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Al-Qassam Brigades: Militant Force Shaking Israel - What Do We Know?

A boy carries what appears to be an RPG launcher during an event held by al-Qassam Brigades in the city of Gaza last summer (AFP)
A boy carries what appears to be an RPG launcher during an event held by al-Qassam Brigades in the city of Gaza last summer (AFP)
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Al-Qassam Brigades: Militant Force Shaking Israel - What Do We Know?

A boy carries what appears to be an RPG launcher during an event held by al-Qassam Brigades in the city of Gaza last summer (AFP)
A boy carries what appears to be an RPG launcher during an event held by al-Qassam Brigades in the city of Gaza last summer (AFP)

The surprise assault launched by the al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, along the Gaza border on Oct. 7 of last year, has heralded a notable shift in the Israeli-Arab conflict.

They caught Israeli forces off guard, resulting in the death of over 1,200 Israelis and the capture of around 240 others.

The attack, resembling scenes from a Hollywood thriller, underscores the ongoing struggle.

Since the Oct.7 ambush, Israeli authorities claim to have dismantled a significant portion of the paramilitary group’s infrastructure and taken out as many as 12,000 of its fighters.

But what do we know about the al-Qassam Brigades, currently locked in a protracted conflict with Israel?

Formation, Focus on Prisoner Release

Al-Qassam Brigades were established in early 1988 under the name “Majd,” later changed to its current name.

The group’s security arm, which keeps the title “Majd” to this day, was tasked with hunting down Israeli agents.

One of al-Qassam Brigades’ key founders was Yahya Sinwar, now the leader of Hamas in Gaza and a prime target for Israel due to his alleged involvement in the Oct. 7 assault.

Al-Qassam Brigades gained attention in 1994 with attempts to abduct Israelis, succeeding in their first capture of soldier Nachshon Wachsman in the West Bank.

Wachsman was killed by Israeli forces along with his captors in a military operation near a village between Ramallah and Jerusalem.

Thereafter, the swapping of Palestinian prisoners for kidnapped Israelis became a major goal for al-Qassam Brigades.

This led to intense operations, notably during the group’s “Engineers Phase” in the 1990s, led by Yahya Ayyash.

That phase witnessed several suicide bombings inside Israel, which temporarily halted but resumed strongly during the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000.

Kidnapping Israelis remained a priority for Hamas, especially in 2006 before consolidating control over Gaza in 2007.

Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was then captured by Palestinian militants in a cross-border raid via tunnels near the Israeli border. Hamas held him captive for over five years until his release in 2011 as part of a prisoner exchange deal that saw the release of 1,027 Palestinians from Israeli jails.

Despite years of conflict and attempts to pressure Israel, including capturing soldiers during the 2014 war and infiltrating across borders, the al-Qassam Brigades’ efforts for a prisoner exchange deal have largely been ignored by successive Israeli governments.

Oct. 7, Triggering a Catastrophic Conflict

Al-Qassam Brigades’ desire to kidnap Israelis to pressure their government for a prisoner exchange deal is believed to have prompted their surprise attack along the Gaza border on Oct. 7.

This assault resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Israelis and the capture of hundreds more, including many soldiers, marking an unprecedented event that Israel likened to its worst experience since the Nazi Holocaust.

In response, Israel launched a massive war on Gaza, resulting in the deaths of approximately 30,000 Palestinians and widespread destruction.

Since the war’s onset, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared the objective of “eliminating Hamas” and completely dismantling al-Qassam Brigades.

After about 145 days of conflict, Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant claim to have killed about 12,000 Hamas fighters and disbanded all brigades except for those positioned in the southern Gaza city of Rafah.

However, these figures are disputed, with Hamas initially refuting reports of 6,000 casualties within their ranks.

In the Eye of the Storm: Al-Qassam Brigades’ Situation

Asharq Al-Awsat has tried to shed light on the state of the al-Qassam Brigades using insights from informed Palestinian sources and field reports from Gaza.

According to these sources, Israel has failed to target leaders Mohammed Deif and Marwan Issa, who are top on the assassination list.

They also haven’t been able to reach leaders of the Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Gaza brigades. Meanwhile, Israel has successfully assassinated leaders from other brigades, along with many frontline fighters.

Sources mentioned that precise figures regarding casualties among al-Qassam Brigades couldn’t be provided.

However, they confirmed Israel's success in targeting the group’s leaders and other activists, sometimes through massacres targeting their families. These sources also questioned Israel’s reported figures, suggesting they were misleading.

According to available information, Israel has so far succeeded in assassinating two of al-Qassam Brigades’ leaders: Ayman Nawfal, commander of the central brigade, and Ahmed al-Ghandour, commander of the northern brigade, who was killed along with four other field leaders.

Ayman Siyam, commander of the rocket unit in al-Qassam Brigades, and other officials in Hamas’ military wing, such as Wael Rajab, Rafat Salman, Ibrahim al-Bayari, and Wissam Farhat, have also been targeted.

Despite details about lower-level leaders being currently unavailable, sources confirmed that many have been killed in assassinations, operations, and clashes.

Al-Qassam Brigades: A Flexible Structure

The al-Qassam Brigades once had divisions, battalions, and other units totaling up to 30,000 before the current Gaza conflict erupted.

According to Asharq Al-Awsat sources, the group’s structure is highly adaptable, even during communication blackouts with leadership. In such cases, deputies are appointed to each commander’s position.

The al-Qassam Brigades have an integrated military system, with five brigades: Northern, Gaza, Central, Khan Yunis, and Rafah.

Each brigade has several battalions, factions, and military formations.

Thousands of fighters have been trained by instructors, some of whom received military training outside Gaza, in places like Lebanon, Iran, and Syria.

Israel says al-Qassam Brigades has 24 military battalions, a claim supported by Asharq Al-Awsat sources.

Each battalion has between 600 to 1200 fighters, organized into brigades, factions, and formations. While the exact number of fighters isn’t clear, al-Qassam Brigades’ recent focus has been on recruiting young people.

Before the war, estimates suggest that al-Qassam Brigades numbered between 25,000 to 30,000 fighters.

Their structure includes various specialized units within each brigade, such as military judiciary, manufacturing, monitoring, combat support, intelligence, and more.

Although they lost some capabilities during the current conflict due to Israel neutralizing many tunnels and hiding spots, fighters in al-Qassam Brigades still display strong combat abilities in ongoing clashes in Gaza.

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25 Years of Unanswered Questions in Iraq

A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)
A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)
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25 Years of Unanswered Questions in Iraq

A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)
A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)

People in Iraq often wonder dejectedly: What if Saddam Hussein were alive and ruling the country today? Many will reply with fantastical answers, but Saddam’s era would have responded: Iraq is isolated, either by siege or by a war that he launched or was being waged against him.

Many people cast doubt on whether actual change has been achieved in Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. The invasion ousted the Baath version of Iraq and Saddam was executed in December 2006, leaving questions to pile up over the years with no one having any answers.

After a quarter century, Iraq is accumulating questions. It casts them aside and forges ahead without addressing them. At best, it reviews itself and returns to that moment in April 2003 when the US launched its invasion. Or it asks new questions about the 2005 civil war, the armed alternatives that emerged in 2007, how ISIS swept through the country in 2014, or the wave of protests that erupted in 2019. It also asks new questions about Iran’s influence in the country that has persisted for decades.

The questions are many and none of the Iraqis have answered them.

A US marine wraps the American flag around the head of a Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad. (Reuters file)

Saddam and the alternative

The September 11, 2001, attacks shook the United States and the entire world. They struck fear in Baghdad. Saddam had that year claimed that he had written a book, “The Fortified Castle”, about an Iraqi soldier who is captured by Iran. He manages to escape and return to Iraq to “fortify the castle”.

The terrifying Saddam and the terrified Iraqis have long spun tales about escaping to and from Iraq. It is a journey between the question and the non-answers. That year, when Baghdad was accused of being complicit in the 9/11 attacks, Saddam’s son Uday was “elected” member of the Baath party’s leadership council. The move sparked debate about possible change in Iraq. Bashar al-Assad had a year earlier inherited the presidency of Syria and its Baath party from his father Hafez.

The US invaded Iraq two years later and a new Iraq was born. Twenty-five years later, the country is still not fully grown up. Twenty-one years ago, on April 9, 2003, a US marine wrapped the head of a Saddam statue in Baghdad with an American flag. The Iraqis asked: why didn’t you leave us this iconic image, but instead of an American flag, used an Iraqi one?

Baghdad’s question and Washington’s answer

As the Iraqis observe the developments unfold in Syris with the ouster of Bashar from power, they can’t help but ask how this rapid “change” could have been possible without US tanks and weapons. Why are the Syrians insisting on celebrating “freedom” every day? They are also astonished at the Syrians who scramble to greet Abu Mohammed al-Golani, who has not yet managed to put this image behind him and fully assume his original identity of Ahmed al-Sharaa. The Iraqis wonder how the Syrians are managing this transition so far without a bloodbath.

They ask these questions because the Iraqis view and judge the world based on their own memories. They keep asking questions and await answers from others instead of themselves.

The Iraqis recall how in August 2003, after four months of US occupation, that the Jordanian embassy and United Nations offices were attacked, leaving several staff dead, including head of the UN mission Sergio de Mello. The Americans arrested Ali Hassan al-Majid, or “chemical Ali”, Saddam’s cousin, and 125 people were killed in a bombing in al-Najaf, including Shiite cleric Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim.

During that bloody month, the Iraqis asked questions about security, forgetting about Saddam’s alternative, democracy and the promised western model. Later, the facts would answer that the question of security was a means to escape questions about transitional justice.

Sergio de Mello (r) and Paul Bremmer (second right) attend the inaugural meeting of the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad on July 13, 2003. (Getty Images)

The question of civil war

Paul Bremer, the American ruler of Iraq, once escorted four opposition figures to Saddam’s prison cell. They flooded him with questions. Adnan al-Pachachi, a veteran diplomat, asked: “Why did you invade Kuwait?” Adel Abdul Mahdi, a former prime minister, asked: “Why did you kill the Kurds in the Anfal massacre?” Mowaffak al-Rubaie, a former national security adviser, asked: “Why did you kill your Baath comrades?” Ahmed al-Halabi simply insulted the former president. Saddam recoiled and then just smiled.

Saddam’s opponents left the prison cell with answers that should have helped them in running the transitional justice administration, but they failed.

The following year, Washington appointed Ayad Allawi to head the interim Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) that had limited jurisdiction so that it could be free to wage two fierce battles: one in Najaf against the “Mahdi Army”, headed by Moqtada al-Sadr, and the other against armed groups comprised of “resistance fighters” and “extremists” in Fallujah.

The opposition in the IGC got to work that was already prepared by the Americans. They outlined the distribution of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds in the country, with historic questions about the majority and minority, and the “oppressed” now assuming rule after the ouster of the “oppressors”.

On the ground, the Ghazaliya neighborhood in western Baghdad with its Shiite and Sunni residents was in store for a bloodbath. On a winter night in 2005, an entire family was massacred and an enfant strangled to death. Soon after, lines drawing the Shiite and Sunni sections of the neighborhood emerged. The popular market became the tense border between the two halves. Two new rival “enemies” traded attacks, claiming several lives.

In Baghdad’s Green Zone, the IGC drew up a draft of the transitional rule. In January 2005, 8 million Iraqis voted for the establishment of a National Assembly.

Meanwhile, different “armies” kept on emerging in Baghdad. The media was filled with the death tolls of bloody relentless sectarian attacks. Checkpoints manned by masked gunmen popped up across the capital.

Those days seemed to answer the question of “who was the alternative to Saddam.” No one needed a concrete answer because the developments spoke for themselves.

Nouri al-Maliki came to power as prime minister in 2006. He famously declared: “I am the state of law” - in both the figurative and literal sense. Iraqis believed he had answers about the “state” and “law”, dismissing the very pointed “I” in his “manifesto”.

Nouri al-Maliki. (Getty Images)

The Maliki question

The American admired Maliki. Then Vice President Dick Cheney had repeatedly declared that he was committed to the establishment of a stable Iraq. Before that however, he had dispatched James Steele - who was once complicit in running dirty wars in El Salvador in the mid-1980s - to Baghdad to confront the “Sunni rebellion”. Steele set up the Shiite “death squads”. Steele was the man in the shadows behind Ahmed Kazim, then interior minister undersecretary, and behind him stood the new warlords.

In 2006, the political process was shaken by the bombing of the Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra. Questions were asked about the “need” to draw up new maps. Shiite high authority Ali al-Sistani said in February 2007 that the Sunnis were not involved in the attack. In July 2013, Maliki denied an American accusation that Tehran was behind it.

In those days, Maliki’s ego was growing ever bigger, and Steele’s death squads were rapidly growing greater in numbers.

The Iran and ISIS questions

Maliki tried to save himself as one city after another fell into the hands of ISIS. On June 9, 2014, as ISIS was waging battles in Mosul, Maliki met with senior Sunni tribal elders based on advice he had not heeded earlier and which could have averted the current disaster.

It was said that he made reluctant pledges to them and a third of Iraq later fell in ISIS’ hands. Sistani later issued a fatwa for “jihad” against the group, which later turned out not be aimed at saving the premier.

Maliki left the scene and Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force, took over. Successive prime ministers would know from then on what it is like to be shackled by Tehran’s pressure as IRGC officials made regular visits to their offices.

Soleimani reaped what Steele sowed. By 2017, armed factions were the dominant force in Iraq. Running in their orbit were other factions that took turns in “rebelling” against the government or agreeing with its choices.

Today, and after 14 years, Iran has consolidated what can be described as the “resistance playground” in Iraq that is teeming with armed factions and massive budgets.

Protesters in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square in October 2019. (AFP)

The October question

The Iraqis were unable to answer the ISIS question and the armed factions claimed “victory” against the group. Many ignored Sistani’s “answer” about whether the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) was there to protect Iraq or just its Shiites.

Exhausted Iraqis asked: “What next?”

Next came Adel Abdul Mahdi’s government in October 2018. It was weighed down by unanswered questions and a year later, thousands of youths took to the streets to protest the state of affairs in Iraq, specifically the dominance of armed groups.

They were met with live bullets. Many were abducted and others were silenced. Abdul Mehdi acquitted the killers, saying instead that a “fifth column” had carried out the bloody crackdown on protesters.

After he left office, some Iraqi politicians were brave enough to tell the truth, dismissing former PM’s acquittal and pinning blame on the factions.

Sistani called for PMF members to quit their partisan affiliations. His demand was left unheeded. Mustafa al-Qadhimi became prime minister in May 2020. He left office months later, also failing in resolving the issue of the PMF and armed factions.

By 2022, everyone had left the scene, but Iran remained, claiming the Iraqi crown for itself, controlling everything from its finances to its weapons.

Question about post-Assad Syria

On December 8, Syria’s Bashar fled the country. Everyone in Iraq is asking what happens next. The whole system in Iraq is at a loss: Do we wait for how Tehran will deal with Ahmed al-Sharaa, or do we ask Abu Mohammed al-Golani about his memories in Iraq?

The Iraqi people’s memories are what’s ruling the country, more so than the constitution, political parties and civil society because they are burdened with questions they don’t want to answer.

And yet they ask: What if we weren’t part of the “Axis of Resistance”? Iraq’s history would reply that it has long been part of axes, or either awaiting a war or taking part in them.