Damascus-Tehran Amid Inconsistencies And Possibilities

Storms surround Syria, and some have hit neighboring countries. The latter have felt the impact domestically: Türkiye, its neighbor to the north, Iraq to the east, Jordan to the south, and Lebanon to the west. The storms have also hit Israel, as can be seen in the struggle between Benjamin Netanyahu's government and its rivals, as well as the repercussions of its ongoing assault on the Palestinians.
Storms have encircled the Eastern Mediterranean as Israel wages its war on Gaza, which has spread to South Lebanon as Israel and Hezbollah engage in skirmishes that could escalate into a full-scale war at any moment. The Iranian-Israeli conflict has shifted after Iran had avoided direct retaliation to Israeli strikes against Iran and its allies in Syria for years. We saw a tit-for-tat following Israel’s attacks on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, with Iran going into a frenzy and launching hundreds of drones and missiles without achieving tangible results, and Israel responding with a strike on Isfahan airport. However, both sides have set new rules of engagement that could prevent a full-scale, albeit for a brief period.
Naturally, Syria has not been left unscathed by the storms hitting Syria’s neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean. Regional conflicts have had profound ramifications on domestic developments. The repercussions are only increasing, aggravating the challenges facing this country that has been home to an array of conflicts over the past thirteen years. Syria, given the multifaceted challenges and dangers it faces, is in a more difficult position than any other country in the region. The situation is exacerbating, and the implications could go beyond threatening all aspects of life to end its future as a political entity and split the Syrian people.
The most prominent manifestation of this threat is the current territorial and demographic divisions in Syria. Setting aside the issue of refugees and assuming that many of them will return in the future, especially those in neighboring countries, the country has been split into three entities. Each of these three entities is under the de facto control of a different political actor:
The Syrian regime controls the coastal region and part of the center, including the main cities from north to south. The "Autonomous Administration" governs northeastern Syria, including parts of Al-Hasakah, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Aleppo. Then we have the Northwest, which includes Idlib and parts of rural Aleppo and Latakia; it is run by Türkiye and its local partners, the most prominent being the Syrian Interim Government of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, and the Salvation Government run by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which is led by the al-Qaeda figure Abu Mohammad al-Julani. None of these three regions have agreed to a shared political project, as each seeks to maintain control by any means necessary, making them beholden to regional and international powers.
Political, economic, social, and security conditions in the areas controlled by the de facto authorities are tied to this primary objective of maintaining power, which shapes the decisions and actions of all the de facto authorities. The conditions of the population in the regions whose interests they claim to represent are an afterthought. As a result, we have deeply repressive authorities mired in political deadlock failing to address economic-social crises, corruption, poverty, hunger, and lawlessness amid intense infighting among the rulers of all three regions.
While the Syrian regime is not the best of the de facto authorities, it has the strongest capabilities because it has seized what remains of the Syrian state. The regime uses its capacities to retain power, whatever the policies, methods, and outcomes that achieving this goal demands. This has given rise to unique relationships between Damascus and its Russian and Iranian allies. These allies are given benefits and opportunities in return for the political, military, and economic support they provide to ensure the regime’s continuity. These relationships have made the regime seem subordinate to Iran and Russia, rendering both occupying powers.
As domestic and external developments reshape the Damascus regime’s alliance with Tehran and Moscow, we have seen shifts that reflect disputes within the alliance. Some of these disagreements concern their joint presence in Syria and are tied to regional and international dimensions. Three examples of these developments are Russia's war in Ukraine, the recent shifts in the confrontation between Israel and Iran, and the Arab and global pressure on the Damascus regime to change its policies, particularly those pertaining to its stance on a political solution to the Syrian conflict and its relationships with Iran.
The three parties to this alliance, Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime, have taken steps and measures in response to these developments, and their actions escalated last year. The regime’s Russian and Iranian allies have reduced their support for the regime and begun demanding the repayment of debts owed to them, and they have objected to some of its policies. The Iranians have been particularly aggressive in their pursuit of expanding their presence and role in Syria, both with and without the regime's knowledge. They have developed strategies for long-term and deep entrenchment in Syria through various means, such as promoting Shia Islam, establishing Syrian militias loyal to the IRGC, securing Iranian routes from Iraq to the Syrian coast and into Lebanon through Damascus, and strengthening control over particularly sensitive areas, especially around Damascus.
These developments have angered factions within the Syrian regime and segments of its support base, leading to a deterioration of relations with its allies, particularly Iran. Iran's actions in Syria are being criticized, and the Syrian authorities have taken measures to restrict its movement in Syria. Moreover, some agreements between the two parties have not been implemented, and the regime has not been sufficiently concerned by Israel’s actions in Syria, which include the bombardment of Iranian bases, the assassination of Iranian officials, and the destruction of the consulate in Damascus. Additionally, traditional Iranian activities have been boycotted in Damascus, the most recent being “Quds Day.” The regime has also avoided taking strong positions regarding the Israeli war on Gaza and its repercussions.
The actions of the Damascus regime are being scrutinized by its allies, regardless of the aim behind them, be it to pressure these allies for more aid that would help the regime deal with its problems, or to court Arab and Western political actors, most notably the United States. While Russia, due to the nature of its presence and role in Syria, as well as the Ukraine war, might be less sensitive to these shifts, the same cannot be said for Iran. The strategic importance of Syria for Iran's regional strategy, the significant costs Iran has borne over the years, the objectives it has achieved, and the humiliation it has endured at the hands of Israel without retaliating. This all leaves Iran facing the challenge of confronting the actions of its ally, the Damascus regime, and Iran has many retaliatory options.