Votel to Asharq Al-Awsat: US Deterred Iran in Iraq, Syria… It Could in Yemen

A handout photo made available by German Armed Forces shows a C-130 of the bi-national German-French squadron “Rhein/Rhin” drops relief supplies over the Gaza Strip, 16 March 2024. (EPA/Sherifa Kaestner / German Armed Forces / Handout)
A handout photo made available by German Armed Forces shows a C-130 of the bi-national German-French squadron “Rhein/Rhin” drops relief supplies over the Gaza Strip, 16 March 2024. (EPA/Sherifa Kaestner / German Armed Forces / Handout)
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Votel to Asharq Al-Awsat: US Deterred Iran in Iraq, Syria… It Could in Yemen

A handout photo made available by German Armed Forces shows a C-130 of the bi-national German-French squadron “Rhein/Rhin” drops relief supplies over the Gaza Strip, 16 March 2024. (EPA/Sherifa Kaestner / German Armed Forces / Handout)
A handout photo made available by German Armed Forces shows a C-130 of the bi-national German-French squadron “Rhein/Rhin” drops relief supplies over the Gaza Strip, 16 March 2024. (EPA/Sherifa Kaestner / German Armed Forces / Handout)

The dire humanitarian situation in Gaza constitutes a major point of contention between the United States and Israel, General Joseph Votel, the former commander of the US Central Command, said in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, adding that Israel has eliminated 20 to 30 percent of Hamas so far.  

The four-star General said that the Houthis attacks against navigation in the Red Sea have become a “major problem.” He suggested an increase in the assets of the U.S. military in the region to make it “extremely painful” for the Houthis and Iran, to stop their attacks against the ships and international navigation in the Red Sea, noting that the United States recently “deterred” Iran from continuing its militia attacks in both Iraq and Syria against American forces and interests in the region.  

Votel said he believes that “there is no interest’ for Israel or Hezbollah in a full confrontation. He also expressed "concern" about the ongoing discussions regarding the withdrawal of American forces stationed in Iraq, which could also affect the presence of the US forces in Syria.  

Here is the full interview:  

* Let me start from the situation in Gaza, because the President tried to arrange for some ceasefire during Ramadan. Apparently, it's not the case. And probably that would have some implications from the military perspective, including on the US forces in the region. Your insights, please.  

I think everybody can agree that Israel needs to do what it needs to do to protect itself from the threat of Hamas, but I think a large part of the disagreement from our government standpoint is that the military operation does not seem to take into consideration the extreme humanitarian situation that is playing out on the ground.  

Nearly 80-90 percent of the population of Gaza has been displaced by this conflict, and a military operation while necessary, must also take place in the context of planning and coordinating and synchronizing with the humanitarian community to ensure that we don't we don't exacerbate the humanitarian situation and make things worse than they already are. So, I think this has been the major sticking point between the United States government and the government of Israel toward coming operations particularly in the southern part of Gaza in and around Rafah.  

Humanitarian challenge  

*If you were in the same position you were previously, and had the President needed your advice on the situation, what would say?

I think that some of the actions that we’ve seen by the administration reflects some of the advice that would be provided. For example, one of the things that I would try to emphasize is that we should do those things that are within our capacity to do, like delivering aid by air or by the sea. That's an appropriate thing for us to do. It helps demonstrate that we are attuned to the humanitarian situation, and we are trying to take measures to remedy it, and hopefully these means will provide a way to perhaps address the broader challenge of humanitarian issues in Gaza.

I think secondly, it's important to make sure that we are maintaining very good communications, not just with the Israelis, but with our other partners on the region, and across the region, to make sure that we are sharing best insights and then we are preserving relationships going forward. I am concerned that some of the political discourse that is taking place could be affecting some of the effectiveness of our military to military or intelligence community to intelligence community relationships. So, those are very important.  

Third, I would be encouraging the administration to be stronger against those activities that are outside of the Gaza area, for example, what's happening in the Red Sea. This has become a big problem.   

Not enough  

*While the US is trying to make some arrangements for humanitarian aid either by air or by sea, humanitarian organizations and the UN are saying that this is not enough to prevent famine. After five months of war, what has Benjamin Netanyahu have achieved other than this humanitarian crisis and the destruction of the strip?

I agree that airdrops of humanitarian food supplies are not going to be enough to address the problem. They are a start, and they will address some small portion of the problem. But again, the most effective way of addressing humanitarian situation will be to open up ground lines of communication, ground routes with non-government organizations, UN organizations, other humanitarian aid organizations who can be on the ground to distribute and make sure these materials get to the people that are needed, and can assess the progress we're making. So yes, I do agree what we are doing while it's necessary, it's insufficient to the to the need.

The over the shore option that we're not looking at for bringing up aid through a temporary port has the potential to have more impact. But again, it is just one other way of getting things in there. And there needs to be much more effort put into getting the right organizations on the ground to make sure the aid gets to where it is most needed. I agree with you that it is a humanitarian disaster.  

As to the leader of Israel, Mr. Netanyahu, my own personal opinion here is that what would they have accomplished so far, is they have removed a significant, or at least a good portion of Hamas' ability to effectively attack into Israel. They have neutralized a percentage of the of the Hamas fighters. I've seen estimates 20 to 30 percent.  

*Would you advise the President to put more pressure on Israel in order to try to alleviate this humanitarian disaster? This would have some military implications because the US is the main provider of arms to Israel.

I'm not sure I'm there on making a decision to stop providing all support to Israel. I'm not sure I'm there on that, or I would recommend that. I think the United States is putting a lot of pressure on the Israeli government, on the Prime Minister in particular. I mean War Cabinet Minister Benny Ganz was in Washington last week, and met with a number of our national leaders here. The President by the day has become more strident and more critical of the approach that the Netanyahu government is taking, to how they're conducting operations in Gaza.

I think it's important to keep that pressure up to try to change that. But I also think the United States has to continue to work, to connect all the different parties here, whether it is Hamas and in Israel to try to come to some kind of temporary or permanent ceasefire or some resolution of the hostage situation, or continuing to open up easier ways to get humanitarian aid into the people of Gaza. I think these are three areas where the United States should be continuing to push, and continuing to put pressure not just on Israel, but on Hamas and the backers of Hamas as well. I think it's important to make sure that we are putting equal pressure in all directions here.

Resistance Axis

*On the regional, or probably international dimensions of this conflict in the Red Sea. It seems to me, and probably this is silly to say, that the Houthis are happy that they are fighting America.

I think this is true. So far, the Houthis have derived more benefit by perpetrating these attacks than they have felt the effects of the pressure that we’ve put on them. While there have been a number of strikes that we have conducted and the British have conducted against coastal defense sites, against supply depots, against command and control nodes, they have not been to a level that has convinced the Houthis that they have more to lose than they have to gain by continuing to push these attacks and conduct these attacks. We've just seen waves and waves of them just over this last weekend, a lot of them launched at US military vessels that are operating in the Red Sea.  

So until we are able to do something that convinces the Houthis that the cost of continuing to have to take these attacks or launch these attacks, the cost associated that outweighs the benefit, they will likely continue to do this. And they are deriving a benefit from this. They are there in the news. They have had a significant impact on global shipping through the Red Sea; somewhere between 80 and 90 percent of it has stopped.  

They're being viewed as a group that is standing up against the United States and other Western powers, and they're being seen as a very good and loyal member of Iran's Axis of Resistance. So right now, all of these things are more beneficial to them than the cost associated with the strikes that we have done against them. So we either have to ramp things up and really go after this, and make it very painful for them and Iran who is supporting them, or we have to live with the fact that we're going to deal with these threats for a long time, for until the situation in Gaza is resolved.

*What is your main concern on the situation in the Red Sea for the time being?

 My main answer is that we have to go after the supplier routes and facilitation routes that are continuing to provide the Houthis with all the materials that they have. They’ve been getting these materials for years. So, they have a large supply on the ground. So, while we destroy some things, it's relatively easily replaced. If we want to stop this, we have to cut them off. And we have to go after those facilitators largely at the best of Iran, who are bringing materials into that country. We need to prevent them from doing that. And then in conjunction with our ongoing strike campaign, reduce their ability to launch these attacks. I think that's what we have to do. So that will require more resources. It'll require more focus, it'll likely require more combat to do that.  

These are all things that our government would weigh in when making a decision like this. But in order to address this effectively, we will have to commit more resources, and take more effort to shut this down completely, not just protect ourselves. Just shut down the ability of the Houthis to conduct these types of attacks.

Israel and Hezbollah

*And that might risk the US slipping into a war…

Well, it could. It would certainly require us to deploy more resources into the region that would draw get away from other things that are important to us, and likely could get us involved in more of a protracted conflict with the Houthis or, you know, maybe with Iran over something like this or others in the region. There are definitely risks that are associated with this, and as you know, there's risks involved in everything.  

*Another hot point is the border between Israel and Lebanon. And it's just simmering there, and we don't know what's going to happen in the in the near future, if the Gaza war doesn't stop.

My assessment is that both sides in this case the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli government, neither of them want to have a confrontation along the northern border. That's in no one's interests. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah certainly remembers what happened there the last time when there was an Israeli incursion into Lebanon. The amount of destruction that resulted in, and the pressure that was put on him from the rest of the Lebanese government, and the broader population largely because of the policies that he was pursuing. There is no strong desire to do that.  

That said, Hezbollah will continue to hedge their bets, and they will continue to conduct harassing attacks to make it difficult for Israeli citizens to come back into their homes near the border, and that will continue to put more pressure on Netanyahu. They see it in their interest to continue to launch a few strikes here, a few strikes there, that aren’t overly effective, but which are constant reminders that Lebanese Hezbollah can impact things in Israel.  

It's important that we try to get this back to more of a status quo, where there are very few attacks across the border, and people can go back to living their lives in these areas. I don't know that there's going to be a particularly big breakthrough politically here. I think the best case would be going back to the status quo to the situation before October 7.

*Israel wants Hezbollah to be pushed away from the border.

That's unlikely to happen as well.

*On Syria and Iraq, the US Army posture in both countries and the ramifications of what's going on in Gaza, what do you think?

We've absorbed a lot of attacks here from Iranian allied militias in both Iraq and Syria. That seems to have dropped off since we conducted a series of strikes several weeks ago.

I think Iran has seen that they are vulnerable in this area, and they have recognized that they have a lot to lose by continuing to push these attacks and in potentially put more American lives at risk in the in the region. I think we've been successful in beginning to deter that and trying to return it to a more normal situation. I am concerned about the ongoing discussions that are taking place in Iraq, and to some degree with the United States over the disposition of US troops in Iraq.  

It's my personal view that those troops, about 2,500 or so, that are in Iraq for the purpose of helping the Iraqi security forces with the remnants of ISIS are doing good work, doing important work for Iraq, and important work for the United States. I am concerned that these discussions may lead to the departure of US forces, and as a result, less of a focus on ISIS and other terrorist organizations that may arise in the region. I think the conditions are still around that would allow an organization to do what ISIS did and rise and come back.  

I think the role of the United States plan is helping prevent that right now. I'm concerned that if we have to depart, that becomes much, much more difficult to do, and that raises the risk for the region. Departing from Iraq will have an impact on our troops in Syria as well. They derive a lot of their support from our bases in Iraq and if those are gone, then it will be very difficult to sustain, or we will have to find new ways to sustain our troops and in Syria. There could be some effects in that country as well.

Edge of the abyss

*No matter how you look at the map or the picture in the region; Gaza, Yemen, Red Sea, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, you’d see Iran somehow in the picture. And you right on saying that the US strikes a few weeks ago were kind of effective in deterring Iran. Is that the way that Iran should be dealt with in order to try to contain the mayhem in the Middle East?

The best approach to creating a more stable situation in the Middle East, of course, is diplomatic relations, and opening ties and communication between different parts of the region. The United States has had some efforts in the past to try to reach out to the Iranians; we did this through the nuclear discussion talks that took place.  

Again, we had some different policies in our government that contributed to some of the confusion around this as well. But I think what's important for the long term is that the United States has to take a sustainable approach to the region. We have to be willing to commit some amount of military force to the region to look after our security interest. But more importantly, we have to make sure we're putting in the diplomatic informational and economic aspects into the region that better also as the as equally important as the military one is.  

We’ve got to foster conversations, we've got to foster discussions, we've got to change the nature of the discussion, from one of Iran against the United States, to one of how do we bring Iran into the region effectively. They’ve been around a long time. They are historic country in this part of the region. Their role should be one that is more constructive for the region. And that's only going to be done through diplomatic discourse between the various parties there. We've got to continue to emphasize all that. We've got to be willing to stick with it, and start to address some of these long-term underlying issues of the region.

I mean, we're seeing right now the whole Palestinian issue that has erupted now as a result of an underlying issue that we've known about for decades, we've known as a problem. And now it has come to the head, and it's now brought the region back to the brink. So if there's one good thing that comes out of this, perhaps it is that we can, from this move forward on some way to address the status and the situation of the Palestinians in the Middle East for the long term here. The United States obviously has a policy of the two-state solution, but we have to move forward and address some of these deep underlying tensions and issues of the region, and we need to do it before a crisis arises. 



Field Escalation in Lebanon as Israel Seeks to Entrench Security Belt Ahead of Washington Talks

A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)
A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)
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Field Escalation in Lebanon as Israel Seeks to Entrench Security Belt Ahead of Washington Talks

A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)
A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)

The map published by the Israeli army showing the areas where its forces are deployed in south Lebanon has raised questions about the implications of the US-Iranian agreement, as military operations continue and the issues of withdrawal and redeployment remain tied to anticipated Lebanese-Israeli negotiations in Washington.

While Israel speaks of a “security zone” inside Lebanese territory, Israeli army spokesman Avichay Adraee said Israeli forces are deployed “based on operational necessity” within an area extending roughly 10 kilometers into Lebanon, with the aim of removing what he described as threats and improving the defense of residents in northern Israel.

On the ground, two people were killed and another wounded in an Israeli drone strike that targeted a vehicle at the Kfar Tebnit roundabout. Drones also struck Hadatha without causing casualties, while another drone dropped a bomb on Beit Yahoun, wounding two people. An Israeli drone also dropped a stun grenade on a family inside a house in Nabatieh al-Fawqa near the teachers’ college.

Artillery shelling struck the outskirts of Nabatieh al-Fawqa, while the Israeli army carried out bulldozing operations in Khiam.

As Lebanese army troops and members of the Al-Risala Health Emergency Association entered Hadatha, Israeli forces opened fire toward civilians and Lebanese soldiers in the town. Villages in the eastern sector and the Marjayoun district remained relatively calm compared with other parts of southern Lebanon.

A field source in south Lebanon told Asharq Al-Awsat that the map “effectively reflects an attempt to impose a new reality on the ground following the US-Iranian understanding by treating vast areas of south Lebanon as zones under Israeli security and military control.”

The source said the boundaries shown on the map extend beyond what is known in some places as the “Yellow Line” and include areas where the Israeli army was unable to establish a permanent presence during the war, such as Ali al-Taher Hill and the southeastern outskirts of Hadatha.

The source noted that the Lebanese army is deployed inside Hadatha itself, while Israeli forces continue attempting to advance toward the surrounding high ground.

According to the source, “including these areas on the Israeli map has heightened residents’ fears and slowed the return of displaced people to Nabatieh and its surroundings.”

The concern, the source added, extends beyond Nabatieh city to include Dweir, Jibshit, Harouf, Zebdine, Mifadoun, Shoukine, Kfar Tebnit and Nabatieh al-Fawqa. These areas still lack basic living conditions, while near-daily artillery shelling continues, prompting many residents to delay their return.

The source said, “The boundaries Israel is drawing today closely resemble those that existed before its withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, stretching from the western sector through the central sector and into large parts of the eastern sector toward Khiam.”

Israel did not include in its current map some areas it previously occupied as far as the outskirts of Jezzine, the source said. In practice, however, it has treated the entire western and central sectors, together with the highlands extending east of Nabatieh toward the Marjayoun-Khiam axis, as falling within its security sphere of control.

The source said the most significant outcome of the period following the US-Iranian understanding has been Israel’s effort to draw what it described as “occupation boundaries” and establish them as a fait accompli on the ground by effectively turning these areas into an undeclared security belt.

According to the source, the line Israel is seeking to consolidate runs through the central sector along the Bint Jbeil and Wadi al-Salouqi axes, reaching Hadatha, Baraachit and Beit Yahoun.

Although Israeli forces are not physically deployed inside these towns, the source said they are treated as part of an advanced security zone and a new line of contact in south Lebanon.

No Signs of Israeli Withdrawal

Retired Brig. Gen. Bassam Yassin told Asharq Al-Awsat that the US-Iranian agreement has not yet translated into any tangible changes on the ground in south Lebanon.

The situation on the ground, he said, still reflects continued Israeli deployment in the areas under its control, while issues related to withdrawal and post-war arrangements remain under discussion in negotiations currently taking place in Washington.

Yassin said the map recently published by the Israeli army suggests that Israel views the areas it marked as territory under its military control, “as though it is saying these areas are under Israeli occupation, should not be approached, and that any movement within them will be treated as a security threat.”

He said one of the most important of these areas is Ali al-Taher. Many people, he noted, reduce it to a hill or small elevation, “when in fact Ali al-Taher is a mountain ridge extending between three and four kilometers from the area around Kfar Tebnit toward Kfar Rumman. Including large parts of it in what Israel considers an area under its control therefore carries important operational implications.”

“The Israeli occupation is currently consolidating the positions where it is deployed, while attempts to advance toward Ali al-Taher are still continuing,” he said.

Artillery and rocket fire in the Nabatieh area has also continued in recent weeks, he added, stressing that “there are still no real indications of Israeli withdrawals, contrary to what some believe.”

Yassin said the issues related to an Israeli withdrawal, redeployment or the deployment of the Lebanese army “are not decided on the ground but are being discussed within the framework of ongoing Lebanese meetings and negotiations in Washington.”

Any talk of withdrawal or new arrangements, he added, “remains premature at this stage.”

No Withdrawal

Meanwhile, Israel’s Channel 14 reported that “the future of the Israeli deployment in south Lebanon will be discussed during negotiations with the Lebanese side in Washington.”

Israel’s public broadcaster also reported that the issue of withdrawing from positions where Israeli forces remain deployed inside Lebanon will be raised during the next round of negotiations.

Yedioth Ahronoth reported that “the Israeli army has demanded that it retain a buffer zone inside south Lebanon while insisting on the dismantling of weapons in the south.”


Defections Shake Sudan’s RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance

Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)
Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)
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Defections Shake Sudan’s RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance

Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)
Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)

The resignation of Fares al-Nur, a senior figure in the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis), from all his posts in the Rapid Support Forces and the political bloc backing it has revived questions about a wave of defections from the force in recent months and what they may mean for its military and political cohesion.

The move comes as Sudan’s war enters its fourth year with no clear sign that either side is close to a decisive military victory.

Al-Nur told Asharq Al-Awsat on Wednesday that he had left all positions of responsibility within the RSF and Tasis. He said he acted because of what he described as a deepening political deadlock, the continuation of the war and the vast humanitarian suffering it has caused.

He said his resignation was intended to open space for a broad Sudanese dialogue that brings together different parties, away from political and military polarization, and helps reach a settlement to end the crisis.

The importance of the step lies not only in al-Nur’s position inside the alliance, but also in its nature. He is not a battlefield commander with troops on the ground.

He is instead viewed as one of the most prominent political figures associated with the project that the RSF sought to build alongside its military campaign. That gives his resignation political weight beyond any immediate military effect.

Al-Nur was a member of the Tasis presidential council and had been appointed “governor of Khartoum Region” in the parallel government announced by the alliance. He had previously served for years as an adviser to RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and was one of the most prominent members of the RSF negotiating delegation at the 2023 Jeddah talks.

What makes this different?

This type of departure differs from earlier splits within the RSF over the past two years. Most of those involved were field commanders with military influence or fighters on the ground.

In May, Bashara al-Huweira, who was responsible for military operations on the Bara axis in North Kordofan State, announced his defection from the RSF. Before him, field commander Al-Nour Adam, known as Al-Nour al-Qubba, said he had withdrawn from the RSF and joined the Sudanese army after his forces left their positions in North Darfur.

Before them all, Abu Aqla Keikal, one of the RSF’s most prominent commanders and the governor of Gezira State while it was under RSF control, announced his cooperation with the Sudanese army.

File photo showing the defecting commander Abu Aqla Keikal (third from left) with Rapid Support Forces elements before joining the army.

That was seen as one of the most consequential defections because of his influence in central Sudan. Most recently, field commander Ali Rizq Allah, known as Al-Savannah, announced his defection and joined the Sudanese Armed Forces.

The political and military weight of these figures varies. But the pace of defections over a short period has raised a sharper question: do they point to growing pressure inside the RSF camp, or are they still individual moves that do not affect the force’s core structure?

The RSF has tried to project a different picture. In recent days, it broadcast video clips that it said, according to its Telegram platform, showed groups from the Joint Force of armed movements allied with the army joining its ranks.

The message was clear: movement between the camps is not going in one direction only.

Such messages are part of a propaganda and media war running alongside the fighting, with each side trying to prove its cohesion and its ability to attract leaders and fighters.

Shartai Samir, a prominent RSF supporter on social media, played down the importance of Fares al-Nur’s departure. He said the political and military project represented by Tasis had moved beyond individuals, and that the departure of leaders or groups would not affect its continuity.

He also said the developments were part of attempts to attract political and military figures from the RSF camp after its opponents, as he put it, failed to achieve their goals militarily.

But the key question is not how many people leave. It is what effect they have.

Political researcher Mohamed Latif says it is important to distinguish between political and military defections.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sudanese politics has seen repeated splits inside parties and alliances over many decades, but that they have rarely produced a radical shift in the balance of power.

Latif said most political splits are driven by personal disputes or ambitions rather than ideological or programmatic differences. For that reason, their impact often remains limited.

He said the impact of “military defections” is measured by how far they affect a party’s fighting strength or geographical deployment. In his view, most of the defections from the RSF in the recent period have not had a tangible effect on its basic military structure or its main areas of influence.

That is why he said he did not expect the departure of Fares al-Nur, as a political and civilian figure, to have a major impact on the cohesion of the Tasis alliance.

But not everyone agrees with that assessment.

Commander Al-Savannah, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces, speaking at a press conference in Khartoum (Sudan News Agency/SUNA)

Retired Brigadier General Dr. Jamal al-Shaheed, a strategic expert specializing in security and military affairs, says defections should not be judged by the announcement alone, but by their practical effects on the ground.

Al-Shaheed told Asharq Al-Awsat that defections become significant when they reach middle-ranking and field commanders, or political figures with organizational and social influence. Such figures, he said, are the link between the top leadership and the base.

“The indicators that should be monitored are not limited to the number of defectors, but include whether the phenomenon continues and expands, and its impact on internal discipline, the ability to recruit and mobilize, and the maintenance of field deployments,” he said.

According to al-Shaheed, the decisive test is ultimately military performance.

If defections are accompanied by battlefield retreats, the loss of areas of influence, or a weaker ability to carry out coordinated operations, then they move from being a political or media event to a factor affecting the balance of the conflict.

The retired military expert points to earlier experiences of Sudanese armed movements during the civil war in southern Sudan and the Darfur conflict. Some defections yielded no meaningful strategic results, while others weakened entire factions by stripping them of influential leaders and undermining their organizational cohesion.

All of this raises a broader question about the future of the war itself.

RSF supporters say the latest defections are no more than individual moves that will not affect their political and military project. Others argue that their repetition warrants close attention as a sign of internal pressures and challenges that may extend beyond individuals to the organizational structure itself.

So far, there is no evidence that defections between the parties to the war can, on their own, change the course of the conflict or force a political settlement.

But their persistence and spread among military and political figures make them a phenomenon worth watching in a long, open-ended war. Its final outcome still depends on what the battlefield reveals in the coming months, and on whether the warring parties can preserve both military and political cohesion.


US Issues Sanctions on Hezbollah-linked Targets

A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
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US Issues Sanctions on Hezbollah-linked Targets

A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir

Washington has issued new "counter ‌terrorism" ‌sanctions ​targeting ‌individuals ⁠and entities ​linked to ⁠Lebanon’s ‌Hezbollah, details ‌posted ​to ‌the US‌ Treasury Department's ‌website on Thursday showed.

It announced sanctions against several Lebanese officials it said were aligned with Hezbollah and members of the sanctioned ⁠Alaa Hassan Hamieh ⁠business network for obstructing Lebanon’s peace process and delaying the disarmament of Hezbollah.

The Treasury said its Office of Foreign Assets Control was also designating individuals in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, who it said were raising ⁠funds ⁠and operating front companies to generate revenue for Hezbollah, an Iran-backed militant group.