director for Iran, said before the Middle East war began.

Born in Najaf, Iraq in 1957 to a prominent Shiite cleric who was close to the Islamic Republic's founder Khomeini, Larijani's family has been influential within Iran's political system for decades.

Some of his relatives have been the targets of corruption allegations over the years, which they denied.

He earned a PhD in Western Philosophy from the University of Tehran.

A veteran of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq war, Larijani later headed state broadcasting IRIB for a decade from 1994 before serving as parliamentary speaker from 2008 to 2020.

In 1996, he was appointed as Khamenei's representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). He later became secretary of the SNSC and chief nuclear negotiator, leading talks with Britain, France, Germany and Russia between 2005 and 2007.

He ran in the 2005 presidential elections, losing to populist candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with whom he later had disagreements over nuclear diplomacy.

Larijani was then disqualified from running for president in both 2021 and 2024.

Observers viewed his return as the head of the SNSC as signaling a turn reflecting his reputation as a conservative capable of combining ideological commitment with pragmatism.

Larijani supported the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with world powers which unraveled three years later after US President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement.

In March 2025, Larijani warned that sustained external pressure could alter Iran's nuclear posture.

"We are not moving towards (nuclear) weapons, but if you do something wrong in the Iranian nuclear issue, you will force Iran to move towards that because it has to defend itself," he told state television.

Larijani repeatedly insisted negotiations with Washington should remain confined to the nuclear file and defended uranium enrichment as Iran's sovereign right.

- Violent repression -

Larijani was among officials sanctioned by the US in January over what Washington described as "violently repressing the Iranian people", following nationwide protests which erupted weeks earlier due to the rising cost of living.

According to rights groups, thousands of people were killed in the government's brutal crackdown of the protests.

Larijani acknowledged that economic pressures had "led to the protests", but blamed the violence which ensued on foreign involvement by the United States and Israel.


Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
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Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)

Western diplomatic sources have outlined to Asharq Al-Awsat the tight inner circle surrounding Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, shedding light on the key figures shaping decision-making at a critical moment for the country.

According to these sources, any serious discussion of a comprehensive ceasefire in the ongoing war with Israel and the US is unlikely to begin until this inner circle concludes that the country has reached a point of military exhaustion and that prolonging the conflict would only deepen its strategic predicament.

The sources also dismissed claims over Khamenei’s lack of experience over decision-making. Khamenei has long been involved in the decision-making process within the office of his late father, former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, they stressed. He has also maintained extensive ties with Iran’s military leadership, particularly within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

A key figure in this circle is Mohsen Rezaei, appointed by Mojtaba Khamenei as a senior military adviser. Often described as a “man of war”, Rezaei is also believed to have been among those who advised Khomeini to accept the ceasefire with Iraq at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when Iranian forces were reportedly exhausted.

The sources identified several influential figures in the Supreme Leader’s inner circle. The most prominent among them is parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander who is said to have played a leading role during last year’s 12-day conflict with Israel.

Other key figures include General Ahmad Vahidi, the commander of the IRGC, who previously served as minister under both presidents Ebrahim Raisi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and was the first commander of the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the IRGC.

General Rahim Safavi, a senior adviser during the tenure of the slain Khamenei, General Ali Abdollahi, head of operations at the armed forces’ general staff, General Majid Mousavi, commander of the IRGC’s missile unit, and Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, head of its naval forces, are also part of the new supreme leader’s inner circle.

Despite the heavy blows, the Iranian regime has so far succeeded in preventing any fragmentation within its military and leaderships, the sources noted.

Developments indicate that Iran’s military leadership had preprepared a strategy aimed at making any war against it extremely costly for both the region and the global economy.

This strategy, they said, rests on two main pillars: first, “drawing Gulf states into the theater of war through missile and drone attacks under the pretext of targeting US presence”; and second, “causing widespread or total disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.”

The sources added that Tehran is betting on what it perceives as US President Donald Trump’s limited patience for prolonged conflict, especially amid rising oil prices, which Iran hopes could approach $200 per barrel, the proximity of US midterm elections, and the lack of broad public support for war.

On the other side, US and Israeli forces have escalated strikes in an effort to demonstrate the scale of destruction inflicted on Iran’s military arsenal and defense industries.

The objective of regime change appears to have receded in favor of a strategy of attrition, one that could compel Iran to scale back what the sources described as its “self-destructive behavior.”

The sources suggested that the new supreme leader may initially find it difficult to adopt a flexible or conciliatory stance in his first test of leadership. However, a growing sense that continued attrition could trigger internal unrest — or even raise questions about the regime’s survival — may ultimately lead senior military figures to conclude that preserving the system justifies accepting painful compromises.

They also warned that missile and drone attacks targeting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries could prove counterproductive, particularly as they have largely struck civilian targets.

The sources stressed that the Gulf states’ significant regional and international standing could form the basis for mounting global pressure on Iran to agree to a ceasefire. When that moment comes, Tehran may find that the war has set it back by years.


Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
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Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)

Cheap and deadly, Iranian-designed Shahed drones have inflicted major damage in the Middle East war, and have anti-jamming and other capabilities that make them difficult to stop.

- Offline navigation -

Designed to explode on impact, Shahed drones connect to GPS to register their location shortly before or after takeoff, then typically turn off their receivers, said Thomas Withington, a researcher at Britain's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

The drones then travel long distances towards their target using gyroscopes that measure their speed, direction and position -- known as an "inertial navigation system".

"GPS is going to get jammed by whatever is protecting the target," Withington told AFP.

"If you look at a map of GPS jamming at the moment in the Middle East, you see that there's a lot of jamming... By not using the GPS, you avoid that."

The drones can then return to GPS just before impact for a more precise strike, or remain offline.

"It's not always necessarily very accurate, but it's as accurate as it needs to be," said Withington.

- Anti-jamming mechanisms -

Russia has been making Shahed-style drones to use in its war in Ukraine.

The US-based Institute for Science and International Security found in 2023 that those drones used "state-of-art antenna interference suppression" to remove enemy jamming signals while preserving the desired GPS signal.

Anti-jamming mechanisms were found in the wreckage of an Iranian-made drone that struck Cyprus in the opening days of the Middle East war, a European industry source told AFP.

"They have put (the Shahed) together using off-the-shelf parts, but it has... many of the capabilities that US military GPS equipment has," Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, told AFP.

Defending against them now requires sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.

"The Shaheds have been upgraded," said Ukrainian air force spokesman Yuriy Ignat.

- Stealth materials -

The Shahed is built from "lightweight radar-absorbing materials", such as plastic and fiberglass, a 2023 RUSI paper said.

Their small size and low altitude allow them to slip through aerial defense systems.

- Other positioning systems? -

Some experts think Iran is using multiple positioning systems, making it easier for its drones to dodge jamming.

Serhii Beskrestnov, a technology adviser to the Ukrainian defense ministry, said Iran is using the BeiDou system, a Chinese rival to the US-developed GPS.

And the Russia-made version of Shaheds uses both BeiDou and the Russian equivalent, GLONASS, he said.

Others suspect Iran may be using LORAN, a radio navigation system developed during World War II.

LORAN, which does not require satellites, largely fell out of use when GPS emerged.

But Iran said in 2016 it was reviving the technology, which requires a network of large ground-based transmitters, though experts have not confirmed it is active today.

- Counter-strategies -

Militaries have mainly defended against Shaheds by shooting them down with cannon fire, missiles and interceptor drones, with the United States and Israel also developing lasers.

But jamming can work, as Ukraine has shown, as can "spoofing", which involves hacking into the drone's navigation system to change its destination.

Ukraine used electronic warfare to neutralize 4,652 attack drones from mid-May to mid-July 2025 -- not far off the number it shot down in the same period, 6,041, according to AFP analysis of Ukrainian military data.

Its experts insist that electronic and conventional defenses are often used in tandem against the drones.